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ART. I. — *Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative.* Second Series. By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. vii., 362.

IN 1811 Sir William Herschel communicated to the Royal Society a paper in which he gave an exposition of his famous hypothesis of the transformation of nebulæ into stars. "Assuming a self-luminous substance of a highly attenuated nature to be distributed through the celestial regions, he endeavored to show that, by the mutual attraction of its constituent parts, it would have a tendency to form itself into distinct aggregations of nebulous matter, which in each case would gradually condense from the continued action of the attractive forces, until the resulting mass finally acquired the consistency of a solid body, and became a star. In those instances wherein the collection of nebulous matter was very extensive, subordinate centres of attraction could not fail to be established, around which the adjacent particles would arrange themselves; and thus the whole mass would in process of time be transformed into a determinate number of discrete bodies, which would ultimately assume the condition of a cluster of stars. Herschel pointed out various circumstances which appeared to him to afford just grounds for believing that such a nebulous substance existed independently in space. He maintained that the phenomena of nebulous stars, and the changes observable in the great nebula of Orion, could not be satisfactorily accounted for by any other hypothesis. Admitting, then, the existence of a nebulous substance, he concluded, from indications of milky nebulosity which he encountered in the course of his observations, that it was distributed in great abundance throughout the celestial regions. The vast collections of nebulæ which he had observed, of every variety of structure and in every stage of condensation, were employed by him with admirable address in illustrating the *modus operandi* of his hypothesis." *

Laplace, in his *Système du Monde*, applied this hypothesis, by an ingenious but simple use of mechanical principles, to the explanation of the origin of the planetary bodies, and of the general features of their movements in the solar system. Supposing the original nebulous mass to receive a rotatory motion by its aggregation, he showed that this motion would be quickened by a further contraction of the mass, until the centrifugal force of its equatorial regions would be sufficient to balance their gravitation, and to suspend them in the form of a vaporous ring. Again, supposing this revolving ring to be broken, and finally collected by a further aggregation into a spherical nebulous mass, he showed, in the same way, how the body of a planet, with its system of satellites, might be formed. The material and the original motions of the planets and their satellites could thus, he supposed, be successively produced, as the nebula gradually contracted to the dimensions of the sun.

No scientific theory has received a fairer treatment than the nebular hypothesis. Arising as it did as a speculative conclusion from one of the grandest inductions in the whole range of physical inquiry, — connecting as it does so many facts, though vaguely and inconclusively, into one system, — it possesses, what is rare in so bold and heterodox a view, a verisimilitude quite disproportionate to the real evidence which can be adduced in its support. The difficulties which ordinarily attend the reception of new ideas were in this case removed beforehand. The hypothesis violated no habitual association of ideas, at least among those who were at all competent to comprehend its import. Though resting on a much feebler support of direct evidence than the astronomical theories of

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* Grant's History of Physical Astronomy.

Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, it met with a cordial reception from its apparent accordance with certain preconceptions, of the same kind as those, which, though extrinsic and irrelevant to scientific inquiry, were able to oppose themselves successfully for a long time to the ascertained truths of modern astronomy.

The test of conceivableness, the receptivity of the imagination, is a condition, if not of truth itself, at least of belief in the truth; and in this respect the nebular hypothesis was well founded. It belonged to that class of theories of which it is sometimes said, "that, if they are not true, they *deserve* to be true." A place was already prepared for it in the imaginations and the speculative interests of the scientific world.

We propose to review briefly some of the conditions which have given so great a plausibility to this hypothesis. In the first place, on purely speculative grounds, this hypothesis, as a cosmological theory, happily combines the excellences of the two principal doctrines on the origin of the world that were held by the ancients, and which modern theorists have discussed as views which, though neither can be established scientifically, have no less interest from a theological point of view; — namely, first, the materialistic doctrine, that the world, though finite in the duration of its orderly successions and changes, is infinite in the duration of its material substance; and, secondly, the spiritualistic doctrine, that matter and form are equally the effects, finite in duration, of a spiritual and eternal cause.

At first sight the nebular hypothesis seems to agree most nearly with the materialistic cosmology, as taught by the greater number of the ancient philosophers; but the resemblance is only superficial, and, though the hypothesis possesses those qualities by which the ancient doctrine was suited to the limitations and requirements of the poetical imagination, yet it does not involve that element of fortuitous causation which gave to the ancient doctrine its atheistic character. In the nebular hypothesis the act of creation, though reduced to its simplest form, is still essentially the same as that which a spiritualistic cosmology requires. The first created matter filling the universe is devoid only of outward and developed forms, but contains created within it the forces which shall determine every change and circumstance of its subsequent history. Being thus at once simple and theistic, it appeals to imagination and feeling as a doctrine which at least ought to be true.

Such considerations as these doubtless determined the fate of still another ancient cosmological doctrine, which, though adopted by Aristotle, was regarded with little favor by ancient philosophers generally. For there could be but little support, either from poetry or religion, to the doctrine which denied creation, and held that the order of nature is not, in its cosmical relations, a progression toward an end, or a development, but is rather an endless succession of changes, simple and constant in their elements, though infinite in their combinations, which constitute an order without beginning and without termination.

While this latter doctrine was not necessarily materialistic, like that which has been so termed, and which was more generally received among the ancients, and though it has the greater scientific simplicity, yet it fails on a point of prime importance, so far as its general credibility is concerned, in that it ignores the main interest which belongs to the problem. Cosmological speculations are properly concerned with the mode or order of the creation, and not with the fact of the creation itself. That the first cosmogonies were written in verse shows the interest almost dramatic which their themes were fitted to inspire. " In the beginning " has never ceased to charm the imagination; and these are almost the only words in our own sacred cosmogony to which the modern geologist has not been compelled to give some ingenious interpretation. That there was a beginning of the order of natural events and successions may be said to be the almost universal faith of Christendom.

The nebular hypothesis, conforming to such preconceptions and to the greatest poetic simplicity, passed the ordeal of unscientific criticism with remarkable success. Not less was its success under a general scientific review. A large number of facts and relations, otherwise unaccountable, follow as at least very probable consequences of its assumptions; and these assumptions were not, at first, without that independent probability which a true scientific theory requires. The existence of the so-called nebulous matter was rendered very probable by the earlier revelations of the telescope; and, though subsequent researches in stellar astronomy have rather diminished than increased the antecedent probability of the theory, by successively resolving the nebulæ into clusters of star-like constituents, — suggesting that all nebulosity may arise from deficiency in the optical powers of the astronomer rather than inhere in the constitution of the nebulæ themselves, — and thereby invalidating the scientific completeness of the theory, yet the plausible explanations which it still affords of the constitution of the solar system have saved it from condemnation with a considerable number of ingenious thinkers. With astronomers generally, however, it has gradually fallen in esteem. It retains too much of its original character of a happy guess, and has received too little confirmation of a precise and definite kind, to entitle it to rank highly as a physical theory.

But there are two principal grounds on which it will doubtless retain its claim to credibility, till its place is supplied, if this ever happens, by some more satisfactory account of cosmical phenomena. To one of these grounds we have just alluded. The details of the constitution of the solar system present, as we have said, many features which suggest a physical origin, directing inquiry as to how they were produced, rather than as to why they exist, — an inquiry into physical, rather than final causes; features of the same mixed character of regularity and apparent accident which are seen in the details of geological or biological phenomena; features not sufficiently regular to indicate a simple primary law, either physical or teleological, nor yet sufficiently irregular to show an absence of law and relation in their production.

The approximation of the orbits of the planets to a common plane, the common direction of their motions around the sun, the approximation of the planes and the directions of their rotations to the planes of their orbits and the directions of their revolutions, the approximatively regular distribution of their distances from the sun, the relations of their satellites to the general features of the primary system, — these are some of the facts requiring explanations of the kind which a geologist or a naturalist would give of the distribution of minerals, or stratifications in the crust of the earth, or the distribution of plants and animals upon its surface, — phenomena indicating complex antecedent conditions, in which the evidence of law is more or less distinct. The absence of that perfection in the solar system, that unblemished completeness, which the ancient astronomy assumed and taught, and the presence, at the same time, of an apparently imperfect regularity, compel us to regard the constitution of the solar system as a secondary and derived product of complicated operations, instead of an archetypal and pure creation.

Such is one of the grounds on which the nebular hypothesis rests. The other is of a more general character. The antecedent probability which the theory lacks, from its inability to prove by independent evidence the fundamental assumption of a nebulous matter, is partially supplied by a still more general hypothesis, to which this theory may be regarded as in some sort a corollary. We refer to the "development hypothesis," or "theory of evolution," — a generalization from certain biological phenomena, which has latterly attracted great attention from speculative naturalists. This hypothesis has been less fortunate in its history than that of the astronomical one. Inveterate prejudices, insoluble associations of ideas, a want of preparation in the habits of the imagination, were the unscientific obstacles to a general and ready acceptance of this hypothesis at its first promulgation. Though in one of its applications it is identical with the nebular hypothesis, yet, in more direct application to the phenomena of the general life on the earth's surface, it appears so improbable, that it has hitherto failed to gain the favor which the nebular hypothesis enjoys. Nevertheless, as a general conception, and independently of its specific use in scientific theories, it has much to recommend it to the speculative mind. It is, as it were, an abstract statement of the order which the intellect expects to find in the phenomena of nature. "Evolution," or the progress "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and from the simple to the complex," is the order of the progress of knowledge itself, and is therefore, naturally enough, sought for as the order in time of all natural phenomena. The specific natural phenomena in which the law of "evolution" is determined by observation as a real and established law, are the phenomena of the growth of the individual organism, animal or plant. As a law of psychological phenomena, and even of certain elements of social and historical phenomena, it is also well established. Its extension to the phenomena of the life of the races of organized beings, and to the successions of life on the surface of the earth, is still a speculative conclusion, with about the same degree of scientific probability that the nebular hypothesis possesses. And lastly, in the form of the nebular hypothesis itself, it is extended so as to include the whole series of the phenomena of the universe, and is thus in generality, if accepted as a law of nature, superior to any other generalization in the history of philosophy.

As included in this grander generalization, the nebular hypothesis receives a very important accession of probability, provided that this generalization can be regarded as otherwise well founded. As a part of the induction by which this generalization must be established, if it be capable of proof, the nebular hypothesis acquires a new and important interest.

We are far from being convinced, however, that further inquiry will succeed in establishing so interesting a conclusion. We strongly suspect that the law of "evolution" will fail to appear in phenomena not connected, either directly or remotely, with the life of the individual organism, of the growth of which this law is an abstract description. And, heterodox though the opinion be, we are inclined to accept as the soundest and most catholic assumption, on grounds of scientific method, the too little regarded doctrine of Aristotle, which banishes cosmology from the realm of scientific inquiry, reducing natural phenomena in their cosmical relations to an infinite variety of manifestations (without a discoverable tendency on the whole) of causes and laws which are simple and constant in their ultimate elements.*

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* The laws or archetypes of nature are properly the laws of invariable or unconditional sequence in natural operations. And it is only with the objective relations of these laws, as constituting the order of nature, that natural science is concerned. Their subjective relations, origin, and essential being belong to the province of transcendental metaphysics and to a philosophy of faith. According to this division, there can never arise any conflict between science and faith; for what the one is

In rejecting the essential doctrine of "the theory of evolution" or "the development hypothesis," we must reserve an important conclusion implied in the doctrine, which we think is its strongest point. There are several large classes of facts, apparently ultimate and unaccountable, which still bear the marks of being the consequences of the operations of so-called secondary causes, — in other words, have the same general character as phenomena which are known to be the results of mixed and conflicting causes, or exhibit at the same time evidence of law and appearance of accident. That such facts should be regarded as evidence of natural operations still unknown, and perhaps unsuspected, is, we think, a legitimate conclusion, and one which is presupposed in "the theory of evolution" and in the nebular hypothesis, but does not necessitate the characteristic assumptions of these speculations. An extension of the sphere of secondary causes, even to the explanation of all the forms of the universe as it now exists, or of all the forms which we may conceive ever to have existed, is a very different thing from adopting the cosmological doctrine of the "development theory." Naturalists who have recently become convinced of the necessity of extending natural explanations to facts in biology hitherto regarded as ultimate and inexplicable, but who are unwilling to adopt the cosmological view implied in the "development theory," have adopted a new name to designate their views. "The derivative theory," or "derivative hypothesis," implies only continuity, not growth or progress, in the succession of races on the surface of the earth. Progress may have been made, as a matter of fact, and the evidence of it may be very conclusive in the geological record; but the fact may still be of secondary importance in the cosmological relations of the phenomena, and the theory ought not, therefore, to give the fact too prominent a place in its nomenclature.

That the constitution of the solar system is not archetypal, as the ancients supposed, but the same corrupt mixture of law and apparent accident that the phenomena of the earth's sur-

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competent to declare, the other is incompetent to dispute. Science should be free to determine what the order of nature is, and faith equally free to declare the essential nature of causation or creation.

face exhibit, is evidence enough that this system is a natural product;* and the nebular hypothesis, so far as it is concerned with the explanation simply of the production of this system, and independently of its cosmological import, may be regarded as a legitimate theory, even on the ground we have assumed, though on this ground the most probable hypothesis would assimilate the causes which produced the solar system more nearly to the character of ordinary natural operations than the nebular hypothesis does. With a view to such assimilation, and in opposition to "the theory of evolution" as a generalization from the phenomena of growth, we will now propose another generalization, which we cannot but regard as better founded in the laws of nature. We may call it the principle of *counter-movements*, — a principle in accordance with which there is no action in nature to which there is not some counteraction, and no production in nature by which in infinite ages there can result an infinite product. In biological phenomena this principle is familiarly illustrated by the counter-play of the forces of life and death, of nutrition and waste, of growth and degeneration, and of similar opposite effects. In geology the movements of the materials of the earth's crust through the counteractions of the forces by which the strata are elevated and denuded, depressed and deposited, ground to mud or hardened to rock, are all of the compensative sort; and the movements of the gaseous and liquid oceans which surround the earth manifest still more markedly the principle of counter-movements in the familiar phenomena of the weather.

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* This argument for physical causes is apparently the reverse of that which Laplace derived from the regularities of the solar system and the theory of probabilities; but in reality the objects of the two arguments are distinct. For the legitimate conclusion from Laplace's computation is, not that the solar system is simply a physical product, but that the causes of its production could not have been irregular. The result of this computation was a probability of two hundred thousand billions to one that the regularities of the solar system are not the effects of chance or irregular causes.

The gist of this argument is to prove simplicity in the antecedents of the solar system; and, had the proportion been still greater, or infinity to one, the argument might have proved a primitive or archetypal character in the movements of this system. It is therefore in the limitations, and not in the magnitude, of this proportion, that there is any tendency to show physical antecedence. Hence it is not from the regularities of the solar system, but from its complexity, that its physical origin is justly inferred.

Regarding the *law of causation* as universal, since, if not implied in the very search for causes, it is at least the broadest and the best established induction from natural phenomena, we conclude that the appearance of accident among the manifestations of law is proof of the existence of complex antecedent conditions and of physical causation, and that the absence of this appearance is proof of simple and primitive law.

Of what we may call cosmical weather, in the inter-stellar spaces, little is known. Of the general cosmical effects of the opposing actions of heat and gravitation, the great dispersive and concentrative principles of the universe, we can at present only form vague conjectures; but that these two principles are the agents of vast counter-movements in the formation and destruction of systems of worlds, always operative in never-ending cycles and in infinite time, seems to us to be by far the most rational supposition which we can form concerning the matter. And indeed, in one form or another, the agencies of heat and gravitation must furnish the explanations of the circumstances and the peculiarities of solar and sidereal systems. These are the agents which the nebular hypothesis supposes; but by this hypothesis they are supposed to act under conditions opposed to that general analogy of natural operations expressed by the law of counter-movements. Their relative actions are regarded as directed, under certain conditions, toward a certain definite result; and this being attained, their formative agency is supposed to cease, the system to be finished, and the creation, though a continuous process, to be a limited one.

It should be noticed, however, in favor of the nebular hypothesis, that its assumptions are made, not arbitrarily, in opposition to the general analogy of natural operations, but because they furnish at once and very simply certain mechanical conditions from which systems analogous to the solar system may be shown to be derivable. The dispersive agency of heat is supposed to furnish the primordial conditions, upon which, as the heat is gradually lost from the clouds of nebulous matter, the agency of gravitation produces the condensations, the motions, and the disruptions of the masses which subsequently become suns and planets and satellites. And if the mechanical conditions assumed in this hypothesis could be shown to be the only ones by which similar effects could be produced, the hypothesis would, without doubt, acquire a degree of probability amounting almost to certainty, even in spite of the absence of independent proof that matter has ever existed in the nebulous form.

But the mechanical conditions of the problem have never been determined in this exhaustive manner, nor are the conditions assumed in the nebular hypothesis able to determine any other than the general circumstances of the solar system, such as it is supposed to have in common with similar systems among the stars. A more detailed deduction would probably require as many separate, arbitrary, and additional hypotheses as there are special circumstances to be accounted for. Until, therefore, it can be shown that the nebular hypothesis is the only one which can account mechanically for the agency of heat and gravitation in the formation of special systems of worlds, like the solar system, its special cosmological and mechanical features ought to be regarded with suspicion, as opposed to the general analogy of natural operations.

We propose to criticise this hypothesis more in detail, and to indicate briefly in the following pages the direction in which we believe a better solution of the problem of the construction of the solar system will be found. But before proceeding, we must notice the able Essay, the first in this second series by Mr. Herbert Spencer, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article.

In this essay on the "Nebular Hypothesis," and in the following one on "Illogical Geology," Mr. Spencer has attempted the beginning of that inductive proof of the general theory of "evolution" to which we have referred. Undoubtedly the clearest and the ablest of the champions and expounders of this theory, he brings to its illustration and defence an extraordinary sagacity, and an aptitude for dealing with scientific facts at second hand, and in their broad general relations, such as few discoverers and adepts in natural science have ever exhibited. For dealing with facts which are matters of common observation, his powers are those of true genius. In the essays following those with which we are immediately interested, and particularly in the essay on "The Physiology of Laughter," and in the review of Mr. Bain's work on "The Emotions and the

Will," he displays the true scope of his genius. In psychology, and in the physiology of familiar facts, we regard his contributions to philosophy as of real and lasting value. He is deficient, however, in that technical knowledge which is necessary to a correct apprehension of the obscure facts of science; and his generalizations upon them do not impress us as so well founded as they are ingenious.

In his *résumé* of the facts favorable to the nebular hypothesis, he has committed sundry errors of minor importance, which do not in themselves materially affect the credibility of the hypothesis, but illustrate the extremely loose and uncertain character of the general arguments in its support. A singular use is made of a table, compiled by Arago, of the inclinations of the planes of the orbits of the comets. The legitimate inference from this table is, that there is a well-marked accumulation of the planes of these orbits at small inclinations to the plane of the ecliptic. In considering the directions of the poles of these planes, we ought to find them equally distributed to all parts of the heavens, in case the orbits of the comets bear no relation to those of the planets or to each other. Instead of this, we find a marked concentration of these poles about the pole of the ecliptic, showing that their planes tend decidedly to coincide with the ecliptic. But Mr. Spencer has drawn from this table a conclusion directly the reverse of this. Assuming, as we cannot but believe on insufficient evidence, that the directions of the major axes of the orbits of those comets whose planes are greatly inclined to the ecliptic have nearly as great an inclination as they can have, or that they are nearly as much inclined to the ecliptic as the planes of the orbits themselves, he regards the table of the inclinations of the planes of the orbits as indicating, at least for such comets, the directions of their *axes*, and draws thence the conclusion, that there is a well-marked concentration about the pole of the directions of the *axes* of the cometary orbits, and hence that the regions in which the *aphelia* of comets are most numerous are above and below the sun, in directions nearly perpendicular to the ecliptic. This conclusion, though the reverse of that which is legitimately drawn from Arago's table, is not inconsistent with it; and if

Mr. Spencer were correct in his assumption concerning the directions of the axes of highly inclined orbits, the table would show that there are really *two* well-distinguished systems of comets, the one belonging to the general planetary system, and the other, Mr. Spencer's, forming a system by itself, — an axial one, at right angles with the general system.

But either conclusion serves the purpose of the discussion equally well. For what Mr. Spencer wished to show was, that the relations of the comets to the solar system are not utterly fortuitous and irregular, but such as indicate a systematic connection ; and this is undoubtedly true, since the connection of the planetary and cometary orbits is even more direct and intimate than Mr. Spencer has suspected. The inference which Arago's table warrants is, then, another in that interesting series of facts which some physical theory, whether nebular or not, by "evolution" or by involution, may some day explain.

The greater number of the arguments, old and new, which Mr. Spencer adduces in support of his thesis, do not apply specifically to the nebular hypothesis in particular, but are simply an enumeration of the facts which go to show the existence of physical connections, of an unknown origin and species, in the solar system. In his handling of the mechanical problems of the nebular genesis, Mr. Spencer has succeeded no better than his predecessors. In attempting to account for the exceptions to a general law which the rotations of the outer planets, Uranus and Neptune, and the revolutions of their satellites, exhibit, — the great inclinations of the planes of these rotations and revolutions to the planes of the orbits of the primaries, — Mr. Spencer makes what appears to us a very erroneous assumption, and one from which the conclusion he wishes to draw by no means inevitably follows.

It is one of the few successes of the nebular hypothesis, that it accounts in a general way for the fact that the planes and directions of the rotations of the planets, and the revolutions of their satellites, nearly coincide with the planes and directions of their own orbital motions. A ring of nebulous matter, detached by its centrifugal force from the revolving mass of the nebula, contains within it the conditions by which the direction, and even the amount, of the rotation of the resulting planet is determined; and this direction is the same as that of the revolution of the ring. This ring must originally be of a very thin, quoit-shaped form, even if it be composed of separate, independently moving parts; otherwise the planes of the orbits of the several parts would not pass through or near to the centre of attraction in the central nebula, and the parts must either pass through each other from one to the other surface of the ring in a semi-revolution, or else exert a pressure on the ring, which would tend, along with other forces, to flatten it to the requisite thinness. Hence, a hoop-shaped fluid ring, or one thinner in the directions of its radii than in a direction perpendicular to its general plane, could not exist. Much less could such a ring be detached by its self-sustaining centrifugal force from the body of the nebula. The nebula must necessarily be flattened in its equatorial regions to a sharp, thin edge by the centrifugal force of its revolution, before those regions could be separated to form a ring. The supposition, therefore, which Mr. Spencer's ingenuity has devised to account for the anomalies presented in the rotations and the secondary systems of Uranus and Neptune, — a hoop-shaped ring, with a less determinate tendency to rotation in forming a planet, — is untenable. But this is not all. Supposing such a form possible, and even if the parts of the ring did not move among themselves, or press upon one another so as to flatten the ring, yet the direction of its tendency to rotation in contracting to a planet is just as determinate as in the quoit-shaped ring.

We have gone thus into detail, to show the vague and uncertain character of the mechanical arguments of the nebular hypothesis when they deal with details in the constitution of the solar system. In his treatment of recent discoveries and views in stellar astronomy, we think Mr. Spencer more fortunate. We agree with him in believing the current opinion to be an error, which represents the nebulæ as isolated sidereal systems, inconceivably remote, and with magnitudes commensurate with the Galactic system itself. There are many reasons for believing that the nebulæ belong to this system, and that they are, in general, at no greater distances from us than the stars themselves. We think, also, with him, that the actual magnitudes of the stars are probably of all degrees, and that their apparent magnitudes do not generally indicate their relative distances from us. We would even go further, and maintain, as both *a priori* most probable and most in accordance with observation, that the free bodies of the universe range in size from a grain of dust to masses many times larger than the sun, and that the number of bodies of any magnitude is likely to bear some simple proportion to the smallness of this magnitude itself. Star-dust is not at all distasteful to us, except in the form of nebular boluses. For reasons which will appear hereafter, the smaller bodies are not likely to be self-luminous; and star-dust is probably the cause of more obscuration than light in the stellar universe. That gaseous and liquid masses also exist with all degrees of rarefaction or density, dependent on the actions of heat and gravitation, is also, we think, very probable; and the three states of aggregation in matter doubtless play important parts in the cosmical economy.

Before leaving Mr. Spencer, to attend more immediately to the merits of the nebular hypothesis, we wish to adopt from him an estimate of the value of certain ideas in geology, the bearing of which on our subject is not so remote as it may at first sight appear to be.

Geology has not yet so far detached itself from cosmological speculations as to be entitled to the rank of a strictly positive science. The influence of such speculations upon its terminology, and upon the forms of the questions and the directions of the researches of its cultivators, is still very noticeable, and shows how difficult it is to start anew in the prosecution of physical inquiries, or completely to discard unfounded opinions which have for a long time prevailed. Greater sagacity is sometimes required to frame wise questions, than to find their answers. Geologists still continue to collate remote stratifications as to their stratigraphical order, mineral composition, and fossil remains, as if these were still expected to disclose a comparatively simple history — simple at least in its outlines — of the changes which the life of our globe has undergone.

A story, dramatically complete from prologue to epilogue, was demanded in the cosmological childhood of the science, and its manhood still peruses its fragmentary and mutilated records for the history of the creation. But doubtless the story is as deficient in the dramatic unities, as the record itself is in continuity or completeness. Referring to Mr. Spencer's admirable essay on "Illogical Geology" for our reasons, we will simply state our belief that nothing in the form of a complete or connected history will ever be deciphered from the geological record.

> "Only the last chapter of the earth's history has come down to us. The many previous chapters, stretching back to a time immeasurably remote, have been burnt, and with them all the records of life we may presume they contained. The greater part of the evidence which might have served to settle the development controversy is forever lost; and on neither side can the arguments derived from geology be conclusive."

We must not ascribe to Mr. Spencer, however, our opinion, that, even if this record were more complete, we should not necessarily be the wiser for it. According to Mr. Spencer's views, the first strata, had they been preserved, would have contained the remains of protozoa and protophytes; but, for aught we dare guess, they might have contained the footprints of the present archangels.

Evidence of progress in life through any ever so considerable portion of the earth's stratified materials would not, in our opinion, warrant us in drawing universal cosmical conclusions therefrom. Alternations of progress and regress relatively to any standard of ends or excellence which we might apply, is to us the most probable hypothesis that the general analogy of natural operations warrants. Nevertheless, as we have already intimated, we accept the purely physical portion of the "development hypothesis," both in its astronomical and biological applications, but would much prefer to designate the doctrine in both its applications by the name we have already quoted. This name, "the derivative hypothesis," simply connotes the fact, that, in several classes of phenomena hitherto regarded as ultimate and inexplicable, physical explanations are probable and legitimate. But it makes no claim to rank with the names of the Muses as a revealer of the cosmical order and the beginning of things.

We are aware that in thus summarily rejecting the cosmological import of the nebular hypothesis, along with its special physical assumptions, and retaining only its fundamental assumption, that the solar system is a natural product, we leave no provision to meet a demand which we allow, and we ought to justify this insolvency by proving the bankruptcy of the hypothesis whose debts we thus assume. It would be difficult, however, to prove that this hypothesis cannot fulfil the promise it has so long held out. Much more difficult would it be to supply its place with an equally plausible theory. But our object should not be to satisfy the imagination with plausibility. If we succeed in satisfying our understandings with the outlines of a theory sufficiently probable, we shall have done all that in the present state of our knowledge can reasonably be demanded.

The agencies of heat and gravitation acting, however slowly, through the ages of limitless time, and according to the law of counter-movements, or according to the analogy of the weather, constitute the means and the general mode of operation from which we anticipate an explanation of the general constitutions of solar and sidereal systems.

There comes to our aid a remarkable series of speculations and experiments recently promulgated upon the general subject of the nature and origin of heat, and under the general name of "The Dynamical Theory of Heat," the principles of which we shall endeavor briefly to explain. It is a fundamental theorem in mechanical philosophy, that no motion can be destroyed, except by the production of other equivalent motions, or by an equivalent change in the antecedent conditions of motion. If we launch a projectile upward, the motion which we impart to it is not a new creation, but is derived from forces or antecedent conditions of motion of a very complicated character in our muscular organism. It would be confusing to consider these at the outset; but if we look simply to the motion thus produced in the projectile itself, we shall gain the best preliminary notions as to the character of the phenomena of motion in general. The projectile rises to a certain height and comes to rest, and then, unless caught upon some elevated support, like the roof of a house, it returns to the ground with constantly accelerated motion, till it is suddenly brought to rest by collision with the earth. In this series of phenomena we have in reality only a series of commutations of motions and conditions of motion. The projectile is brought to rest at its greatest elevation by two forms of commutation. A small part of its motion is given to the air, and the remainder is transformed into the new condition of motion represented by its elevated position. The latter may remain for a long time permanent in case the projectile is caught at its greatest elevation upon some support. But a small auxiliary movement dislodging the projectile may at any time develop this condition of motion into a movement nearly equal to that which the projectile first received from our muscles. The small part that is lost in the air or other obstacles still exists, either in some form of motion or in some new conditions of motion, and the much greater part which disappears in the collision of the projectile with the earth is converted into several kinds of vibratory molecular movements in the earth, in the air, and in the projectile itself; and perhaps in part also in various new molecular conditions of motion.

If we designate by the word "power" that in which all forms of motion or antecedent conditions of motion are equivalent, we find that in the operations of nature no "power" is ever lost. Nor is there any evidence that any new "power" is ever created. It would be foreign to our purpose to follow into their ramifications the speculations by which this interesting theorem has been illustrated in many branches of physical inquiry. We are immediately interested only in the three principal and most general manifestations of "power" in the universe, namely, the movements *of* bodies, the movements *in* bodies, and the general antecedent conditions of both.

The proposition that the principal molecular motions in bodies are the cause which produces in our nerves the sensations of heat, or that they are what we denominate "the substance of heat," — the objective cause of these sensations, — has long been held as a very probable hypothesis; and has latterly received experimental confirmations amounting to complete proof. The three principal manifestations of "power" in the universe are then, more specifically, the massive motions of bodies in translation and rotation, their molecular motions, or heat; and the principal antecedent condition of both, or gravitation.

In comparing these as to their equivalence we obtain a sum of "power," which remains invariable and indestructible by the operations of nature. It remains to determine the precise relations of their equivalence, and what the operations are by which they are converted into each other.

The mechanical equivalent of heat is a quantity which has been very accurately determined by experiment. By means of it we may very readily compute what amount of heat would be produced if a given amount of massive motion were converted into heat by friction or otherwise; or, conversely, what amount of massive motion could be produced by the conversion of a given amount of heat into mechanical effect; but it is unnecessary to our purpose to give the precise method of this computation.

The mechanical equivalent of gravitation is another quantity or relation depending on the changes of what is called the "potential" of gravitation, or the sum of the ratios of the masses to the distances apart of the gravitating bodies. The "power" of motion is a relation or quantity, commonly called the "living force" of motion, and depends on the mass and on the square of the velocity of the moving body.

The living forces of all moving bodies, *minus* the potentials of their forces of gravitation, *plus* the mechanical values of their heat, *equal* to a constant quantity, — is the precise formula to which our cosmical speculations should conform. It will be impossible, however, to make any other than a very general use of this precise law. What concerns us more nearly is the consideration of the natural operations by which these manifestations of "power" are converted into each other.

The origin of the sun's light and heat is a problem upon which speculative ingenuity has long been expended in vain. The metaphysical conclusion, that the sun is composed of pure fire, or of fire *per se*, the very essence of fire, is one of many illustrations of the ingenious way in which speculation covers its nakedness with words, and can really mean, we imagine, only that the sun is very hot. That the sun, like any other body, must grow cooler by the expenditure of heat, is without doubt an indisputable proposition; and the question, how this heat is restored to it, is thus a legitimate one. The nebular hypothesis explains how the primitive heat in the sun and in other bodies could be generated by the condensation of the original nebulous mass, in which the heat is supposed to have been originally diffused; but it affords no explanation of the manner in which this heat could be sustained through the ages that must have elapsed since the nebular genesis must have been completed.

There are no precise means of estimating the amount of heat contained in the sun, since the capacity for heat of the materials which compose it is unknown; but from general analogy it may safely be assumed that the sun must grow cooler at a sensible rate, unless its heat is in some way renewed. Concerning the rate of its expenditure of heat, and the means which the dynamical theory of heat proposes to supply the loss, we will quote from the interesting lectures of Professor Tyndall, "On Heat considered as a Mode of Motion."

> "The researches of Sir J. Herschel and M. Pouillet have informed us of the annual expenditure of the sun as regards heat, and by an easy calculation we ascertain the precise amount of the expenditure which falls to the share of our planet. Out of 2,300 million parts of light and heat the earth receives one. The whole heat emitted by the sun in a minute would be competent to boil 12,000 millions of cubic miles of ice-cold water. How is this enormous loss made good? Whence is the sun's heat derived, and by what means is it maintained? No combustion, no chemical affinity with which we are acquainted, would be competent to produce the temperature of the sun's surface. Besides, were the sun a burning body merely, its light and heat would assuredly speedily come to an end. Supposing it to be a solid globe of coal, its combustion would only cover 4,600 years of expenditure. In this short time it would burn itself out. What agency, then, can produce the temperature and maintain the outlay? We have already regarded the case of a body falling from a great distance towards the earth, and

found that the heat generated by its collision would be twice that produced by the combustion of an equal weight of coal. How much greater must be the heat developed by a body falling towards the sun! The maximum velocity with which a body can strike the earth [arising from the earth's attraction] is about 7 miles a second; the maximum velocity with which it can strike the sun is 390 miles a second. And as the heat developed by the collision is proportional to the square of the velocity destroyed, an asteroid falling into the sun with the above velocity would generate about 10,000 times the quantity of heat generated by the combustion of an asteroid of coal of the same weight.

"Have we any reason to believe that such bodies exist in space, and that they may be rained down upon the sun? The meteorites flashing through our air are small planetary bodies, drawn by the earth's attraction, and entering our atmosphere with planetary velocity. By friction against the air they are raised to incandescence, and caused to emit light and heat. At certain seasons of the year they shower down upon us in great numbers. In Boston [England] 240,000 of them were observed in nine hours. There is no reason to suppose that the planetary system is limited to vast masses of enormous weight; there is every reason to believe that space is stocked with smaller masses, which obey the same laws as the large ones. That lenticular envelope which surrounds the sun, and which is known to astronomers as the zodiacal light, is probably a crowd of meteors; and, moving as they do in a resisting medium, they must continually approach the sun. Falling into it, they would be competent to produce the heat observed, and this would constitute a source from which the annual loss of heat would be made good. The sun, according to this hypothesis, would be continually growing larger; but how much larger? Were our moon to fall into the sun, it would develop an amount of heat sufficient to cover one or two years' loss; and were our earth to fall into the sun, a century's loss would be made good. Still, our moon and our earth, if distributed over the surface of the sun, would utterly vanish from perception. Indeed, the quantity of matter competent to produce the necessary effect would, during the range of history, produce no appreciable augmentation of the sun's magnitude. The augmentation of the sun's attractive force would be more appreciable. However this hypothesis may fare as a representant of what is going on in nature, it certainly shows how a sun might be formed and maintained by the application of known thermo-dynamic principles." *

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* Appendix to Lecture XII. p. 455.

This part of our inquiry — how gravitation and motion are converted into heat — is receiving the amplest illustration and discussion from physicists at the present time; and, though the somewhat startling conclusions we have quoted are still too new to be generally credited, they are too well founded in experiment and the general analogies of natural phenomena to be passed lightly by.

The second part of our inquiry — how heat is refunded, in the eternal round of cosmical phenomena, into the antecedent conditions of motion, or to the conditions which preceded the production of the motions that are converted into heat — is a subject to which physicists have given little attention. Indeed, the cosmological ideas which prevail in geological inquiries beset this subject also, and impede inquiry. The order of nature is almost universally regarded as a progression from a determinate beginning to a determinate conclusion. The dynamical theory of heat lengthens out the process better, perhaps, than the nebular hypothesis alone; but both leave the universe at length in a hopeless chaos of huge, dark masses, — ruined suns wandering in eternal night.

It seems not to have occurred to physicists to inquire what becomes of the heat the generation of which requires so great an expenditure of motion. This heat is, in another form, the same motion as that which is lost by the fallen bodies. It is radiated into space, while the bodies remain in the sun; but this radiation is still the same motion in other bodies, in the luminiferous ether, or in the diffused matters of space. It cannot be lost from the universe, and must either accumulate in diffused materials or be converted into other motions or into new conditions of motion. But if the solid bodies of the universe are gradually collected at certain centres, and their motions are diffused in the form of heat throughout the gaseous materials of space, what do we gain? How do we by such a conclusion avoid the ultimate catastrophe which we regard as the *reductio ad absurdum* of a scientific theory? How do we thereby constitute that cycle of movements which we regard as characteristic of all natural phenomena? Perhaps we have been somewhat too hasty in adopting the conclusion that the fallen bodies must necessarily remain in the sun, and gradually augment its mass. Let us, therefore, examine this point more closely.

The principles of the steam-engine afford a clew to the converse process we are in search of, by which heat may be refunded into mechanical effects and conditions. The mechanical effects of the expanding power of steam are only partially developed in the work which the engine performs. This work, converted back to heat by friction or otherwise, would be insufficient to reproduce the same effects in the form of steam. The remaining power consists in the motions and the power of expansion with which the steam escapes from the engine. This is lost power; but if it should be allowed to develop itself by an expansion of the steam into an indefinitely extended vacuum, the molecular motions of the particles of the steam would gradually, and on the outside of the expanding vaporous mass, be converted into velocities or massive motions; the vapor itself would be converted back into water, or even be frozen into snow, and the particles of this water or snow would, at the top of the expanding cloud, finally come to rest by the force of gravitation. A part, therefore, of the lost power of the heat which escaped in steam would be converted into that antecedent condition of motion represented by elevation above the attracting mass of the earth or by gravitation; a part would continue to manifest itself as velocity or massive motion; and the remainder would still continue to exert an outward pressure in the form of heat in vapor. This development would continue so long as the steam continued to discharge itself into the indefinitely extended vacuum we have supposed. The rain or snow falling from the top of the cloud would convert its gravitative power back again into motion, which, again arrested by collision with the earth, would suffer other transformations in the endless round. In the actual case, where the steam escapes into the air instead of a vacuum, the phenomena would be less simple. The history of its heat would become involved with the grander phenomena of the weather, — phenomena that may be regarded as typical of that cosmical weather, concerning the laws of which we must inquire in considering what becomes of the sun's heat.

This heat is capable, provided it could all be so expended, of lifting the amount of matter which, by falling into the sun, is supposed to produce it, to the same height from the sun as that from which the fallen bodies may be supposed to have descended. This follows from the general mechanical principles we have stated. But how is this lifting effected? What is the Titanic machinery by which the sun performs this labor? The velocity with which a body falling from the interstellar spaces enters the body of the sun is sufficient, when converted to heat by friction and the shock, to convert the body itself into vapor, even if the body be composed of the least fusible of materials. The heat thus produced is not, however, confined to the fallen matter. A large portion is imparted to the matter already in the sun; but parts, no doubt, both of the projectile and of the resisting material are vaporized. The atmosphere immediately surrounding the sun contains the vapors of many of the most refractory metals that are known, as we learn from that wonderful instrument, the spectroscope. And this is made evident by the absorption from the sun's luminous rays of certain portions characteristic of these metals. Doubtless, in absorbing their characteristic vibrations, these metals are further heated and expanded, and gradually lifted from the surface of the sun; and the vibrations of light and heat that pass through them and escape are probably all ultimately absorbed in the same or some similar way in the diffused materials of space. The speculations of the elder Struve on the extinction of light in its passage through space — conclusions founded on Sir William Herschel's observations of the Milky-Way — afford a happy and independent confirmation of these views. Moreover, the spectroscopic analyses of the light of the stars show broad dark bands, indicative of great extinctions of light. And we may add, that many gases and vapors which are transparent to luminous rays are found to absorb the obscure rays of heat.

Such is the kind of evidence we have of what becomes of the light and heat, and a portion, at least, of the material of the sun. The heat which is not expended immediately in vaporizing these materials is ultimately extinguished in further heating, expanding, and thus lifting the materials (may we not believe?) which have already been partially raised to the height, whence perhaps, in former ages, they in their turn were rained down as meteors upon the sun. In these suppositions we have exactly reversed the nebular hypothesis. Instead of, in former ages, a huge gaseous globe contracted by cooling and by gravitation, and consolidated at its centre, we have supposed one now existing, and filling that portion of the interstellar spaces over which the sun's attraction predominates, — a highly rarefied continuous gaseous mass, constantly evaporated and expanded from its solid centre, but constantly condensed and consolidated near its outer limits, — constantly heated at its centre by the fall of solid bodies from its outer limits, and constantly cooled and condensed at these limits by the conversion of heat into motion and the arrest of this motion by gravitation.

There are certain chemical objections which apply equally to the views here advanced and to the nebular hypothesis. But these must necessarily arise from the limits to the knowledge we can gain of the whole range of chemical phenomena For what takes place in the chemist's laboratory, under the very limited conditions of temperature and pressure he can command, ought not to be regarded as determining the possibilities, or even the probabilities, of that cosmical chemistry of which we can hardly be supposed to know even the rudiments. We shall consider this subject, however, more particularly, after attending to what is now of more immediate interest, namely, the secondary mechanical conditions and phenomena that result from the suppositions we have made; and particularly the question, how the systems of the planets and their satellites stand related to the round of changes we have considered.

The fundamental and most important motions of the solar system are, as we suppose, the radial movements of solid bodies inward and of gaseous bodies outward, arising from the counteractions of gravitation and heat. But these radial movements must assume a vortical form, if one does not already exist, such as is constantly exhibited by movements in the air and in water. The rotation of the sun, imparted to the materials which rise in vapor from its surface, continues in them as they rise higher and higher, and, though exhibited in a constantly diminishing tangential motion, remains in reality constant, as measured by what mechanicians term "rotation area." Or, rather, it is slowly increased by the mutual resistances of contiguous strata in the expanding gases, so that when this matter falls again towards the sun in the form of solid bodies, it falls in spiral trajectories, and only reaches the sun after perhaps many revolutions, or not at all, unless its motions be rapidly diminished by the resisting medium. If the resistance of the medium is not sufficient to convert the path of a falling meteor into a spiral, the meteor will mount again, and continue to move perhaps for a long time in an eccentric orbit, like a comet. When, however, the meteor at length, in any way, reaches the sun, a part of its motion is expended in increasing the sun's rotation, and thus compensating the loss of motion continually sustained by the sun in the evaporation of its material. The denser the resisting medium is in any system, the greater will be the revolution of its outer parts, and the larger will be the spiral trajectories which its falling bodies will describe. Such spiral or vortical motions as would thus be produced, or rather sustained, in the matter surrounding the sun, is exhibited, by the most powerful telescopes, in the forms of the appendages to certain nebulous stars, and in the structure of the so-called Spiral Nebulæ. Porhaps the bodies which are supposed to give rise in our system to the appearance of the zodiacal light would exhibit some such spiral arrangement, if seen from a point far above or below the ecliptic.

It follows from this vortical motion, that the form which the diffused materials of the solar system would assume, or rather maintain, would be that of an oblate ellipsoid or of a flattened lenticular body. The height to which the matter would rise in the plane of the sun's equator before its massive and molecular motions would be arrested by gravitation, would be much greater than in the directions of the sun's axis of rotation. The degree of oblateness which such a system of diffused matter will maintain depends on the frictions or resistances that successive strata exert on each other. It should be borne in mind in this connection that friction is not a loss of force, where all kinds of force are taken into account. Friction or resistance can only effect a conversion of massive into molecular motions, or the motion of velocity into the motion of heat. Hence, whatever velocity is lost by interior strata in the gaseous materials of the solar system, and is not gained by those exterior to them, must yet be ultimately restored; for the stability of such a system is no longer a question; this is insured in the fundamental mechanical law on which our speculations are founded.

It may still be a question, however, whether the planetary bodies of such a system are successively produced and destroyed, like generations of animals and plants, or whether they are permanent elements in a system of balanced forces and operations. So far as the effects of mutual perturbation are concerned, and independently of a resisting medium, astronomers have shown that the latter supposition is the more probable one; but there are several other considerations which point to a different conclusion. In the first place, the considerations already mentioned. The existence of systematic relations in the structure of the solar system, some of which are independent of its stability under the law of gravity, indicate the operations of causes other than the simple ones on which this stability depends, — such causes as the nebular hypothesis endeavored to define, but which we, in rejecting this hypothesis, have still to search for.

It has undoubtedly occurred to our readers to ask how the planets stand related to the meteoric system, and in what manner, if at all, their motions and masses are affected by this perpetual shower of matter. As out of every two thousand million parts of the light and heat of the sun's radiation the earth receives one part, so out of the two thousand million meteors sent back in return the earth will receive one, or perhaps a somewhat larger proportion, since the meteors are supposed to fall most thickly near the plane of the sun's equator. If we multiply this proportion by ten, as we probably may, it is still a very small quantity; but if we are permitted to multiply it by a factor of time as great as we please, this insignificance will disappear, and in its place we shall have a cosmical cause of the greatest moment in the history of the solar system. Two hundred million years is but a day in the cosmical eras, yet in that time the earth could receive as many bodies as fall to the sun in a year, or a hundredth part of the mass of the earth itself. In a hundred such days, then, the earth might be built up by the aggregation of meteors, provided it should lose none of the material thus collected, as the sun probably does. But this calculation proceeds on the supposition that the earth would have caught as many meteors when it was smaller, as it probably does now. A correction is therefore required which lengthens the period to three hundred such days, or to about a cosmical year, if we may so estimate times which are without limits or measure. In sixty thousand million years, then, the earth could have been made by the aggregation of meteors.* In this time the sun itself would have received and evaporated fifteen hundred times the amount of its present mass, provided a permanent amount of matter and heat should have been maintained in it during so long a period. In these estimates no account is taken of the heat immediately absorbed in evaporation, or absorbed in the space included within the earth's orbit. This heat would probably require a still greater expenditure of motion, and the fall of a still greater number of bodies. Hence the period required to build up the earth's mass might be materially shortened.

Such a method of inquiry, however, violates the canon we have laid down for our guidance in physical speculation. We must not suppose any action in nature to which there is not some counteraction, and no mode of production, however slow, from which in infinite time there could result an infinite product. We must, therefore, conclude that the planets either ultimately fall into the sun, and make a restitution of their peculations, or that heat and gravitation preserve in them also the balance of nature and the golden mean of virtue. The existence of a resisting medium favors the first supposition, unless it can be rendered probable that this medium revolves with velocities equal to those of the planets at the same distances from the sun. There is also another cause affecting the mean distances of the planets. An increase of mass in the sun will diminish the size of the planetary orbits, and conversely a diminution of this mass will increase the size of these orbits. The rate of change in the mass of the sun, whether to increase or to decrease, must depend on the relative rates of cooling by radiation and by evaporation. As the sun grows cooler by excessive radiation, its mass must be increased by the fall of meteors, and the planets will draw nearer to the sun; but if its radiation be diminished, and a larger proportion of the heat be expended in evaporation, then the planets will withdraw from the sun. Such are the causes which may affect the mean distances of the planets.

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* Most of the materials which fall to the earth are probably in the form of very small bodies, which must be disintegrated by heat in their passage through the atmosphere, and must consequently reach the earth's surface in the form of fine dust. At the rate of accumulation estimated above, this dust, when reduced to the mean density of the earth's materials, would add one foot to the thickness of its crust in about three thousand years. In the loose form of dust or mud this accumulation would amount to about a hundredth of an inch in a year. The materials which have accumulated within historical periods over the ruins of ancient cities may thus in great part have been collected from the sky. The agencies of the winds and of flowing water in transporting and depositing the loose materials of the earth's surface would distribute this star-dust in deposits at the bottom of the sea, and in hills and mounds on the land.

If on such grounds we may adopt the first of our suppositions, that the planets are successively formed and finally lost in the sun, like the meteors, the most probable hypothesis we can make concerning their origin is, that they are formed by the aggregation of meteors. Certain conditions, which, in the present state of our knowledge, it would perhaps be impossible to define, must determine the distances from the sun where these aggregations will begin; but the body and the attraction of the planet, when once begun, will determine further aggregation until the planet either falls into the sun, or approaches to such a distance that the evaporation of its material keeps pace with the fall of matter upon it. The size to which a planet could attain would thus be determined by the distance from the sun at which it begins to grow. A nearly circular orbit, and a small inclination of its plane to the plane of the sun's equator, would result from the circumstances attending the fall of the meteors, — their approach to the sun from every direction near the plane of the sun's equator.* A vortical motion and a rotation of the planet might result from such aggregations, which would be analogous to those of the sun and the general system. A more rigorous and comprehensive discussion of such problems than has yet been attempted is required before trustworthy conclusions can be formed.

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* The rare occurrence of spots on the sun beyond thirty degrees either side of its equator may indicate some connection between these spots and the fall of meteors, and serve to determine the limits of the meteoric system.

The following considerations may materially affect the conclusions we have drawn from the existence of a resisting medium. The gaseous medium of the solar system might receive from the sun's rotation, and by the mutual friction of its own materials, greater velocities in its interior parts than the planets could have at the same distances from the sun, provided the exterior parts should move with less than planetary velocities, and should press with a portion of their weight upon the parts below them. For the centrifugal forces of the interior parts might thus be balanced, not merely by their own gravitation, but by a portion also of the weight of the superincumbent masses. At a distance from the sun less than half the mean distance of the planet Mercury, a period of revolution equal to that of the sun would produce a planetary velocity. At a greater distance, the medium might revolve more rapidly than the planets. But there must be a limit where the revolutions would be simply self-sustaining, and beyond this the medium would move less rapidly than the planets. So far, therefore, as a resisting medium could affect the motions of the planetary bodies, it might tend to increase the dimensions of the interior orbits, and to diminish those of the exterior ones; and it would thus tend to concentrate the planets, not in the sun, but at this limiting distance, where the medium would neither accelerate nor retard their motions. The motions of the medium would produce the greatest effect upon the smaller bodies of the solar system, which would, therefore, approach most rapidly to this limiting distance. That region in the solar system, about half the distance from the sun to the orbit of Jupiter, which is so thickly crowded with small planetary bodies or asteroids, may be regarded, on this hypothesis, as the region in which the gaseous medium now revolves with planetary velocity. Could this limiting distance remain fixed for a very long period, most of the planetary masses of the solar system might accumulate there, and be concentrated into one huge planet or secondary sun, and the solar system would thus be converted into a binary system, like those observed among the stars. But from the small amount of matter probably contained in the asteroid system, we ought to conclude that this limiting distance changes from time to time, as the medium grows denser or rarer.

The planets are not the only aggregations of meteoric bodies which we have to account for. Beside the comets, there are probably streams of meteors falling to or circulating around the sun. This is rendered very probable by the phenomena of the showers of these bodies which fall into our atmosphere at certain seasons of the year, or at certain positions in the earth's orbit.* And further, the rings of Saturn are probably examples of the same kind of meteoric aggregation. For of the three hypotheses in regard to the constitution of these rings which have been submitted to rigorous mathematical examination,—namely, first, that they are solid, secondly, that they are fluid, and, thirdly, that they are composed of distinct bodies or meteors,—the latter is the only one which has been found to afford the conditions of stability which are implied in their continued existence. It is unnecessary to add the physical reasons, which render this hypothesis still more probable.

We have no space to consider the many interesting geological consequences which follow from our hypothesis. Let it suffice to remark, that the formation of the earth's mass by meteoric aggregation precludes the hypothesis, otherwise improbable, that the core of the earth is a molten mass. The occurrence of volcanoes in local systems, distinct from each other, points to local causes of an unknown chemical character as the true sources of these phenomena. The heterogeneous character of the materials of the earth's crust, in which are mingled, in the most intimate manner, all kinds of substances, irrespectively of their chemical affinities, and in opposition to their chemical forces of aggregation, could hardly be the results of the actions of heat and aqueous solution, both of which afford conditions favorable to chemical aggregation. Indeed, in most cases in which such aggregation occurs, where homogeneous and chemically simple substances are found in considerable quantities, the agency either of heat or aqueous solution is evident. It is hardly necessary to add, that the theory of meteoric aggregation is the one which would most readily explain these facts.

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* There is a period of about eleven years in the numbers of spots that appear on the surface of the sun, a period coincident with that of the amount of diurnal variations in terrestrial magnetism,—an amount undoubtedly due to the influence of the sun. This period also coincides nearly with the period of the revolution of Jupiter, the largest planet in our system. If, then, we may suppose that the sun's spots are occasioned by the fall of large meteors, the courses of which lie near to the orbit of Jupiter, the attractions of this planet, alternately turning such a stream of bodies upon and away from the surface of the sun, would connect these three nearly coincident periods by a common physical cause.

The phenomena of magnetism and electricity, as subordinate manifestations of motion and conditions of motion, have not been included in our speculations on the commutations of "power," on account of their insignificant values as compared with the three principal forms of "power." For the same reason, we omit any consideration of the numerous but minute modifications of "power" which are manifested by the forces of vital phenomena on the surface of the earth.

But we must here leave the consideration of these interesting problems, and return to a topic much more obscure, to which we called attention a few pages back.

The dynamical theory of heat has not only suggested new and interesting inquiries concerning the constitution of the universe, but it throws new light in the philosophy of chemical phenomena on such problems as the origin of the three states of aggregation in matter, and on the character of the changes which may take place under circumstances beyond the reach of chemical experiments and observation.

That the dreams of the alchemists were at fault rather in point of method than of doctrine, is a confession which the modern chemist must make, when he compares the slight resources of experiment at his command with the possibilities of nature. If, as has been surmised, the characteristic properties of different kinds of matter consist in characteristic internal or molecular motions (and molecular conditions of motion), a complete destruction of such motions would obliterate all the characteristic differences of matter, and such a result might be attained by the production of absolute cold. In respect to the motions of light and heat, however, the universe, so far as we know it, and even so far as we could know it, is a perfectly continuous body. In no corner or recess of its unfathomable depths to which the feeblest light of a single star could find its way, can there be an absence of the motions of light and heat. Nothing can set bounds to the all-pervading reach of these motions except limits to that medium of motion, the luminiferous ether; and these, so far as all cognizable physical conditions are concerned, would be limits to space itself. That potent sidereal influence, the absolute cold, transmuting all substances into one, could only arise momentarily, in nodal points or lines or surfaces, but could not be extended discontinuously into space of three dimensions. What may happen at such times and limits, where matter, expiring from one form of chemical life, may be awakened to another, according to the kind of molecular agitation which may next overtake it, and determine its history, perhaps for myriads of years, is what the chemist cannot tell us, and only the alchemist can dream. It suffices for our instruction, that the chemistry of absolute cold has possibilities of which experimental chemistry affords no criterion, and may play a part in the economy of nature not inferior to that of gravitation or heat.

But it may be objected, on grounds of experimental chemistry, " that the sun's heat, though sufficient to volatilize the least fusible materials, could not keep them in the form of vapor at the heights and in the temperature of the interplanetary spaces, much less lift them in the form of vapor to the heights of the interstellar regions whence the meteors are supposed to fall. For most bodies which are solid at ordinary terrestrial temperatures tend, upon cooling, to crystallize with such energy that they would soon be precipitated from the vaporous form." But this objection takes no account of those effects of diffusion, expansion, and commingling of heterogeneous materials, which must remove the parts of a volatilized body to such hopeless distances from each other that the forces of chemical aggregation might require ages to collect what is thus dispersed. Nor can any account be taken of such unknown laws of chemical affinity and aggregation as are possible under the circumstances we are considering. The known laws of chemical action should, then, be ranked with those laws of life, exhibited in the phenomena of growth, which were too hastily generalized and applied, in " the theory of evolution," to the interpretation of the riddles and the explication of the order of the System of the World.

ART. II. — 1. *Revised Statutes of New York.* New York and Albany: Banks and Brother. 1859. 8vo. 3 vols. pp. 1054, 1017, 1355.

2. *A Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania.* By JOHN PURDON. Ninth Edition. By F. C. BRIGHTLEY, ESQ. Philadelphia: Kay and Brother. 1862. 8vo. pp. 1264.
3. *The General Statutes of Massachusetts.* Boston. 1861. 8vo. pp. 1126.
4. *A Treatise on the Legal and Equitable Rights of Married Women.* By W. H. CORD, ESQ. Philadelphia: Kay and Brother. 1861. 8vo. pp. 796.
5. *Report of the Law Amendment Society,* in Vol. I. (1856) of Law Magazine and Review. London. pp. 16.
6. *Traité du Contrat de Mariage ou du Régime des Biens entre Epoux.* Par PIERRE ODIER, Docteur en Droit, Professeur de Droit Civil à l'Académie de Genève. Paris. 1847. 8vo. 3 vols. pp. 391, 455, 543.

WHETHER woman has an equal natural right with man to exercise the right of suffrage and to fill public offices, whether the same avenues to employment should be open to her as to the opposite sex, are questions of which we do not now intend to speak. Neither do we propose to say anything concerning the rights of single women, as such. Our present purpose is merely to discuss, in a general way, the pecuniary relations which grow out of the marriage state, especially as they are affected by recent legislation in the United States.

The subject itself is of such importance and of such general interest, affecting as it does the happiness of so large a class of society, as to render it worthy of the most serious attention. A very large proportion of the unfortunate differences between husband and wife, many of which ultimately become the subjects of judicial investigation ending in separation or divorce, but a much greater number of which are never known to the world at large, owing to the natural unwillingness of the parties immediately concerned to expose their domestic difficulties to public view, have had their origin, directly or indirectly, in the inequality of the laws regulating the pecuniary relations during the marriage state. Moreover, within a recent period a change so radical and complete has been made in the legislation affecting these relations in many of the States of the Union, that we may well feel some curiosity in seeking for the reasons which have induced an overturn of laws that have existed for so long a time without material alteration as have those concerning the property rights of married women. For it is not the system of a day which has been overthrown, but one which dates as far back, at least, as the reign of Edward IV.

In all legislation upon this subject the great question is, how adequately to secure and protect the interests of those women who are unfortunate enough to have improvident, rapacious, or intemperate husbands, and at the same time to avoid the introduction of an element of discord between those who are more happily situated. In discussing the topic, we propose, first, to give a brief sketch of the various systems of legislation relating to the matter under consideration; secondly, to state the substance of the principal changes made in the United States; thirdly, to answer the objections which have been made to *any* change; and, finally, to suggest some imperfections and deficiencies in the laws regulating the subject as they now stand.

The systems of legislation which regulate the enjoyment of property during the marriage state, and which determine its devolution when *coverture** is ended, may be divided into two grand divisions; one based upon the unity of husband and wife, and the other recognizing them as more or less distinct persons. The fundamental idea of the common law of England and the United States upon this subject is, that husband and wife are but one, and that one, as a caustic modern orator has expressed it, the husband. By the theory or fiction of the law, "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during coverture." It is to be observed, however, that this union is only a civil union, for the wife is answerable separately in criminal prosecutions, except in respect to some inferior crimes where she is screened by her husband on the supposition of being under constraint. By marriage all the personal property the woman has at the time of the contract, and all she subsequently acquires, becomes, under the common law, in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement to the contrary, her husband's absolutely. Her choses in action, that is to say, that property which is not in her actual possession, but which she may recover in an action at law, also become his, if reduced to possession during coverture. He is entitled to the rents and profits of her real estate as long as the marriage relation subsists, and if she has inheritable issue, and he survives her, to a life estate in all her lands.

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* Husband and wife are one person in law; the legal existence of the woman is incorporated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and *cover* she performs everything, and is therefore called in our law French a *feme covert*, and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. 1 Bl. Com. 442.

The corresponding obligations on the part of the husband are, first, a liability for all the ante-nuptial debts of the wife, and, secondly, to maintain her and furnish her with necessaries suited to his degree and her station in life. If she survives him, she is entitled to a life interest in one third part of all the real estate of which he was seized during coverture; and if he dies intestate, to one third part of his personal estate absolutely, or, if there are no children, to one half. She may bar herself of dower by accepting before marriage a jointure made in lieu thereof, or, after the death of her husband, by assenting to a provision in his will intended as a substitute for it. In England the alienage or treason of the husband, and both in England and the United States the wife's elopement and living in adultery,* or a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*, also deprive her of dower. She might also in England bar herself by levying a fine, or suffering a common recovery, (peculiar modes of conveyance now abolished,) as, since the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV., ch. 74, she may bar herself by joining in a deed with her husband to a third party. Since the English Dower Act of 1834, the husband there has a still more absolute control over his real property, and the wife may be deprived of dower without any act or fault of her own.

In the United States until quite recently she had substantially the same rights as in England prior to the Dower Act of

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* In New York and Massachusetts, however, dower is not barred by elopement and adultery, unless followed by a divorce. Reynolds *v.* Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193; Lakin *v.* Lakin, 2 Allen, 45.

1834, except in Louisiana, Texas, and California, where her property rights and liabilities approximated more nearly to those enjoyed in France, or the other countries of Europe where the system of *communio bonorum* prevails.

As a consequence of this theoretical unity, and the absorption of the personality of the wife into that of the husband, she could make no contracts, either with her husband or with third persons, which would be binding on herself; she could neither sue nor be sued, and even when she lived apart from her husband with his consent, and had a separate maintenance secured to her by deed, she could not be sued in an action at law, even for necessaries.

The systems of legislation which recognize a personality in the wife, as respects property, distinct from that of her husband, may be divided into three: the *dotal*, the separate property system, and that of the community of goods. Under the Roman or civil law the property of the woman was divided into two portions, the dotal and the paraphernal. The first was the property brought by the wife to her husband to defray the expenses of the marriage state. The *property* in this still remained in the wife, but the husband had the control of it for the purpose of providing for the expenses of the household. The principal he was bound to restore to the woman or her legal representatives when the marriage relation was dissolved. To secure its restitution, she had a general lien upon all his property, and even had a preference over creditors of a prior date. The paraphernal property belonged to the wife exclusively, and was under her sole administration. The Roman law still prevails in Italy, and by ante-nuptial agreement parties in France may bring themselves under its provisions.

Under the separate property system neither husband nor wife has any ownership in the goods or estate the other possesses at the time of marriage, or afterwards acquires. The husband, however, is the legal manager or administrator of all that portion of the wife's property of which she has not expressly reserved to herself the control. This administration may be withdrawn from him by the wife or by the law. But if this is done, he is not obliged to render any account of the income of the property, as it is presumed that he has expended it for her or for the expenses of the household. At the dissolution of the marriage by death or otherwise, each party, or his or her representatives, takes the part he or she possessed at the time of the marriage, the husband rendering an account of his administration. This general system prevails in Russia (since 1833), in some parts of Prussia, in Austria, in the grand-duchy of Saxe-Weimar, in the marquisate of Brandenburg, and in Switzerland.*

The system of community of goods admits of three subdivisions: the universal community (*communauté universelle*), the community of movables and acquests (*communauté des meubles et d'acquêts*), and that of gains or acquests (*communauté d'acquêts*). By the first, all the property, movable and immovable, (to borrow the terms of the foreign law corresponding nearly to the English personal and real,) owned by either party at the time of marriage, or afterwards acquired, is thrown into the common stock, of which the husband is the administrator. At the death of husband or wife, his or her heirs and the survivor divide the property between them, after paying the debts of the community, in equal proportions. This mode of the community system prevails in Holland, in some parts of Russia and Germany, and in Neufchâtel.

By the second (*communauté des meubles et d'acquêts*), all the movable property that each of the parties possesses before marriage, and all of this character acquired during coverture, including in this the income and profits of the movable property, form part of the community. All the immovable property acquired during coverture by either party by *onerous* title (*à titre onéreux*), i. e. for which a valuable consideration of some sort is paid, also belongs to the community. The immovable property accruing during coverture to either husband or wife by *gratuitous* title (*à titre gratuit*), that is, for which no consideration is paid, (e. g. that acquired by descent, devise, &c.,) remains the separate property of each. The community is liable for all the debts chargeable upon the income or affecting the acquisitions, and for the movable debts (*dettes mobilières*) of either husband or wife. The husband has the administration of the community property; but if the wife can prove some loss experienced by his fault, she can have the property divided by instituting a suit in the proper court, and the administration of her share intrusted to herself. At the dissolution of marriage by the death of either party, the property of the community is divided between the survivor and the representatives of the deceased. This mode prevails in France, in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, in Scotland, with some modifications, in the duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, and in most of Switzerland.

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* Odier, *Contrat de Mariage*, Vol. I. pp. 20 - 22.

The most restricted form of the community is that where there is merely a partnership in the gains or acquests (*société d'acquêts*). Under this form both husband and wife retain for their separate property all the movable or immovable property owned by either before marriage, and all which they acquire during marriage by the sale or exchange of any portion of this, and all coming to either of them by *gratuitous* title. The income of both kinds of property, the acquisitions made by the labor or savings of either during marriage, and the profits of trade or business carried on jointly or separately, belong to the community. This property is managed by the husband, and divided at the termination of coverture as in the other modes of the system; and this form prevails in Bavaria, in the electorate of Hesse, in the duchy of Nassau, and in Spain.*

From this brief outline of the various systems of legislation upon this subject, it will be seen that they all, except the common law, recognize the wife as possessing, in a greater or less degree, so far as property rights are concerned, a legal existence separate from that of the husband. The common law is, then, *sui generis*. In seeking to render that moral and social unity which is, or should be, the distinguishing characteristic of the marriage relation more complete, by merging the personality of the wife in that of the husband, it differs from all other systems of legislation, and is absolutely unique.

It would be difficult to assign with precision and certainty the cause of this peculiarity of the common law. Some have attempted to derive its origin from the feudal system;

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* Odier, *Contrat de Mariage*, Vol. I. pp. 13-19.

and it is certain that many of the disabilities to which women in general were and are subject may be deduced from feudal principles. Under this system it was sought to render the whole power of the state available for warlike purposes, and but imperfect property rights were allowed to those who were disqualified from performing military duty. Hence males were preferred to females in the succession to estates, and women, children, and professed monks, being incapable of bearing arms and rendering personal service, could not succeed to a genuine feud. The extravagant and chivalric respect accorded to woman socially, which finds its characteristic expression in the romances, poems, and love-ditties of the feudal period, operated, and may have been intended, as a sort of compensation for this deprivation of civil rights. It is not, however, so easy to trace to the same source the disabilities of married as distinguished from single women under the common law; for they did not exist, at least to not nearly so great an extent, in some parts of Europe, where the feudal system, even in a rigorous form, prevailed. But whatever may have been the origin of this peculiarity of the common law, when it had once been established there was no disposition to exchange it for the milder doctrines of the civil law. The old lawyers of the common law of England regarded with jealousy the civilians and their system of jurisprudence. They saw nothing unjust, or unsuited to the exigencies of society in these somewhat severe doctrines concerning the rights of married women. Blackstone, writing in a later age, but endeavoring to exalt the common as compared with the civil law, expressed their ideas upon this subject when he declared, at the close of the chapter in his Commentaries on Husband and Wife, "that even the disabilities which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit; so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England."

But some of the editors of his Commentaries and some of the English judges have not regarded the law upon this subject with so much favor. Lord Mansfield, in particular, endeavored to modify the strict rules of the common law, and adapt it to the wants of modern society. Especially was this the case in regard to the liability of married women in certain circumstances upon their contracts. In the celebrated case of Corbett *v.* Poelnitz (1 Term Rep. 5), he held that a married woman living apart from her husband, by deed of separation mutually executed, and having a large and competent maintenance secured to her, beyond the control of her husband, might contract and sue and be sued at law as a single woman. He held, substantially, that, the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself must cease, and that, as the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind. Mr. Justice Buller, speaking of this case a few years afterwards, declared that the points there decided were "founded in good sense, and adapted to the transactions, the understanding, and the welfare of mankind." Yet this guarded and qualified decision was considered, like some others of the same eminent judge, as an attempt to import the doctrines of equity, that is, of equity in its technical sense, into the common law, and was doubted from the first, then indirectly attacked, and finally decisively overruled by the twelve judges in Marshall *v.* Rutton (8 Term Rep. 545), after the fullest argument, the court going back some three hundred years to fortify their opinion by the declaration of Littleton, that husband and wife are but one person in law.

In 1857 an attempt was made in England to change the law upon this subject by direct legislation. In that and the preceding year petitions were presented to both houses of Parliament, asking for some alteration in the laws respecting the property of married women. These petitions were signed by about twenty-four thousand persons. One of them, to which about two thousand signatures were attached, embracing some of the most eminent names in English literature, — such as Mrs. Browning, Mrs. Jameson, Mrs. Howitt, Miss Martineau, Mrs. Gaskell, and others, — was presented in March, 1856, to the House of Lords by Lord Brougham, and to the House of Commons by Sir Erskine Perry. At about the same time the Law Amendment Society made a Report upon the Laws relating to the Property of Married Women, tracing briefly the history of the English law upon this subject, and contrasting it with that of France, of Germany, of Scotland, and the United States, and with the doctrines of the courts of equity, and recommending some changes in the existing law. These recommendations were embraced under seven heads, and were afterwards incorporated into the Married Woman's Property Act of 1857. This, although pressed with distinguished ardor by that veteran reformer, Lord Brougham, was lost. A clause, however, was introduced into the new Divorce Bill, passed in 1858, securing to married women who had been deserted by their husbands their own earnings and savings. This is the extent of English legislation upon this subject up to the present time. *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare* seems to be the motto of English judges and legislators.

Although the English legislators, taking no lesson from the progress that has been made in almost all other branches of the law, have thus refused to change or modify in any essential particulars the law upon this point as it stood in the time of Littleton, yet it is admitted, even by the opponents of change, that many cases of distressing hardship and inconvenience might arise, and indeed have arisen, under it. A husband might die the next week after marriage, and all the personal property he received by his wife might be bequeathed to his illegitimate children, and she be immediately reduced from affluence to poverty. A dissolute husband might so conduct himself as to make his house unfit for his wife to live in, and yet retain all of her fortune. The wife might earn a competent maintenance by the profits of a trade, or, as in the case of Mrs. Norton, who has published her wrongs to the world,* by her pen, and yet her husband take it all, and reduce her to live upon the barest pittance. These cases, and others of a similar character, would, perhaps, have long since induced some modification of the law, if the courts of equity had not stepped in to abate its rigors. As these courts adopted their doctrines upon this subject from the civil law, which, as we have seen, differed radically from the common law, it may easily be conceived that the legal and equitable (technically speaking) conclusions were often widely at variance. Thus, while at law a gift to the wife was a gift to the husband, in equity land or personal property might be given to a married woman for her separate use, even without the intervention of a trustee. At law, the wife could not ordinarily sue or be sued; in equity, she might sue even her own husband, if there was no other way of asserting her rights. A gift from husband to wife, except under the statute of uses, was void in law; yet in equity a gift would be supported. These are only a few of the inconsistencies and contradictions between the law and equity;* but they are enough to show us the singular spectacle of two judicial tribunals in the same country, one of which professes to follow the other (*æquitas sequitur legem*), starting with the same premises, but arriving at exactly opposite conclusions. In the instances cited, equity relieved the severity of the law; but in one particular it gave the husband additional power over the property of the wife. At law his control over it began with the marriage, but in one case in equity it even preceded it; for if a woman, while a marriage treaty was pending, made a secret, voluntary conveyance or settlement of her property, with the intent to deprive her future husband of the interest he would otherwise acquire in it, and the marriage was afterwards entered into, this was held to be a fraud upon his marital rights, and was void.† The fortune of the future wife, it was supposed, might be in many cases such a material inducement to the marriage, (and the supposition too often is in accordance with the fact,) that it ought to be judicially recognized.

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* English Laws for Women in the Nineteenth Century. By C. NORTON. London. 1854. 8vo. pp. 188. Printed for Private Circulation.

The common law, so far as applicable to our situation and government, was adopted, either expressly or by implication, as the law of the land in almost every State in the Union. In regard to the property relations between husband and wife, the law then was, until recently, substantially the same here as in England prior to the Dower Act of 1834. Some changes, however, were made many years ago. On one account there was more need here of some modification of the strict rules of the common law than in England. Some of the States had no courts of chancery or equity, and others none until quite recently. Perhaps, however, this want was more than counterbalanced by the much greater facilities afforded in most of the States for obtaining divorces, which furnish the most effectual remedy for many of those occasional and exceptional cases where the husband is disposed to use in an unjustifiable and oppressive manner the rights which the law confers upon him over the property of the wife. A majority of the States gave to married women the power of devising or bequeathing their property, in some with, and in others without, the consent of their husbands. Wives deserted by their husbands have been allowed their own earnings, and rendered liable on their contracts. As long ago as 1829 the statutes of Illinois allowed married women over eighteen years of age to dispose by will of their separate real and personal estate; and upon the death of the husband intestate, and without children or descendants of children, the fee simple of one half of his real estate, and all of his personal estate, went to the widow, in addition to her dower.* In this connection, however, we may notice one change in the statutes of the "chivalric" State of Georgia of an opposite character, giving to the husband the same power over the wife's real estate that the common law did over the personal.† In 1847 Vermont exempted the wife's real estate, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, from attachment for the husband's debts.

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* For these and further specimens of contradictions between the law and equity, see the Report of the Law Amendment Society, before alluded to, p. 397 of Vol. I. of Law Magazine and Review, 1856, where they are arranged in parallel columns.

† Strathmore *v.* Bowes, 1 Ves. Jr. 22.

The laws of Louisiana, Texas, and California in regard to the property of married women differ in many important respects from those of the other States. The system of community of goods, before spoken of, prevails. The form of the community more nearly resembles that of the third or most limited character, — the community of acquests or gains (*communauté d'acquêts*). The leading features of this have been before described; and the details of the legislation in these States, especially that of Louisiana, would occupy too much space for the present article. The laws of California have been exceedingly liberal towards married women. The capacity of the wife to hold separate property is created by the State Constitution, adopted in 1849. The property acquired by the husband after marriage, but before the act of April, 1850, is common property by the Spanish law, and that acquired subsequently is so by statute.* The homestead, to the amount of five thousand dollars, forms no part of the common property, but is held by husband and wife by a kind of joint tenancy, or tenancy by entireties, the survivor having the right to the whole. The property owned by the husband at the time of marriage, may become the homestead. Courtesy and dower are abolished. By complying with certain requirements in regard to the publication of the amount invested, &c., the wife may carry on in her own name any business, trade, profession, or art, provided the original capital does not exceed five thousand dollars; and this amount may be furnished to the wife by the husband. If we may believe the remarks of Judge Burnett, this law would seem to operate, as might naturally be expected, rather disadvantageously to creditors. "The rights of honest creditors are more restricted here than elsewhere, and the law has been greatly abused and perverted from its honest intent. Since the passage of the act in 1852, the public prints have teemed with notices, on the part of married women, that they intended to carry on business in their own names; and the different kinds of business specified have included stock-raising, farming, blacksmithing, carpentering, and brickmaking." †

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* Tyson *v.* Postlethwaite, 13 Ill. 730.

† Hotchkiss's Codification of Statute Laws of Georgia, 1845, p. 428.

In Texas it has been held, that, as the fundamental principle of the marital relation in that State is that, whatever may be the unity of persons between husband and wife, there is no unity of estates, arguments drawn from the incapacity of the wife at common law to acquire and enjoy property have little or no force.‡ Husband and wife are distinct persons as to their estates; when property is in question, he is not baron, nor is she covert.§ There is not the slightest difference between the capacity of husband and wife to hold property.‖ A husband may therefore convey directly to his wife either the community or his separate property.¶ We have spoken thus early of the statutes of these States, because they are so unlike those of the other States, not only before the recent changes, but also as they now stand.

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* Selover *v.* American Russian Commercial Company, 7 Cal. 266.

† Guttman *v.* Scannell, 7 Cal. 455.

‡ Smith *v.* Strahan, 16 Texas, 314.

§ Wood *v.* Wheeler, 7 Texas, 13.

‖ 5 Texas, 363.

¶ 24 Texas, 305.

In 1844, the State of Maine, true to her motto of *Dirigo*, led the van in a most complete and utter subversion of the doctrines of the common law upon this subject. In that year, a statute was passed exempting the real and personal property of any woman subsequently married from attachment for her husband's debts, and allowing any married woman to become seized or possessed of any real and personal property as her own. In 1847 the provisions of this act were extended so as to apply to all married women, whether married before or after its passage. In 1848 the great States of New York and Pennsylvania marched up abreast of Maine. Unlike the attempted changes in England, which were zealously urged by some very eminent persons, the reform in the United States sprang rather from a popular feeling of the inconvenience of the common law, and an enlightened conviction in the minds of many of its abstract injustice, than from the efforts of any particular individuals, or the influence of any great name. The public sentiment was stronger here in favor of the reform than in England, owing to the greater general intelligence of the people, and to the fact that legislation is more obedient to the popular will. As the time was ripe for the change, when it had once begun, it spread with great rapidity, and the legislation of Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania, with alterations and amendments of a similar character, has been followed, with some unessential variations, in Massachusetts (1855, 1857), Connecticut (1849, 1850, 1854, 1855), New Hampshire (1853, 1860), Illinois (1861), Ohio (1861), Iowa, Kentucky, Alabama, Wisconsin, and some other States.

The following five propositions will express, in general, the existing state of the law upon this subject in those States where legislation has gone the farthest.

1. The common law, which makes marriage a gift of all the woman's personal property to the husband, is repealed, and a woman who marries without any ante-nuptial contract retains her property and her subsequent acquisitions and earnings.

2. A married woman can now hold separate property at law, as she formerly could only in equity, and is liable, so far as

this goes, on her separate contracts, whether made before or after marriage.

3. A husband is not liable for the ante-nuptial debts of his wife, except so far as the property brought to him by the wife under a settlement extends.

4. A married woman has the power of making a will, and can dispose in this way of her real and personal property as fully as her husband can of his.

5. The statutes of distributions, and the right of succession between husband and wife, as to courtesy or dower, secure equal advantages to either party in the disposition of the property at the dissolution of the marriage state.

These changes, it will be seen, are radical: they deny the fundamental doctrine of the common law concerning the unity of husband and wife, when property is in question, and effect such an entire revolution in it, that a learned judge, looking, as it seems to us, at marriage merely as a pecuniary or business connection, has even suggested a doubt as to whether the relation can be said longer to exist.* To that moral influence which the husband naturally exerts over the wife in regard to the disposition of her property there is not now added the legal right to dispose of it as he pleases; and we may reasonably expect that the number of marriages entered into from purely mercenary considerations, where "impassioned dollars" are wedded to "enamored stocks," will be diminished. Not that marriage will not still be employed by many as a stepping-stone to wealth and social position, but that the law will not lend its active aid in gaining the former. If acquired at all by this means, it must be by the voluntary exercise on the part of the wife of those feelings of trust and confidence which the union naturally inspires.

Such extensive changes have not been made without considerable opposition, and men occupying judicial stations have in some cases characterized these laws in terms hardly consonant with the dignity of their position, and lacking somewhat in respect toward the legislative department of government. Thus Judge Woodward, the recent Democratic candidate for Governor in Pennsylvania, speaking of the old law and the new, says: "The object of the act of 1848 was to protect the wife's separate property from the creditors of the husband. This was accomplished before the act by means of marriage settlements; but occasional instances of hardship occurred, which, magnified by that prurient philanthropy that begins its work where the wise and good leave off, and demolishes what they build up, led a too susceptible legislature into declaring," * &c. So, too, Judge Taylor declares this law to be one "which is well calculated in its influence to embitter the chief springs of social enjoyment, degrade the sacred relation of man and wife, and leave in full vigor only the secular and sordid companionship of baron and feme." † The fear lest a system of concubinage should be substituted for the marriage relation seems also to have haunted the minds of some of the Pennsylvania judges.‡

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* Strong, J., 33 Penn. Rep. 525.

But without dwelling longer upon particular instances of expressed dislike to the law, it may be well to notice here some of the principal objections that have been made to the recent changes. And, first, it is urged that, by allowing the wife to hold property independent of her husband, and not subject in any manner to his control, we create a separate interest in husband and wife, and make them bargainers with and watchful of each other; that the social unity is thereby weakened, and domestic happiness impaired, inasmuch as there is a complete severance of the relation at one point. But to this it may be replied, that the knowledge by each party that the other possessed valuable rights will tend to promote mutual forbearance and respect, and thereby increase rather than diminish the felicity of the married state. The same considerations which in the great majority of cases induce the husband to devote his income to promoting the interests of the family, will also influence, and in a still greater degree, the wife who has separate property to devote this, or its income at least, to the same purpose. And in those unfortunate cases where there is a want of harmony between the parties, the argument is unanswerable,

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* Ritter *v.* Ritter, 31 Penn. 396.

† Am. Home Miss. Soc. *v.* Wadhams, 10 Barb. 606.

‡ Ritter *v.* Ritter, 31 Penn. 396; 33 Penn. 525; 31 Penn. 398.

that the wife has an equal right with the husband to claim the protection of the law to secure her material interests. In the most thoughtful and provident classes of society, by means of marriage settlements and the interposition of the courts of chancery, separate property interests have frequently been secured to married women. The verdict of this portion of the community is in favor of some such provision, at least for their own class. What, then, is the objection to making a "general marriage settlement" for all those improvident and ignorant persons who have neglected this provision, and thus render the rights of all equally secure?

Some English writers have attributed the superior domestic purity of English married life over that of the Continent to the difference of the laws regulating the property rights of the wife during coverture. But this is a far-fetched conclusion. That the English matron does not, like the Italian dame, consider a *cavaliere servente* as an indispensable part of her household establishment, — that conjugal infidelity in one country is esteemed the highest of social crimes, and in the other as a comparatively venial failing, — may be fairly attributed to other reasons than that the property rights of wives in the former are derived from the severe and rigorous doctrines of the common law, and in the latter from the milder jurisprudence of the Romans. For even prior to marriage we find the same relative difference in the estimate of female purity. Moreover, if we go back to the time of Charles II. and the period of the comedies of Congreve and Farquhar, when the laws regulating the property rights of the wife were substantially the same as at present, we shall find that this boasted superior domestic purity of Englishwomen has not always been so great as the upholders of the law would have us imagine; and we shall, perhaps, be led to conclude that it is owing more to diversity of race, climate, education, and moral training, than to the difference in legal institutions. But still another answer to this objection is, that the condition of married women, so far as property rights are concerned, in the better classes of society in England, from which these examples of superior domestic purity are for the most part drawn, does not differ materially from that in the corresponding classes on the Continent. It is regulated in the former, in a great degree, by the doctrines of the courts of chancery, which, as we have seen, are derived from the Roman law, and recognize the wife as possessing a personality, when property is concerned, distinct from that of the husband. Yet our English writers have not objected to these doctrines on this ground.

But it is urged, that this new legislation is adapted to exceptional cases; that the great majority of wives experience no practical inconvenience from the law as it now stands, and that it is unwise to legislate specially for unusual and extraordinary instances. But this argument, which admits the imperfection of the old law upon this subject, proves too much. A great deal of legislation is to provide for exceptional cases. Criminal law, for the most part, is of this character. The great majority of society keep the sixth and eighth commands of the Decalogue, yet we make laws to provide for the exceptional cases of thieves and murderers. Granting that the chief aim of legislation should be to lay down general rules applicable to events as they ordinarily happen, are we to be debarred from attempting to amend a law, if thereby the number of exceptional cases, which, on account of this generality or universality, it cannot reach, will be materially diminished? This is not legislating for exceptions, but an attempt to reduce their number, by establishing a more comprehensive rule. Suppose that the law had gone still further, and given to the husband, as in the early ages of Rome, the *patria potestas*, or power of life and death over his wife; would it be a sufficient answer to a proposition for the repeal of this, that the wives who suffered from the exercise of this power by their husbands were few, and that it was inexpedient to legislate for exceptional cases?

Again, it is said that the remedy in equity was sufficient to provide for these occasional cases of hardship and inconvenience. This argument has more force in England than in the United States; for in some of the States, as we have before remarked, there is no distinct equity jurisdiction, and others where chancery powers were not given until recently. Besides, there are many cases which equity cannot relieve. Take, for instance, the case of a fortune coming by descent to a married woman. Ordinarily, a husband need not resort to a court of equity to obtain this, but gains absolute possession of it by merely legal means; and if he be improvident or niggardly, the wife to whom he is indebted for it, and to whom it justly belongs, may be deprived of all benefit of it, and yet be without a remedy. So, too, if a wife be owing debts contracted before marriage, and die during coverture before the creditors have prosecuted their claims against husband and wife to judgment, although she may have brought a large fortune to her husband, yet he may retain it all, and the creditors be remediless. An instance of this sort in England, where the husband retained the goods bought by the wife before marriage, but yet refused to pay the debt contracted for them, although he had received a large fortune by the wife, so irritated Lord Nottingham, that he declared he would alter the law. But Lord Talbot said, that nothing less than an act of Parliament could alter the rule, and in England it is still unchanged. Other instances of a similar character, where neither at law nor in equity is there any relief for the wife or creditors, might be cited.

Again, too, it is argued that, as the husband is bound to support the wife, and is liable at law for her necessaries, it is but just he should have her property. But he is not under this obligation on account of the property he receives from the wife, for the same liability exists where she brings nothing to him. The duties of the wife while cohabiting with the husband form the consideration for this burden; and it is only while she is living with him, or when she is driven from him by his own improper conduct, that he is thus bound. Her services as wife and housekeeper are supposed to be a sufficient equivalent for her maintenance. Besides, in these modern times, when the sphere of woman's labor is so much larger than it was in the early ages of the common law, what shall we do with those "exceptional cases" where it is the wife who supports the husband? Is it just that he should have all the property she possesses at the time of marriage, and be supported by her personal labor afterwards? Yet under the common law some distressing cases of this character occurred. The recent statutes of some of the States seem to have settled this question as to who shall be liable for the support of the family upon a proper basis, by providing that the husband's person or property shall be primarily liable, and, if that prove insufficient, recourse may be had to the wife's estate.

Another objection to these changes is the litigation caused by them. The rules of the common law upon this subject, whether they were just or not, were few and simple; and the rights of all parties concerned had become so well defined, that, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, there had been of late but a small amount of litigation under them. But it must be remembered, that this was owing not so much to the justice or expediency of the law itself as to the length of time it had remained unchanged. As questions arose, they were adjudicated upon; and, the law remaining the same, the possible number that could arise under it grew less every year. It was not to be expected that a radical change could be made in laws to which men had been so long accustomed, without giving rise to considerable controversy. The time that has elapsed since the passage of these statutes in the various States of the Union is yet too short to enable us to form any decisive opinion as to what will be their general effect as respects this point. If we compare the cases which have arisen under them thus far with those under the recent liquor laws, or the laws regulating mechanics' liens in some of the States,* we shall perhaps be led to the conclusion that this objection does not apply with peculiar force to these statutes. There seem to be two opposite opinions concerning the object of these enactments, — one, that they are enabling, and the other that they are restraining statutes; the former, that they are designed for what is, somewhat vaguely, termed the "enfranchisement of woman," — of giving her more ample powers over property than the marital yoke formerly allowed, — and the latter, that their object is to *protect* married women, and to secure their property from improvident and dissolute husbands, who might squander it or appropriate it to the payment of their own debts. The titles of the acts in some of the States would seem to give some countenance to this conflict of opinion; for the Pennsylvania enactment of April, 1848, is termed an act "to secure the *rights* of married women"; that of New

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* In the four volumes of E. D. Smith's (New York) Reports, there are seventy-five cases upon the Mechanics' Lien Law.

York, of about the same date, is entitled an act "for the *protection of the property* of married women"; and this diversity of views in regard to the intention of the law-makers has been the cause of much of the litigation that has arisen under these statutes. But the amount of litigation under a statute is no certain index of its justice, or even of its utility. Perhaps more cases have arisen in the construction of the statute of 29 Charles II. c. 3, for the prevention of frauds and perjuries, requiring written evidence as proof of certain transactions, than any other that has ever been enacted; yet its provisions have been incorporated, substantially, into the statute law of all, or nearly all, the States in the Union, and no one denies its general utility, or advocates its repeal.

Perhaps, however, enough has been said to show that justice and the exigencies of social life called for *some* alteration in the law upon this subject. As the common law of England and the United States differed from that of all other nations, and in its essential features had remained unchanged for several centuries, it would almost seem as though the burden of proof was upon those who oppose the present change, to show the adaptation of the common law to the needs of modern society. The recent legislation in the United States, and that of a similar character proposed in England, sufficiently indicate a very general belief that some change was required. But admitting this, and approving the general design of the recent legislation, yet the enactments themselves are, it is true, liable to some serious objections. In the first place, the language employed in some, especially the earlier of them, is of too general and sweeping a character, and this has given rise to much litigation concerning their interpretation. The first section of the New York act of 1848 declares that "the real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry, and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property as if she were a single female." The Pennsylvania statute of 1848 declares that "every species and description of property, whether consisting of real, personal, or mixed, which may be owned by or belong to any single woman, shall continue to be the property of such woman as fully after her marriage as before." Now it is impossible that a married woman can own her property "as fully after marriage as before," or "as if she were a single female." That omnipotent Parliament which "can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman," cannot bestow upon a married woman the absolute rights of property which belong to her while single. The nature of the relation forbids it. The husband himself does not have the same power over, or own his property as fully, as before marriage, but holds it subject to the paramount duties and liabilities which the relation imposes. His real estate is subject to the wife's right of dower, and, if he would dispose of it, she must join in the conveyance. Both his real and personal property is liable to be attached for her debts, and he can have no action against her for the destruction, improper use, or abstraction of the latter, as he could against a third person. Pèrhaps the absurdity of supposing that a wife can own her property as fully after marriage as before cannot be set forth more forcibly than in the emphatic language of Chief Justice Lowrie of Pennsylvania: "The act of 1848 was intended as a protection to the estates of married women, and it was not intended that she should so fully own her separate property as to impair the intimacy and unity of the marriage relation. It was not intended to declare that her property should be so separate that her husband could be guilty of larceny of it, or liable in trespass or trover for breaking a dish or chair, or using it without her consent. It was not intended, by allowing her to use her property 'as fully after marriage as before,' that he should not sit at her table, or use her furniture or house, without her consent specifically given, or that she might have an action of assumpsit against him for use and occupation of her house, or for the use of her carriage, or for boarding at her expense, or that she might obtain a divorce *a mensa et thoro* by an action of ejectment." *

In conformity with this view of the subject, the earlier Pennsylvania decisions, which, interpreting the statute according to the most obvious meaning of the words, held that a married woman must be considered as single in regard to any estate, of whatever name or sort, owned by her before marriage, have been overruled, and, notwithstanding the sweeping words of the act, a married woman does not hold her property as one unmarried, but as if it were settled to her use as a *feme covert.* Accordingly, the common-law disability of the wife to contract is not removed; she cannot borrow money for the purpose of carrying on a mercantile business, so that the goods thus purchased will be protected against the creditors of the husband; her husband must join with her in any conveyance of her real estate; personal property in the possession of the family is presumed to belong to the husband; possession of money by the wife is presumptively the possession of the husband.

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* **Walker v. Reamy, 36 Penn. State R. 410.**

To the statute, as thus interpreted, even those opposed to the recent innovations would find but little to object; but we submit that, under these and other similar limitations and restrictions (for we have not attempted to enumerate them all) imposed by the Pennsylvania courts upon the power of the wife, she does not own her property "as fully after marriage as before," notwithstanding the legislative declaration to that effect. It was long ago said, that it was the part of a judge *jus dicere, et non jus dare;* but we fear that some of these decisions are justly obnoxious to the charge of being "judge-made law." We are not urging here any objection to the policy or expediency of the decisions themselves, but simply suggesting a doubt as to whether the words of the statute, upon any just principles of interpretation, will bear such a construction. If the legislature *intended* what some of the judges have declared it did, most unusual words were employed to express this intention,— *Voluit, sed non dixit.*

The New York statutes of 1848 were silent upon the subject of tenancy by the courtesy. The most obvious interpretation of a clause allowing married women to own their property as fully after marriage as before, or as a single woman, would seem to exclude the husband's right of tenancy by the courtesy. For a woman who owns real estate in which another has or may have upon a certain contingency a life interest, can hardly be said to possess it as fully as one who owns it subject to no such encumbrance. Such would seem to have been the opinion of the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts legislators; for in the statutes of these States there was an express reservation of the husband's right of tenancy by the courtesy. When the question was first presented to the New York courts, it was held that the legislature did not intend to deprive the husband of this right, and some subsequent cases also sustained this view of the subject. They were unwilling to believe that so great an innovation was contemplated. But in a still later case Justice Potter, in a very long and elaborate decision, expressed a contrary opinion in the following emphatic language: "The useless and absurd fiction of tenancy by the courtesy is abrogated, and no longer remains to disfigure the system of common law or the republican institutions of this State."* As these conflicting decisions were held by courts of equal authority, and as the question seems never to have been presented to the court of last resort, it was perhaps a somewhat doubtful question as to whether the legislation of 1848 did abolish tenancy by the courtesy. By the legislation of 1860 the question was settled in regard to all cases arising subsequently to it. By this the husband's former estate as tenant by the courtesy was reduced to substantially the same condition as the widow's dower at common law.

The New York legislature of 1849 found married women with the power to hold property independent of their husbands, but having no power themselves or lodged anywhere else to dispose of it,† and they enacted the following statute: "Any married female may take by gift, grant; devise, or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to her sole and separate use, and convey and devise, real and personal property, and any interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, in the same manner and with the like effect as if she were unmarried, and the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts." Under this section the question has arisen, and been elaborately argued on both sides, as to whether a married woman could make a valid conveyance of her real estate to her husband. Nothing could be more repugnant to the principles of the common law, than that a wife should enter into any contract with, or make any conveyance directly to, her husband. In the Supreme Court it was held in 1852 by a single justice, who admitted that the words of the statute would bear an opposite interpretation, that the safer and more reasonable construction of the statute was to restrict her right to convey to persons other than her husband. In 1860 the same question was again raised in the Supreme Court, and decided by a majority of the judges in the same way. The court held that the disability of the wife was not the mischief the statute intended to remedy, but that the act was, as its title imported, designed for the protection of married women, and that to put it into her power to convey directly to her husband was not a provision calculated to promote this end; and that as by the statute the husband was restricted from conveying to the wife, the intention of the legislature was also to retain the corresponding common law disability which restricted the wife from conveying to the husband, and that where the intent was doubtful, the consequences were to be regarded.* About six months later the question was again raised in another judicial district of the Supreme Court, and the judges were unanimously of the opinion that a married woman could make a valid conveyance to her husband, and one which would bind her heirs. The language of the act was declared to be so clear and explicit, that there was no room for interpretation or construction; that the court had no right to infer that the broad and comprehensive language of the act did not confer on married women this power, because they (the court) did not think it wise for them so to do; that, as the legislature had in express terms limited the wife's power of taking, if they had intended any restriction upon her power of alienation they would have been equally explicit upon that point; that the act aimed to enlarge the powers of the wife, and that the theoretical unity of husband and wife was entirely dissolved by it.†

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* Billings *v.* Baker, 28 Barb. 343.

† Justice Strong in Dickerman *v.* Abrahams, 21 Barb. 551.

The Pennsylvania courts, in interpreting their statute, the language of which is as sweeping as that of New York, have, as we have seen, come to conclusions similar to those of the earlier New York decisions, and have been very decided in the expression of their opinion. "We hold," say the court, in Bear's Administrator *v.* Bear,* "that the act protected the wife's property against the creditors of the husband by protecting it against him. What would the protection be worth, if it made her a *feme sole*, authorized her to enter into contracts with him, and assume pecuniary obligations to him? How long would her property remain secured to her? Such parties cannot deal on equal terms. The wife is even more defenceless than is a ward dealing with his guardian." In another case the court say: "We have gone very far in the way of statutory enfranchisement of married women. Almost all the disabilities, and with them the securities, of the common law are taken from her; and if legislation goes on according to its modern tendencies, she will be left before long entirely competent to contract on her own account, and entirely exposed, therefore, to all the importunities and frauds which her husband or others may be disposed to practise. What will the act of 1848 be worth to her, when she recovers her coveted freedom to alien and encumber her estate at pleasure?"† In Iowa, on the contrary, it has been held that a wife may convey directly to her husband,‡ and under the statutes of Maine he can convey directly to her, if creditors are not thereby defrauded.§

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* White *v.* Wager, 32 Barb. 250.

† Winans *v.* Peebles, 31 Barb. 371.

Other questions of a similar character have arisen in the interpretation of the very comprehensive words of these statutes, but the discussion of them belongs more properly to a strictly legal article; and in respect to those to which we have alluded, it has not been for the purpose of discussing their justice or expediency, but simply to illustrate the defect in the statutes which we have indicated. We have spoken more particularly of the New York and Pennsylvania cases, because the changes in these States were first in point of time, and the decisions have been more numerous than elsewhere. In Massachusetts the statutes concerning married women were of later enactment, and their language was not of so sweeping a character as that of those of New York and Pennsylvania, and thus far but comparatively few questions have arisen under them.

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* 33 Penn. 525.

† Heugh *v.* Jones, 32 Penn. State Rep. 432.

‡ Blake *v.* Blake, 7 Iowa, 46.

§ Johnson *v.* Stilling, 35 Me. 427.

Besides the objection to the statutes from the too sweeping character of their language, there is another, more especially applicable to the earlier enactments, springing from the want of a sufficiently comprehensive view of the common law upon this subject. The rules of the common law relative to the property rights and liabilities of husband and wife formed a consistent and logical whole, the parts of which were mutually dependent upon each other. Starting with the fundamental idea of the unity of the married pair, all their immunities and obligations were logically deduced from it. In changing the law radically in any part, all the others must be considered, else, while endeavoring to improve the structure in one place, we may mar and disfigure its symmetry in some other. Modern legislators, in regulating the property relations of husband and wife, do not seem to have sufficiently regarded this. Their first attempt seems to have been to establish the exact contrary of the leading idea pervading and underlying the common law, and to make husband and wife, so far as property is concerned, entirely distinct persons. This, as we have endeavored to show, is impossible. The mutual surrender of some property rights is an essential element in the idea of marriage. The object of legislation should be, then, to make this surrender such as should be just to both parties. In attempting to modify or partially destroy this absolute unity of the common law, and to secure to woman equal rights, those of the opposite sex have been sometimes overlooked or disregarded, and unnecessary difficulties thrown in the way of creditors seeking to recover their just debts. Thus the Pennsylvania legislation of 1848 allowed a married woman to dispose of all her real and personal property by will, so that, if her husband survived her, he might receive none of it, while by the statute of 1833, which still remained in force, the wife who survived her husband could have, in addition to her dower, one third part of his personal property, notwithstanding any will to the contrary. That is to say, the wife could dispose of all her property by will, while a corresponding right was denied the husband. This, as Chief Justice Lowrie of that State observed, was a "chivalrous generosity which must often have a strong smack of injustice in its application." * This, however, was remedied by the legislation of 1855, which gave husband and wife equal rights in this respect.

The second section of the New York act of 1848 deprived the husband of any right over his wife's property, except so far as it might be liable for his debts contracted previous to its passage. As the most obvious, and, as it seems to us, the only interpretation of the words of the statute, taken in connection with the rest of the act, would have the effect of taking from the husband the right, already vested in him, of reducing the wife's things in action to his possession, it has been held by the courts that, so far as it did this, it was in violation of the State constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.†

The same act, while giving to the wife such absolute power over property, left the husband still liable, as at common law, for her ante-nuptial debts. Although, as we have before seen, the money which the wife might bring to her husband was not the sole reason for this liability, for he was obliged to pay these debts whether he received any property by her or not, yet it would be difficult to assign, since the recent changes, satisfactory reasons why the husband should be so charged. In 1853 this was amended, and now in New York, and in most, if not all the other States where the common law has been changed or modified, the husband is exempted from liability for his wife's ante-nuptial debts any further than the property brought to him by a settlement extends, admitting thus, by implication, that the ownership of the wife's property acquired by marriage was the principal reason upon which this liability depended.

One of the provisions in the Kentucky statutes would seem to indicate that not all the modern legislation upon this subject was designed to give married women a greater control over their property than before, or proceeded upon the assumption that they were perfectly competent to resist the "persuasive potency of their husbands," or to "manage and control as well as any man or single female." This provision, which was

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* Walker *v.* Reamy, 36 Penn. State R. 410.

† Westervelt *v.* Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202.

amended and approved in 1858, prohibits married women from alienating their separate estates previously created, except by the consent of a court of equity, and then only for the purpose of exchange or reinvestment for the same use as that of the original conveyance or devise, and the court is to see that the reinvestment is properly made. Estates created subsequent to the passage of the act cannot be alienated either with or without the consent of the donor, unless the property is a gift, when it may be disposed of with the consent of the donor.* This fettering of the interests of the wife by prohibiting alienation, which is designed to counteract the influence of the husband in inducing her to dispose of her property, when applied to estates created subsequent to the passage of the act, seems open to no valid objection, for it is optional with the wife to accept or reject such a qualified interest. A similar clause is frequently introduced into conveyances or devises to married women, (called the non-anticipation clause,) and its validity has been upheld by the courts of equity while the coverture lasts; and although nugatory during the interval between a first and a second marriage, yet, if the property has not been disposed of in the mean time, the provision re-attaches upon a second marriage. Yet, as applied to estates previously created, the provision seems to be an unwarrantable restriction upon the right of private property. The courts of Kentucky, however, have held that it was within the scope of legislative authority to do this, on the ground that "the mode of translating [*sic*] property from one individual to another was a matter pertaining to its power and duty." † The objection to this reasoning seems to be, that the restrictions imposed upon the power of alienation are so severe, that they amount virtually to a prohibition, and must seriously impair the value of the estates of married women created prior to the passage of the act. The intention of the legislature seems to have been, to secure married women the enjoyment of their property by depriving them of the right to alienate it.

From this brief survey of the various systems of legislation upon this subject, and of the recent changes which have been made in the United States, it will be seen that the law is as yet in a transition state in this country. The greater part of the States have abrogated the leading provisions of the common law, and denied the correctness of the principle upon which they were based. As is too often the case in reforms of any kind, the reformers have rushed into the opposite extreme. Denying the unity of husband and wife when property was concerned, the earlier legislation of New York and Pennsylvania attempted to establish the exact reverse of this, and laid down the proposition that they were entirely independent of each other in this respect. This, taken absolutely and unqualifiedly, was a proposition at least as erroneous as that which it displaced, and one which has since been modified and corrected by legislation and judicial interpretation.

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* Rev. Stat. of Ky., ch. 47, sec. 17.

† Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Monroe, 384.

Theoretically, some one of the various forms of the community system might seem to be the best adapted to promote harmony between husband and wife, and secure equal property rights to both. This neither asserts the absolute unity or disunity of the parties, but constitutes, as it were, a partnership as respects property between them. This partnership, however, is not one which can be dissolved at pleasure; but under it power is given to a married woman who has a spendthrift husband, who is mismanaging or squandering her estate, to have the control of it taken from him and transferred to herself. As in the greater number of marriages there is a common interest, a law recognizing this and in accordance with it would seem to be based upon a better and more comprehensive principle than one which declared husband and wife to be distinct persons when property was concerned. The objection made to this system in England, — that it would be unfair to the husband, inasmuch as, owing to the preference of males to females in the distribution of estates, his property is much greater than that of the wife, — would not apply in this country, where a different and more equitable rule applies to the descent of property.

A more serious objection to this system is the difficulty that would arise in going into the details concerning the respective amounts of property belonging to each at the dissolution of this partnership by death or otherwise. Each case would require some kind of judicial investigation, which would often be disagreeable and troublesome in the extreme. In France, where nine tenths of the marriages are made under the community system, many nice questions have arisen upon this subject of partition, which occupy a considerable space in the French law-books.

But whatever may be said in favor of the theory and system of community, there is one argument of no inconsiderable weight to the professional mind in favor of the separate property system which has been adopted in most of the United States where any change has been made; namely, that the principles upon which it is based have long been recognized and acted upon by the courts of chancery. In fact, the recent statutes are in a great measure but legislative declarations of the doctrines to be found in the decisions of these courts, and go far towards obviating the inconsistencies before alluded to between the courts of law and those of equity. The cases decided in the latter tribunals afford a large number of precedents to aid in the interpretation of the statutes, and furnish the strongest arguments for their justice and utility.

Moreover, by adopting the separate property system, we avoid the numerous provisions and minute details of either form of the community, and the increased litigation consequent thereupon. On the whole, then, the simplicity and brevity of the separate property system, its harmony with our equitable jurisprudence, and the large number of precedents ready made for our hands afforded thereby, as well as the general equity of its provisions, render it better adapted to our institutions and the wants of our society than any of the forms of the *communio bonorum*. Though either party, by insisting on all the rights the law allows, may impair to a great extent the unity and harmony of the marital relation, yet it is perhaps better to rely upon the good-will and affection, or the prudential or other considerations which first induced the union, to prevent this, rather than to leave the weaker party so completely in the power of the stronger as did the common law.

Whether any further changes or essential modifications of the present law are needed, can be better determined after a longer experience of the existing statutes. In those States where legislation has gone the farthest, the property of a married woman seems to be sufficiently well protected from her husband or her husband's creditors, and the statutes of Kentucky aim even to guard it from her own improvidence or impulsive generosity. The married woman still retains her right of dower, or, where it has been taken away, an equivalent has been given; the husband is still primarily liable for her maintenance; she has the use of her real, and as absolute control of her personal property, as her husband has of his, and the same power of disposing of either by will; the earnings of her personal labor and the profits of any trade or business she may carry on are secured to her; and the homestead exemption statutes are adapted for providing for her and her minor children a comfortable home after the decease of her husband. But what is still better than these positive benefits and these ameliorations of the rigors of the old law, there is a general disposition to give a fair hearing to all arguments which may be presented for any further changes, and to make such as justice and the exigencies of social life shall seem to require.

ART. III. — THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPACE AND TIME.

IN the higher metaphysics no ideas are more worthy of critical examination than the ideas of Space and Time, or yield richer rewards to a careful and patient analysis. Ramifying in all directions, they connect themselves with almost every important philosophical inquiry. Before proving the subjectivity of matter and motion, Idealism must first prove the subjectivity of Space and Time; while the doctrine of their objectivity is the impregnable fortress of Realism. By establishing the *a posteriori* origin of these ideas, Empiricism accomplishes its derivation of all knowledge from experience; while, by demonstrating their origin *a priori*, Transcendentalism proves the existence of non-empirical elements in intelligence. By reducing them to the category of mere generalizations from physical phenomena, Materialism takes a vast stride towards the identification of mind with matter; while by showing the impossibility of such a reduction, and profoundly discriminating between general and necessary truths, Immaterialism grounds the generic distinction between physical and mental processes on an indestructible basis. By elucidating the characteristics of these ideas, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge is shown to be greatly abused when so construed as to exclude all absolute elements from intelligence, and is restored to a rational interpretation. By the same elucidation, the origin, nature, and extent of the cognition of infinity are exhibited without the necessity of self-contradiction. And, lastly, an analytic and synthetic exposition of these ideas will be found to conduce greatly to a thorough criticism of philosophical systems, and to furnish a truer criterion of their value in some respects than can otherwise be obtained. Yet, vast as is the importance of an exhaustive and systematic doctrine of Space and Time, it still remains a philosophical desideratum; although its *disjecta membra* might perhaps be gathered from the labors of the past, we are aware of no treatment of the problem conducted upon rigorously scientific principles, combining at once breadth of survey and depth of insight with a methodical development. The following monograph is presented in the hope that it may partially supply this want, and that, however imperfect, it may serve at least as the hint and suggestion of a more thorough analysis.

PART I. ANTITHESIS OF SPACE AND EXTENSION.

§ 1. Before discussing the problem of Space itself, it is necessary to show the essential difference between Space and Extension. The speculations of metaphysics demand the utmost precision of language; and perhaps no single inaccuracy of nomenclature in the whole range of the science implies greater confusion of thought, or has led to more important errors in philosophy, than the use of these two words as convertible terms. Space and Extension, so far from being identical, are in all respects to be contrasted; and although it will be necessary, in distinguishing them, to assume by anticipation some of the results of the succeeding analyses, the intelligibility of the analyses themselves will depend in large measure upon the previous establishment of the distinction. We will, therefore, proceed at once to its elucidation.

§ 2. Extension is the *continuity of matter in Space*, as Protension (to borrow a convenient term from Hamilton) is the *continuity of existence in Time*. There can be no extension unless there is something extended, and there can be no protension unless there is something protended. They cannot be cognized except in necessary connection with some object to which they belong; in other words, they are simply qualities or attributes. The limitations of extension in objects produce shape (figure, form) and bulk; the limitations of protension (duration) produce succession. When extended and protended objects are presented to us, they are immediately perceived; but this is not all. Objects are not only extended and protended, but they must be extended *in Space*, and protended *in Time;* when immediately cognized, therefore, they must be cognized in necessary relation to the conditions of their existence, namely, Space and Time. Space and Time as such, however, are not sensuously perceptible in phenomena, and cannot be derived from them, but are perceived only under the special determinations of extension and protension. By the perceptions of extension and protension, therefore, or, rather, by the perception of objects as continuous in Space and Time, the ideas of Space and Time are developed in the mind as necessary logical conditions of these perceptions; that is, as the absolute and necessary correlates of extension and protension.

It is not necessary to unravel the tangled operations of nascent intelligence, which, on account of the silence of memory and the impossibility of observation, are hidden in hopeless obscurity; nor to frame ingenious hypotheses incapable of verification. Such attempts are an utter waste of labor, and from the nature of the case must forever be barren of results. It is sufficient to analyze the processes of matured intelligence, note their genetic connection, and deduce from these data what must be the fixed laws of thought. When Mr. Spencer claims that what are necessities of thought to the adult are not necessities of thought to the infant, and that adult thought differs *in nature* from infantile thought;* or when he maintains the possibility of a state of consciousness in which the idea of Space is not present;* he deserts the path of rigorous philosophical method to roam without a guide in the fields of wild conjecture. Conditioned and condition, Extension and Space, are necessarily known in an indivisible cognitive act. To quote the admirable language of M. Cousin, the idea of Space in the logical order (*l'ordre logique*) precedes that of body, but in the chronological order (*l'ordre chronologique*) succeeds it;† although in absolute strictness the two ideas should be regarded as simultaneously arising in consciousness. Extension, therefore, which is always an attribute of body, presupposes Space as its *conditio sine qua non.* So likewise of Protension and Time. Now the ideas of Space and Time possess characteristics not pertaining to Extension and Protension; and it is indispensable to our purpose to determine precisely what these characteristics are. For the sake of brevity, we shall confine ourselves in this undertaking to Space alone, since the general characteristics of the two ideas of Space and Time are identical. But before beginning the analysis of Space itself, it is necessary to develop more in detail the antithesis between Space and Extension.

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* Principles of Psychology, p. 254.

§ 3. Extension differs from Space in six important respects. Regarded psychologically, as subjective ingredients of human knowledge, they differ in complexity, logical function, and the faculties to which their cognition must be referred. Regarded ontologically, as objective existences, they differ in their nature, the sources from which their cognition is derived, and the specific character of this cognition. These two departments of the distinctions shade into each other, but the general division is advisable. That our distinction between Space and Extension may be more thoroughly understood and more vividly realized in thought, let it be borne in mind that Space would be unaffected by the annihilation or creation of a universe. Matter may displace other matter, but not Space; for the displacement of Space would be the displacement of place itself. Matter may move in Space; but inasmuch as its extension or continuity must move with it, while the space it at any one moment occupies cannot move at all, matter can simply leave one position in Space to occupy another. Extension is mobile, Space is immobile; the absence, presence, or motion of extended matter leaves Space unchanged and unchangeable.

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* Ibid., p. 231.

† Histoire de la Philosophie du XVIIIe Siècle, XVIIe Leçon. The expression alone is original with Cousin; for the idea, see Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, Vol. II. p. 360, foot-note, *et passim*; Aristotle, Categ., ch. 12, and Metaph. VIII. 8. 2.

§ 4. Extension is a simple and undecomposable notion, while Space is, as we shall see hereafter, the indissoluble synthesis of three distinct elements.

The continuity of matter must be regarded as ultimately absolute, and cannot be explained away by the hypothesis of the repetition of an infinite number of points. If these points are themselves extended, each point must occupy a certain portion of space and be absolutely continuous in that space. If they are not extended, their aggregate sum cannot constitute an extended body; and the perception of extended body is illusory. Unless, therefore, we embrace Idealism, we must admit the existence of an *absolute continuity* in matter as one of its primary qualities, irreducible to lower terms, and therefore existing in our thought as a simple idea. And even the adoption of Idealism will not release us from the necessity of admitting the subjective reality of this simple idea. The triplicity of the idea of pure Space will be shown hereafter.

§ 5. Extension is always, and Space never, a quality; in other words, Extension is always a predicate, Space always a subject.

By this distinction it is not meant that the quality of extendedness or continuity cannot be abstracted like all other qualities, and made the grammatical subject of a proposition; for if that were the case, the very sentence in which the distinction is stated would be its own refutation. But it is meant that Extension, being a mere quality of matter, exists in and through matter; and that, if matter were annihilated, Extension would be annihilated also; whereas Space, not being a quality or attribute, depends for its existence on no other object, and would not be involved in the annihilation of matter. Extension and matter are reciprocally conditioned as subject and attribute, and both are conditioned on Space. Extension must always be predicated of matter, and, except as a predicated attribute, has no existence in thought; but Space can be predicated of nothing.

§ 6. Extension is cognized through the senses and the sensuous imagination, while Space is cognized only through the non-sensuous reason or the faculty of pure intellection.

This distinction is more fruitful of results than the preceding, and demands a much fuller explication. It is not yet necessary to state the grounds of the conclusion that Extension is immediately cognized both by visual and tactual perception; for present purposes it is sufficient to assume the truth of this position, and concentrate our attention on the thesis that the sensuous imagination is conversant with Extension alone, while Space is known by a very different faculty. It seems best in this place to notice the dangerous ambiguity of the words *conceive*, *conception*, *conceivable*, and *inconceivable*, which refer now to the act of the sensuous imagination in reproducing or re-combining the data of sensuous perception, and now to the act of comprehension by the higher mental faculties. Innumerable fallacies have crept into the arguments of the best thinkers from the unwary employment of these vague and shifting expressions; and we take occasion to mention that, in all the succeeding pages, we shall adhere strictly in our own use of the words to the former signification.

The sensuous imagination is that faculty of the mind which creates a *mental representation of objects which have previously been presented to sensuous perception*, or by means of which *new syntheses of these previous perceptions* are formed under the superintendence of the Elaborative Faculty. Sense perceives only qualities of matter, secondary, secundo-primary, or primary. Whenever we see, we see extended colors; and whenever we move, being always subjected to atmospheric pressure, we move under conditions of greater or less material resistance. Absolute vacuity, or empty Space, is never presented either to visual or tactual experience; and even if it were, no perception of it would be possible, inasmuch as it implies the utter absence of matter and material qualities, and no perception would be possible in the absence of all objects of perception. It must be admitted that there is no sensuous perception of pure Space. It follows, therefore, that the sensuous imagination, which can never transcend the data of sensuous perception, forms no conception of absolute vacuity or pure

Space. It has been recorded by medical observers, that, in cases of loss of sight, if the eye alone is disorganized, the power of imaginative vision remains unimpaired; whereas, if the optic nerves and thalami are likewise disorganized, this power is lost. This fact, taken in connection with other considerations, has led Sir William Hamilton to the conclusion that "imagination employs the organs of sense in the representations of sensible objects." * Going a step further in the same direction, we deduce an important corollary; namely, *The sensuous imagination can mentally reproduce no object without at the same time reproducing the physical conditions of the perception of that object.* These conditions, in the case of sight, are light and extension (color and shape); in the case of touch, resistance and extension (solidity and continuity). Hence, in imagining an object of sight, we must imagine it under modifications of color and shape. Conversely, whenever we mentally represent color and shape, we imagine what has been, or, if existent, might have been an object of sight; and this representation is necessarily a conception of the sensuous imagination. The bearing of these remarks will be at once obvious. Extension is, and Space is not, an object of sensuous perception; consequently, extension alone can be an object of representation under modifications of shape and color, while pure Space, whether as finite or infinite, is absolutely excluded from such representation. Neither being perceived in phenomena, nor conceived under phenomenal conditions, Space is known only as the necessary condition of phenomena in the world of matter. That is to say, Extension is cognized only through the senses and the sensuous imagination, while pure Space is cognized only through the non-sensuous reason or intellect.

This simple distinction at once explains why infinite Space is "inconceivable." We can only represent to the mind by the imagination color and extension, which, be it remembered, are only qualities of matter, perceived and conceived under conditions of limitation; *no conception whatsoever of pure Space is possible*, however much the assertion may contradict the ordinary notions on this point. To confirm the foregoing conclusion, we will cite the unconscious testimony of two witnesses, of antagonistic schools in philosophy, who yet evince perfect coincidence of opinion on the question at issue. The one is Sir William Hamilton, who holds the transcendental doctrine, that the idea of Space originates *a priori;* the other is Mr. Herbert Spencer, who holds the doctrine of empiricism, that the idea of Space originates *a posteriori;* both equally confound Space with Extension, which accounts for their singular coincidence of opinion.* We will first quote from Hamilton: —

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* Lectures on Metaphysics, pp. 461, 462, Amer. ed.

"So far, in fact, is the doctrine which divorces the perceptions of color and extension from being true, that we cannot even represent extension to the mind, except as colored." † "In this act [i. e. imagination] I can easily annihilate all corporeal existence, — I can imagine empty space. But there are two attributes of which I cannot divest it, that is, shape and color." ‡ "For example: extension is only presented to sense under some modification of color, and even imagination cannot represent extension except as colored. We may view it in fantasy as black or white, as translucent or opaque; but represent it we cannot, except either under some positive variety of light, or under the negation of light, which is darkness. But psychologically considered, blackness or darkness is as much a color, that is, a positive sensation, as whiteness or redness; and thus we cannot imagine to ourselves aught extended, not even space itself, out of relation to color."§ "But if we do our utmost to realize this notion of infinite extension by a positive act of imagination, how do we proceed? Why, we think out from a centre, and endeavor to carry the circumference of the sphere to infinity. But by no effort of imagination can we accomplish this; and as we cannot do it at once by one infinite act, it would require an eternity of successive finite efforts, — an endless series of imaginings beyond imaginings to equalize the thought with its object. The very attempt is contradictory." [*]

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* "Extension is only another name for Space." (Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 346.) "Extension and Space are convertible terms." (Spencer's First Principles, p. 48.)

† Lect. on Metaph., p. 385.

‡ Ibid., p. 386.

§ Lectures on Logic, pp. 15, 16, Amer. ed.

The following is the passage from Spencer: —

"It [i. e. the experience-hypothesis] accounts for a certain peculiarity in our conceptions of Space, which the Kantian hypothesis does not account for; this peculiarity being, that every conception of Space which can be formed by a single mental act, is limited to such portion of Space as we can have experience of at one time. Let any one attempt to form an idea of the whole surrounding sphere of Space simultaneously, and he will find it impossible to do so. When standing upright, he can very well conceive the hemisphere of Space extending in front of him; but he cannot in the same act of thought include the hemisphere of Space that is behind. On watching his mind, he will perceive that, in thinking of the Space that is behind, he becomes momentarily unconscious of the Space that is in front. If, to get rid of perturbing circumstances, he mentally abolishes the earth and all objects, and supposes himself in an infinite void, he will still find that the infinity at any moment occupying his imagination is the infinity extending on one side of him, and never the infinity on both sides. Now the Kantian hypothesis not only leaves this fact unaccounted for, but is at variance with it; for if Space be a form of thought, our conception of it should be simple, total, uniform, and altogether unrelated to external perception. Whereas, the experience-hypothesis not only accounts for it, but involves it, as an inevitable corollary; for if all knowledge is from without, the conception which we can by one act form of Space cannot exceed the perception which one act can give us of it. To the first theory the fact is an obstacle; to the second, it is a confirmation."

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[*] Lect. on Metaph., p. 387. Contrast the profounder thought of Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Malebranche. "Le vrai infini à la rigueur n'est que dans *l'absolu*, qui est antérieur à toute composition et n'est point formé par l'addition des parties." (Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais, Liv. II. Ch. XVII. § 1.) And again: "Le véritable infini ne se trouve point dans un tout composé de parties." (Reflex. sur l'Essai de Locke, Opp. Phil., ed. Erdmann, p. 138.) "Quantitatem infinitam [esse] mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis, quæ inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt, quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est, quod nos supra jam demonstravimus." (Spinoza, Eth., Pars I. Prop. XV. Schol.) "Car le fini, quelque grand qu'il soit, appliqué ou répété tant qu'on voudra, ne peut jamais égaler l'infini." (Malebranche, Entretiens sur la Métaphysique, Premier Entr., § viii.) So Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, II. 17, § 11.

No one who carefully observes his own mind can question the perfect accuracy of these psychological results. If we identify Space and Extension, it must be confessed that our conception of Space is hampered and embarrassed by all these difficulties; though it may well be wondered how a logical mind can refuse to accept the empiricism which is the natural result of the identification. Spencer is perfectly right in the conclusions he deduces from these premises, and Hamilton is strangely inconsequent. But the distinction between Space and Extension shows on the one hand that our so-called conception of Space is only the conception of Extension, and on the other that the idea of Space must exist *a priori* as the necessary condition of this very conception. Try the experiment; try to represent to the mind Space by itself, and you will discover that you can succeed only in representing some extended color, — blue, gray, black, or some other. But how palpably evident it is that an extended color is not, as Hamilton calls it, "empty space"! Our only conception of empty space is, according to Hamilton, the conception of a colored something which is indefinitely extended; yet color and extension are only qualities of matter, however sublimated or attenuated it may be. Consequently we have only conceived matter indefinitely extended and colored. But every extended object must be *contained in Space;* the more we expand our conception of Extension, therefore, the farther we are from embracing the all of Space. The irresistible impulse of which we are conscious to dilate our conception arises from the logical necessities of the case, and is referrible only to a faculty which transcends the imagination and reveals these logical necessities. The indefinite is the only infinite of the sensuous imagination. Not even by a series of additions which should exhaust eternity itself should we, as Hamilton supposes, approximate the conception of an infinite Space; for Space must still subsist as the eternal condition of our conception. It would be as impossible to overtake the idea of Space by continuing the accretions of imagination through eternity, as it would be to overtake our own shadow by endlessly chasing it. Our inability to represent Space by the sensuous imagination, however, is no argument either for or against its reality or its infinity.

§ 7. Extension is a congeries of infinitesimal units, Space is an infinite unit.

That a cubic foot of iron consists of two halves, that each half consists of two fourths, each fourth of two eighths, &c., is a necessary truth; and of such division there can be no arbitrary termination. But the partition in this case is merely nominal, not real; and it extends so far only as the mind follows out the process in imagination. Since, however, the mind can never complete an infinite series, such divisibility cannot properly be called infinite, but only indefinite. Matter, therefore, is not infinitely divisible in thought. Neither can an infinite division of matter be possible in fact. For, inasmuch as mere division cannot annihilate anything, it could never reduce extended matter to nonentity; and concrete units must still subsist as the condition of all discrete quantity. In other words, matter, while existent at all, must exist as an aggregation of extended parts. The same conclusion follows directly from the consideration that an interminable series, being by its nature aggregated, can never be infinite, since infinity is contradictory of aggregation or number. It having been shown (§ 4) that absolute continuities must be assumed as the elements of composite continuities, extended units of matter actually indivisible by existent forces must be concluded to exist. That greater forces might continue the division is not to be rashly denied; but to suppose that any force whatever could continue it far enough to destroy all ultimate units of extension, is to fall into a metaphysical absurdity. Nothing short of the annihilation of matter would abolish the necessity of the existence of infinitesimal extended atoms; their inconceivability by imagination has no bearing on the question.

The continuity of matter, as *empirically* known by us, is never absolute. Experiment has yet found no limit to the divisibility of matter. On the one hand, the universal compressibility of matter disproves the absolute character of its extension as perceived by us, by proving the existence of pores or vacua; on the other hand, its impenetrability or ultimate incompressibility proves the existence of ultimate resistant atoms, inasmuch as an infinity of non-resistances could never constitute resistance. From the two starting-points of solidity and extension, therefore, the two primary qualities of matter, we equally arrive at the same necessity of the existence of infinitesimal extended and resistant atoms or units. The infinite unity of Space, though apparently a self-contradiction, will be demonstrated hereafter.

§ 8. Extension is presented to cognition *a posteriori*, Space *a priori*.

The space-predicates of body are extension (dimension, continuity, &c.), magnitude (bulk, size, &c.), figure (shape, form, &c.), position (place, location, situation, &c.), distance, and direction. It is believed that all others are either synonymous with these, or reducible to them. Of the six, extension is primary or absolute; the rest are secondary or relative. Magnitude being quantity of extension, as determined by reference to some special limited extension assumed as the unit of linear, superficial, or cubic measure, and figure being the mutual relations of the surfaces of limited magnitudes, magnitude and figure are plainly nothing but relations among the limits of extension. Direction being the relative bearing of two positions, and distance being the length of a right line conceived to exist between them and measured by a linear unit, are nothing but relations of position. Position itself is empirically known only as a relation among objects; and although every single object must have absolute position in the sense of occupying a certain part of Space and no other, still even this is a *relation* between the object and pure Space; a relation, moreover, which, from the nature of one correlate, Space, is inconceivable. But absolute continuity, which in an ultimate unit of matter is limited, and in Space is unlimited, although in both cases equally inconceivable by the imagination, is psychologically a simple idea, and does not of itself involve any other idea. It is true, every minimum of matter, being limited in continuity, must of necessity have surfaces or extremities among which exist relations of magnitude, form, position, distance, and direction; but these predicates are involved, not in the continuity itself, but only in its limitation, as is evidenced by the fact that the continuity of Space does not involve them. Moreover, there being actually no such thing as absolute rest in Space, although Space itself is in absolute rest, every unit of matter is forever changing its position with reference to Space, while its continuity remains unchanged,—another proof that continuity or extension is the only absolute space-predicate of matter. It may be observed, by the way, that the mobility of Extension, as thus contrasted with the immobility of Space, would alone necessitate a distinction between the two.

Extension and its modifications, magnitude, form, position, distance, and direction, being thus the space-predicates of matter, it remains to determine which of them are immediately perceived by the senses, and also by which of the senses we perceive them.

Extended matter is the sole object of immediate sensuous perception; except as extended, matter is imperceptible. By whatever senses, therefore, we immediately cognize matter, we immediately cognize its extension. Science and philosophy teach us that this extension cannot, except in the ultimate units of matter, be absolute; but the breaks of continuity in densely compacted substances, as a polished metallic surface, for instance, are imperceptible on account of the imperfection of the senses. The real discontinuity, therefore, is apparent continuity; and, considering the question from the psychological point of view, we do perceive matter as strictly continuous. It is indubitable that all the senses are modifications of touch;[*] but, setting aside the obscure problem of the perceptibility of extension by hearing, smell, and taste, and the relative proportions of sensation and perception in the activity of those senses, we will confine ourselves to the cases of sight and touch proper.

Now the five modifications of extension above described are all *relations* among the limits of extension; and inasmuch as relations cannot possibly be objects of sensuous perception, but only of a higher faculty, it follows that extension alone, and not its modifications, is immediately cognized by sense.

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[*] Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph., p. 374.

Whether these relations can in any way be cognized immediately, or only by a process of inference, it is unnecessary here to inquire, and the problem may be postponed to a future occasion; suffice it to say, that if we really *know* the objective relations of things, there must be some faculty of pure and immediate cognition of relations. The subject of the present inquiry has been narrowed down to this: Do we obtain immediate knowledge of extension through touch, through sight, or through both? And as all who admit any really immediate knowledge of matter whatever admit also the cognizability of extension by touch, and as we do not here propose to refute Idealism, we may still further narrow the inquiry as follows: *Is extension visually perceptible?*

Berkeley argues that color, which is universally admitted to be the only immediate object of vision, is also universally admitted not to be "without the mind"; and that, therefore, since the extension of color must exist where the color itself is, the extension also must be in the mind.* This argument stands or falls with the general theory of Idealism. As to the question whether the perceptions of extension and color mutually involve each other, he professes himself unable to decide.† Sir William Hamilton replies to all scepticism on this point by the argument that, inasmuch as we perceive two different colors in juxtaposition, and inasmuch as their mutual limitation affords a breadthless line of demarcation, the perception of linear extension is given in that of the colors.‡ Against this argument, which we regard as conclusive, Mr. Spencer retorts as follows: "Superficial extension cannot be conceived except as the attribute of something separate from consciousness,— something belonging, not to the mind, but to an object out of the mind. That is to say, it implies the idea of outness, or, in other words, the idea of distance. Hence, as it is admitted that distance is knowable only through experiences of motion, it follows that visible extension is knowable only through such experiences." §

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* New Theory of Vision, § xliii.

† Ibid., § cxxx. Condillac is more dogmatic, and gives up the objectivity of Extension. Traité des Systèmes, Œuvres Complètes, Tome II. pp. 136, 139.

‡ Lectures on Metaphysics, pp. 383, 385.

§ Principles of Psychology, p. 220.

The reason assigned by Berkeley for holding that distance is not visually perceptible, is this: "For distance being a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter." * This reason must be admitted to be valid, so far as relative distance is concerned, that is, the greater or less distance between the perceived color and the eye; but is it equally valid as regards merely the externality of the color? One of two things is certain: in the primary visual act, the color must either seem to be in contact with the eye, or not to be in contact with it. Now, if the latter is the case, the idea of indefinite distance is indissolubly associated with the perception of the color. But if the former is the case, then the visual perception is on a par with any other tactual perception; and, it being admitted that tactual perception in general involves the idea of outness, it must equally be admitted that the visual perception involves the idea of outness. Moreover, without framing any hypothesis as to the how or the why, it is certain that the perception of objective extension is indissolubly linked with the subjective sensation consequent upon contact between an object and a sensitive surface; and, inasmuch as more or less of the retinal surface is affected whenever an object is seen, and inasmuch as it is admitted that sight is reducible to touch, it follows that, if extension is tactually perceptible, it is also visually perceptible. These considerations not only set aside Spencer's attempted refutation of Hamilton's argument, but strengthen the conclusion of the latter, that the perception of extension is included in the perception of color. Another argument, equally strong, and tending to the same conclusion, is this. No object is perceptible to sight unless it subtends in the eye a visual angle of a certain magnitude (*minimum visibile*); and the object is thus, as it were, the base of a triangle whose sides are formed by the rays reflected from its extremities. Now unless the base of this triangle possesses a perceptible continuity, or extension, or length, it will not subtend an angle of the requisite magnitude, and will therefore fall below the limit of the *minimum visibile*, and become altogether imperceptible. The perceptibility of the object, therefore, depends absolutely on the perceptibility of its extension or continuity.

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* New Theory of Vision, § ii.

The cognition of Extension, being thus an essential element of visual and tactual perception, evidently originates *a posteriori*, that is, is derived from experience alone. But pure Space, not being contained in sensuous data, either as a perceptible object or as an attribute of perceptible objects, must be known in some other way than by experience. Since the only possible sources of knowledge are the *ego* and the *non-ego*, and since the idea of Space is not derivable from the *non-ego*, it follows that it must be derived from the *ego*, that is, *a priori*. How the idea is shown, notwithstanding its subjective origin, to correspond necessarily with an objective fact, will appear below.

§ 9. Extension is mathematically, and Space metaphysically, cognized.

Mathematicians are not agreed as to the precise object of mathematical cognition. According to Price, "the subject-matter of geometry is space, abstracted from all consideration of the space which we occupy, and in which we are; and the science consists in the development of this idea of space." * According to Montferrier, mathematics in general is "the science of quantities"; and, defining extension as "the limited space occupied by an object," he defines geometry as the "science of extension." † Wronski defines mathematics as the "science of the laws of space and time." ‡ Comte defines it as having for its object the "indirect measurement of magnitudes," or "the determination of magnitudes by means of each other, according to the exact relations existing among them." § According to Descartes, "order and measurement" are the objects of mathematics.[*] Hamilton uses the following explicit language: "Without inquiring into the reality of existences, and without borrowing from or attributing to them anything, arithmetic, the science of discrete quantity, creates its numbers, and geometry, the science of continuous quantity, creates its figures; and both operate upon these their objects in absolute independence of all external actuality. The two mathematical sciences are dependent for their several objects only on the notion of time and the notion of space,—notions under which alone matter can be conceived as possible, for all matter supposes space, and all matter is moved in space and in time. But to the notions of space and time the existence or non-existence of matter is indifferent; indifferent consequently to geometry and arithmetic, so long at least as they remain in the lofty regions of pure speculation, and do not descend to the practical application of their principles. If matter had no existence, nay, if space and time existed only in our minds, mathematics would still be true; but their truth would be of a purely formal and ideal character,—would furnish us with no knowledge of objective realities."[†]

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* Treatise on Infinitesimal Calculus, Vol. III. p. 8.

† "Les mathématiques, considérées dans leur ensemble ou comme formant une seule science, peuvent être définies: *la science des quantités*." (Encyclopédie Mathématique, Tome I. p. xiii.) "L'objet général de cette science est, comme nous avons dit (Tome I. p. 14), l'espace particulier occupé par un objet physique dans l'espace absolu et sans limites qui s'étend en tous sens autour de nous. L'espace limité occupé par un objet se nomme l'*étendue* de cet objet." (Ibid., Tome IV. p. 3.)

‡ "La science des lois du temps et de l'espace." (Ibid., Tome I. p. xiv.)

§ "Nous sommes donc parvenu maintenant à définir avec exactitude la science

A definition somewhat more comprehensive than any of the foregoing seems to be needed. All mathematical symbols whatsoever represent quantities or their relations, and all syntheses of these symbols into equations and formulæ, from the simplest up to the most complicated and abstract, still represent relations among quantities. We will therefore hazard the following definition:—Mathematics is the *Science of Quantities and Quantitative Relations.* It branches into the three grand divisions of Algorithmy, the science of Number; Geometry, the science of Extension; and Phoronomy, the science of Motion.[‡]

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mathématique, en lui assignant pour but, la mesure *indirecte* des grandeurs, et disant qu'on s'y propose constamment de déterminer les grandeurs les unes par les autres, d'après les relations précises qui existent entr'elles" (Cours de Philosophie Positive, Tome I. p. 129.)

[*] "Illa omnia tantum, in quibus *ordo* vel *mensura* examinatur, ad mathesin referri." (Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, s. v. *Mathématiques.*)

[†] Lectures on Logic, p. 380. Compare the passages there referred to,—Esser's System der Logik, p. 355, and Fries's System der Logik, p. 409.

[‡] "En effet, il nous suffit de faire observer que la *quantité* est dite géométrique, lorsqu'elle se rapporte au plus ou moins d'espace occupé par un objet: on la nomme alors l'*étendue* de cet objet; et qu'elle est dite numérique, lorsqu'elle se

It is geometry alone, with its subdivisions of elementary geometry, trigonometry, descriptive geometry, and analytical geometry, which is concerned in our present discussion. The problem is briefly this, — Is pure Space, Extension in the sense of limited spaces, or Extension in the sense of the continuity of body, the object-matter of the science? And inasmuch as quantities and their relations are confessedly the sole objects of mathematical cognition, the problem is still further reduced to this, — Does pure Space, whether as unlimited or as limited, come under the category of quantity?

The word *quantity* is defined as "that which is susceptible of augmentation or diminution."[*] But every geometrical quantity or magnitude susceptible of augmentation or diminution must possess definite limits, since it is the mutual recession or approximation of its limits which constitutes its augmentation or diminution. Space, therefore, as an illimitable totality, cannot be called an *infinite quantity* without a contradiction in terms. It avails nothing to reply that this term cannot be self-contradictory, because the higher mathematics habitually employ it in the calculus, and attain true results by its use; for the word *infinite* in mathematical usage denotes inconceivable or immeasurable greatness, not absolute negation of limitation in all directions. The expressions "different orders of infi-

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rapporte au plus ou moins des parties dont l'objet est composé: on la nomme alors le *nombre* de cet objet. Le *nombre* et l'*étendue* forment donc deux objets généraux des mathématiques qui se divisent ainsi en deux branches fondamentales, en deux sciences distinctes: la *science des nombres* ou *l'algorithmie*, et la *science de l'étendue* ou la *géométrie*. Outre ces deux branches fondamentales, il en existe nécessairement une troisième, dans laquelle le temps et l'espace concourent pour former une nouvelle espèce de quantité; cette quantité, différente de l'*étendue* et du *nombre*, mais participant de l'une et de l'autre, est le *mouvement*. Nous avons donc encore, comme branche fondamentale des mathématiques, la science du *mouvement* ou la *Phoronomie*." (Encyclopédie Mathématique, Tome I. p. xiv.)

[*] Par quantité, on entend ordinairement tout ce qui est susceptible d'*augmentation* ou de *diminution*, — un objet matériel, par exemple, tel qu'un monceau de sable, ne nous apparait, en faisant abstraction de sa nature physique, que comme un aggrégat de parties, c'est-à-dire comme une quantité plus ou moins grande, susceptible d'être augmentée en ajoutant de nouvelles parties, ou d'être diminuée en retranchant quelques unes de celles-ci que la composent. En outre, la portion d'espace que ce monceau occupe est elle-même une *quantité*, qui peut croître ou decroître selon qu'on ajoute ou qu'on retranche des parties composantes, ou encore selon que ces parties sont plus ou moins pressées les unes contre les autres." (Ibid. p. xiii.)

nites," "infinity squared," etc., must not blind us to the fact that the real infinite can never be a term in an actual quantitative relation.

But, admitting that the term *quantity* is applicable solely to the finite, and that therefore Space as an infinite whole is excluded from the category of quantity, it is nevertheless contended by nearly all mathematicians that finite spaces, or the portions of space occupied by determinate magnitudes, are mathematically cognized. Our citations from Montferrier have shown that, defining extension as the "limited space occupied by an object," he regards that extension as the object of geometrical cognition. It is unnecessary to mention other mathematicians who hold the same opinion; but they are numerous. Our argument, therefore, must concentrate itself on this point, and show if possible the untenability of the opinion in question.

Recurring to the definition of quantity above cited, and bearing in mind that a geometrical quantity exists solely in and through its definite limitation, it will be evident that such an expression as "limited space" is self-contradictory. Not to insist on the fact that we invariably regard Space as illimitable, and that what is true of the whole is equally true of its so-called parts, it will be sufficient to say here that no arbitrary limitation can create any break in the continuity of Space, and to refer for a fuller consideration of this point to the psychological analysis given below. For it will, of course, be replied, that by a "limited" space is only meant an "enclosed" space, and that, since arbitrary limits do necessarily enclose more or less space, our criticism of the definition is a mere verbal quibble.

But, considering the nature of geometry itself, it will be manifest that, while elementary geometry begins with figures, analytical geometry, inasmuch as all its algebraic formulæ are interpretable into points, lines, and surfaces, ends with figures; in a word, that all geometrical ratiocination is based on construction. From the definition of a triangle up to the generation of the hyperbolic paraboloid, the entire science depends on the figuration of points, lines, and surfaces, either objectively on paper, or subjectively in imagination. Consequently, since surfaces as the limits of solids, lines as the limits of surfaces, and points as the limits of lines, are the ultimate elements of all construction, it will be necessary to consider what the figuration of points, lines, and surfaces involves. Now, at the very outset, we find a striking want of harmony between the mathematical definitions of these ultimate elements, and their actual realization on paper or in imagination. A point is position without extension, — a line is length without breadth, — a surface is length and breadth without thickness; but, as such, they are, according to the admission of geometers themselves, neither presentable to perception nor representable by imagination. Actual limits must either be perceived or conceived, as the necessary data of geometrical reasoning; and from this it follows that geometrical operations and investigations are absolutely impossible without the aid of sensuous symbols. The dependence of geometry as a science, therefore, upon the faculties of perception and sensuous imagination, is seen to be absolute and unconditional; and inasmuch as these faculties are conversant with Extension only, and not with Space, it follows that the object-matter of geometry is, not Space, but Extension.

Against this it will be argued, that all these symbols are imperfect and inexact; that geometrical formulæ, being absolutely exact, cannot be true of the symbols to which they but qualifiedly apply, but must be true only of the things symbolized, namely, points, lines, and surfaces, as geometrically defined; and that, therefore, since mathematical points, lines, and surfaces are not found in Extension, whether perceptively or imaginatively cognized, they must be properties of pure Space. Consequently it will be concluded that, though employing sensuous symbols in its processes, geometry reveals actual relations among the parts of Space, which must, therefore, be its object-matter.

The reply to this counter-argument is as follows. Geometrical quantities, that is, points, lines, and surfaces, and the quantitative relations existing among them, are the sole objects of geometrical cognition; intuitions of points, lines, and surfaces, and equations or general formulæ expressing their relations, constitute the science of geometry. The existence of the relations is necessarily conditioned on the existence of quantities; and, since we admit without reservation that the sensuous symbols employed are indeed inexact representations of the real objects of geometrical cognition, it is necessary to define our conceptions of these objects, that is, to determine what actually existent points, lines, and surfaces are, in their objective reality. Now on this point there can be but one opinion. A given solid cube being presented in Space, its surfaces are manifestly nothing apart from the cube itself, but are simply the terminations of its extension in various directions; the only existences are Space and the cube, the general surface not constituting a third independent existence. Similarly, the bounding lines are merely the terminations of the surfaces, and the points, or vertices of the angles, are merely the terminations of the bounding lines. But the relations among these surfaces, lines, and points are unaffected by the physical nature of the cube; and whether the cube consist of iron, or wood, or any other substance whatsoever, so long as the amount of its extension remains unchanged, the geometrical relations remain unchanged. But if it be possible to suppose the cube absolutely annihilated, the bounding surfaces, lines, and points, not being distinct from the body bounded, are likewise annihilated. They are simply *limits*, and are therefore absolutely conditioned on the object limited; and all mathematical formulæ, expressions, or equations, representing their mutual relations, become objectively valueless on the annihilation of the object. The mathematical definitions are strictly correct; the point really has no extension, the line no breadth, the surface no thickness, and the reason is, that they exist only as the limits or terminations of extended matter. For this very same reason, they are inconceivable by themselves; and all sensuous symbols are necessarily inexact, without thereby affecting the absolute exactitude of mathematical formulæ, which are not based on these negative conceptions of limitation, but on positive conceptions of the extension they limit. But without positively perceiving or conceiving the object limited, mathematical cognition is impossible; hence mathematical equations and formulæ possess objective validity so long only as the objects exist, and subjective validity so long only as their sensuous representations exist. The only possible escape from this conclusion is to suppose that the annihilated cube leaves an impression of its form as a residuum in pure Space, which in some inexplicable way becomes an object of mathematical cognition; than which no supposition could be more absurd. The most abstract conception of a cube in pure Space is that of a delicate framework of edges, supposed to remain after the rest of the cube has been removed; and the absence of the interior portion has led to the false notion that this framework of edges is a conception of pure Space. If we try to retain a conception of the cube, however, after abolishing this residual framework, the illusion becomes manifest; and nothing is then clearer than that the representation of form, independent of material images, is a psychological impossibility. Points, lines, and surfaces, existing both in nature and in thought only as the limitations of objects, are conditioned on the existence of matter; and since they are only modifications or limitations of Extension, it follows that Extension is the sole object of geometry.

But still it may be retorted, that, granting all this, it remains true that limited spaces are quantities, and therefore geometrically cognizable. Let a cubic yard of matter be sensuously conceived. From this cube of matter let all the interior be supposed to be removed and not replaced by other matter, (a supposition which involves no self-contradiction,) leaving only six superficial laminæ of absolutely inappreciable thinness. It must be admitted that they include pure Space, unless we would fall into the absurdity of supposing a part of the universe possible in which Space does not exist. Now although these laminæ do not limit Space in the sense of breaking its continuity, they do limit it in the sense that the Space *included by them* does not extend beyond them; hence the pure Space enclosed is limited, in so far as segregated or distinguished from the rest of Space by definite limits. But since these limits differentiate a portion of Space from infinite Space by exactly mensurable dimensions, which are mathematically cognized, we may say in absolute strictness that the cubic yard contains *twenty-seven cubic feet of pure Space mathematically cognized as a given quantity.*

To this we reply as follows. The simple fact that it makes absolutely no difference whether we conceive the laminæ as enclosing matter or as enclosing pure Space, proves demonstratively that the attention is entirely abstracted from the interior of the cube, and entirely concentrated on the sensuously-conceived surfaces; in a word, that the object of our mathematical cognition is, not the *contents* of the laminæ, but the *laminæ themselves as mutually related.* Three edges of the cube, meeting at the same solid angle, are measured by reference to a certain unit of extension, namely, a foot; each contains three units of extension, and their product is twenty-seven units of extension. Now how is it that these twenty-seven units *of extension* are transmuted into twenty-seven units *of Space?* Does the multiplication of a quantity change its nature? Or is it not rather self-evident that every product must be of the same nature as its factors? Extension, whether of one, two, or three dimensions, is still Extension, and not Space. The twenty-seven cubic feet, therefore, are not to be taken as the measure of the Space enclosed, but simply of the quantity of extension possible within the bounding laminæ, which with their mutual relations are the real objects of geometrical cognition. No philosophical mathematician of the present day defines an angle as the quantity of Space enclosed by its sides; and the day is at hand when no philosophical mathematician will so define geometrical solids. We by no means deny, but rather affirm, that these solids do enclose pure Space; what we deny is, that this enclosed Space is the object of mathematical cognition, rather than its enclosing limits and their mutual relations.

In fine, that there can be no mathematical analysis of pure Space follows directly from the fact that it is absolutely continuous, illimitable, and indivisible; for that which has neither parts nor limits can sustain no mathematical relations with itself. That is, no mathematical cognition is possible of an absolute vacuity, wherein no points, lines, and surfaces are conceived to exist; for without these there could be no relations of number and quantity, which would have no basis of existence where things to be numbered and measured were absolutely absent. An infinite unit can bear no numerical or quantitative relation with itself, being secluded by its very nature from all mathematical categories. Only when specialized or determined in extension, which it underlies and renders possible, does it admit of computation or measurement. It cannot even be said that we know pure Space as possessing three dimensions; for Altitude, Latitude, and Longitude are cogitable only through the mental representation of three lines intersecting mutually at right angles, which representation, being possible through sensuous symbolism alone, is a representation, not of Space, but of Extension. The very word *dimension* implies mensurability, a predicate inapplicable to pure Space. If we could frame non-sensuous conceptions of dimension, we could cognize Space as tridimensional; as it is, however, we can cognize it, as such, solely in and through Extension.

We cannot close this section without briefly referring to a possible perversion of our doctrine. It may be said that, if the annihilation of matter would involve the annihilation of all mathematical relations, then mathematics becomes purely contingent in its character, and is degraded from the rank of an absolute science to that of the physical sciences. We cannot here discuss a question which goes down deep into the very foundation of the universe. Suffice it to say, that mathematical law is the *form* of matter, or that in accordance with which alone matter can exist. In a word, mathematical law is a part of the ultimate Nature of Things, on which we evermore abut, — uncreated, eternal, absolutely unconditioned; yet, if all things were abolished, there would be no Nature of Things *except as the law of their possibility.** This shows that mathematics could not exist as a science, if matter had never existed; and yet that matter depends absolutely on mathematics, and not reciprocally.

The metaphysical nature of the cognition of pure Space will presently be developed, and need not be here anticipated.

§ 10. The antithesis of Space and Extension may be summed up as follows: —

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* Compare the striking phrase of Baggesen, Philosophischer Nachlass, Vol. II. p. 150: "Die Trias von Zeit, Raum, und Zahl ist, in ihrer nothwendigen ursprünglichen Uebereinstimmung, *die Grundform der Schöpfung*, und somit in ihrem Unterschiede das ewige Gesetz des Weltalls."

A. *Subjective Distinctions:* —

1. Extension is a simple idea, Space a complex idea.

2. Extension is always a predicate, Space always a subject.

3. Extension is known by sense and imagination, Space by pure intellect.

B. *Objective Distinctions:* —

1. Extension is a congeries of infinitesimal units, Space an infinite unit.

2. Extension is known *a posteriori*, Space *a priori*.

3. Extension is an object of mathematical science, Space an object of metaphysical science.

§ 11. Before leaving this department of our subject and entering upon the discussion of Space itself, it may be well to present a synoptical table of the possible consequences of identifying and distinguishing the ideas of Space and Extension.

Tabulated Synopsis.

Space and Extension Identified.	1. Space Infinite: — matter must likewise be infinite. Cartesian and Spinozistic tenet. 2. Space Finite: — matter must likewise be finite. Paralogism;* see below, Psychological Analysis. 3. Space Ideal: — matter must likewise be ideal. Logical result of the Kantian system.
Space and Extension Distinguished.	4. Space Infinite, Extension Infinite: — the distinction vanishes. This case coincides with No. 1. 5. Space Finite, Extension Finite: — ditto. This case coincides with No. 2. 6. Space Ideal, Extension Ideal: — the ideality of one involves that of the other. But the distinction itself disproves the ideality. 7. Space Finite, Extension Infinite: — a contradictory and unmeaning proposition. 8. Space Infinite, Extension Finite: — matter must be finite.

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* "Non si può fuggir il vacuo, ponendo il mondo finito." Giordano Bruno, Letter to Michel di Castelnovo, prefixed to *De l'Infinito Universo e Mondi* (ed. Wagner).

For the sake of completeness, we have here exhibited all the possible suppositions: but of the eight, only the 1st, 3d, and 8th have, so far as we know, ever been defended. Either an infinite Space is permeated with an infinite matter, or else an infinite Space contains a finite matter. In the former case, we adopt the absolute *plenum* of Descartes; it then becomes as legitimate to say that matter contains Space as that Space contains matter, the ground of distinction between Space and Extension is lost, the dogma that Extension constitutes the interior essence of matter, and the theory of vortices, follow by a natural transition, and the most indefensible parts of Cartesianism are logically necessitated. In the latter case, innumerable absurdities are avoided, and the instinctive affirmations of "common sense" are justified. The only third possibility is the mutual ideality of Space and Extension. Berkeley makes the ideality of extension prove the ideality of matter;* and Kant, while postulating a pseudo-reality of matter, substantially tends to the same doctrine.† As Descartes ignored force (resistance, solidity) as a primary quality of matter, assumed that the essence of matter is extension, and thereby fell into the vagaries above pointed out, so Leibnitz, ignoring extension and assuming that the essence of matter is force, fell into the opposite extreme of teaching that we know matter only as an aggregation of forces, a doctrine which is still held by many who are less conversant with philosophy than with physical science. In this doctrine, however, which Kant adopted,‡ may be detected the germ of his idealistic theory of Space and Time. Inasmuch as all these extravagances are the result of a defective analysis of Space and a neglect of the distinction between it and Extension, the importance of a correct analysis is evident, and the impropriety of using Space and Extension as synonymes is equally evident.§ Empiricism is impossible except through the confusion, intentional or unintentional, of these two terms; for the admission of Space as absolute in itself, and yet at the same time as an object of human cognition, is fatal to the hypothesis that all knowledge is derived from empirical sources. It will appear hereafter how complete is the revolution accomplished by a rigorous adherence to this distinction, in all philosophical systems which, like those of Descartes, Kant, Trendelenburg, Hamilton, Spencer, and others, are based on the fusion of the two ideas.

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* Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I.

† "Ist Raum und Zeit mit meiner blossen Subjectivität gegeben, so hat ja der Idealist recht — so hat ja Berkeley recht." Baggesen, Philosophischer Nachlass, Vol. I. p. 180.

‡ "Die Substanz im Raume kennen wir nur durch Kräfte." Werke, Vol. II. p. 218.

§ James Mill, who identifies the two notions, and makes Space the synonyme of infinite Extension, is consistent with himself and strictly logical when he reduces

PART II. ANALYSIS OF PURE SPACE.

§ 12. The problem of pure Space is threefold, and divides itself into three co-ordinate departments,[*] as follows: —

Psychological Problem. To determine the elements of the idea of Space as a subjective phenomenon.

Logical Problem. To determine the genesis of the idea of Space as an *a priori* form of sensibility, as an *a posteriori* generalization, or as the absolute correlation of a necessity of thought with a necessity of things.

Ontological Problem. To determine the nature of Space as an objective existence.

Psychological Analysis.

§ 13. It was stated as the first distinction between Space and Extension, that, while the latter is a simple notion, the former is the indissoluble synthesis of three distinct elements. Now all

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Space to a purely empirical notion, and considers it as the abstraction of the quality of *extendedness* from the concrete *extended body*. (Analysis of the Human Mind, Chap. XIV. § 4.) Spencer, who makes the same identification, also teaches the empirical genesis of the idea of Space: "Our conceptions of Time and Space are generated, as other abstracts are generated from other concretes; the only difference being, that the organization of experiences has, in these cases, been going on throughout the entire evolution of intelligence." (First Principles, p. 230.) Compare his Principles of Psychology, pp. 53, 231, 233 - 243, 267, 297. So also Stewart, Dissertation, &c., Works, Vol. I. p. 595, Hamilton's edit.; and Samuel Bailey, Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 222, et seqq.

[*] This general division of the problem was suggested by an admirable article by M. Bénard, published in the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*, s. v. *Espace*. In the *Précis de Philosophie*, pp. 119, 121, by the same author, we have found opinions more nearly approximating our own conclusions than those of any other writer.

these constituent elements of the idea of Space are *negative notions*. It is erroneous to suppose that a negative notion is the negation of all thought, and conveys absolutely no knowledge; the contrary is easily demonstrable. If, however, as will be proved, we know Space only by negative characteristics, this simple consideration will sufficiently explain why we can never represent it, either as finite or infinite, by the sensuous imagination.

§ 14. The first of the three notions is that of *receptivity*. Matter is contained in Space, — Space contains matter. Extended matter is the only object of perception and of the sensuous imagination; but the existence of Space is the necessary condition of the possibility of Extension. In other words, matter could not be continuous if Space did not exist; yet Space is not given as an object of positive cognition by any faculty. Every act of the pure intellect is the intuition of a relation between terms; and, the proposition, "Matter is contained in Space," being the formula of the receptivity of Space, the terms of this relation are *Matter* and *Space*, and the relation itself is that of *inclusion*. Now in all instances in which the relation of inclusion is positively cognized, the two terms are alike in kind, as when we say that the pitcher contains the water, or the apple contains its seeds; here both terms are extended matter. But in the above formula the two terms are unlike in kind, and the second is simply a negation of the first. It is true that the formula is not precisely interpretable into "Matter is contained in *Not-matter*," — for time, mind, &c. equally come under the category *Not-matter*, which shows that the terms Space and *Not-matter* are not strictly convertible. As to its receptivity, Space may be defined, "that which is not matter, but which renders matter possible"; or, more briefly, "the immaterial condition of matter"; or, again, "the absence of matter *plus* its possibility." But these definitions do more than simply define Space as one term in the formula, "Matter is contained in Space"; *for they also state the relation between the terms*. So far forth as a single term only, analysis can reach no result beyond this, that Space or absolute vacuity is the *negation of matter;* we cannot go further and say that this *not-matter*, as distinguished from other *not-matters*, is the necessary condition of Extension, without stating the relation between this term and the other term, matter, This very fact proves the absolute necessity which characterizes the psychological relation between Space and Matter; neither term can be thought independently of the other, and the correlation is therefore unconditioned and indissoluble. Moreover, the receptivity of Space is cognized, not by the sensuous imagination, but by the faculty of pure intellection, or the nonsensuous reason: Space cannot be imagined *as containing*, but only *Extension as contained.* When imagination pictures Extension, reason postulates an underlying and including Space; annihilate Extension, and imagination is paralyzed. Space does not exist at all to the sensuous imagination, which is conversant only with that which exists *in* Space. But Reason asserts that, while Space contains and underlies Extension, it is not the Extension contained, beyond which she is silent. The receptivity of Space, therefore, as an idea of the reason, is simply the *negation of matter;* and this is the primary and intuitional element of the triple synthesis, on which the other two depend as logical necessities.

§ 15. The second of the three notions is that of *unity.* All division of Space into parts is arbitrary and seeming only. Extension, so far as perceivable and conceivable, is indefinitely divisible and separable; Space must be indivisible. For suppose it divided into parts, the parts must either be separated or not separated. If they are not separated, Space is still continuous, and the division is illusory, like that of the earth's surface by parallels and meridians, which serve for convenience of reckoning, but indicate no actual partition. But if they are separated, they must either be separated by matter or by vacuity; whereas Space on the one hand is presupposed by matter, and on the other hand is itself, in the absence of matter, vacuity. Consequently Space must be divided from itself by Space, or, in other words, is not divided at all. Hence we see it involves a logical contradiction not to predicate unity of Space. Now human intelligence can form both an imaginative conception and a rational idea of unity, radically diverse in their characteristics because the products of radically diverse mental faculties. Positive unity is the attribute of a complete, bounded whole, limited in the very fact of its completeness, which can be conceived and grasped as one by the imagination; it necessarily involves, on the one hand, complexity of parts, and, on the other, finitude or limitation; it is the unity of matter which we perceive by the senses, or conceive by the sensuous imagination. Negative unity is the negation of plurality and complexity of parts, and is strictly synonymous with simplicity or indivisibility; it involves necessarily neither finitude nor infinitude, limitation nor illimitation, and is perfectly compatible with either; it cannot be pictured or grasped by the sensuous imagination, and is a purely rational idea; it is the unity which is possessed by mind, and is in fact only the condensation of the proposition, "There are no parts." The imagination, from its nature, can represent only the positive unity of Extension, which is unavoidably conceived as a limited aggregate of parts; whereas the reason, cognizing the negative unity of Space as simply the attribute of indivisibility, discovers no contradiction between the unity and the infinity of Space.

In regard to the unity of Space but two propositions are possible, namely: —

1. Space is many.
2. Space is not many, i. e. one.

The propositions are contradictory and mutually exclusive. Now the first, affirming the plurality or divisibility of Space, has just been shown to involve in its very statement a logical absurdity; and is therefore set aside. But the removal of one contradictory necessitates the positing of the other; the second proposition, therefore, which, although utterly inconceivable by the sensuous imagination, is not a contradiction in itself, is necessarily established. The negative unity of the reason, which is seen to be simply the *negation of plurality*, is the second notion of the triple synthesis.

§ 16. The third notion is that of *infinity*. Extension, being only a quality of matter, must be limited; for matter, however vastly extended, must still be extended *in Space*, and is consequently limited by the space beyond itself. Extension, being included, is *ipso facto* limited by the including Space. All limitation of Space, however, is purely arbitrary, and non-inclusive of that which is to be included. For suppose it limited, it must be limited either by matter or by vacuity; but Space is presupposed by matter, and is itself, in the absence of matter, vacuity: consequently Space must be limited by Space, or, in other words, is not limited at all, but is uniformly continuous. Hence we see it involves a logical contradiction and absurdity to predicate finitude of Space. But here again it must be noticed that the infinity of Space is not the infinity of the sensuous imagination, which is merely the indefinite expansion of Extension. The putative infinity of the imagination is simply the *absence* of limitation, whereas the cognized infinity of the reason is the *impossibility* of limitation. The imagination wearies itself in fruitless essays to represent an infinite extension, and gives over its attempt from sheer exhaustion; set a boundary in thought, and, goaded on by reason, which asserts Space still beyond, the jaded pinions of imagination flutter hopelessly onward, until, like Noah's dove, she flies back in awe to her abandoned home. The imagination cannot compass infinity; *but the reason can.*

In regard to the limitation of Space but two propositions are possible, namely: —

1. Space is limited.
2. Space is unlimited.

These propositions are contradictory and mutually exclusive. Now the first, affirming the limitation of Space, has just been shown to involve a manifest absurdity, and is therefore set aside. But this necessitates the positing of the second, which, although utterly inconceivable by the sensuous imagination, is not contradictory in itself. The infinity of the reason, therefore, which is seen to be simply the absolute *negation of limitation*, is the third notion of the triple synthesis.[*]

§ 17. We have thus completed the psychological analysis of the idea of Space as it exists in the human mind. The conclusiveness of the arguments which demonstrate the unity and infinity of Space can only be impugned by impugning the validity of the *reductio ad absurdum.* The general result may be summed up as follows. We know Space only by negative characteristics, and these are cognized, not by the sensuous imagination, but by the non-sensuous reason. Our idea of it is a triple synthesis, the constituent elements of which are three negative notions, receptivity, unity, and infinity; the first is the negation of matter, the second the negation of divisibility, and the third the negation of limitation. To some one of these three, every other possible predicate of Space may be reduced; hence the analysis is exhaustive. For instance, to the receptivity of Space may be referred its penetrability, incorporeity, incorruptibility, &c.; to its unity may be referred its simplicity, uniformity, &c.; and to its infinity may be reduced its immutability, immobility, &c. We have not included necessity in the synthesis, inasmuch as it attaches to the idea of Space as the logical condition of the possibility of Extension, and to each of the three notions as the constituent elements of this necessary idea; but it is not a distinct element in the synthesis.*

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[*] "Non, Ariste, l'esprit ne voit pas une étendue infinie, en ce sens que sa pensée ou sa perfection égale une étendue infinie. Si cela était, il la comprendrait, et il serait infini lui-même. . . . . Mais l'esprit voit actuellement que son objet immédiat est infini: il voit actuellement que l'étendue intelligible est infinie. Et ce n'est pas, comme vous le pensez, parcequ'il n'en voit pas le bout; car si cela était, il pourrait espérer de le trouver, ou de moins il pourrait douter si elle en a, ou si elle n'en a point; mais parcequ'il voit clairement qu'elle n'en a point." — Malebranche, Entretiens sur la Métaphysique, Prem. Entr. § ix.

Logical Analysis.

§ 18. The theories hitherto advanced respecting the genesis of the idea of Space fall into two main classes, that of Transcendentalism and that of Empiricism; the former deriving the idea *a priori* from the *ego*, the latter deriving it *a posteriori* from the *non-ego.* Of the former class, Kant is the originator and principal champion; of the latter class, which is the more numerous of the two, the latest and perhaps most ingenious representative is Herbert Spencer. We shall confine ourselves to the criticism of their arguments. Kant's argument is long, abstruse, and marked with the obscurity of his style and terminology; but we shall endeavor to present it in as clear, forcible, and condensed a form as possible. To avoid repeated references, we refer once for all to the Introduction and Part First of the Critique of Pure Reason.

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* "1°. L'idée de corps est une idée contingente et relative, tandis que l'idée d'espace est une idée nécessaire et absolue; 2°. l'idée de corps implique l'idée de limite, et l'idée d'espace implique l'absence de toute limite; 3°. enfin l'idée de corps est une représentation sensible, et l'idée d'espace est une conception pure et toute rationnelle." — Cousin, Hist. de la Phil. du XVIII° Siècle, Vol. II. p. 138. For Cousin's purpose, the refutation of Locke, this professedly imperfect contrast of Space and Matter is sufficient; but as an analysis of the idea of Space it is scientifically defective and erroneous. Not to mention the omission of receptivity and unity, the necessity and rational origin of the idea are co-ordinated with one of its elements, infinity. The necessity of the idea, psychologically considered, is simply the modality of the proposition, "Space exists"; or, in other words, the energy of its mental affirmation. The origin of the idea is a question extraneous to that of the determination of its constituent elements.

§ 19. Knowledge is of three kinds. Knowledge *a posteriori*, or empirical knowledge, is that derived exclusively from experience; as, for instance, the proposition, "Snow is white." Pure knowledge *a priori* is that which is independent of experience,—not of this or that experience only, but absolutely of all experience; as, for instance, "Two lines cannot enclose space." Impure knowledge *a priori* is that which contains both *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements; for instance, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," contains the *a priori* principle of causality and the *a posteriori* conception of change, which can only be derived from experience. The criterion of knowledge *a priori* is necessity and universality; if a proposition involves the idea of strict necessity, and absolute, not inductive universality, it is a proposition *a priori*. Mathematics affords an example how far we may carry pure *a priori* knowledge independently of all experience.

Judgments are of two kinds. Analytical judgments are those which analyze or evolve distinctly in the predicate what is contained obscurely in the subject, without adding anything to the conception of the subject; for example, "All bodies are extended," a proposition in which the predicate "extended" is involved in the very conception of the subject. Synthetical judgments are those which by means of the predicate add to the conception of the subject a new and augmentative conception; for example, the proposition, "All bodies are heavy," adds the conception of weight to that of the subject, which does not involve it.

Now judgments *a posteriori* are always synthetical, inasmuch as reflection only, not experience, can analyze a conception into its elements. But judgments *a priori* may be either analytical, as in the decomposition of a given conception independently of experience, or synthetical, as in the judgment, "Every change has a cause." Here the conception *cause* is augmentative, and not contained in the conception *change;* yet the judgment possesses the distinctive marks of strict necessity and universality, and is therefore *a priori.* It is an indubitable fact, that synthetical judgments *a priori* constitute the fundamental principles of all mathematical science; for instance, the axiom, "A straight line between two points is the shortest," is plainly synthetical, inasmuch as the conception *straight* is qualitative merely, while that of *shortest* is quantitative. Again, the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, is synthetical, since the conception of the union of 7 and 5 does not contain the conception of their arithmetical sum: this will be still more evident by the substitution of larger numbers. The science of physics likewise lays down synthetical judgments *a priori* as principles; as, "In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged"; and, "In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal";—truths which transcend possible experience. It is thus evident that the most stable of human sciences can have no validity or worth whatsoever, unless we admit the legitimacy of synthetical judgments *a priori.*

Thus is developed the universal problem of pure reason, namely, "How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible?" For look at the indubitable facts. We find the human intellect positing certain propositions, not only as actually true, but as necessarily and universally true; and these propositions are not mere evolutions and analyses of subjective conceptions, to which necessity and universality may well attach, but synthetical assertions laid down as objective laws which govern the universe. Experience cannot be the origin of these propositions, for experience, whether external or internal, can certify only what *is*, never what *must be.* How, then, can reason, independently of and antecedently to all experience of external objects, enact absolutely necessary and universal laws regarding it? The stability and certitude of human knowledge demand imperatively a full answer to this question; and its discovery is one great object of the Critique of Pure Reason.

The solution of this problem, to be intelligible, must be prefaced by a few definitions.

The only manner in which we derive immediate knowledge from objects is by means of an intuition (*Anschauung*).[*] An intuition can take place only so far as we are affected by objects; and our receptivity of impressions from objects is called the sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), which embraces an external and an internal sense. The sensibility alone furnishes intuitions, which, being *thought* (*gedacht*) by the understanding (*Verstand*), furnish conceptions (*Begriffe*). When an object is presented to the sensibility, that which corresponds to the sensation is called the matter of the phenomenon; while that which causes that the various constituents (*Mannigfaltige*) of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, the mould, as it were, in which they are run, is called its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, is not itself sensation.[†] The matter of phenomena is given *a posteriori;* but their form lies in the mind *a priori*, and can be regarded apart from sensation. Now the intuition of the shifting and contingent matter of phenomena is empirical intuition; but the intuition of their constant and necessary form is pure intuition, that is, wholly independent of sensation and experience.

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[*] It is all-important that the peculiar use of this word, which plays so distinguished a part in Kant's system, should be correctly understood. An intuition is the direct contemplation of an *individual object*, whether of sense or of thought; a *looking at* the object, either by the external or the internal sense, and hence the direct product of the sensibility as affected by the object. It includes perceptions by the outward senses, representations by the sensuous imagination, and all representations of *objects* of thought in general as distinguished from the relations of these objects. "The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently the understanding is no faculty of intuition." (Krit. d. r. Vern., p. 69.) Hamilton gives the following as one of five senses of the word: "3. The knowledge which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the term to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of Time and Space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding.)" Reid's Works, Note A, sect. 5, p. 759. See Mansel, Proleg. Log., p. 22, note.

[†] The vagueness of meaning here is irremediable, and, to quote the fine phrase of Montbeillard, should be ascribed to "l'obscurité toujours inhérente à l'erreur." De l'Éthique de Spinoza, p. 18.

Thus, abstracting from the intuition of a body all its empirical attributes, we find extension and shape left behind as the residuum of the intuition; and these, therefore, belong to pure intuition. So much by way of preface and definition of terms.

Space cannot be a conception derived from outward experience. For the first act of intelligence, namely, the distinction between what is within and what is without me, is possible only through a prior representation of Space, as the foundation of this cognition. Without this antecedent representation, I could not distinguish between the different parts of Space, nor discern the difference between *within* and *without*. It is evident, therefore, that, instead of the conception of Space being derived from external experience, external experience itself is only possible through this very conception.

Geometry determines the properties of Space synthetically, and yet *a priori*. Now the source of all synthetical propositions is intuition; mere analysis of conceptions can furnish only analytical propositions. Consequently the origin of geometrical principles must be intuition. But all geometrical principles possess the characteristics of necessity and universality, and therefore cannot be derived from experience. Consequently, the origin of such principles must be, not merely intuition, but pure intuition *a priori*, wholly independent of all experience. Now how can the mind, anterior to all perception of external objects, possess *a priori* knowledge of their relations, and lay down absolutely necessary and universal laws regarding them? Such a fact (and that it is a fact the existence of geometry as a science demonstrates) can be possible only on the supposition that the mind itself creates its geometrical objects in an intuition *a priori*, cognizes *a priori* their necessary relations, and then imposes these cognized relations on outward objects in the very act of perception.* In other words, Space, whose properties geometry can determine antecedently to all objective experience of them, can be only a subjective and regulative intuition, the form of all phenomena of the external sense, the subjective condition of the sensibility in accordance with which alone external intuition is possible. The sensibility is thus, as it were, a vase which imparts its own form to whatever liquid is poured into it, while the liquid possesses no determinate form in and of itself.

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* To show that Kant is not here misrepresented, we cite the following: "Ihr seht Euch genöthigt, zur Anschauung Eure Zuflucht zu nehmen, wie es die Geometrie auch jederzeit thut. Ihr gebt Euch also einen Gegenstand in der Anschauung; von welcher Art aber ist diese, ist es eine reine Anschauung *a priori* oder eine empirische? Wäre das Letzte, so könnte niemals ein allgemein gültiger, noch weniger ein apodiktischer Satz daraus werden; denn Erfahrung kann dergleichen niemals liefern. Ihr müsst also Euren Gegenstand *a priori* in der Anschauung geben, und auf diesen Euren synthetischen Satz gründen." — Krit. d. r. Vernunft, p. 53.

§ 20. Such, in a very condensed form, rearranged and stripped as far as possible of obscurity and technicalities, is the powerful argument for the ideality of Space devised by the most subtile analyst that ever lived. Since his day, the majority of philosophers have accepted as an established fact the *a priori* origin of the idea of Space, even while rejecting the doctrine of its exclusive subjectivity. In regard to Kant's argument, Hamilton expresses the following opinion: "The analysis of Kant, independently of all that has been done by other philosophers, has placed this truth [that Space is a fundamental law of thought] beyond the possibility of doubt, to all who understand the meaning and conditions of the problem."* On the same page, however, he claims that Space is known both *a priori* and *a posteriori:* and this mature position must be regarded as essentially modifying his earlier complete acceptance of Kant's doctrine.† But Kant's argument professes to be demonstrative; and his point is, not merely that Space *is* a form of intuition, but that it *cannot possibly be anything else.* To admit the conclusiveness of the argument, and yet reject the conclusion, is strange enough. If Kant's reasoning is sound, then Space does not objectively exist; but if Space does objectively exist, then Kant's reasoning is unsound. It is treason to intelligence to admit that what is false in fact can be true in logic. There must somewhere be fallacy in the process, if there is error in the result. Notwithstanding Cousin's attempted refutation in his "Philosophie de Kant," he fails to point out the flaws in Kant's argument, and contents himself with an appeal to common sense, and with general criticisms of the whole system. For the credit of philosophy, we hope that some sufficient refutation of this generally rejected conclusion exists, although we have not met it. Meantime we offer the following.

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* Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 346.

† Discussions on Philosophy, pp. 23, 35, 37. His disciple, Mansel, cannot decide whether Space is subjective or not (Prolegomena Logica, p. 82).

§ 21. Against this theory we have two objections to bring forward, either of which, if substantiated, must subvert it. The first is, that from a false premise at the outset a thread of fallacy runs through the whole; this false premise is the *assumed possibility of pure knowledge a priori*, and is based on the neglect of the broad distinction between Space and Extension, upon which we have already laid so much stress. The fact that Hamilton himself is guilty of this same neglect to a much greater degree, accounts for his not detecting it in another. The second is, that, admitting the possibility of synthetical judgments *a priori*, Kant does not account for their necessity and universality, as he professes to do, but merely carries the question one step further back, and leaves it unanswered at last.

§ 22. All knowledge is relative; and the antithesis of a thinking subject and an object thought is the general law of its relativity. It is possible only in accordance with certain regulative special laws of thought. These laws, which are truly *a priori*, and do not depend on experience, are merely the modes of activity to which the mind, from the very nature of intelligence, is necessarily self-determined on the presentation of objects of cognition. Anterior to the presentation of objects, they exist only potentially, as the capacity for knowledge, and are in themselves nothing until actualized as the modes of individual cognitive acts. In thought, the laws and the acts they regulate are separable; in fact, they are inseparable. *The mind cannot create objects of its own cognition;* that were to suppose a pure, spontaneous mental activity, which would violate the law of the relativity of knowledge. All objects must be presented to it, and hence all objects of knowledge whatsoever are, mediately or immediately, empirical. What the object contributes to the act of knowledge, therefore, is *a posteriori;* what the mind contributes is *a priori*. It is thus evident that all knowledge without exception must be impure, that is, must involve both *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements; and the division of it into three kinds, as *a poste-*

riori, pure *a priori*, and impure *a priori*, is consequently deceptive. The laws of knowledge are *a priori*, and absolutely independent of experience; but knowledge itself, being from its very nature the knowledge of objects and of their relations, is not possible until the presentation of objects, and is consequently so far dependent on experience. Laws are known only *in phenomena;* phenomena are known only *according to laws;* hence every act of knowledge involves both an object of the act and laws which regulate the act. Let us take, for example, the proposition, "Snow is white," which appears to be, and according to Kant is, purely empirical. An indivisible object, white snow, is empirically presented to cognition; and according to the *a priori* laws of intelligence the indivisible object is separated in thought into substance (snow) and attribute (white), that is, into subject and predicate. Previous to the presentation, the law which determined this separation had only potential existence; subsequently, it existed only as the manner of knowing the object, the mode of the act of knowledge, although by abstraction it may itself become an object of knowledge. Again, the proposition, "A straight line between two points is the shortest," is claimed by Kant as purely *a priori*, and independent of experience; but points and lines are objects of knowledge, and experience alone can furnish them. Mathematics, which is brought forward by Kant as a "brilliant example" of pure knowledge *a priori*, has been shown (§ 9) to be wholly dependent upon empirical conceptions; number, quantity, unity, plurality, points, lines, surfaces, solids, etc., are conceptions derived from experience, yet mathematics would be impossible without them. Hence we must conclude, that knowledge purely *a priori* and knowledge purely *a posteriori* are alike impossible.

§ 23. It is evident, therefore, that we must slightly modify the question which Kant proposes as the "universal problem of pure reason." It should no longer read, "How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible?" for they are not possible; but "How can any synthetical judgment be absolutely necessary and universal?" which is the real fact Kant means to explain. Induction from experience can warrant only conclusions of comparative universality, the legitimate extent of the conclusion being regulated, *ceteris paribus*, by the number of instances embraced in the induction. But we find geometry and other sciences collecting from a few instances, often from only one, conclusions which are claimed to be coextensive with the universe, and necessary in the nature of things. Since experience cannot be the source of such judgments, what is their source? The important error in Kant's answer to this question is the result of his slight error in stating it. His reply is this. Absolutely prior to and independent of experience, we possess a pure *a priori* intuition of Space in itself, unmixed with any empirical elements; therefore we can determine the relations and properties of the parts of Space irrespectively of external objects; therefore these relations and properties are determined solely by the nature of our own minds, and are necessarily imposed on all perceived objects as the very conditions of their perception; therefore the judgments we pass concerning Space *a priori* will apply necessarily and universally to all objects *a posteriori*; and on no other theory than this of the ideal nature of Space as the mere form of the sensibility, can such necessity and universality be possibly accounted for. Now nothing can be clearer than that by the "pure intuition of Space *a priori*" Kant means the mental image we form of empty Space; but we have shown conclusively (§ 6), that of empty Space, whether finite or infinite, no imaginative conception is possible, and that our putative imagination of Space is really that of Extension merely. It follows inevitably, that, inasmuch as Extension is only a quality of matter, and all knowledge of matter is empirical in its origin, such a thing as a "pure intuition of Space *a priori*" is an utter impossibility. It only remains to show that this is the fair and true interpretation of Kant's phrase, which is easily done by quoting his own illustrations of its meaning:—"We cannot cogitate a geometrical line without *drawing* it in thought, nor a circle without *describing* it, nor represent the three dimensions of Space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which is to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby," &c.* And again, more plainly still: "Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, &c., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, color, &c., yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, *Extension* (Ausdehnung) *and Shape* (Gestalt). *These belong to pure intuition*, which exists *a priori* in the mind, as a mere form of the sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation."* Even if some may be found still disposed to vindicate the imaginability of Space, surely no one will be hardy enough to assert that *shape*, which is merely the quality of Extension as limited in an object, can be other than an empirical representation of the sensuous imagination. Extension with its modification, shape, being only a primary quality of matter, and hence cognized only *a posteriori*, Kant's pure intuition *a priori* reduces itself to an empirical intuition *a posteriori*. Geometry, which according to Kant "determines the properties of Space synthetically, yet *a priori*," is not the science of Space, but of Extension; the properties of Extension are mathematical, and furnish positive conceptions of the sensuous imagination, while the properties of Space (receptivity, unity, and infinity) are metaphysical, and furnish only negative conceptions of the non-sensuous reason. (See § 9.) The mathematical definitions of a point as position without extension, a line as length without breadth, &c., are confessedly impossible to be imagined; and geometry is consequently obliged to represent these notions by sensuous symbols. Thus it is clear that Kant's idealistic theory of Space has its root in the confusion of Space with Extension; and a fatal flaw in the argument is detected.

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* Kritik d. r. Vern., p. 748.

§ 24. The second objection is still more sweeping. The problem is this: How shall we account for the necessity and universality of synthetic judgments *a priori?* We admit unconditionally, that mere induction from experience can never possess these characteristics. We will likewise admit, for the sake of argument, that synthetical judgments purely *a priori* and pure intuitions *a priori* are possible, and actually exist in human intelligence. But notwithstanding these admissions, we maintain that the problem is not solved by the offered solution.

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* Kritik d. r. Vern., p. 32.

For an illustration, let the following theorem be taken: "The sum of the three angles of any triangle is equal to two right angles." We draw or conceive a particular triangle for the sake of the demonstration; and, having gone through a series of successive intuitions, we arrive at last at the demonstrated truth of the theorem *in this particular instance.* This is the utmost that experience will warrant us in concluding. But this conclusion is instantaneously and irresistibly extended to all possible triangles, although such an extension of it is objectively inadmissible without being fully accounted for. The only possible explanation, according to Kant, is to hold that the mind determines this property of triangles in an intuition of Space *a priori;* that this pure intuition, being the form of all empirical intuition, necessarily imposes its own laws upon all our intuitions of objects *a posteriori;* and that thus the theorem is proved strictly necessary and absolutely universal. But this explanation is no explanation at all. It is impossible, says Kant, to derive a universal conclusion from a solitary instance in intuition *a posteriori;* we must derive it from intuition *a priori.* But if a conclusion from a single instance in empirical intuition can possess only limited validity, how can a conclusion from a single instance in pure intuition possess unlimited validity? In either case, the universal is deduced from the particular; what is the difference in the two cases? It does not follow that the theorem is true of all triangles possible to pure intuition, simply because it is true of one, unless it equally follows that the theorem is true of all triangles possible to empirical intuition, because found true of one triangle. In fact, in the effort to escape experience outwardly, Kant unwittingly admits experience inwardly into his postulated intuition *a priori;* but experience is experience still, whether outward or inward, and can never of itself yield a universal and necessary principle. Without some further hypothesis, the problem is left precisely where it was taken up; a form of pure intuition itself must be postulated on exactly the same grounds as a form of empirical intuition; then a form of this form, and so on *ad infinitum.* In reality, Kant did not foresee this difficulty, and makes no provision in his theory against it; yet it renders the subjectivity of Space a purely gratuitous assumption, contradicting the voice of mankind, yet explaining nothing. If we come no nearer to a solution of the proposed problem by taking one of an endless series of steps, the law of parsimony suggests the propriety of omitting that one, thus leaving the solid conviction of "common sense" unassailed. It would be foreign to our present purpose to go further in search of an answer to the really great problem of the origin of necessary and universal judgments; by setting aside an illusory answer to it, it remains still an open question, as before. In fine, we have found, first, that Kant's famous hypothesis in regard to Space and Time, resting on the possibility of pure knowledge and pure intuition *a priori*, is founded on the confusion of Space and Extension; and, secondly, we have found that, even admitting the possibility of such knowledge, the hypothesis fails to solve the problem it was devised to solve.

§ 25. Turning now to the empiricistic view, we will briefly mention the leading points of Mr. Spencer's argument. He professes to fuse the transcendental and empiricistic hypotheses, and reduce them to harmony and mutual consistency.[*] But inasmuch as experience is still regarded as the sole source of the idea of Space, although in a new and modified sense, and inasmuch as the essence of the *a priori* theory is the irreducibility of this idea to the category of empirical cognitions, his attempted reconciliation is evidently merely a partisan advocacy of one of the theories to be reconciled. In regard to the immediate perceptibility of extension, it is impossible to make out a consistent doctrine from Mr. Spencer's statements. On the one hand, he says: "Without doubt, by the adult human consciousness all tactile resistances are unconditionally known as coexistent with *some* extension; and all tactile extensions are unconditionally known as coexistent with *some* resistance."[†] And again: "The two terms of the relation, extension and resistance, cannot be cognized in absolutely the same state of consciousness. . . . . . The apparently incessant presentation of both is really a rapid alternation,—an alternation so rapid as to produce the effect of continuity."[‡] Whence, waiving all criticism of the apparent contradiction, that a coexistence can be a sequence, it is fair to infer that, at least during an inappreciable time, extension is immediately cognized. On the other hand, many passages seem to state more explicitly that extension is not immediately cognizable: "We know extension only through a combination of resistances: we know resistance immediately by itself."[*] "Reduced to its lowest terms, then, extension is knowable as some series of states of consciousness."[†] But while thus denying that Extension is an object of immediate perception, and while identifying Extension with Space,[‡] he still holds to the empirical genesis of the idea of Space,[§] and denies that it is a necessity of thought *per se*,[||] or can be known by us as an absolute existence.[¶] His theory of the origination of the idea is peculiar, and we will present it in his own words: "Body and Space being distinguished as resistant extension and non-resistant extension, it is impossible to treat of extension in any of its modes without virtually treating of them both."[**] "Fundamentally, Space and coexistence are two sides of the same cognition. On the one hand, Space cannot be thought of without coexistent positions being thought of; on the other hand, coexistence cannot be thought of without at least two points in space being thought of. A relation of coexistence implies two somethings that coexist."[††] "All modes of extension are resolvable into relations of coexistent positions. Space is known to us as an infinitude of coexistent positions that do not resist; Body, as a congeries of coexistent positions that do resist."[‡‡] "It was pointed out that our inability to banish from our minds the idea of Space was readily to be accounted for on the experience hypothesis: seeing that, if Space be a universal form of the *non-ego*, it must produce some corresponding universal form in the *ego*, — a form which, as being the constant element of *all* impressions presented in experience, and therefore of *all* impressions represented in thought, is independent of every

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[*] Principles of Psychology, p. 23, foot-note; also p. 577.

[†] Ibid., pp. 208, 209.

[‡] Ibid., p. 514.

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[*] Ibid., p. 266; comp. pp. 191, 218, 224.

[†] Ibid., p. 298.

[‡] First Principles, p. 48.

[§] Principles of Psychology, pp. 233 - 243, 267; First Principles, pp. 229, 230.

[||] Principles of Psychology, p. 231.

[¶] First Principles, p. 231.

[**] Principles of Psychology, p. 230.

[††] Ibid., p. 243.

[‡‡] Ibid., p. 297.

particular impression; and consequently remains when every particular impression is banished."* "For, joined with this hypothesis [the development hypothesis], the simple universal law that the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, requires but to be supplemented by the law that habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative in generation after generation, to supply an explanation of all psychological phenomena; and, among others, of the so-called 'forms of thought.' . . . . . If there are certain relations which are experienced by all organisms whatever, — relations which are experienced every instant of their waking lives, relations which are experienced along with every other experience, relations which consist of extremely simple elements, relations which are absolutely constant, absolutely universal, — there will be gradually established in the organism answering relations that are absolutely constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of Space and Time." † "Corresponding to absolute external relations, there are developed in the nervous system absolute internal relations, — relations that are developed before birth; that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences; and that are automatically established along with the very first cognitions. . . . . . I hold that these pre-established internal relations, though independent of the experiences of the individual, are not independent of experiences in general; but that they have been established by the accumulated experiences of preceding organisms." ‡

§ 26. On this ill-jointed theory we will make but two criticisms, and those brief ones.

In the first place, Mr. Spencer violates the distinction between Space and Extension both in word and in thought. He violates it in asserting that Space and Extension are "convertible terms." He violates it in holding that Body and Space are merely "modes of extension," whereas Extension is a mode, or rather attribute, of Body, and Space is a mode of nothing.

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* Principles of Psychology, p. 231; compare pp. 53, 233, 577 – 583.

† Ibid., pp. 578, 579.

‡ Ibid., p. 583.

He violates it in holding that, while the relation of coexistence implies "somethings that coexist," Space is known as an "infinitude of coexistent positions"; thereby confounding the unity of Space with the plurality of Extension. And, in fine, he violates it in holding that "relations of Space" are empirically cognized; whereas relations of Extension are the objects of empirical cognition, and Space, having no relations with itself, because without parts, is only known *a priori* as the condition of Extension.

In the second place, even ignoring this confusion of Space with Extension and the numerous errors traceable to it, it is absurd to suppose that the *non-ego* could impress on the *ego* its universal conditions or forms, *except in a universal experience*. Experience of only an infinitesimal fraction of the *non-ego*, which is all that is possible to an individual, will warrant no conclusions transcending the exact limits of that experience; whatever conclusions of intelligence do transcend these limits must be derived from other than empirical sources. Even the generalization of the actual experiences themselves presupposes a power not to be derived from them; much more, then, will they fail to account for principles necessarily extended beyond all possible experience, so as to include the totality of the universe. To suppose that the extension of such principles is accounted for by the law of hereditary transmission, or legitimated by the accumulation of experiences in successive organisms, is singularly irrational. Does this hypothesis account for the necessity of the law of contradiction, as well as for the necessity of Space? It cannot rationally be denied that there are absolute elements in thought *per se*, that there is an absolute and necessary nature of intelligence; and to hold the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge in such a way as to deny the existence of these absolute elements, is deliberately to wink out of sight half the data of the great problem offered for our solution. The only way to be consistent in empiricism is absolutely to deny the possibility of the absolute, whether in thought or in existence; and such consistency is, on the very face of it, glaring inconsistency.

§ 27. What, then, is our own answer to the logical problem of pure Space? Is Space a Law of Thought, a Law of Things, or both a Law of Thought and a Law of Things?

That Space is a law of thought has been shown above, in the Psychological Analysis. Whether we can regard it also as a law of things, depends entirely on the theory of perception we adopt. Admitting, as we do, Hamilton's theory of direct and immediate perception of the external world, but one reply is possible. For the nexus between Space and Extension is absolute and unconditioned; if one is subjective or objective only, the other is subjective or objective only. If I do not immediately cognize Extension as an objective reality, there is no ground whatever for assuming the objectivity of Space. But if I do immediately perceive extended matter exterior to my own percipient mind, then Extension exists objectively; and if Extension exists objectively, Space, its *conditio sine qua non*, also exists objectively. The original and central datum of consciousness, namely, the distinction of self from not-self, becomes thus the demonstration of Space as an objective reality. It is unnecessary here to canvass the arguments for admitting this indivisible duality of consciousness; the labors of Hamilton in this field render the investigation superfluous, and have earned for him an imperishable wreath of laurel.

Ontological Analysis.

§ 28. A succinct historical summary of the most striking answers heretofore given in modern philosophy to the inquiry concerning the ontological nature of pure Space, will properly precede the answer to be deduced from the conclusions we have already reached.

Descartes conceived the extension of matter to be its interior essence,[*] and was consequently compelled to accept the Platonic identification of matter and Space.[†] The inevitable and logical corollaries from this theory are the infinity of matter and the impossibility of vacua; the latter Descartes admitted unconditionally,[‡] while the hesitation with which he accepted the former does more honor to his candor than to his philosophical consistency.[*] The same doctrine is likewise expounded by Spinoza, and apparently adopted without modification.[†]

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[*] "Je conçois son étendue [i.e. l'étendue de la matière] ou la propriété qu'elle a d'occuper de l'espace, non point comme un accident, mais comme sa vraie forme et son essence." — Le Monde, Chap. VI.

[†] "La même étendue en longueur, largeur, et profondeur qui constitue l'espace constitue le corps." — Princ. de la Phil., Seconde Partie, § 10.

[‡] "Pour ce qui est du vide, au sens que les philosophes prennent ce mot, à savoir pour un espace ou il n'y a point de substance, il est évident qu'il n'y a point d'espace en l'univers qui soit tel, parceque," &c. — Ibid., § 16.

Leibnitz saw the glaring untenability of the Cartesian hypothesis, and strenuously opposed it, on the ground that, if extension were the essence of matter, it should account for all the essential qualities of matter; whereas the force and natural inertia of material substance are not explicable by extension. He says: "Beside extension, there must be a subject which is extended, that is to say, a substance to which it pertains to be repeated or continued. For extension signifies only a repetition or continuous multiplicity of that which is extended, a plurality, continuity, and coexistence of parts; and consequently it does not suffice to explain the essence of the substance extended or repeated, since the notion of the substance is anterior to that of its repetition."[‡] This is excellently said; and is indisputably true of extension, so far as it is a multiplicity of continuities which are ultimately absolute; but by failing to observe the distinction between Space and Extension, Leibnitz passed, by an easy transition, to the theory that Space itself is nothing apart from material bodies, of which it is the mutual relation, an "order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions."[*] He reasons thus: "Nevertheless, although it is true that, in conceiving body, we conceive something beside Space, it does not follow that there are two extensions, — that of Space and that of body. When we conceive several things at once, we conceive something beside number, to wit, the things numbered; and yet there are not two multitudes, — the one abstract, that of number, and the other concrete, that of the things numbered. So we should not imagine two extensions, — the one abstract, that of Space, and the other concrete, that of body."[†] The annihilation of material bodies, by this theory, would involve the annihilation of Space itself, their mutual relation of course depending on their existence; and the idea of Space, being degraded from the rank of unconditioned to that of conditioned ideas, is no longer necessary, but contingent. This fact has made the theory of Leibnitz a favorite one with the sensationalists, — Condillac, for instance.[‡]

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[*] "Nous saurons aussi que ce monde, ou la matière étendue qui compose l'univers, n'a point de bornes, parceque," &c. (Ibid., § 21.) But this must be modified by the following extract from a letter to Henry More, dated 1649: "Ne regardez point comme une modestie affectée, mais comme une sage précaution à mon avis lorsque je dis qu'il y a certaines choses plutôt indéfinies qu'infinies...... Pour le reste, comme l'étendue du monde, le nombre des parties divisibles de la matière, et autres choses semblables, j'avoue ingénuement que je ne sais point si elles sont absolument infinies ou non." Likewise by the following extract from *Œuvres inédites de Descartes*, published for the first time in 1859 by M. Foucher de Careil (Tom. I. p. 66): "En disant qu'il est indéfini, dit-il, nous ne nions pas que peut-être dans la réalité il ne soit fini; mais nous nions seulement qu'une intelligence comme la nôtre puisse comprendre qu'il ait des bornes ou des extremités quelconques." That is to say, if our intelligence is a trustworthy interpreter of the reality of things, Descartes held strictly to the infinity of matter.

[†] "Spatium ab extensione non nisi ratione distinguimus, sive in re non differt." (Princip Phil. Cartes., Pars II. Def. VI.) "Corporis sive materiæ natura in sola extensione consistit...... Spatium et corpus in re non differunt." (Ibid., Prop. II. et Coroll.) "Qui autem durationem et tempus ante res creatas imaginantur, eodem præjudicio laborant ac illi, que extra materiam spatium fingunt, ut per se satis est manifestum." (Cogitata Metaphysica, Pars II. Cap. X. § 5.) In these works we have no criterion by which to separate Spinoza's own opinions from those of Descartes, whose doctrine he professes to explain; yet no other theory will consist with Spinoza's reduction of all the attributes of the One Substance to two, Thought and Extension. Compare also Epist. IV. Opera, Vol. II. p. 151:—"Si una pars materiæ annihilaretur, simul etiam tota extensio evanesceret."

[‡] Journal des Savans, 18 Juin, 1691; and 5 Janvier, 1693.

In opposition to this view, Dr. Samuel Clarke advanced another equally indefensible. Space, being evidently independent of the objects it contains, and not contingent, must be something more than their mere order or mutual relation; it must be an actual existence. But every existence is necessarily either a substance or an attribute; and, as Space cannot be a substance, it must be an attribute. Since Space, however, is infinite, and since only an Infinite Being can possess infinite attributes, Space must be the immensity of God himself. This argument was probably suggested by Clarke's friend, Sir Isaac Newton, at least in its germ.[*] Dr. Isaac Barrow, the learned preceptor of Newton, was more cautious in his language concerning Space, and can hardly be considered responsible for the opinion of his pupil.[†] The weaknesses of Clarke's theory, however, being manifold and obvious, engaged him in much controversy. In 1713, a correspondence with Bishop Butler (then a young man) on Necessary Existence developed Clarke's famous argument *a priori* for the necessity of a God, founded on the necessity of Space, his attribute; in this contest, victory inclined to the side of the younger combatant. In 1715 and 1716, a joust took place between Clarke and Leibnitz in defence of their respective theories, and each knight succeeded in unhorsing his antagonist. The dispute was prematurely closed by the death of Leibnitz; but the attack was soon resumed by minor assailants. The Pantheistic tendencies of Clarke's doctrine have been well exposed by a recent French writer.[‡]

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[*] Correspondence of Clarke and Leibnitz, in 1715-6, on Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion: Leibnitz's Third Paper, § 4.

[†] Nouveaux Essais, Livre II. Chap. IV. § 4.

[‡] "Dans la realité des choses, l'étendue n'est donc que l'ordre qui est entre les monades et les aggrégats." And in a foot-note: "C'est-là ce qu'entend Leibnitz, quand il dit que l'étendue n'est que l'ordre des co-existans." (Traité des Systèmes, Œuvres Complètes, Tome II. p. 139.) Bailly, in his Éloge de Leibnitz, espouses the same theory. Compare D'Alembert, Mélanges, Tome V. § xvi.: "S'il n'y avoit point de corps et de succession, l'espace et le temps seroient possibles, mais ils n'existeroient pas." Even Calderwood (Philosophy of the Infinite, 2d ed., p. 334) gives up the infinity of Space, and (p. 331) resolves Space into the "relative position" of bodies: in his first edition he held more philosophical views.

Since Clarke's day, few notable ontological theories in regard to Space have, so far as we know, been brought forward. Following the wise example of Locke, who modestly confesses his ignorance,[§] the Scotch school and the kindred French school, as well as Cousin and Comte,[||] have refrained from positively

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[*] "Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem, constituit." (Principia Mathematica, Schol. Gen.) For some distinctions, mainly judicious, between Space Absolute and Relative, compare Definitio VIII., Schol.

[†] "Dicerem primo spatium revera dari, distinctum a magnitudine; hoc est, illo nomine designari quid, ei conceptum respondere, fundatum in re, alium a conceptu magnitudinis, ac ita quidem ut ubi non existit magnitudo, quamvis ea non existeret omnino, spatium nihilominus extiturum. Dicerem secundo, spatium non esse quid actu existens, actuque diversum a rebus quantis, nedum ut habeat dimensiones aliquas sibi proprias, a magnitudinis dimensionibus actu separatas. . . . . . Spatium nihil est aliud quam pura puta potentia, mera capacitas, ponibilitas, aut (vocabulis istis veniam) interponibilitas magnitudinis alicujus."—Mathematical Works, Whewell's ed., p. 158.

[‡] Th.-Henri Martin, Examen d'un Problème de Théodicée, 1859, p. 28.

[§] Essay on Human Understanding, II. 13, 15.

[||] In no part of his works does Comte more conclusively prove his need of discipline at the hands of his despised "metaphysicians," than in his account of the empirical origination of the idea of Space, of which this is a sample: "Quant dogmatizing on the subject. It would have been discreet in the German philosophers to have observed a similar reticence. Schelling defined Space, "Pure being, with the negation of all activity," as he defined Time, "Pure activity, with the negation of all being"; — definitions possessing some poetical beauty, but destitute of any precise meaning; while Hegel styled it the "first determination of the Idea (i. e. Absolute Being) in the world of nature."* Trendelenburg † deduces the idea of Space from the idea of Motion, arguing that the pure *a priori* intuitions of figures in Space are impossible except through a process of mental construction, and that this mental construction or description necessarily involves Motion. By citations from the Critique of Pure Reason, he shows that Kant, on his own theory, ought to have made Motion the condition of all pure intuitions. Not content, however, with his psychological deduction, which seems plausible if we admit his identification of Space with Extension, and sensuous imagination with pure thought, he also holds the strange ontological theory that Space, objectively considered, is "extended and created" by the motion of physical forces.‡ In the Philosophical Remains of the poet Jens Baggesen, published in 1863, appears an ingenious theory of Space and Time, which tempts us to apply the doctrine of metempsychosis to philosophical hypotheses, inasmuch as it is a revivification of Clarke's speculation, though in an

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la nature physique de cet *espace* indéfini, nous devons spontanément nous le représenter, pour plus de facilité, comme analogue au milieu effectif dans lequel nous vivons, tellement que si ce milieu était liquide, au lieu d'être gazeux, notre espace géométrique serait sans doute conçu aussi comme liquide." (Cours de Philosophie Positive, Tome I. p. 353.) He plainly has not soared above Extension, and unconsciously confirms the doctrine of our § 9.

* See Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, s. v. *Espace.*

† Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I. pp. 131 – 232 (ed. 1862).

‡ "Wie sich die Vorstellung den Raum erst dehnen und schaffen muss, so dehnen und schaffen ihn ausser uns ewige Kräfte." (Ibid. p. 218.) To a limited extent, E. V. Neale accepts Trendelenburg's psychological theory (Analogy of Thought and Nature, 1863, pp. 28, 29): "As Trendelenburg has shown, ... all attempts to explain the thought of Space made by the profoundest thinkers, either imply the thought of motion, or fall into absurdity. . . . . . The thought of Space is no sooner formed, than it distinguishes itself into two *opposite* thoughts, that of centre and circumference; which imply, while they deny each other." Such a "thought of Space" is clearly a sensuous image of Extension. Morell, in his Introduction to Mental Philosophy, 1862, pp. 115 – 148, adopts Trendelenburg's theory more completely, and makes no distinction between *thought* and *imagination*.

entirely new body. We commend it to the attention of those who are fond of juggling with the words Existence, Nothing, Being, and Becoming.[*] Baggesen's rhapsody recalls to mind the fine illustration of Hume: "Men of bright fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those angels whom the Scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings."

§ 29. The true solution of the ontological problem of pure Space is involved in the solutions we have obtained of the psychological and logical problems. It has been shown that Space is objectively real, and it has likewise been shown that we cognize it only by negative characteristics. Hence it is evident that no theory in regard to the positive nature of Space *per se* is possible, which does not transcend the limits of human knowledge. All ontological theories, therefore, apart from special refutation, are refuted *en masse* by this simple consideration. The whole of the little knowledge we can derive from these negative characteristics may be summed up briefly in the following definition:—

Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.

By drawing a distinction between Protension and Time, analogous, with some slight modifications, to that drawn between Extension and Space, the idea of Time is likewise resolvable into the notions of receptivity, unity, and infinity; with this difference, that the receptivity of Time is not the negation of matter, but of existences. In fact, eternity is the synonyme of pure Time.[†] Hence we define Time as follows:—

Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existences.

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[*] Philos. Nachlass, Vol. II. pp. 145, 146.

[†] "L'immensité ou l'unité de l'espace, l'éternité ou l'unité de temps—" (Cousin, Hist. de la Phil. du XVIII^{e} Siècle, Introd., p. 121.) Compare Royer-Collard, in Jouffroy's Reid, Vol. III. p. 434: "La durée se perd dans l'éternité, comme l'espace dans l'immensité." The negativity of our cognitions of Space and Time forbids any dogmatic exposition of their mutual relations; but we cannot forbear citing a passage from Reid, expressed with remarkable dignity and vigor: "All limited duration is comprehended in Time, and all limited extension in Space. These, in their capacious womb, contain all finite existences, but are contained by none. Created things have their particular place in Space, and their particular place in Time; but Time is everywhere, and Space at all times. They embrace each other, and have that mysterious union which the schoolmen conceive between soul and body,—the whole of each is in every part of the other." (Intellectual Powers of Man, Ess. III. Chap. II.) This passage is translated almost word for word by Royer-Collard, without acknowledgment. See Jouffroy's Reid, Vol. IV. p. 441.

§ 30. It will be seen that these definitions express no more than is contained in the instinctive judgments of mankind; and we rejoice that our analysis may thus justly claim the general approbation. For it is unphilosophic in the last degree to despise those *naturæ judicia*, or ultimate beliefs, for which men commonly can assign no reason, yet which are fortunately too deeply rooted to be shaken by reasoning. Common sense is the well at the bottom of which lies Truth. It is the high and true function of philosophy to "convert ἀληθὴς δόξα into ἐπιστήμη," the right opinion into science, — to clarify and elucidate the thought that lies crude in the universal understanding of the race, rather than to rear gigantic superstructures for vanity to dwell in.

One word as to the general result of our critique, and we will close. As Transcendentalism, starting from the *a priori* cognition of Space, denies the *a posteriori* cognition of Extension; so Empiricism, starting from the *a posteriori* cognition of Extension, denies the *a priori* cognition of Space. Each repudiates a truth possessed by the other, and grounds its thesis on the identification of Space and Extension. The only means of their common refutation is the establishment of a profound distinction between Space and Extension, and a rigorous adhesion to it. It then becomes apparent that, though distinguished by antithetical characteristics, and opposed as two terms of a relation, Space and Extension are united by an absolute and necessary nexus; in a word, that the cognition of one is possible only through that of the other. Extension is known only as contained in Space; Space is known only as containing Extension. But inasmuch as Space is cognized solely *a priori*, and Extension solely *a posteriori*, the recognition by philosophy of their absolute and necessary correlation becomes a bridge whereby *the chasm between the subjective and the objective may be spanned, and whereby Thought may be brought face to face with Existence.* From a profoundly true philosophy of Space, therefore, much light will be thrown on the fundamental problem of all philosophy, the validity of human knowledge. In a second paper we design to apply some of the foregoing conclusions to Hamilton's Law of the Conditioned, and to the cognition of the Infinite in general.

Art. IV. — 1. *Debates of the several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in* 1787, *together with the Journal of the Federal Convention. Collected and Revised from Contemporary Publications, by* Jonathan Elliot. Published under Sanction of Congress. Second Edition, with considerable Additions. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1863. 4 vols. 8vo.

2. *Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in the Convention held at Philadelphia in* 1787: *with a Diary of the Debates of the Congress of the Confederation as reported by* James Madison, *a Member and Deputy from Virginia. Revised and Newly Arranged by* Jonathan Elliot. Complete in One Volume. (Supplemental to Elliot's Debates.) Second Edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1863. 8vo.

3. *The Fœderalist. A Collection of Essays written in Favor of the New Constitution as agreed upon by the Fœderal Convention, September,* 1787. *Reprinted from the Original Text, with an Historical Introduction and Notes, by* Henry B. Dawson. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. 2 vols. 8vo.

4. *The Congressional Globe.* December, 1863, to May, 1864, inclusive. Washington.

No political arrangement has been the object of more admiration than the American Constitution. Almost ever since its adoption, few Americans, except the members of one small and politically very insignificant sect, have spoken of it except in terms of the highest eulogy. In speeches, in lectures, articles, and orations, in the pulpit and in the forum, it has constantly been treated as the most skilful attempt ever made to form a confederation, and as the arrangement best suited to the States, not only at the time of its adoption, but for all time. Down to the outbreak of the present war suggestions for its amendment were generally regarded as indications of folly or fanaticism. It was, in short, held up to the gaze of the world as a final result, which required no modification, and to which coming generations would have to adapt themselves, not it to them.

Much of this adoration was a tradition from the generation which had lived and suffered under the old Confederacy, and witnessed the great change wrought by the formation of the new government, — the restoration of national credit and of the national dignity, the return of public confidence, the full assurance of peace and the enjoyment of tranquillity. What has been added to it in our day has been largely due to the fact that the Constitution has been the symbol and condition of the Union of the States, and everybody has been conscious that in the Union alone was to be found what in this age is felt to be the sweetest, if not the most valuable, of political blessings, sweeter even than liberty or security, — the privilege of belonging to a great nation. There is, perhaps, no political calamity from which the men of the nineteenth century shrink with so much dread, as from living under a foreign yoke or under a weak government. That if he have a tyrant, his tyrant shall be at least his countryman, and that this tyrant's passport shall be respected whenever it is shown, is to the malecontent of our day the first of political blessings. For all others he can wait, as all others, he feels, are sure to come if this one be secured. Amongst us the feeling has been intensified by the long association of national power with liberty and prosperity. There has been nothing in the past to throw over the American's yearnings for greatness and expansion that shade of dread and misgiving as to its effect on individual rights, from which those of the most patriotic of European liberals are never entirely free. With liberty so fully and so long secured that all danger to it from any quarter seemed chimerical, the American imagination has been left free to revel in dreams of national grandeur; and as long as the Union lasted, no dream on this subject could well be deemed wild or extravagant.

But an attempt to account for the sacredness of the Constitution would, in our opinion, be incomplete, which took no notice of one of the most marked characteristics, not simply of the American people, but of the whole Anglo-Saxon race. It is a characteristic which the peculiar conditions of life in the New World are perhaps gradually effacing amongst us, but which has played a very prominent part in English history, and has exercised, or is now exercising, a very strong influence on our own. We mean that dislike to pure speculation, that distaste for theorizing and repugnance to the logical method of solving legal and political problems, which have made the English Constitution a patchwork of makeshifts and expedients, and of the English legal system, to use Mr. Austin's words, "a monstrous chaos." For all purposes of government, abstract theories have in the eyes of a genuine Anglo-Saxon very little value. But let them, however illogical or indefensible, be once thrown into a concrete form and assume the shape of an "institution," and our devotion to them is shown in the direct ratio of our previous dislike or neglect. The formula once framed, our reluctance to disturb it, or go behind it, or analyze it, is generally so intense as to be nearly insurmountable. The impatience of Frenchmen under the restraints of a constitution, their chronic eagerness to break loose from it and plunge anew into the depths of revolutionary sentiment, are to the Anglo-Saxon mind utterly incomprehensible; while to them our reverence for what is written *because* it is written, and the English submission to a legalized abuse for the simple reason that it is old, bear all the marks of a degrading superstition. The English have this incapacity to recur to fundamental principles in so marked a degree, that it is safe to say that nothing but the "omnipotence of Parliament" has saved them from political stagnation. If "the wisdom of their ancestors" had bestowed on them a written organic law, nothing short of a tremendous social revolution like that of France would have sufficed to place the nation on the path of progress. And, although we have been saved from sinking to the lowest depths of this idolatry, both by the character and the aims of the founders of the Colonies, and by the circumstances in which we are ourselves placed, we have given proofs of an ability, as well as a disposition, to weave an artificial arrangement into the very texture of our political thought, which a philosopher might well call alarming.

There is something really startling in the fatal facility we have shown in erecting an artificial standard of right and wrong, and in allowing it to shut out from our gaze all the higher criteria of political conduct furnished by abstract justice and truth. During a long period the work of testing the morality of national legislation by the application of fundamental principles was abandoned by the leading minds of the country, and fell into the hands of the Abolitionists, — a body which, admirable as its aims have been, has had too narrow a field of vision, and been too deficient in the art of practical application, and had too little national feeling, to make the influence of its utterances on general politics of much value. In the eyes of most of those who should have been the lights of the community on questions of government, the Federal Constitution gradually, and we believe imperceptibly, became a final rule of right, behind which there was nothing to which good citizens were called upon to look for guidance. This hallucination, of course, made itself more strongly manifest in the conflict about slavery than elsewhere, because it was in this that law and principles were brought most strongly into contrast and collision. Some of the phenomena to which it gave rise will always remain amongst the most striking incidents in our political history. There could not, for instance, have been a more forcible illustration of the danger of Constitution-worship than the general contempt and ridicule excited at one time by appeals to the "higher law." This phrase meant, in the mouths of those who originated it, that government is after all a conventional arrangement, entitled, no doubt, to the utmost respect, and not to be disturbed unless it plainly fails to answer the purpose for which it was instituted; but that cases may arise, not calling for revolution, in which justice and truth are so clearly outraged, under color of law, that it becomes the duty of good citizens to be guided rather by the principles of morality, on which the law ultimately rests all its claims to obedience, than by the law itself. We believe there is no Christian country, except Russia, in which this proposition, as here stated, would be denied even by the firmest supporters of "authority"; but it nevertheless, not very long ago, whenever any attempt was made to apply it to the relations of a citizen of the Free States with slavery, excited the scorn and derision of a large portion of the American public. It was evidently expected of those antislavery men who conscientiously revolted against their "constitutional obligations," not only that they should bear them patiently in the hope of change, but that they should distinctly acknowledge that the Constitution of the United States was a final authority, the supreme law of morals as well as of the land. Their recognition, even in words, of the existence of an older and more binding rule, was received with mingled amusement and execration, as the crowning proof of their folly or knavery. It is not to be wondered at that many of those who believe that "progress" means increase of virtue and intelligence, as well as of wealth, should have looked upon this indication of popular feeling as a symptom of moral deterioration. Complete harmony between what is and what ought to be, will probably never be witnessed in any political organization; for as long as men are men, considerations purely material must have their weight in the conduct of government, as well as considerations purely moral; but no condition of public sentiment can be healthy, which does not make the predominance of the latter the great aim of legislation.

Nor is it on the morals only of the nation that the effect of Constitution-worship has been bad. It has been largely instrumental in putting a stop to all vigorous exploration in the field of legislative science. For half a century or more the study of it has been all but entirely neglected by the best minds at the North. In the South it has received much attention, but solely owing to the general anxiety of Southern statesmen to frame a new social organization, in which slavery should have a place *de jure* as well as *de facto*. Mr. Calhoun was perhaps the most acute and vigorous writer on government that we have produced within the present century. But the smallness of the contributions made by the Free States to the literature of political philosophy has been very remarkable. We have far outstripped the rest of the world in what are called "constitutional lawyers." Our judges and commentators have acquired the widest celebrity as skilful and shrewd expounders of the organic law. Their applications of its provisions to the complex phenomena of our social and political condition have been marvels of ingenuity and erudition. But the examination and elucidation of the principles on which governments ought to rest, one of the highest and most interesting pursuits in which the human understanding can engage, has generally been neglected by our ablest men, as a barren and unprofitable field. Political speculation has been regarded as an occupation fit only for French or German "reds" or for boy debaters. The study of the law as it is has attracted all the keenest intellects in the country, while the consideration and discussion of what the law ought to be have been left, strangely enough, to newspaper editors and clergymen, — two classes singularly ill-fitted for the task; the one from the nature of its duty, and the other from that of its training. What is called "political preaching," and is so vigorously denounced by some people, has been in reality nothing more than an instinctive effort on the part of the Church to perform a work properly belonging to the world, but which the world has neglected; but it is a work which must be done by somebody in every nation that aspires to keep its place in civilization.

It is, of course, rash to assert that any social phenomenon is due to a single cause; and we do not wish to have it understood that we believe the general neglect of the study of legislative science has been caused solely by excessive reverence for the Constitution. Much of it is doubtless to be ascribed to the overwhelming importance naturally assumed by material pursuits, in a new country of boundless resources; and much to the loss of political influence of late years by a large portion of that class which has most taste and capacity for speculative inquiry. But after all due allowance has been made for these things, there is still a large residuum which is clearly attributable to the general prevalence of the belief, that, when the Federal Constitution was framed, the canon of political revelation was complete; that, whether the order of things which it established was bad or good, no better was possible, and that the duty of this and coming generations was, not to reform, but "to rest and be thankful."

We may indeed be told, also, that it is not strictly true that the North has not labored in the field of political speculation; that the vast changes which have been made during the last forty years in the Constitutions of the great majority of the

States prove that a large amount of thought has really been expended upon it, and that there has always existed a strong sensibility to errors and abuses, and strong anxiety to amend them. These changes have certainly generally been radical enough to raise the presumption that they had been prepared by a good deal of mental labor; but we know, as a matter of history, that such was not the case. There is not one of them which was the work of trained thinkers. They have been the result of the pressure of the democratic tide, which has been steadily rising, here as well as in Europe, ever since the French Revolution; and this is tantamount to saying that they were the offspring of desire rather than of opinion. We owe most of these changes to the determination of the whole male population to share in the exercise of the whole governing power, and to share in it at any cost. The result is, that much of their handiwork is rough-hewn; hardly any of it bears marks of scientific polish and adjustment. There are provisions in most of the new Constitutions which could not possibly have been inserted deliberately, and of their own free will, by men who had made a close study either of political science or of human nature; the election of judges for short terms, by universal suffrage, is one of them.

The spell has been broken by the war; criticism has been let loose even upon the Constitution of the United States. The secession of the South has satisfied even the most sceptical that a thing may be unconstitutional and still possible, and that the Constitution, admirable as it is, has not fully served its purpose. Its object was to hold the States of this Union together, — whether as a nation or a confederation it matters not; and it has not succeeded in accomplishing it. We might, as every one knows, fill a hundred volumes in tracing out the causes of the disruption; but it is not necessary that we should even briefly enumerate them here. It is enough for us that the disruption has taken place. Of course it might have been prevented by the occurrence or non-occurrence of a vast number of things. If the Abolitionists and Fire-eaters had kept quiet; if cotton had not become so important; if Jefferson Davis and his associates had not been so ambitious; if the North had been firmer, wiser, and more united; and if slavery had never existed, — no doubt the Union would never have been dissolved, and the doctrine of Secession might never have been heard of. But propositions of this kind, though they have constituted the gist of nine tenths of the disquisitions which have appeared on the war and its origin, are, after all, barren truisms; and, after we have established them to everybody's satisfaction, we are not a whit better off than before. If everything always went right, of course nothing would ever go wrong. If the citizens of the United States were all wise and virtuous, as they undoubtedly ought to be, not only would the Constitution have subsisted in full force to this day, but the Union might have been preserved without any constitution whatever.

But governments have to be framed in this age of the world, — and the same thing may be said of every other age, — not for men as they ought to be, but as they are. Their vices have to be taken into account with even more care and confidence than their virtues. Any political fabric which is erected for their benefit must be strong enough to contain the selfish as well as the public-spirited, the knave as well as the honest man, the ambitious as well as the disinterested, the traitors as well as the patriots, the fools as well as the wise. And any arrangement which is intended to bind the North and South together in one political organization must be strong enough, either to defy the efforts of slaveholders to break it down, or to put an end to slavery. We are saved the necessity of all argument on this point by the experience of the last eighty years. To anybody who undertakes to show us that the Constitution ought to have held the Free and Slave States together, we reply, that the experiment has been fully tried, and that it did not succeed.

This ought not to be said, however, without exonerating the founders of the government from all responsibility for the catastrophe which we are now witnessing. The adulators who would have us believe that the men of 1787 foresaw the changes which have brought about the crisis through which we are passing, that they framed the Constitution for just such a North and such a South as now exist, do them gross injustice. It reflects no discredit upon them that they should not have foreseen the social and commercial revolution which has created a gulf between the two sections; but it would certainly lower our estimate of their sagacity, if it could be shown that they foresaw the creation of this gulf, and yet relied on the arrangement which they formed to bridge it over. But to have foreseen in 1787 the career that slavery was to run, and the influence it was to have on the Southern mind, would have required wisdom more than human. At that time its friends as well as its enemies looked on it as an institution whose extinction was certain, at a period perhaps not very distant. It occupied the ignoble position of a makeshift, and almost everybody felt bound at least to make a pretence of deploring it as a violation of natural justice. It is rarely touched upon in the writings and speeches of leading Southern men of the period, without eliciting an allusion and comment in some degree deprecatory. There is abundant evidence that, so far from its having acquired the honors of a fundamental social relation, its existence in a republic was very generally looked upon as a scandal which owed its origin to English favor and encouragement, and which would not have been tolerated had not its removal been surrounded by humanitarian as well as financial difficulties. In fact, the difference in the sentiments of the North and South on this subject was one of degree rather than of kind, and was mainly due to the difference in the industrial importance of the institution in the two sections.

It was the invention of the power-loom, followed by the introduction of the cotton culture, that first started the South in that downward course which has at last led her into the abyss in which she now lies bleeding. The power-loom created an enormous demand for cotton, and the cotton-gin enabled the slaveholders to satisfy it. Arkwright and Whitney were in reality the innocent authors of the revolution which raised slavery out of the position of a genteel but rather objectionable encumbrance, to that of a highly profitable machine. As the price of the great staple rose, the discussion of the legality of slaveholding gradually ceased. Slaves multiplied under the new stimulus; but the more they multiplied, the more the conscience of the world became troubled by their condition, and at last the clergy and moralists of the South were set to work to find justification for keeping them. The result, as we all know, was the concoction of a system of social and political philosophy, in which slavery is declared to be the only stable foundation for society; in which everybody who works with his hands is not only denied all share in the government, but handed over to capitalists as "property"; in which education is declared to be the privilege of the wealthy alone, unnecessary and hurtful to the poor; in which all the ideas of human rights and of human destiny prevalent at the time of our Revolution, as well as throughout the civilized world at this hour, are repudiated and pronounced false, mischievous, and absurd. A society with slavery for its base, with these ideas governing legislation and moulding the manners, is clearly something more than "another form of industry," as some of our euphemists call it: it is another form of civilization.

The persistence, however, with which some of the leaders even of the Republican party persuade themselves that the history of the last eighty years has shed no fresh light upon the conditions of union, is one of the most curious and discouraging incidents of the day.

Mr. Foster of Connecticut, in the debate on the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law in the Senate, in April last, opposed the repeal of the act of 1793 on the express ground that Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth voted for it, and asks triumphantly, "Who are we in this day to say that wisdom has come to us unknown to our fathers?" We doubt if the worship of ancestors has ever been carried much further than this even in China. There is not a mechanic in the United States who is not, or ought not to be, far wiser than either Sherman or Ellsworth, or Franklin or Hamilton, or any other man of the last century, concerning the merits and short-comings of the Constitution, concerning the advisability or unadvisability of acting under its permissory clauses, concerning the political needs and tendencies of this Union and of this age, and above all, concerning the nature and influence of negro slavery. To deny this is to deny all value to human experience, and stamp all change, or in other words all progress, with folly or impiety. To suppose that Sherman and Ellsworth would vote for the Fugitive Slave Law, were they now living, because they voted for one in 1793, is about as sensible as to assume that Oliver

Cromwell would, if he commanded an army in our day, discard rifled cannon. The men of the Revolutionary epoch framed the Constitution in the belief that it would work; but their belief was based on conjecture, — the conjecture of able and sagacious men certainly, but still conjecture. But where they saw as in a glass darkly, we see face to face; where they struggled through mire, we stand on firm ground. To abandon our right to amend it, or to reason for ourselves on the altered state of facts which surrounds us, in deference to their authority, would be as degrading and as extraordinary a confession of degeneracy as has ever been made by any body of civilized men.

Those who oppose any movement for the abolition of slavery by an amendment to the Constitution, do so mainly on the ground that it is unnecessary; that the war is doing it far more effectually than we can do it by voting; and that wherever slavery is not disappearing before the advance of the Union armies, it is disappearing by the action of the States themselves. Now we have little doubt that in Maryland, Missouri, and Arkansas we shall witness within the next two years immediate and complete emancipation by the vote of the people of these States. But there is at present nothing to warrant us in looking for any such display of wisdom on the part of Virginia and the Cotton States. It is quite true that the slaves actually within those States at present have been declared free by the President's Proclamation, but it is equally true that his Proclamation is not a final and conclusive authority; it is open to revision by the Supreme Court, and its constitutionality is at least doubtful. It may be annulled by the decision of that tribunal, and even those who are most confident that it will not be annulled, must confess that it would be at least rash to leave matters of such overwhelming importance as the liberty of four millions of people, and the form of social organization that is to prevail over half the continent, to the hazard and uncertainty of a judicial decision, when the means of settling them in accordance with the dictates of justice and expediency are within our reach. If the Emancipation Proclamation should be declared null and void, it leaves the negroes who were in bondage at the time it was issued still in bondage; and, in any event, whether it be valid or invalid, the institution of slavery is not in the least affected by it. Certain persons are declared free by it, but it does not touch the system; for the legislature of any State would still be competent to enslave any blacks not covered by the Proclamation; such, for instance, as free negroes, and children born after the 1st of January, 1863. It must not be forgotten, too, that the Proclamation will always be regarded in the South as what Mr. Lincoln intended it to be when he issued it,—a weapon of war. No confirmation of it by the Supreme Court will give it, in the eyes of slaveholders, any higher character than that of an act of personal hostility to themselves. It can never have for them, and it has not now, as we all know, for many people at the North, the force and dignity of a law. The liberation of slaves under it will be to their masters a perpetual reminder of their subjugation, the direct and palpable consequence of defeat in an armed struggle, and as such humiliating and exasperating. In other words, it will have no moral weight at the South after the war is over any more than while it is raging, and will, we may depend upon it, be resisted and evaded whenever and wherever the opportunity offers.

The amount of benefit the negroes will derive from it, therefore, after peace is restored, will depend almost entirely, in our opinion, upon the ability and willingness of the Administration, for the time being, to enforce it faithfully. But it is not difficult to foresee that these also will be largely affected by the personal character of the President. If Mr. Lincoln should have passed away, it will be to his successor, even supposing him to approve in a general way of Mr. Lincoln's policy, a matter of small account, as long as the public peace is not disturbed by it, whether a few thousand blacks here and there are restrained of their liberty. And even supposing him to be sincerely devoted to the policy of emancipation, or supposing Mr. Lincoln himself to be still in the White House, they overestimate, it seems to us, the depth of the trouble to Northern minds occasioned by negro wrongs *per se*, who suppose that the public of the Free States would press on him the adoption of a more vigorous policy. There is too much reason to fear the North will by that time be too weary of civil strife, too anxious to obliterate all traces of it and restore the ancient harmony and good feeling, to be disposed to put armies in motion, and bring on a renewal of bloodshed, in defence of the liberties of blacks who can show no better title to them than the at least doubtful one of a measure of "military necessity."

It might be different if the negroes were men of a sterner mould and more indomitable spirit, men who not simply desired freedom, but hated oppressors. But it must be confessed that their apathy during the present struggle has disappointed both their friends and enemies. The tameness with which they suffer themselves to be assassinated, to be carried back into bondage and held in it, and with which they have submitted to every other outrage which either party chooses to inflict upon them, may be proof either of sublime patience or of extreme degradation; but, in either case, it indicates a state of mind which, though it may have spared us some embarrassment during the war, promises to throw serious obstacles in the way of their redemption after the restoration of peace. Some trace of self-respect, even if it take the low form of savage vindictiveness, is the first condition of moral and social elevation. When it fails to reveal itself in a whole race, and when this race has to assert its claims to mere manhood against oppressors of such a fierce and vigorous type as the Southern slaveholder, it is hard to say how much third parties can do to help it.

So far, the negroes have shown themselves ready enough to run away, and even to fight for their freedom, when we choose to enlist and organize them; but to avail themselves of our protection to the full extent, they must give stronger evidence of love of freedom than this. Time and training, and especially the service of large numbers of them in our armies, will doubtless eventually awaken in them a natural feeling of resentment towards those who do them wrong, — a feeling which has perhaps done more for freedom and civilization than all others put together. But until it is roused, the difficulties in the way of their complete liberation will be immense, — such difficulties, in short, as will call for the active exercise of all the powers of the government, and particularly its legislative powers.

Their title to their freedom must be made as strong as law can make it.

This is, of course, tantamount to saying that we do not share the general reliance upon the growth or prevalence at the South of hostility to slavery as the cause of the present trouble. There is little doubt that this feeling prevails in the Border States, which have either never thoroughly sympathized with the Rebellion, or have been so long in the grasp of our armies that they have lost most of their slaves, see little hope of their ever having any more, and are ready for anything which promises them repose. But we do not know where the proof is to be found that public opinion in the rest of the South has undergone any radical change, or in fact any change whatever, as to the advantages, moral, material, or political, of the slave system. Whatever the people of the Gulf States thought on these points before the war, we feel satisfied they think still. We do not see that anything has occurred to modify their prejudices. Their doctrine of the morality or divine origin of the institution, of course, if sincerely held, cannot be shaken by the successes of our armies. The loss of slaves proves nothing as to the owner's right to hold them, and they probably look on it in the same light as the loss of any other species of property, — one of the inconveniences inseparable from an armed struggle. And there is no denying that the war has revealed some points of advantage in slavery for military purposes, of which we at the North were far from suspecting the existence. Slaves whom the presence of the public enemy does not rouse into revolt, or even into insubordination, are clearly not that source of weakness, in a military point of view, which we were in the habit of considering them. The Southern negroes belong to this class. The number of whites engaged in the work of superintending and guarding them must have been greatly diminished during the last three years, and yet we have not heard of a single attempt at a rising, or even a riot. Meek and long-suffering beyond example, loving liberty only with that mild and unfruitful love from which energizing hatred of the oppressor is excluded, they have, as far as we know, continued to toil on the plantations to which our army has not penetrated, as peaceably, helplessly, and hopelessly since the war began as before it. And for the military purposes of the Confederacy, they have this capital advantage, that they consume a vastly smaller proportion of what they produce than free laborers. Of course, it would be very easy to show that the South loses much by having four millions of her population indifferent to the issue of the struggle in which she is engaged, serving her with the slow indolence of cattle, instead of the passion and devotion, the versatility and industry of free men. But this is a loss for which the advocates of slavery were prepared, and for which they hold themselves compensated by the absence of the pauperism, turbulence, and insecurity of all kinds which they, in their delirium, conceive to be the inseparable concomitants of "free society." In fact, to convince a Southerner of the inferiority of slavery to free labor, as a supporter of armies in the field, would be to deprive it of its greatest value in his eyes. But towards this desirable consummation the war has certainly contributed nothing; for no free community of the same size has ever raised larger armies, or produced the *matériel* of war in greater abundance, or displayed greater skill, dexterity, and ability in turning their resources to account, than the Confederacy. In short, we do not know of a single reason, revealed by the *war*, that should lead a Southerner, imbued with the ordinary Southern notions of the ends of civil society, to conclude that slavery is a misfortune; while there are several that should lead him to consider it a benefit. We fear, therefore, that those who look for the destruction of slavery by means of a revolution in the public sentiment in those States in which it is most firmly established will find themselves rudely undeceived, when perhaps the opportunity which now offers itself of using surer and more potent means for its extinction will have passed away, if not forever, at least for our time.

But even if slavery were abolished by an amendment to the Constitution, though we should have secured for the first time a sound logical foundation for our political fabric, we should still find it far short of our ideal. We should have embodied in it, indeed, a recognition of the great truth, — not that men are literally born equal, that is, with equal capabilities and advantages, — but that they are born with equal right to turn such faculties as God has pleased to give them to the best account. Any democratic Constitution in which this truth is not solemnly recognized furnishes, as ours has furnished, one of those satires on popular consistency and popular justice in which cynics and tyrants delight. But after having recognized it ever so fully, much beside remains to do. The founders of the government did not by any means flatter themselves that they had in framing it, even supposing slavery never to have existed, provided a machine of perfect accuracy and finish, and that posterity would never find room for improvement in it. The doctrine of its perfection was invented by a later generation, and long before its working had been thoroughly tested. On the contrary we find, both in the debates of the Convention and in the *Federalist*, an incessant iteration of the confession that the Constitution was not by any means the best thing that those who were chiefly instrumental in framing it could have thought of, but the best thing which at that time, with the ideas then current, and under the circumstances in which the States were then placed, the public could be induced to accept. It was not the ideal either of the Federalists or the Democrats, either of the slaveholders or the antislavery men, either of the large States or of the small ones, of the North or of the South. It satisfied neither Hamilton nor Jefferson. It was, in short, a compromise between a variety of interests and opinions: there is not a principle embodied in the whole of it.

The *Federalist* is now generally regarded as an elaborate treatise, the best in existence on federal government, and so it is; but its form is not by any means didactic. It is not written by men in the position of lawgivers, at whose feet their countrymen were reverentially seated. It is, on the contrary, simply an elaborate defence, by men of great powers, of a scheme which was evidently looked on by a large portion of the public with great distrust and misgiving. Every one of its papers consists of a series of answers to objections, of explanations and extenuations, showing that this or that provision was at least no worse or more dangerous than a similar one in the State Constitutions or in that of Great Britain; that certain dreaded consequences would not result from the adoption of the new system; and that, in any event, it would be a vast improvement on the state of things under the old Confederacy. A very large portion of the work is devoted to showing that the grant of power to raise and maintain armies does not create a rule of military despotism; that the grant of power to tax does not involve the risk of wholesale absorption of State property; that the President is not a monarch in embryo; that the Senate is not the germ of an oligarchy; that small States will not be trampled on by hostile majorities in the House of Representatives; that the possession of the treaty-making power by the President and Senate will not be likely to convert them into corrupt institutions of foreign intrigues against our commerce and independence. We are virtually told, in short, in every line of the work, that the authors of the Constitution might have done better if the passions and prejudices and weaknesses of the public had let them; that the Constitution would remedy the evils under which the States were then suffering, in the old Confederacy, and convert them from a jarring, confused mass of little Commonwealths, without strength or influence, into a compact, powerful, and respected nation; but there is no trace of a belief that a blind adherence to its letter would keep them so forever.

A singular notion has grown up in later days, that the Convention which framed the Constitution was guided, in drawing the line between the authority of the States and that of the United States, by the nature of things; and that the amount of power which the members of the Confederation surrendered to the central authority was fixed by some fundamental principle of government. Two thirds of the clamor about encroachments on "the rights of States" is due to this fallacy. Its victims are possessed by the belief, that, when the Colonies had secured their independence, they thereupon found themselves invested with a mysterious something called "sovereignty," of which they cannot get rid, even if they desire it, which sticks to them through all changes of men and things, like orders to a priest, or divine right to a king, and with which it is impious to meddle. There are, according to this theory, a certain number of the attributes of this sovereignty of which the State can divest itself temporarily, and from motives of convenience, but which it cannot wholly alienate, while the power of resuming them can always be exercised at pleasure. The number and nature of these attributes that may thus be laid down are supposed to be fixed, not by expediency, but by certain eternal rules of right, which seem to have been revealed in early times to the founders of the government, who embodied their knowledge in the Federal Constitution. According to the school of political philosophers who support this theory, — and it is not a new school, — the American people exist for the purpose of maintaining and perpetuating this State sovereignty, just as, according to the disciples of Metternich, the *raison d'être* of the various European nations is the promotion of the grandeur and dignity of the reigning houses.

These doctrines are not, as we have said, of recent origin. They were broached just as freely, and maintained just as stoutly, eighty years ago as now, and the comments made on them at that time by Madison possess just as much point to-day as when they were uttered: —

> "The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead of considering, in the first place, what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety; but that the governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings

for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape, that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us." *

We have here the key to the problem before us. A state is a conventional arrangement, just as much as a confederacy or a kingdom. It exists for the purpose of promoting the happiness and prosperity of those who live in it, and for no other. If this purpose can be better served by merging it in other states, it is not only the right, but the duty, of the people to merge it; if by parting with one half, or two thirds, or three fourths of its sovereignty, it is their duty to part with one half, or two thirds, or three fourths, as the case may be. How much local power must be transferred to the central government in order to form a confederation, is a question which cannot be decided by any general rule. Each case has to be settled on its own merits. How much may be safely granted, and how much ought to be retained, depends on the character, the training, antecedents, traditions, tendencies, and needs of the people for whose benefit the union is founded. All attempts to frame a formula on the subject are as certain to prove vain and fruitless, as the attempts which some political writers are constantly making to trace general limits for the province of government, — limits which must vary in different countries, as their civilization, habits, and traditions vary. It would be clearly impracticable and injurious to leave to individual effort in Russia all that had much better be left to individual effort in America;

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* The Federalist, No. XLV. Dawson's edition, No. XLIV.

and official interference, or "initiative," which in France acts as a wholesome tonic, would in England be simply a weakening irritant.

The nearest approach which perhaps it is possible to make to a maxim for our use in the regulation of the relations between the States and the Union, will be found in the proposition, that whatever experience has shown to be necessary for the popular safety, comfort, and progress, had better, if it cannot be or is not done by the individual States, be done by the general government. That a State may safely part with its right of declaring war or making peace, of making treaties, of regulating commerce, of taxing imports, of exercising jurisdiction on the high seas, of coining money or creating orders of nobility, and cannot part with anything else without danger to liberty, is a fiction of the stump, and has no foundation either in reason or experience. A very much smaller amount of local power and independence would render liberty safe in all contingencies, except those that may be called wildly remote, — such as the combination of the President, Congress, and army in a gigantic conspiracy against the established Constitution. To develop and foster the spirit of local independence, however, to such a degree as to keep it constantly on the verge of anarchy, in order to guard against danger of this kind, is like always sleeping in one's clothes for fear of the house taking fire. The conduct of political as well as private life has to be arranged with reference to ordinary risks; extraordinary ones must be left to that reserved fund of energy and courage which popular government, whether on a large or small scale, is sure to create. The whole doctrine of State sovereignty might be swept away to-morrow, the very remembrance that the States ever were sovereign might be wiped out, and our liberties would still be safe; for it is on our love of them, and not on our theories of the origin and nature of our government, nor yet on the precise form of the government itself, that our possession of them depends. No people ever yet lost their freedom, except through foreign conquest, without either having ceased to care for it, or used it as an instrument for the oppression of others. Nations have been free under monarchies, as well as in republics. Our great safeguard against despotism does not lie, and will never lie, wholly in the manner in which we parcel out power between the governing bodies, but in the character of the persons we charge with the management of our affairs, the spirit of those who choose them, the vigilance with which their acts are watched, and the boldness with which they are criticised.

The Southern feeling of dissatisfaction with the Union was created by slavery, but the means to which the malecontents have resorted for giving vent to it have been provided by the doctrine of "State rights," and by the centrifugal tendency which this doctrine has communicated to the States. This tendency has had most force at the South, but we have felt its effects at the North, as malaria shows itself in some persons in violent fever, and in others only in a lowered vitality. And it has been rendered all the more dangerous by changes which have been gradually taking place in the character of our population. New communities are springing up at the West every month, on whom the past has but little hold. They have no history, and no traditions. The great memories of the Revolution are far less potent swells in Iowa and Illinois than in Massachusetts. The West, in short, has inherited nothing, and so far from regretting this, it glories in it. One of the most marked results of that great sense of power by which it is pervaded, is its strong tendency to live in the future, to neglect the past. It proposes to make history, instead of reading it. It cares little, as yet, for the slow results of study, for the careful deductions of long experience, — in short, for most of the tedious and painful processes by which the older world acquires capacity and arrives at results and conclusions. Individualism is cultivated in it to an extent which not simply diminishes respect for authority, but lessens the cohesive force of all relations, domestic, social, and political.

It must not be forgotten, too, that though the movement in all countries towards assimilation of manners and customs and modes of thought is steady and rapid, and though the additions which science is every day making to our means of intercommunication are rendering the preservation of all differences, at least in externals, more and more difficult, a nation which covers a whole continent, stretching through sixteen degrees of latitude, can never hope to be perfectly homogeneous. Differences of soil and climate, involving as they do differences of diet and pursuits and habits, must in the long run produce differences of temperament, and differences of temperament produce differences of character. No community of origin, or language, or faith, or laws, will ever prevent the man who lives under the burning sun of South Carolina or Texas from being in many marked features a different man from him who toils among the snows of Minnesota or Vermont. The generations which grow up in the manufactories and seaports of New England will differ inevitably and materially from those which hold the plough in the wheat-fields of Illinois, or which watch their flocks on the pastures of the Great Plains. And when we add to the varieties of character thus created those which are likely to arise from the large infusion of foreign blood which we have already received and are daily receiving, (the Irish and Germans in the United States numbered 3,000,000 in 1860,) and when we consider the immense area over which this vast sea of humanity — for vast it will be in a very few years, seething with energy, enterprise, eagerness, and hope — will be spread, to trouble ourselves about the risk of its complete subjection to the rule of one great central despotism seems about as sensible and as profitable as to sit down and fret ourselves over the difficulty of finding fuel when the coal-fields are all exhausted, or that of providing for the increase of population when all arable lands have been brought under cultivation.

No legislation and no political institutions will be able to efface all these differences, and reduce the whole population of this continent to a single type, and no friend of either moral or material progress can wish that they should do so. Perfect uniformity is generally the forerunner of stagnation and decay. Our great danger lies in the exactly opposite direction. It may be safely affirmed, that all we can ever do to modify or efface the differences of interest and of character created by diversities of climate, soil, and situation will not be more than sufficient to keep us all bound up in the same political community; and he must be a sanguine man who, familiar with history and knowing human nature, feels thoroughly assured that it will even be sufficient.

There is one phenomenon in our politics, and a very striking one, which, while it increases the danger of disintegration, points very plainly to the remedy; we mean the gradual, and now all but complete, withdrawal from the State legislatures of our ablest and best men, and their absorption by the federal government. Few men of the highest distinction or capacity will now consent to serve the individual States as legislators. They either abstain from taking part in public affairs altogether, or reserve themselves for the arena at Washington; or else, if they are not able to gratify their desire to get there at the outset of their career, generally manage to do so by the time they have acquired experience and training enough to render their services of much value. The work of local legislation is every day passing more and more into the hands of men of inferior character and capacity; while the work to be done calls every day for a higher order of character and talent, owing to the growth of the community in every direction. The result is, that our State legislation is every year marked by increasing confusion, haste, ignorance, and corruption. The number of contradictory, badly-drawn, ill-considered acts,— the number of acts plainly passed under corrupt influences,—in many of the States, is becoming greater every session. We are thus losing one of the most valuable incidents of the State organization, the opportunity which it has afforded us of comparing and contrasting different systems of legislation. There is clearly no instruction to be derived by other States from the working of laws which are passed, as they are in New York, at the rate of eight or ten a day, and are repealed or modified before they have been a year in operation. Such a thing as steady adherence to a policy long enough to test its value, is now almost unknown. In fact, it is only on the slavery question that most of the States for some time past seem to have had a policy. With regard to all else, the course of their legislation is as erratic as the flight of a butterfly. The law of marriage and divorce, the law of inheritance, the law of debt, the law of real estate, the law of corporations, matters of the first importance to society, are changed and rechanged, as if a fixed policy were a thing neither to be expected nor desired.

That the public interests should, at least visibly, have suffered so little from this fickleness and eccentricity hitherto, can only be accounted for by ascribing it to the lightness of the public burdens, the extraordinary energy of the people, and the prodigious extent of our material resources. But the immense growth of our population and trade, and, above all, the responsibilities arising out of the war, have infused into all our relations, social, political, and commercial, a complexity, and even an intricacy, before unknown. We shall consequently need hereafter much closer attention to remote consequences, much greater delicacy of touch in the manipulation of social and political tendencies, much more thorough subordination of local to national interests, than has hitherto been either displayed or required. May we look for all these things to the State legislatures? Will they prove equal to the strain which the new *régime* is imposing on them already, and the far greater strain which it is likely to impose on them hereafter? We think not; and we think not, while acknowledging to the fullest extent the value and the heartiness of the support which they have given to the national government during the war, and the vastness of the fund of energy which is developed by local independence, even in its most licentious forms. The attractive power exercised already by the federal centre, and which is daily increasing, will prevent it. As the Union grows in size and in the weight of its responsibility, each State sinks in importance, and the field offered to talent at Washington gains in width and in attractiveness. So that, as the years roll on, we may look for a greater and greater eagerness on the part of all men of political ambition to share in the administration of federal affairs, greater and greater reluctance to confine themselves within the narrow and obscure sphere which State politics will offer to their activity. As long as there exists in this country an assembly whose vote puts a large army and a large navy in motion, to whose debates the civilized world listens with anxiety, which regulates the expenditure of one of the largest revenues ever raised, which, in short, holds the whole force of "a mighty and puissant nation" in its hands, all the brain and ambition of the country will gravitate to it as surely, and by a law as irresistible, as that by which an apple falls to the ground. And there is nothing more certain than that the habit of dealing with large interests enlarges the understanding, sharpens the perception, deepens the insight, steadies the judgment, strengthens the purpose, and gives the intellectual vision a wider range. The national government will, from the very nature of its work, always be animated by a higher sense of duty, less influenced by prejudices and passions, more anxious about distant results, and therefore more conservative, than any State legislature can be. Such scandals as the late act of the New York legislature, directing the payment of the interest on the State debt to foreign creditors in depreciated currency, will, we venture to say, never be witnessed in Washington; not perhaps altogether because the national legislators are either wiser or better than those of the State, but because the worst men are apt to be improved, and the giddiest men sobered, by finding themselves armed with vast power, and burdened with heavy responsibilities.

A common regard for our own safety would seem to require, therefore, that the division of power between the State and central governments should now undergo careful revision, and that it should be redistributed under the guidance of that experience of our wants and dangers which we have derived from the history of the last eighty years. Eighty years would in the life of many other nations be but a brief epoch; the last eighty years have, in our national life, been an age, and yet we are but on the threshold of our career. Great as have been the changes and modifications of all kinds, social, political, and material, which the country has undergone since the foundation of the government, they open a vista of vaster changes still to come, for which, if we are wise, we shall begin to prepare while it is yet time. We have seen just enough of the working of democratic government to know that we have not by any means hit upon a perfect form of it; and, as long as the country is undergoing the great modifications necessarily attendant upon rapid growth, we may rest satisfied we shall not arrive at any final conclusions as to what the perfect form is. That consummation is reserved for a still far distant age and generation. All we can do in the mean time is to persist in the only course of experiment which is in politics either possible or expedient, and which consists in the application of such remedies as are within our reach to such evils as may from time to time show themselves.

To glance at all the possible dangers of our present position, at all the tendencies in our political and social progress, which need to be either checked or encouraged by legislation, a volume, instead of an article, would be necessary. Some few of them, however, stand out in marked prominence. We may well ask ourselves whether, in the face of what is now passing before our eyes, the national government needs nothing more for the protection of the national life than the power of raising and equipping fleets and armies, and of punishing pirates and counterfeiters of the public money. It is quite clear that federal authority might be in full and vigorous enjoyment of all the powers conceded to it by the Constitution, and the nation might still perish of dry-rot. For the dangers we have most to fear are not the arms of either foreign enemies or domestic traitors. Nothing can keep the national government together, but the general diffusion of education amongst those who live under it. It has no foe so terrible as popular ignorance, and yet against this one it cannot raise a finger. Whatever helps to lessen the popular appreciation of the value of liberty, to magnify in the popular eyes the superiority of local interests to general ones, to influence local jealousy, to raise the town or the State above the nation, to diminish the popular respect for justice and for individual rights, to cherish the bigotry of class, or creed, or race, will do more to split the United States into warring fragments, to destroy all that is grand, ennobling, and hopeful in our career and prospects, than all the monarchies or oligarchies on earth are capable of effecting. One main source from which these dangers spring is ignorance. It is to the ignorance of the Southern people that we owe the rebellion; to the ignorance of the great masses of the Northern people that we owe much of the baseness and corruption which sully our political life; to the ignorance of the Irish, that we owe two thirds of our crime; and if we ever become the prey of a despot, it will be because ignorance will have rooted out from the popular heart the love of rational freedom. In short, there is hardly any depth of misfortune or degradation to which an ignorant democracy may not sink; there is hardly any attainable height of prosperity and happiness to which an intelligent and enlightened democracy may not rise. If we should ever succeed — and there is no reason why we should not — in carrying a sound and efficient system of popular education wherever the national flag waves, — in placing our whole population on the same plane in this respect, for instance, with Massachusetts, — we might rest assured that we had created a nation against which the gates of hell could not prevail.

And yet, in spite of all this, the national government, whose very existence is imperilled by the failure of the individual States to teach their citizens, is compelled to stand with folded arms until their ignorance has borne fruit in treason or riot. It may then move, but only to shoot or bayonet. Would it not be wiser, as well as juster and more humane, to give it the power, and not only this, but to make it its duty, to establish schools whenever the State governments, through indolence or indifference, false economy or sheer malevolence, fail to do so? If, in short, the safety of the nation depends on the education of the people, ought not the education of the people to be made a national concern? Is there not something suicidal in the obligation now resting on the national government and national courts to uphold and respect a State law, which, as in most of the Slave States, condemns half its population to dwell in the blackest mental night? As if the evil bred in this midnight darkness could, when it burst its barriers, destroy nobody but its authors; as if it were possible, when the Devil was let loose in South Carolina, to guarantee that he should not extend his ravages to New York or Massachusetts.

Next to education, there is in a democratic country nothing of such vast political as well as social importance as the marriage contract, — the way in which it is entered into, the way in which it may be dissolved, and the estimation in which it is held. The family is the basis of civil society. Its protection is, in fact, the great end of government; the bulwarks which are thrown round it, either by law or custom, affect the national life and character perhaps more than all other influences put together. More than one great thinker on the Continent has ascribed the political misfortunes and the moral decline which have overtaken what is called the "Latin race," to the fact that it continues to regard marriage as a bargain, and denies to at least one of the parties all free agency in the solemn and important of contracts; and it is certain that nothing ever brings two peoples into closer relations, gives each a better understanding of the other's ideas, each a deeper sympathy with the weak as well as the strong points of the other's character, than a community of ideas and customs with regard to marriage. To make love in the same manner, utter the marriage vow in the same spirit, put the same value on the marriage contract, look with the same eyes on its breach, be bound by the same rules with regard to its dissolution, constitute between communities, as between individuals, one of the strongest ties, — one that political separation or opposing interests are insufficient to sever.

This is, of course, the sentimental side of the matter; but if we look at it from a legal point of view, its importance rather increases than diminishes. There is no human relation which affects the distribution and transmission of property more powerfully than marriage. The family is, of course, not only the channel along which property passes from generation to generation, but furnishes the most powerful of all stimulants to industry and accumulation. Whatever affects its stability, therefore, naturally and irresistibly exercises, in the long run, a greater or less influence on the national wealth. Now nothing affects its stability more seriously than the law of divorce. If the law of divorce be too lax, it may deprive the marriage contract of all sanctity, by making it a mere instrument for the gratification of a fleeting passion; if too strong, it may convert it in vast numbers of cases into a fountain of bitterness and demoralization.

We have not space to enter into such an elucidation of these points as they merit, but a moment's reflection on them will be sufficient to convince any intelligent person that a uniform law of marriage and divorce is one of the essential bases of real national unity; and yet it is one which this nation does not possess. In other words, the national government is deprived of all support from one of the strongest of the social forces. The whole matter is left by the Constitution in the hands of the State legislatures, and, as might be expected, their action has resulted in producing the widest diversity in the laws of marriage and divorce in different States. If we are not mistaken, there are not more than three States in the Union in which the same form of marriage is binding; we doubt if there are two in which divorces are granted for the same causes, and followed by the same consequences. The result is, that an American citizen may be in one part of his country living in lawful wedlock, but if he cross a line, perhaps half a mile away, he becomes a bigamist, and his children are made illegitimate, and incapable, if he dies intestate, of inheriting his property. The absurdities and wrongs which arise, or may arise, out of the existing state of the law, are innumerable; and that it is not felt to be a greater hardship is a proof of the popular ignorance of the evil that results from it. Many of the States legislate on this subject with a levity which might seem to indicate a desire to bring marriage itself into contempt. The facility with which marriage may be dissolved in portions of the West may well be called scandalous, and we wish it were only scandalous.

Other illustrations might be produced, of the dangers to national unity arising out of the present division of powers between the Federal and State governments; but we hope we have already said enough to show the necessity for such a revision of the Constitution as shall adapt it to the altered circumstances of the country, — its new wants and new dangers. The people have given, during the past three years, too many and too convincing proofs of their appreciation of the Union, to allow us to suppose that they will be deterred by either names or traditions from making any changes that are plainly called for by the public "safety, honor, and welfare." Where blood has been so freely offered, prejudices are but a small sacrifice, and no sacrifice can be too great that may be required to make and to keep this Union indissoluble. If the Union were only to secure to the inhabitants of North America internal peace and freedom of internal trade, it would do more for civilization and for human happiness than any other political organization which has ever existed; and yet these, we need hardly say, are among the least of the blessings which, if it be maintained, strengthened, and perpetuated, it will secure for our own and future generations in long succession.

ART. V. — *Les Marines de la France et de l'Angleterre.* 1815–1863. Par M. XAVIER RAYMOND. Paris. 1863.

IN our last number we observed, "It is agreeable to think that the present changes in naval warfare will produce the effect of equalizing the naval powers of the world, — at least in respect to defence." This is an opinion which, of course, would be very unwillingly accepted by a nation which has hitherto boasted that it possessed the command of the sea; which is conscious that it owes a great deal of its power to its apparent readiness to make good this boast on all occasions; and the effect of whose policy, according to one of its political writers, has been to create as many enemies as possible, to cast, not oil, but blazing petroleum on the troubled waters of European politics, and to betray friends and enemies alike. Thus, a writer in a late number of Blackwood's Magazine very naturally insists that England has lost no advantage by the introduction of iron-cased ships and heavier artillery than any hitherto used; that her resources and wealth, far exceeding that of other nations, enable her to build and equip a fleet of the present day, or to replace such a fleet, if lost or seriously damaged in action, with incomparably greater ease and speed than can be done by any other people; and that she is better able to bear the enormous cost of the present system of warfare. And an earlier writer in the Edinburgh Review, in speculating on the effects of recent changes on the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, adopts the view of M. Xavier Raymond, that, as money is the sinews of war on sea as well as on land, Great Britain, by means of her wealth, her mechanical skill, and her vast manufacturing and shipbuilding establishments, may still wear her dignities without co-rival. But the argument of M. Raymond is curiously infelicitous, and is stated after the manner of an advocate, and not of a judge. "How many of the iron-clad frigates of to-day," he remarks, "would be necessary to produce the same results as the great fleet of Nelson and of Hyde Parker? Would not two be enough, and three more than enough"? And further on he adds, "In the first place, the fortifications, which in 1801 contributed to the defence of Copenhagen, have lost all their efficiency against iron-clad vessels." But M. Raymond does not know what we know by experience, that a single monitor of the class of the Dictator or the Puritan would be more than a match for the present casemated fleet of Great Britain. And he did not know probably, when he wrote, that those very fortifications, of which he speaks so disparagingly, may be protected by iron armor, and may be surmounted and defended by movable turrets.*

There is a loose way of speaking of iron-clad vessels, as if they were all alike, and were intended to perform similar services; but the differences among them, not depending on size, but only on offensive and defensive qualities, are greater than any corresponding differences among wooden vessels. Commodore John Rodgers, the hero of the Weehawken, has pointed out the fundamental distinctions in his admirable letter of April 7th to the Secretary of the Navy, on the subject of armored vessels. He divides them into two classes, and points out their defects and advantages, selecting for his illustrations the best examples of each class.

Though England and France have been running a race since the beginning of the year 1861 in building wooden and iron iron-clad vessels, some of which, like the Royal Sovereign, were, as was also the case with our Roanoke, old wooden screwships cut down for the purpose, while others were entirely new, yet neither of them, in all the varieties of plans adopted, have thought of constructing anything but sea-going vessels, and these, too, with a special reference to their capacity to encounter the armor-plated ships of the other. The question with the Englishman was, what is the progress of shipbuilding in France, and how far are we prepared to meet our ancient enemy, when this present gloss of friendship has lost its lustre, and the hereditary antipathy between the two countries breaks out afresh? When Sir John Pakington asked for an addition of two millions and a half sterling to the navy estimates for the construction of new ships-of-war, he is described by M. Raymond as rising from his seat with the manner and countenance of a man who is about to develop a mystery full of crime and horror, and as relating in a dramatic tone to his colleagues, that Admiral Elliott, who had been sent to France to inform himself of the state of the French fleet, had discovered in her arsenals ten new armored frigates in process of construction; and when Lord Palmerston sustained this extraordinary demand, he rested it upon the alleged fact (which we need nardly add was not accurately stated in the sense in which it was intended to be understood) that France already possessed thirty-seven armor-plated vessels of war. Well may poor M. Raymond exclaim, that he thinks it very hard that, when Lord Palmerston takes it into his head to extort money from Parliament, or when the alarmed imagination of Sir John Pakington calls out for an increase of the navy, France should be designated as the *Croque-Mitaine* whose projects, labors, and inventions are perpetually disturbing the repose of England; and that she should serve as the *echappatoire* to ministers, who, when they are called upon to render an account of wasteful expenditures and crude conceptions, answer the call by indulging in an harangue against their present ally.

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* Several plans for such works of defence have been presented to our Executive Departments and to Congress.

And the question with the Frenchman was, not whether his countrymen were endowed with the genius for the sea; but whether any British minister like Lord Palmerston should set up the audacious pretension, that it belonged to him to prescribe their field of activity upon the great oceans. "Far from this," says M. Raymond; "we assert our right and our duty to continue to make use, to the extent of our ability, of that which Providence has given to all people for their common enjoyment; we will no longer lend an implicit sanction to errors which, by being constantly repeated, end by being accepted as truths; we will no longer yield to the illusions, of which our neighbors, intoxicated by the fumes of a national *amour-propre*, have been for some time the dupes; we will maintain the superiority of our rifled guns and armored vessels over theirs; and finally, we will not suffer it to be admitted among the nations, that our arms are inferior to those of any people, because at the bottom of this argument there lies a question of moral influence, which we must not allow ourselves to be deprived of." Admitting the superiority of the English, and admitting the great distance which is yet to be travelled to overtake them, still the serious desire of the Frenchman is to establish equality, fully recognizing the fact, that hereafter neither during peace nor war can a nation be counted among the great powers, unless she is possessed of an efficient navy. And this desire to occupy the place which belongs to France upon the sea, to shake off the painful sense of inferiority left by the naval disasters of the first Empire, to rise to an equality that will satisfy the ambition, the patriotism, and the security of the nation, like the corresponding feeling on the other side of the Channel, wears its own badge of grief and bitterness. Is it sufficient, says M. Raymond, to repeat the famous *Civis Romanus sum*, to be still singing *Rule Britannia* at the very time when they are constructing vessels no longer able to *rule the waves?* "Ce chant qui représente le Créateur comme heureux d'avoir créé le monde, parce que cela lui a fourni l'occasion de créer l'Angleterre, à laquelle il s'empresse de donner, comme témoignage de sa satisfaction, l'empire absolu des mers au détriment des autres peuples." (pp. 10, 11.) We give this in the original, lest some of the wit and temper should evaporate in the translation, and we may remark by the way, that this claim of Britannia to *rule the waves* is received much more philosophically by ourselves than by France, probably because, when she ceases to do so, the sceptre will pass into our hands.

We go back to our original statement, the truth of which has been made apparent, that France and England have increased, and are now increasing, their navies with an almost exclusive regard to each other. If any proofs of this were wanted other than those already cited, we might refer to some of the recent discussions before the Royal United Service Institution. The truth is, that while France is a perpetual bugbear to England (*un epouvantail de l'Angleterre*), she at the same time regards her rival with a mixture of jealousy, resentment, and apprehension, which make her

"Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike."

Accordingly, these two nations have limited their constructions mainly to the first of the two classes into which Comm

John Rodgers has divided the iron-clad vessels-of-war now in use, and which he denominates the Ironsides class, taking that vessel as its type. The vessels belonging to this class need not vary in any essential particulars from the ordinary model. An increase of size is required to meet the additional weight, and there are some modifications of shape and construction due to the addition of the ram, and to the protection which it is expedient to give to the rudder and propeller. But these vessels have ample quarters for the crews, free access to the decks, the usual light and ventillation, and guns in the common broadside battery; they also are, or may be, propelled in part by sails. They are designed to keep the sea, to take the place of the old line-of-battle ships, to maintain or dispute the possession of the English Channel, and on them England hopes to carry her meteor flag once more over those seas that have so often echoed to the thunders from her native oak. It may be said of these casemated vessels, speaking in the most general way, and without reference to the armament, that they are ships of the old model protected by iron armor. In fact, as we have before said, several of the English ships are really old vessels razeed and plated.

The vessels of the second, or Monitor class, as it is designated by Commodore Rodgers, differ entirely from those of the first class. The fundamental conception of them is different; the plan of construction, and the modes of offence and defence, are different; and these differences are so intrinsic and essential, that the two classes admit of no comparison except as to the results of their work. In the Monitors the guns are reduced in number, and increased in size; they are taken from the broadside or beam-ends, where they are supported upon the frame or ribs of the ship, and carried amidships over the line of the keel, on which, as well as on the main and auxiliary kelsons, they find their basis, being upborne by the whole of the floating power of the vessel, and sustained by all her strength. The Monitors are placed so low in the water that they have the least possible deck and side surface to be plated, and consequently that plating can be for any given tonnage the most impenetrable. In addition to this, the offensive armament of the Monitors is placed on a circular chamber of the smallest admissible dimensions; and here again, the plating, being concentrated, requires to be thicker. To use Commodore Rodgers's precise language, "In the Monitors, concentration of guns and armor is the object sought. In them, the plating is compressed into inches of elevation; while in the Ironsides class it is extended over feet; and the comparatively numerous guns distributed over the decks of the Ironsides class are moulded into a few larger ones in the turrets of the Monitors."

The two prominent results of these changes in the plan of construction are, that the Monitors carry fifteen-inch guns, which no vessels carry in broadside; and that the armor of the most recent of them, the Dictator and the Puritan, for example, is nearly three and a half times thicker than that of the Warrior, or of the Gloire, and nearly three times as thick as that of the Minotaur or Magenta. Target experiments, "if target experiments are reliable, prove that a shot from a fifteen-inch gun will crush in the sides of any of the casemated vessels in Europe or America. A single well-planted blow would sink either the Warrior, Gloire, Magenta, Minotaur, or Bellerophon. The Dictator, of three thousand tons, has armor thick enough, I believe, to withstand fifteen-inch guns."

Commodore Rodgers sums up his conclusions as follows: "I think that the Monitor class and the Ironsides class are different weapons, each having its peculiar advantages, — both needed to an iron-clad navy, — both needed in war; but that, when the Monitor class measures its strength against the Ironsides class, then, with vessels of equal size, the Monitor class will overpower the Ironsides class; and, indeed, a single Monitor will capture many casemated vessels of no greater individual size or speed; and as vessels find their natural antagonists in vessels, and only their exceptional antagonists in forts, it must be considered that, upon the whole, the Monitor principle contains the most successful elements for plating vessels for war purposes."

And these conclusions we accept. They are founded upon correct views, and sustained by experience. When Commodore Rodgers spoke of "a single well-planted blow," he no doubt remembered that the shot by which he disabled the Atlanta struck at such an angle that, although it crushed the casemate, it did not pass through it. These conclusions justify us in maintaining that the effect of the present changes in naval war is to equalize the powers of nations, at least in respect to defence. Of this our own case is an example. We have no means of coping on the sea with the existing navies of Great Britain or France; that is, we cannot match them ship for ship and gun for gun; but we possess means of defence in our Monitors which will be sufficient to protect us from aggression at home, while we are preparing the means of encountering those navies abroad, should that necessity arise.

This question has another bearing, — that of the blockade. In the existing state of things, an attempt on the part of Great Britain to renew Lord Collingwood's blockade of the French fleet off Toulon would hardly be repeated, or, if repeated, would probably be attended with the most disastrous consequences. Blockading is a service which the best-built wooden ships, unencumbered by a superfluous weight, find most trying to their strength. Setting aside all that relates to sailing ships as having no longer any value, we may trust to our own experiences of blockade by steam. If the blockaded party possesses one or more vessels intrinsically superior to all the vessels of the blockading fleet individually, and if this party is gifted with an ordinary share of enterprise, it would be strange indeed if the innumerable chances of weather and accident did not afford occasional opportunities for successful sallies; in which we may suppose that the assailant employs his best ships. For it is not to be forgotten that the employment of the best ships in such a service as that of the blockade encounters the most serious objections. If casemated vessels are very heavily plated, experiments have shown that they soon will be disabled by bad weather, and if they are not heavily plated, they are unsuited to encounter those of the blockaded party, which, not themselves exposed, will only seek an engagement under the most favorable circumstances. These conclusions are confirmed by experiments with the Warrior and Black Prince, both of which vessels are relieved from the weight of armor at the two extremities. We are not informed of the details of their trial cruises, but enough has leaked out to satisfy the public that they are not useful sea-going vessels; and this opinion is further confirmed by the changes made in the subsequent constructions. One of these changes is well worth noticing, and that is in the size. The displacement of the Bellerophon exceeds that of the Warrior by many tons. This increase of size carries with it the necessity for building the hull of iron, and the rapidity with which the iron is covered with the sea-grasses and the sedentary crustacea disqualifies vessels constructed of this material for very active service. During the eight or ten months that the French frigate La Couronne remained in the port of L'Orient, receiving her armor, setting up her engine, getting on board her guns, her bottom was so much covered with mollusks and vegetable matter, that she fell far short of expectation in the speed attained on the trial trip. M. Raymond mentions seeing at the London Exhibition a striking example of this case of deposit; it was a detached fragment of the incrustations which had attached themselves, in a period of four months, to the hull of the Adventure, an iron transport of the English navy. These incrustations were between ten and twelve inches thick. No composition or invention hitherto discovered has remedied this evil. A certain preparation of zinc, which has been warmly recommended, has been fairly tried, and has entirely failed. The only resource is to dock the vessel, and remove the excrescences by hand, — a mode of proceeding always difficult and protracted in the case of these very large vessels, and impossible in any part of the world except on the coast of Euope, and on that of the Northern States of America.

M. Raymond would have us believe that these objections do not apply to the iron-clad vessels of the French navy, which he asserts have sustained every trial at sea with perfect success. Without entering into a discussion of the real merit of the experiments with La Gloire in the Mediterranean, or of the summer voyage of La Normandie to Mexico, &c., we have only to refer to the actual results of blockading service, when kept up for a long time. The sufferings and complaints of Collingwood before Toulon are repeated by our own Admirals before Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile; and it is a simple absurdity to maintain that a service, which exhausts the strength of wooden vessels not surcharged by their armament, could be performed by the same or similar vessels, if to this armament were added an iron plating of the proportionate weight of one thousand tons to a displacement of six thousand tons.

We may pass, without enlarging upon this absurdity, to another difficulty attending the employment of casemated vessels on this close and arduous duty, — we mean the difficulty relating to hygiene. The chief part of our own experience in this very interesting question is limited to vessels of the Monitor class; and by this experience we are every day profiting. Dr. Wheelan, the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Department, has kindly permitted us to examine the voluminous reports of the medical officers of the navy in relation to this subject. But since what we have to say relates rather to the iron-clad ships of France and England than to our own turreted vessels, we prefer to introduce the following extract from an unpublished paper, written by Dr. Wheelan himself.

> "The sanitary condition of iron-clad vessels of war is a subject which has engaged, and continues to engage, the most earnest attention in Europe, and, notwithstanding the many and ingenious appliances for ventilation, I should judge from reports and publications, that no entirely satisfactory results had yet been attained abroad.
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> "I have seen recent allusions in French papers to the Normandie, which formed part of the expedition to Mexico; and though constructed with all the skill and science which an enlightened nation could apply in so important a problem, she is regarded as a sanitary failure. She proved so sickly, that it was found necessary to remove the crew, on two occasions, in a brief cruise, and she is now on her return to France.
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> "I know nothing of the construction of the iron-clads of the navy, and hence the remarks I make in reference to this class of vessels have no special or individual application.
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> "It seems to be conceded that, with *equal* ventilation, a steamer is more unhealthy than a sailing vessel, for the simple reason that the internal heat of the former gives activity to the sources of impurity and disease inseparable from the close aggregation of men. It is asserted that the almost unavoidable accumulation of offensive rubbish under the machinery adds to the impurity of the close air in the between decks.

"The increased mortality in the English navy, from yellow fever, during late years, is found in steamships; and the same is said to be true of our own mercantile marine. We all remember the fearful outbreak of yellow fever on board the Susquehanna a few years ago, when as far as the eye could reach she was a model of cleanliness and order.

"The London Times stated, not long since, that seventy tons of bricks and mortar have been built into the bottom of the Warrior, to prevent the lodgment, and consequent stagnation, of bilge-water. Allusion is frequently made to the submergence of vessels of the Monitor class, as tending to multiply the conditions of unhealthiness.

"It would appear that, while the new styles of vessels may add to the power of the navy, they combine so many unfavorable elements, in high temperature, defective ventilation, the tendency of their walls to accumulate and store up heat, their submergence and exclusion of light, that it is hardly to be hoped we can escape a general deterioration of health, and a large sick list, with any of the ordinary means at our command."

Even M. Raymond, who writes in the purest spirit of vainglory, and represents everything *couleur de rose*, admits that on board La Normandie, while in the Northern tropics, there were complaints of the heat, although but two furnaces were lighted. He attributes these complaints to the necessity for keeping the gun-deck ports closed. There were only three days, he adds, when all the ports could be kept open fore and aft at the same time. This was in consequence of the rolling, though La Normandie is described as not being an exceptional case in this particular. "I have known," said one of her officers, "other vessels that rolled more, but I never knew any whose motions were more easy." To this deficiency of fresh air may be added the evils arising from the want of light, a requisite, though less indispensable than air, to a condition of health. The frigate La Couronne is spoken of as being very faulty in this particular.

If, for a summer cruise in the tropics "avec belle mer et jolie brise," we substitute a winter's gale on our coast, we imagine the result would be still more unsatisfactory. This holiday service will not be accepted by nautical men as a proof that the new ships are equal in all respects to those which they have replaced. Even their most ardent admirers admit that their pitching and rolling motions are so violent, as to wear out the crew, and to interfere with the accuracy of the fire from the battery. They admit that they are disagreeable habitations, deficient in air and light, which can only be supplied at the expense of their defensive qualities, and that these defects give rise to insalubrity. They also admit, that they are very costly, and that they carry in them the seeds of their own destruction, which begin to germinate at the very moment they are put together.

In presenting our views, we have no intention of arguing the matter. If these views are correct, it will be no disadvantage to us whatever, that our enemies do not admit their correctness, or act in opposition to them. We are not writing either to flatter the national vanity, or to maintain a cause, but we are employed in the consideration of our situation relatively to other naval powers, and especially to those which have been balancing in their minds the question, whether they would be accounted wise in their generation if they took part in our national troubles, ranging themselves on the side of human slavery against the side of human freedom.

There are some views concerning the best manner in which a harbor may be defended by vessels of the Monitor class against casemated vessels, which are strictly professional, and need not therefore be broached in this place; but we have enlarged somewhat upon the main considerations, because our first business is defence, and the problem has hitherto been solved favorably to us. We might push this topic further, and discuss the possibility, and even probability, of using Rodman's twenty-inch gun in our Monitor turrets, as well and as easily as in our forts. We say as easily, for the invention of Mr. Eads of St. Louis has rendered the manipulation of two fifteen-inch guns in an Ericsson turret as easy as that of a twelve-pounder howitzer on an open deck. The sudden development of a genius for naval construction and for naval war in the West, of which Mr. Eads is the eminent representative, is certainly one of the most curious results of the war. The workshops and building-yards of Cincinnati, Pittsburg, and Carondelet have risen at once to the full usefulness of complete naval establishments. This fact is cheerfully recognized by Admiral Porter in his report on iron-clads.

"If it is the intention of the government to build any more Monitors, or, indeed, iron vessels of peculiar construction, I would beg leave to recommend that a fair portion of patronage be given to the Western foundries. I believe the work will be done cheaper and better than it can be done elsewhere. Vessels of any size can be built in any part of these rivers. The senseless cry about the want of water here or there should not be taken into consideration for a moment, for at low water the whole Mississippi is a chain of sand-bars, and no place possesses then any advantage over another. There is less water below Cairo than there is at Cairo and neighborhood, and at dead low water a boat drawing six feet cannot get above Helena, while for eight months in the year a vessel drawing ten feet could traverse nearly the whole length of the river. It matters little, then, what point on the river is occupied as a building-point. Proper encouragement on the part of the government would have vessels built by private enterprise cheaper than they could be built at government works out here, which in this region would cost large outlays before they would be ready to build a steamer.* It is astonishing how little these Western manufacturers require to commence operations with; and while the government officials would be laying out the yard to work in, they would have the vessel built."

The latest constructions of the Monitor class on the Western waters are entirely successful in all respects; but in none more than in the mode of working great guns in the turret. Before Mr. Eads's invention was applied, not less than twelve men were required to work each one of the fifteen-inch guns, and now one man can work two fifteen-inch guns with increased certainty and precision. Since Mr. Eads took out his patent, Chief Engineer J. W. King of the Navy has sent us a drawing of his arrangement for accomplishing the same object. These great guns, it must be observed, are altogether the friends of the weak, and on the side of defence. They may not deprive a great naval power of the excellence of having a giant's strength, but they defeat the tyranny that would use it like a giant.

If it were not to consider too curiously, we might pause here to consider the ultimate effect of these great guns upon *casemated* vessels, provided the former continue to be successfully employed in naval war. When armor ceases to be a protection, it becomes a fatal encumbrance. It was not until two centuries after the invention of gunpowder, that fire-arms came into complete use, and decided the fate of battles. Up to that period the long bow and the pike disputed the field with the musket, and seem to have been in some respects the more formidable weapons. It was not until after the battle of Fontenoy, in which the cannon made such terrible havoc with the English column, and commenced the defeat which Lord Clare, leading the hearts that were burning with the "treasured wrongs of fifty years," turned into utter rout and confusion, that the pike finally disappeared. But just in proportion as fire-arms advanced toward perfection, the cumbrous defences of the armor worn by knights and men-at-arms were laid aside.

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* We take the liberty to differ from the gallant Admiral in his estimate of the capacity of private yards. Private yards employed for building public vessels become in fact, and in expense, *public* yards under private management.

This, however, was a gradual process, and the result of long experience. The first consequence of the introduction of gunpowder was an attempt to strengthen the armor to a degree that would resist the force of the bullet. M. de la Noue, in the fifteenth Military Discourse, quoted by Meyrick in his "Antient Armor," says: "There has been good reason, from the violence of the *arquebuses* and pikes, to render the harness more massive, and of superior proof to what it was." In a note, and subsequently in the text, Meyrick speaks of one of these suits being so immensely heavy, owing to the thickness of the breastplate, which has been proved to be bullet-proof, that it could not be worn a whole day. And in a "schedule," drawn up in the beginning of the reign of Charles I., "containing the new rates and prices of the several parts and whole armes, both for Horse and Foot,"—"A breast of pistol-proofe" is set down at eleven shillings (A. D. 1629).

The changes, which it took scores of years to bring about at that early period in the use of fire-arms, find their corresponding successions in as many days in the recent series of rapid revolutions in naval armament. The Warrior, with a plating of four and a half inches, is hardly launched before she is followed by the Minotaur, with a plating of five and a half inches; and the Minotaur in turn is succeeded by the Bellerophon, with a plating of six inches. We, on our side, made the walls of the first Monitor turret eight inches thick, and of the last, fifteen inches thick. If, as we believe, and as our experiments authorize us to conclude, the armor of the Bellerophon, with all its backing, is not proof against the fifteen-inch gun, and the fifteen-inch gun can be carried and worked at sea, then she would be better without her armor than with it. Many a knight and man-at-arms, after being wounded by a ball from a gun, died, not in consequence of his wound, but of his armor, before experience had fully established the fact that a breastplate had ceased to be a protection. But when that fact was established, armor came to be worn only as an ornament, or for special purposes, as for instance the defence of the head against the sabre-cut.

We may follow out this idea with modesty enough, and likelihood to lead it, and apply it to the casemated vessels of the day. If experience should prove that they cannot be made impenetrable, the armor will be laid aside, or used only for special purposes; but wherever these changes may lead, the new prow will probably be retained as a means of offence, and it is very certain that the mounting of guns on a single deck has permanently taken the place of the old batteries of two, three, and four decks.

The reader will observe that these remarks are confined to *casemated* vessels, to which they are applicable on the admission that these vessels are indefensible against guns in actual use. But they are not applicable to the Monitor class of vessels, because this class is not embraced in that condition. The present indications are that the Monitor class of vessels will, in some form or other, continue to be used for harbor defence for an indefinite period. They are the most efficient floating batteries that have ever been invented; and, whatever may be the advances in gunnery, it is much more probable that the Monitors will be strengthened to meet those advances, than that they will be abandoned.

If we had leisure, we might stop to utter a word of lamentation over the condition and disappearance of those noble structures, the old sailing frigates and ships-of-the-line, which formerly constituted the pride of navies, were the gems of the naval constructive art, the ornament and defence of the sea, the glory of nations, and the terror of evil-doers. How have the mighty fallen! Those ships that once carried so proudly the flags of admirals and commodores along the coast and into the ports of every country and people, civilized or barbarous, have sunk now into the humiliation of store-ships, hospital-ships, and receiving-ships, from which they are destined never to rise.

It would seem ungracious, if not ungrateful, not to say a single word about the good service they have performed in this war of the rebellion, in which they have acted so conspicuous a part; their deeds

> "Are registered where every day we turn
> The leaf to read them."

The stately and triumphant march of the Wabash and her companions before the batteries of Port Royal; the daring passage of the forts on the Mississippi, and subsequent encounter of rams, rafts, fire-ships, burning vessels, and water batteries,—not more brilliant than successful; the persevering and steady conflict, of two days' duration, with the batteries at Roanoke Island; the gallant and fortunate dash upon Newbern,—have secured to these wooden vessels a place in the nation's grateful remembrance.

It would be strange if the present exigencies had not disclosed the occasion and necessity for some naval reforms. We cannot fail to admit that, at some future, and we hope not distant time, we are to occupy a more commanding position among the naval powers of the world. It may perhaps cost us a struggle to regain our commercial importance, and it will certainly cost us so much of an effort as consists in the maintenance of a respectable navy, to resist the influences of foreign jealousy, when our rightful place as a nation with internal peace has been resumed. We must begin therefore to look with a more careful eye to the *personnel* of the navy; it must be made an object of legislation to identify the seamen with the service in something the same manner, though not perhaps to the same extent, as the officers. Long and faithful service should carry with it recognized distinctions and substantial benefits. These are the universal reward of industry and fidelity in all professions and occupations, leaving out of view, of course, those accidents or calamities which we call providential. The fortunate officer in the navy reaps this reward, and so also should the successful seaman. The acts of the state are founded upon principles of justice; and not only principles of justice, but the dictates of prudence demand that the strongest inducements should be held out to the seaman to unite his interests, his fortunes, and his purposes with the navy during the whole of his life. And this is only to be done in one way, and never has been attempted in any but one way; and that is, the gradual amelioration of the seaman's condition, so that he may be able to look forward with as much certainty as any other man to the recompense of the good and faithful servant. The advantages or rewards ought not to be of a kind to lessen the self-respect of those who receive them, nor ought they to be conveyed in such a way as to be offensive to those from whom they are withheld. We are a republican people, and need not use towards our public servants such terms as imply a marked inferiority. Then, too, we have seen very lately the force of the navy very much reduced, and its efficiency impaired, by the unlooked-for effect of the enrolment act, by which the army was recruited at the expense of the navy. Crises of this sort should be anticipated and prevented, otherwise they might occur at a moment when they would be fatal to the honor and safety of the country; and they can be prevented only by judicious legislation. This would act as a constant maintaining power, not only keeping full the complements of our ships in commission, but qualifying us to meet any sudden emergency by a new draft. Having laid down the principle on which legislation ought to be based, it would be premature to enter upon the consideration of the practical details by means of which it is developed. It is enough to say, that we should propose to confine ourselves strictly to the analogies and usages of our own navy, — not looking abroad for examples which are uncongenial to our way of thinking. But first of all, the public mind is to be impressed with the want of reform in these respects; the indispensable necessity of it is to be established and acknowledged; and when this is done, the required measures will find a ready interpretation in the ordinary course of legislation.

If we add another word in the way of argument, it is not so much for the purpose of convincing the public mind, as of commanding the public attention. The power of a navy finds its real exponent in the men of the navy, and these men must be possessed of a special development and training. One quality resulting from this special development is the quality of being seamen; a quality that is indispensable. But another and equally important quality is that of being naval seamen. The crews of our men-of-war must not only be familiar with the arts and practices of the sea, and with life upon the ocean; but they must be skilled in the use of the arms of a man-of-war; their military sentiments must be cultivated; their patriotism and pride of country must be aroused; and they must belong to the sea by all the ties, habits, and associations which a naval life engenders. In the war of 1812, the second war of our independence, (when our population numbers sixty or seventy millions, and our resources are proportionately developed, the numerical order of these English wars for American independence and for American liberty may be interrupted,) Commodore Porter carried at his masthead a flag bearing the motto, "FREE TRADE AND SAILORS' RIGHTS." In order that our navy should be efficient, this motto should be as well known and as dear to the men as it is to the officers of the service. The honor of the navy, the freedom of the seas, the protection of the national commerce, — these should be the almost exclusive objects of their devotion. And this is the very period of time for creating such a class of naval seamen. Many more men are now employed than could possibly be wanted in time of peace; and these men are, much the larger part of them, identified with the honor and character of the navy by their participation in the naval events of the war. When the reduction of the navy takes place, an opportunity will be afforded to select a sufficient body of men, who are thoroughly imbued with a love of the profession, who are impressed with its obligations, who are expert in its duties, and inspired with its sentiments. The sea is their home; and they will fight in its defence, as the soldier in defence of his home on land. If we neglect this opportunity to create a class of naval seamen, and to identify them with the service of their country, it will prove an almost irreparable loss, — a loss from which we can only recover by going through similar experiences, that is, by passing through a naval war, at the commencement of which we shall labor under the disadvantage of not having our ships manned by professional seamen.

The changes which are taking place so rapidly in naval art and warfare admonish us, that we cannot safely relax the training and discipline of our crews. We must keep them always in hand,—always instructed in the newest methods of working the great guns, whether smooth-bored or rifled, of handling the howitzers, and of exercising with the small arms. These changes extend to everything that relates to the construction, internal economy, police, navigation, management, and evolutions of ships of war. We are just in that state of transition, when, unless we exert a proper foresight, we are in danger of losing that fine type of manhood, the man-of-war's man. We willingly reconcile ourselves to the gradual disappearance of those traits of his character, and those habits of his life, which had their origin in the state of things that has now become obsolete; but we are eager to preserve the heroic elements of this class of men for the good and behoof of our country.

We have a brief word to say upon another necessity which has grown up during this war, and which proceeds from the recent changes in shipbuilding and the manufacture of cannon. We are neglectful of those joint commissions, freely created in England and France, for the purpose of testing the novelties of art and science, the good effect of which must be felt in two important directions;—one, the decrease of expenditures, the other, the employment of the best means and weapons. We cannot go very far wrong in saying, that, if some of these commissions in England are to be traced to the mistakes in the Warrior, and came therefore too late in that instance, they prevented other and similar errors, and supplied by wise experiment the wants of experience. To enter into this subject particularly, and utter freely the thoughts which prompt this opinion, would be to discuss what it is more judicious to pass over in silence. As an example of our meaning, however, we may mention the desirableness of establishing, by means of experiments conducted by a joint commission composed of officers of the army and navy, fixed rules with regard to the size of the grain and the weight of the charge of the powder used in our guns of the largest calibre. In the army fifteen-inch gun "mammoth powder," differing from other powder in the size and hardness of the grain, is the only powder used. In order to secure progressive combustion, the grain must be so hard as not to be permeated by the gas developed in its combustion. The object aimed at by the use of this powder is to impart a given velocity to the shot, with the least possible maximum strain or pressure of gas upon the gun; or to save the gun at the expense of the powder; — since it will require a larger charge of this than of ordinary small-grained powder to impart a given velocity, there being a portion of each grain of this powder blown out unburned. But the preservation of the gun, and the safety in its use, are believed to more than compensate for the additional expenditure of powder.

The navy fifteen-inch gun is shorter in the bore than that of the army, and therefore requires the use of a smaller-grained powder, or of larger charges, to impart a given velocity to the shot.

The question, whether there is not a combination or mixture of these two kinds of powder which is better than either of them separately, or whether one kind is not uniformly preferable to the other, is one which a joint commission would settle immediately; and it would seem the most sensible thing in the world, that, at the time when we are expending such large sums for powder, we should take pains to ascertain which is the best kind. This undoubtedly is the plan of proceeding we should adopt in our private affairs, and we should adopt it because it is the most expedient, and the most in accordance with sound judgment.

There is another topic which engages the earnest attention of the department and of the thinking men of the service, concerning which it is very desirable that there should prevail a sound and active public opinion.

With the large increase of the navy, and its prospective establishment upon a basis almost exclusively of steam-vessels, the character and status of that class of its officers known as naval engineers is coming to be a subject of manifest importance. Engineers were first commissioned by an act of Congress approved August 31st, 1842. In 1845, they had little more than a nominal existence, there being less than fifty engineers to nearly seven hundred line officers. Even in 1855, or ten years later, the number of engineers had barely reached a hundred; although in January, 1861, immediately prior to the rebellion, the number had come to be about twice as large, the number of line officers remaining almost identically the same as in 1845.

The gigantic operations of the war have changed the relations between the line and engineer officers. On the first of January, 1863, there were over eleven hundred engineers, and nearly sixteen hundred line officers, including both regular and volunteer officers. On the first of January, 1864, the numbers were as follows: —

Regular Officers.

Line Officers	569
Engineer Officers	501

Volunteer Officers.

Line Officers	1493
Engineer Officers	1226

Or, there was a total of 1727 engineers to 2062 line officers.

But a more significant fact, and one which better illustrates the importance of this element in the naval service at the present time, is this. In the detail of officers, regular and volunteer, actually on duty in the various steam-vessels of the several squadrons, the number of engineer officers is practically equal to the whole number of line officers of all grades.

Of this arm of the naval service, now so conspicuous, and which, although a creation of troublous times, is yet so evidently destined to be substantially perpetuated, not to say further developed, what is to be the future status? Are naval engineers to be regarded merely in the light of experts more or less practised in driving the machinery of steam vessels of war, with little, if any, education in the general principles upon which the economics of naval machinery are based? Or are naval engineers not only to be skilled in the management of naval machinery, but professionally educated in the sciences and arts involved in its construction and use? Undoubtedly there are persons, and those whose opinions are entitled to some consideration, who believe that the naval engineer would be better qualified, and more likely to become a really practical man, upon the former than the latter basis; but it is equally certain that there are those whose opinions must be regarded as enjoying a much greater authority, who believe that the naval engineer is not disqualified for useful practical service by possessing a sound knowledge of the principles which exercise more or less control over his professional operations. The question is, however, hardly deserving of an argument; and if it were, it would seem to be rapidly passing out, if it has not already passed out, of the region of practical discussion. This is so, first, because we already count some of the ablest and best-educated engineers of the country among the officers of the service. Our standard has been created, and it is a high one. To neglect the education of those who are hereafter to occupy the position of chief engineers would be an act of retrogradation and debasement. It is so, secondly, because there is an increased demand, not merely for skilful managers of the complicated and costly motive machinery required in modern vessels of war, but for capable designers of such machinery. The demand is not alone for the capacity to copy, to imitate, but for the ability to compare, to estimate. The designing and superintending of the construction of naval machinery, alike with its management afloat, particularly in using it with the greatest efficiency for given supplies of material, must make extensive demands upon the scientific and technical attainments and intelligence of naval engineers. Nay, more, it is quite evident that the new elements of modern naval warfare are to add still further to the professional responsibilities of these officers. The construction of the hull in iron vessels, the adaptation of armor, and the adjustment of the various defensive capabilities of armored vessels, the construction of ordnance machinery for handling and training heavy armaments with rapidity of movement and economy of hands, the construction of ventilating machinery, not to mention other particulars, point to a large domain in the field of naval engineering, and to the need of the highest order of professional qualification on the part of those who are to be charged with these increased responsibilities.

There can be little doubt that the naval engineer is destined, by the inevitable force of circumstances, to occupy a prominent and responsible position in the naval service; and the sooner this is understood, and provided for by legislation and executive action, the better it will be for the navy and for the country. It is well known that, owing to the emergencies of the unquiet time, unworthy persons have been admitted into the corps of engineers, and that the character of this corps, notwithstanding the distinguished names it embraces, has suffered accordingly. But it is gratifying to be assured that the proper steps for remedying this evil have already been taken, and that the general and special education of naval engineers is a project which the friends of the navy will not willingly drop until it has been carried into successful execution.

While we are engaged in the discussion of naval reforms and improvements, we may remark that there is one subject that engrosses a great deal of M. Raymond's attention which it would be hardly worth while for us to touch upon, except for the lessons of warning and instruction it contains. We refer to his critical examination of the administration of the naval affairs of Great Britain, during the greater part of the last half-century, by the British Admiralty. The topic is one which brings out the author's force of mind and character. He evidently is endowed with a large share of the administrative and executive ability common to most of his countrymen. His strictures seem to us to be just, whether we look to the constitution of the Admiralty or to the performance of its duties. We have only to turn to the current English publications and debates, to find that this Board, through indolence, or ignorance, or heedlessness, or obstinacy of opinion, not long since suffered the British navy to fall into such a state of inferiority to that of France, that England may be said to have been almost at the mercy of her rival. If an occasion for the employment of the navy in European waters had arisen at that time, the members of the Board must have sunk under the well-merited objurgations of their countrymen. We find the evidence of this, we repeat, among the English themselves. In fact, a writer, speaking from one of the high places of literature, says, "Most of us could list-with considerable equanimity to any strictures upon our Admiralty system." The obvious objections to the system are the absence of personal responsibility, the want of executive energy, and the singular exclusion from the councils and administrative control of the Board of all persons belonging to any part of the naval service, except the officers of the line. The consequence is, as M. Raymond shrewdly observes, that, in spite of the merit of the men of which it is composed, it is a body indolent and sluggish, endowed with an excessive power for the consumption of means, and of a relatively small capacity for the production of results.

The Navy Department of the United States is essentially different from the Board of Admiralty in its constitution, and in the adjustment and distribution of its duties. General Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, that for an army there was one thing worse than a bad general, and that was two good generals. This sentence contains the principle which forms the basis of the final constitution of our navy office, and which we may presume was derived from ample experience. We began in 1775 with the Marine Committee; in 1776 we created a Continental Navy Board; and in 1779 a Board of Admiralty. Then the government of the navy passed through several phases, till April, 1798, when a Navy Department was established at the seat of the government, with a Secretary of the Navy at its head. This state of things continued during the next seventeen years, and was interrupted by the appointment of a Board of Commissioners, composed of captains of the navy. In 1842 this Board was abolished, and abolished, as many of us recollect, after mature scrutiny, and with general approbation. It was at that time that the present organization of the Navy Department was created, for the avowed purpose of bestowing upon the business of the Department all the advantages of the strictest personal accountability, and the most direct exercise of personal authority. Subsequent experience, and the enlargement of the sphere of duty of the navy, led to a reorganization of the Navy Department about two years ago, in which the same principles were strictly adhered to, and more fully applied.

Regarding this act of reorganization as a measure not likely to be lightly disturbed, it may be well to add a word about it. It distributes the business of the Navy Department into eight Bureaus, the act of 1842 having provided for five only. The chiefs of these Bureaus are selected with reference to professional adaptation; thus avoiding the glaring absurdity of placing a line officer of the navy at the head of the Bureau of Construction, which still forms one of the objectionable features of the English system (Admiral Robinson being at this day the director of naval constructions under the title of "Comptroller of the Navy"), or at the head of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, as was the case here between the years 1844–46. Another effect of this act of reorganization is the separation of duties having no affinity with each other, but having, on the contrary, a manifest want of union and relation, such as Ordnance and Hydrography, Steam-Engineering and Ship-Building. By means of this division, no one special subject is in danger of being crowded out of notice, of failing to receive proper attention, and of slipping away from the cognizance and supervision of executive authority, either because it is a specialty, like the Observatory and the Nautical Almanac, or because it is a temporary service, like a surveying or exploring expedition, or, finally, because it is essentially subordinate to weightier matters under the charge of the same Bureau.

Although the names given to the Bureaus point out the general scope and tenor of their duties, yet, by a separate provision of the law, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to assign and distribute the duties of the Navy Department as he shall judge expedient and proper; and whenever it is shown that the business of the Department would be expedited by the removal of an establishment, an operation, or a supply from one Bureau to another, the change may be immediately made. In this manner the benefits conferred by the trials and observations of our chief instructor, experience, are enjoyed without difficulty. Again, it is provided that the duties of the Bureaus shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall be considered as emanating from him; thus, while there is no lack of executive energy, there is a responsibility of the chiefs of the Bureaus, of such a p as forces them into constant and intimate communication with the head of the Department. Again, it is required by another section of the act, that all estimates for specific, general, and contingent expenses of the Department and of the several Bureaus shall be furnished by the chiefs of the respective Bureaus; thus making them answerable for a sufficient supply of the requisite means to support the navy, and for giving to those means the appropriate course and direction. Finally, it is ordered that the appropriation shall be under the control of the Secretary, shall be expended under his superintendence, and shall be kept separate in the Treasury; thus restoring again the chiefs of the Bureaus to that subordination to a common head which is the beginning of the wisdom of discipline, and preventing any improper, careless, or extravagant use of the public money. In short, in respect to all his duties, the chief of a Bureau stands alone in his responsibility; no one can share his moral obligations in this regard, nor shield him from the consequences of his own trespasses; while in the proper execution of those duties he is upheld by all the authority and co-operation of the Department. The result is simple, and may be stated in a few words. Should there occur in the administration and expenditures of a naval station, in the recruiting, payment, or discharge of seamen and others, in the construction and repairs of a ship or an engine, in supplies and equipment, in ordnance material, in the erection and management of naval hospitals, or in the purchase of provisions or clothing, any error, fault, or deficiency, not only must the record of it exist at the Department, but the individual through whose negligence, irregularity, or moral obliquity the offence took place must be so conspicuous from his situation, that he can be pitched upon without delay or circumlocution. And this being the case, if any suspicion of malpractice arises against the Department, the charge can be established if well founded, and if it be not established, it is because it is not well founded.

Before taking leave of M. Raymond, and dismissing our subject, we must briefly notice the seventh chapter of his work, in the latter part of which he treats of the relation between the naval power of Great Britain and her civil liberty. Here he writes not only with animation, but with a rapid and flowing style that possesses the charm of eloquence. It is truly said that the English navy is *par excellence* a national affair; that it is the focus in which converge the burning rays of British patriotism; and that it is one of the grand productions of British liberty. Thus far M. Raymond's sagacity penetrates, and thus far he sees correctly. But there is something beyond, which is veiled to the perceptions of a Frenchman. And that is the consideration of how far the love of the sea is the source of liberty, and the navy not less a cause than the result of free institutions. It would be no unpleasing task to pursue this thought through all the streams of English literature; to trace the connection between the spirit of generous elation and of conscious freedom infused into the minds of those who really love the sea, who, "footless and wild," traverse its great deserts, and, "hovering on untamed wing," visit its most distant boundaries, and that polity of which the fundamental idea is civil and individual liberty. This undertaking would carry us back to those remote periods of British history, concerning which we know less of fact than of tradition, when our remote predecessors drank

> "Wassail! to every dark-ribbed ship,
> To every battle-field!
> So proudly the Scalds raise their voices of triumph,
> As the Northmen ride over the broad-bosomed billow."

Great Britain is conscious that, in cultivating her navy, she is cultivating the freedom of the state. In the chorus of "Britannia, rule the waves," the answering verse is, "Britons never will be slaves." The love of liberty, and a share in the dominion of the sea, are indissolubly united and mutually dependent.

In fostering our naval power, therefore, we are at once gratifying the absorbing passion of our souls, the love of liberty, and giving security to those institutions which are both our safeguard and our glory, *et præsidium et dulce decus nostrum*.

ART. VI. — 1. *The Color Guard. Being a Corporal's Notes of Military Service in the Nineteenth Army Corps.* By JAMES K. HOSMER, of the Fifty-Second Regiment Mass. Volunteers. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. xii., 244.

2. *Adjutant Stearns.* Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath School Society. [1862.] 16mo. pp. 160.
3. *The Sergeant's Memorial.* By his Father. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1863. 16mo. pp. 242.
4. *Dying for our Country. A Sermon on the Death of Captain J. Sewall Reed and Rev. Thomas Starr King; Preached in the First Congregational Church in Milton, March* 13, 1864. By JOHN H. MORISON. Boston: Printed by John Wilson and Son. 1864. 8vo. pp. 28.
5. *Walter S. Newhall. A Memoir.* Philadelphia: Published for the Benefit of the Sanitary Commission. 1864. Sq. 12mo. pp. 140.

AMONG the many remarkable aspects of the present war, there has perhaps been none more striking than that presented by the armies of the loyal freemen of the North; and among the many new and unexpected proofs which the war has afforded of the strength and worth of our democratic institutions, there has not been one more convincing than that furnished by the character, conduct, spirit, and principle of our soldiers. That a nation should spring from peace, and from the productive occupations of tranquil life, into the destructive storm of war, should suddenly change its ingrained habits, and pour the currents of its activity through strange and untried channels, would be a surprising instance of readiness of will and of fertility of resource; but that a people long accustomed to the freest enjoyment of independence, and unused to obedience to the commands of others, should at once, and of their own accord, submit themselves, and sacrifice their individual independence, to the hard demands of military discipline and subordination, is a convincing indication, not only of the intensity of the motives by which they are influenced, but also of the intelligence which directs their efforts and makes them capable of any sacrifice required for the accomplishment of their purpose. It is no army of machines that the North has sent out; but it is, in the main, an army of thoughtful men,—men who have counted the cost of what they give, who know the worth of what they aim to secure.

Whatever exceptions are to be made, whatever justice there may be in the charges brought by its detractors against our national army, the truth is, that by far the greater part of the men engaged in this war, both in the East and West, are soldiers of a higher character than those of other nations. They are not men bred to the art of war, but men of peace, in their country's service; men who go to war for the sake of peace; men who have no lust of conquest, averse to bloodshed, incapable of wanton cruelty; men who have given up comfort, ease, friends, and home, at the call of duty, for the sake of their principles, in defence of their rights, in love for their homes and dear native land. And more than this, they are men who count life cheap in the balance of right and wrong, and who venture, and will give, (as, indeed, how many have already given!) life itself, in the cause of freedom and of justice. They are good soldiers of the good cause.

The evils of war, even for the best cause, are indeed many and horrible. The suffering, the waste, the demoralization that attend it, are but a part of its bitter fruits. But if war brings evil, let us not forget that it brings also good. It has its compensations. If some men are rendered worse by it, some also are made better. How many of those youths who have, in the last three years, given example of noble patience, endurance, courage, and all manly virtue, who have been brought by the stern tuition of war to a clearer conception of the meaning of life, and to the performance of difficult and heroic duty, might have lived absorbed in illusions, in the ignoble round of petty cares and selfish interests,—have passed from youth to manhood, from manhood to old age, with no generous elation of soul, with no experience of the purifying and elevating influence of hardship and of suffering, with no growth of spirit, and no effort of self-devotion! The temptations of prosperity had already misled us; the love of ease had already begun to work corruption; we were stagnating in selfishn and losing the sense of virtue, when the summons to war broke upon us from the guns of Charleston.

> "In an age of fops and toys,
> Wanting wisdom, void of right,
> What shall nerve heroic boys
> To hazard all in *Freedom's* fight?"

Thank God, the spirit of manliness had been only drugged to slumber by the opiate of peace; it was not dead. Thank God, our boys knew the call of duty when they heard its sound, and answered it with the most glorious alacrity.

The character of the good soldier is one which the world, and we least of all, could not afford at present to let die. No other career offers such a field as that of arms for the exercise of the virtue of obedience, which modern civilization and our democratic institutions have a growing tendency to check and to depreciate. Obedience is indeed demanded of the soldier in its highest form, — that of voluntary submission to an issued command. Manliness in the largest sense, all that is implied in the word *virtus*, finds in war its stimulus and its opportunity. The profession of a soldier is, in one respect, the highest in which man can engage, — that it involves the necessity of absolute self-sacrifice, and the readiness to risk life for the attainment of an end in which no personal interest is involved. Glory has been called the reward and the object of the soldier. But glory is but a low motive to him who has the just idea of his calling. The love of glory is the infirmity of noble minds. There are motives of greater force with the good soldier. If honor and long remembrance await him, he may be glad; but it is not for their sake that he ventures into the fight, and meets the fire of battle. His strongest motive is duty. He offers himself for many. His heart is inflamed with the love of justice and of peace. He strikes for the right, and he receives the blow in testimony of his obedience to the right. He may die unnoticed in the crowd of the dead; his name may be forgotten, but he has his reward in his own keeping, and his life and his death become a spiritual influence to encourage, invigorate, and dignify mankind.

The names of the three hundred who fought and died with

Leonidas at Thermopylæ, though they were all inscribed on a pillar at Sparta, long since perished utterly out of the world; but their example remains, bright and helpful forever. Their deed became an example of deed to mankind; and they need and deserve no better remembrance than that which is contained "in the noblest group of words ever uttered by simple man concerning his practice,"—the immortal inscription on the monument which once stood where they fell:—

Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων νομίμοις πειθόμενοι.

"O stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we are lying here, having *obeyed* their laws."

Who shall record the names of all those who have fallen in our holy war, in obedience to their country's laws? What pillar lofty enough on which to inscribe them? The record of the last three years is crowded full of noble deeds and deaths. No complete list can ever be given of them. Here at least we can recall the memory of but a few of those who form the great company of faithful servants obedient even unto death in our country's cause.

As we call the roll, each name answers for others beside him who bore it. Sedgwick, the self-poised, modest, thorough soldier; the trustworthy commander, equal to every emergency; the beloved of all who knew him; the man whom honor sought, and never found slow at her call. Wadsworth, who counted no sacrifice too dear, but laid the habits of peace, the luxuries of wealth, the allurements of comfort and of a happy home, an offering upon the altar of patriotism and freedom; the upright, earnest, devoted leader, and the honored exemplar of civic and military virtue. Reynolds, born with genius for war, and bred to arms, modest, reticent, studious, and brave; who, where danger threatened, never said, Go, but Come, and of whom, after his death at Gettysburg, Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania said, in an address to his troops: "He was an example to all for singleness of purpose, promptness in action, perfect integrity, and utter self-abandonment to the calls of duty. For dauntless enterprise and brilliancy of achievement he had certainly no superiors, and few who had rivalled him in the armies of the republic; and it is not too much to say, that, if the blessings of his late comrades in arms were flowers, his grave would be robed in perpetual bloom." Stevens, an old army man, who had left the field of war for that of politics, but whose ardent nature and brave heart, tried often in other scenes, hearing the call of war, shattered the bonds of party alliances, and left him free to offer his splendid talents to his country and to prove his devotion to her by a gallant death. Bayard, worthy of his name, Colonel of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, the first Brigadier-General of Cavalry, killed by a chance shot at Fredericksburg, and buried on the day that was to have been his wedding-day, — his twenty-eighth birthday.

But why extend the list? Names press upon our memory. Who of this generation but holds in sacred honor the pure and perfect example of Lyon, of Winthrop, of Mitchell, of Reno, of Shaw, of Strong, of Rice?

Justice indeed cannot be done to our army by a catalogue of conspicuous names, or by biographies, however extended, of the most distinguished officers. The rank and file have shown themselves worthy of the best leaders. The leaders deserve no higher honor than those whom they have led. The same spirit has animated all; the same love of country, the same devotion to liberty and law, the same fidelity to duty, the same intelligent and willing obedience, the same resolute bravery, have been shown by the common soldiers as by their commanders.

Take, for example, the story of the Anderson Troop of Pennsylvania. It was raised in the fall of 1861 for special service in Kentucky, and composed of one hundred men selected from different parts of the State. It was accepted by General Anderson for head-quarters, at a time when it was very difficult for him to obtain good men for orderlies and the responsible duties in the field and office work. The Troop were carefully drilled at the cavalry barracks at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, by sergeants of the regular army, and when they went West, were accepted by General Buell, who had succeeded both Anderson and Sherman, and used by him in a way to try their merit. The General and his officers found them exactly what they promised, and General Buford, then Inspector-General, in his report, published by authority, said that "this company is composed of the best men I have ever seen in the service, — young, active, and intelligent, with good ideas, neat in their appearance, and under fine discipline. They drill constantly, and seem to be in dead earnest to make themselves good soldiers." They went through Shiloh, and Perrysville, and a score of lesser fights under Buell; and when he was relieved from command, he took leave of them in a special order, in which he thanks them for "the zeal, cheerfulness, and intelligence with which they have performed all the duties imposed upon them since attached to head-quarters, nearly a year ago. Manly deportment and soldierly bearing have characterized the behavior of the members of the troop, from the day of their assignment to duty with the army up to the present time. The most ordinary routine duties of the soldier, as well as those of the highest moment and of a confidential character, have been performed alike with efficiency and fidelity." The troop was afterwards recruited to a regiment, and it was at its head that the gallant Major Rosengarten, the senior major and commanding officer, fell on the 29th of December, his twenty-fourth birthday, in the advance of Rosecrans's army on the Murfreesboro' battle-field. "None," said General Stanley, speaking of Major Rosengarten and the men who died with him, — "none during this sad war have fallen in a scene of more heroic daring"; and Rosecrans spoke in a special order of "their steadiness under fire, and the intrepidity of their advance." Many of Major Rosengarten's men were his old friends and comrades from home, and their character is well shown by the story of two brothers, — Richard Wyatt and William Beverly Chase, privates in the regiment, who belonged to a prominent Quaker family of Philadelphia. Richard was killed at Murfreesboro', and we transcribe part of a letter describing his last moments. "Full of courage and hope and faith, he behaved in the field gallantly as became him. On Monday, the 29th of December, whilst riding beside his brother in fine spirits, previous to the action, he recited portions of Tennyson's 'Princess,' and these lines from 'Morte d'Arthur': —

'I have lived my life, and that which I have done
May He within himself make pure! but thou,
If thou shouldst never see my face again,
Pray for my soul. More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of.'

Still riding, he continued: —

'Now I go
To the island valley of Avilion,
Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly; but it lies
Deep-meadowed, happy, fair with orchard-lawns,
And bowery hollows, crowned with summer sea,
Where I will heal me of my grievous wound.'

Almost with the immortal words warm upon his lips, he received the shot that must have been fatal on the instant." Thus he fell, adding another to that innumerable company happily described by Kossuth as "the unnamed demigods who die for country and for man." The other brother, William, was taken prisoner at Chickamauga, and died in Georgia.

The following letter from the "New York Times" of April 21st, 1864, gives the history of a company in another Pennsylvania regiment. It affords a very striking and remarkable illustration of the composition of our volunteer forces.

"*To the Editor of the New York Times:* —

"Company D, of the Forty-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, a portion of which recently spent some time at the Soldier's Rest in our city, on their way to Key West, can show the following record.

"There are in the company the following men: —

William Powell,	Four brothers and a cousin.
John Powell,	
Andrew Powell,	
Solomon Powell,	
Daniel Powell,	
John Brady,	All brothers.
William Brady,	
Ackinson Brady,	
Leonard Brady,	
Samuel Brady,	
Jacob Baltzer,	Brothers.
George Baltzer,	
Benjamin Baltzer,	

George Krosier, William Krosier, Jesse Krosier,	Brothers.
Edward Harper, Martin Harper, George Harper,	Brothers, and brothers-in-law of the Captain.
Jesse Shaffer, Benjamin Shaffer, William Shaffer,	Two brothers and a cousin
Wilson Tag, James Tag, Richard Tag,	Father and two sons; the father served in the Mexican war.
John Clay, George Clay, Jacob Charles, Eli Charles, John Reynolds, Jesse Reynolds, John Vance, Jonathan Vance, John Anthony, Benjamin Anthony, William Vertig, Franklin Vertig,	Six pairs of brothers.
Isaac Baldwin, Cyrus Taylor,	Step-brothers.

"These men all hail from Perry County, Pennsylvania. They are mainly of the old Holland stock, and lived within a circuit of fifteen miles. They are all re-enlisted men but two or three.

"The company has been out over two years, most of the time at the extreme Southern posts. During eighteen months they lost but one man by sickness. They kept up strict sanitary regulations, commuted their rations of salt meat for fresh meat and vegetables, and saved by the operation from one hundred to one hundred and thirty dollars a month, with which they made a company fund, appointing the captain treasurer, and out of which whatever knicknacks were needed could be purchased. They always ate at a table, which they fixed with cross sticks, and had their food served from large bowls, each man having his place, as at home, which no one else was allowed to occupy. While the men were here, they showed that they were sober, cheerful, intelligent men, who had put their hearts into their work, and did not count any privations or sacrifices as too great, if only the life of the country might be thereby maintained. During the whole term of their service they have not had a man court-martialled.

"They are commanded by Captain Henry D. Woodruff, a native of Binghampton, in this State, but long a resident of Pennsylvania. Their First Lieutenant is S. Ouchmuty; Second Lieutenant, George Stroop.

"If any company can show a more striking record, it would be very interesting to know it.

"Yours, &c., C."

A record such as this implies far more than it directly tells. It is evidence of character and conduct, but it needs filling out to enable us to appreciate the full force of its testimony in regard to the men to whom it relates. The intelligence, the self-control, the temperance, the bravery, the patriotic spirit, which it indicates, can hardly be realized by the imagination, stripped of the details of daily life and of service in camp and field. Fortunately, numerous books and reports supply us with these details. Perhaps no single one contains more needed and better information of this sort than the volume called "The Color Guard," by Mr. James K. Hosmer, of the Fifty-second Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers (nine months' men). This little book is one of very great merit and interest. Written in a simple and animated style, full of picturesque detail and of lively description, it reproduces in all the vividness of truth the experiences of the author, and the character of the men who were his companions during his period of service. We know of no book which gives so good an idea of our soldiers; of none which is of such lasting value as a picture of the men who are engaged in maintaining the cause of freedom; of none which is likely to be of more importance to the future historian of this war, as affording him the means of forming a correct judgment on the motives, the principles, and the conduct of the rank and file of the great army of the Union. It is a book which deserves the widest popularity, for it should be read by every one who desires to understand rightly, and appreciate at their true worth, the characteristic traits of the American soldier.

"It is," as Dr. Peabody well says in his brief Introduction to it, "the narrative of one who gave every possible proof of disinterested patriotism. The writer had large and varied opportunities of observation, and with them he possessed keen, quick, and accurate discernment. . . . . . His journal gives a faithful picture of the privations, sufferings, and perils of those whose living and dying sacrifice is the costly price at which we are purchasing the redemption of our country from dismemberment and ruin, and it can hardly fail to do its part in awakening the gratitude we owe to those who have gone forth in the defence of our liberties and institutions."

Its author was a young clergyman in a country village in Massachusetts.

"You want to know," he writes, November 13th, 1862, "why I have left my pulpit and parish, and enlisted. I had several reasons; all plain, simple, and sensible enough. I have believed in the war from the first. The cause of the North, briefly, is, to me, the cause of civilization and liberty. To help this, I have preached, made speeches, and talked in private. Ought I not to practise what I preach? Ought I to shrink from encountering perils and hardships which I have urged others to encounter?

"Then, again, having no family, I can go better than many others in our village, — men liable to be drafted, whose means are straitened, and who have wives and children to support. These are my main reasons; but, besides these, I confess to a love of adventure. Moreover, I hope to gain new robustness from the exposure. I own, also, to something of a military spirit. . . . . . I am now one of the eight corporals whose duty it is to guard the colors."

The regiment to which Mr. Hosmer belonged was attached to General Banks's command, and sailed from New York to New Orleans on board a steam transport, in December, 1862. His younger brother was a sergeant in the same company, — a fine, manly boy, free, strong, jocund, high-spirited, full of love and the pure and noble fervor of youth. He had scarcely been a month in Louisiana before he was struck down with fever, and, after a short illness, died in his brother's arms. The story of his illness and death is told with the utmost tenderness. It is not to be read without tears. He was buried on Sunday, January 25th.

"How have you told me, comrades, that you loved him! Manly Rogers, happy-hearted Brown and Hannum, his fellow-sergeants, from you, from captain and all, there is no dearth of sympathy.

"The service begins. The chaplain, with a broken voice, reads the selections; then came the grand hymn, 'Mourn not that his kin are far,' — Warriner and Browning, and young Cyrus Stowell, and First Sergeant Arms of B. The notes rose and swelled, and mingled with sweet tree-whisperings and the sobs of soldiers. Their voices choked, and they had to wipe away the tears to see the words. 'Warriner, let me have your copy.' Is it not a grand requiem for a young soldier?

'Mourn not that his kin are far,
While we lay him in the grave;
For his fellow-soldiers are
Loving brothers of the brave.

'And his tender mother here
Shrouds him as a warrior thus;
'T is his country, loved so dear, —
Mother, too, of all of us.

'Sleeping soft, the youth shall lie
Calmly here, beneath the sod,
Where, a living sacrifice,
He his body gave to God.

'Now let martial music sound!
Beat the dead-march for the brave!
Lower him gently in the ground!
Fire a volley o'er his grave!'"

For a time Mr. Hosmer was employed as a nurse for the sick. The following is a scene in the hospital tent, on a sunny afternoon.

"Private Clout, sensible, practical, but somewhat unheroic, seated on the bunk of Grimes, who has gone out to take an airing. Attendant, couched in the lair of Chape, opposite, cleaning gun and equipments, against dress-parade.

"*Private Clout, loq.* 'Heard the new rumor, now?

"'Goin' down to New Orleans, p'raps; or, leastways, can if we 're a mind to and the Colonel 's willin'.'

"Attendant suggests, if we go to New Orleans, in all probability we shall not go to Port Hudson, about to be attacked. We shall only have to do the ignoble duty of petty policemen, — pick up the little boys who will sing 'The Bonnie Blue Flag' in the streets, and the naughty ladies who stick out their tongues at the soldiers. We shall have to go home ignominiously, without honor, without having struck a blow, and almost without having run a risk, except from the weather and climate.

"*Private O.* 'Well, honor! — hem! — don't know much 'bout that;

but know this: go to Port Hudson, might get killed, — that ain't comfortable; might get your leg shot off. Putty sure of this, anyhow; if you get hurt, after the first, no one cares about it but your relations. If you hain't got none, like as not you die a pauper. I ain't so fast for going to Port Hudson. Down to New Orleans you get good quarters, good livin', and not much to do. S'pose I'd go into swamps, and where them dreadful careless cannon was pointin' my way, ef I was *ordered;* but I'd rather go where it's safe and easy.' . . . . .

"In hospital life I see the good and bad side of human nature. There are shirks, — but I believe I know one or two, — foul-mouthed often indeed, and altogether too rough, one would think, ever to be fledged out with angels' plumage. They will go home from here (if they live) to a bed on the straw in a barn-loft, or to a cot in a shanty in the woods, where they are getting out timber for some sawmill; but, in view of their substantial goodness, I know not why, some night, these surroundings should not 'like a lily bloom,' as well as the chamber of Abou Ben Adhem, and an angel write them down as 'those who love their fellow-men,' near the head of God's list, thoroughly unsanctified though they seem, as judged by all conventional standards."

In March the regiment was before Port Hudson. It was going into action.

"How do we feel? We are going out to meet the enemy, we all fully believe, and so do our officers, and even staff officers of the general, who are friendly to us, look pityingly after, as we march on; for they know, though *we* do not, that we are to be pushed up in front of the whole army, into close range of the cannon upon the fortress-wall. The Fifty-second is cool, and yet eager; and not a man, that can limp at all, wants to stay. For the last thing, 'Load!' Open cartridge-box; tear the rough paper from the powder end, — and there it goes down the barrel; and now the ball; half-cock, then cap the cone, and all is done. If I have to fire, it will be for the cause. Scruples now are mere squeamishness. Now, 'By the right flank, forward!' Hardiker carries the white State flag; the tall sergeant, the stars and stripes. Old flag, you are woven of no ordinary stuff! Rank and file and shoulder-straps, it is a sacred thing! It has for a warp, liberty; and for a woof, constitutional order; and is dyed deep in tints of love and justice. Between Hardiker and the sergeant marches Wilson, — a fine-looking corporal, with a military face, eye, and figure; moustached, bearded, eager, — such a face as I have seen in Horace Vernet's battle-pieces. A good marksman, too, is Wilson; for many years the terror of squirrels in the woods of E——. Prince and Claypole cover Hardiker and Wilson; while I march behind the sergeant, right in the folds of the great flag. Alongside, in the line of file-closers, go West, and lisping, light-haired Wiebel, the German; and, last, the ever sage, serene, and satisfactory Bias Dickinson. . . . . .

"So we go out of the field into the road, in the centre of the long column, with banners waving, and, I hope, the true light of battle upon our faces, — soldiers in a noble cause, — farmer and mechanic, merchant and preacher, shoulder to shoulder. 'Boom!' go the far-away guns. We are moving rapidly to the front; so the other regiments, and the stout battery-men and the yellow cavalry-men, give way for us, cheering us on. Down a cross-road toward the river, a sweet south-wind shaking white cloud-favors out of every window in heaven at us; the sun smiling God-speed and the lady rose-bushes, from fence-corners like balconies, showing their blossom-handkerchiefs."

We would willingly quote more passages from Mr. Hosmer's book in illustration of our topic, but we must content ourselves with the paragraph in which he sums up the result of his observations on the "roughs" among the rank and file.

"During the past year I have seen much of human nature, — often a very rough side of it. In our own regiment were a large number of men of such age and character as are not usually found in the position of private soldiers; but we had, besides these, a proportion of 'rough characters.' Then, again, in organizations less favored than ours with which we were associated, there was ample opportunity of meeting with those whom society calls very much debased. I met such men under circumstances when many of the ordinary restraints of life were taken off, so that their true natures could come out more fully. What have I learned? To put as much confidence in men as ever; to believe in the intrinsic goodness of the human heart. Indolence, cruelty, sensuality, meanness, are the things men invariably detest, and what they blame. Mercy, liberality, truth, kindness, are what they invariably commend.

"Much evil there is among the rank and file, as there is among those higher in position. I have seen want of patience, want of honesty, want of temperance. I have seen gambling and ill-temper, and know how foul the air of a camp is with coarseness and blasphemy. But this I have not seen: the man who liked or would commend selfishness; the man who disliked or would blame unselfishness. One does not learn to think less of human nature from contact with 'rough men,' however it may be from contact with those at the opposite social extreme. Often they do not imitate what they admire; often they do not avoid in their own conduct what they detest in others; but this is true, that the human instincts are always fixed in a love for good, in a hatred for bad. In the society of the low, as in every human society, there is but one rule for securing enduring popularity, — 'Be unselfish.'

"I have known men, rough in language and manners, judged by our conventional standards thoroughly unsanctified, — perhaps they hardly ever saw the inside of a church, or breathed an audible prayer, though their talk was full of oaths, — yet they would do noble things. They would help others generously; they would bear privation cheerfully; and I have known them, in a time of pestilence, to watch day and night with patients sick of contagious diseases, when the camp was full of death. They watched until they grew sick; then, after they were sick, until their lives were in peril. I have heard the lips of dying men bless them."

The value and force of the evidence in regard to our soldiers supplied by such a book as "The Color Guard" is greatly increased by its incidental character. It thus confirms the more direct testimony afforded by the special accounts of the lives of many of those who have fallen in the war. No one can read these biographies, brief as they generally are, without being profoundly impressed, not only with the high qualities of the individuals commemorated in them, but also with the fact of the general diffusion of such qualities throughout tho army. They are not so much the records of exceptional and unmatched instances of virtue, as testimonies to a common spirit and to a universal temper. The story of the soldier of New England or of New York answers for that of the soldier of Pennsylvania or the West. The portrait of the youth from Indiana, or Ohio, or Minnesota, or California, is the portrait of the youth from Maine, or Rhode Island, or New Jersey, or Maryland. The son or the brother who has gone from his quiet home in Massachusetts finds his companion in battle and in the grave in the son or the brother who has left his home vacant in Illinois. The beauty, the manliness, the fidelity to duty, of the one, are the characteristics of the other. The words of honor, the sobs of noble grief, over the graves of the East, are echoed over those of the West. The union of hearts in a common cause is confirmed by the indissoluble bonds of sympathy in sorrow and in joy.

In selecting from these published records one or two from which to draw further illustrations of the character of the soldiers for freedom, we choose among those nearest at hand, only taking our examples from different States, so that each may stand, not for one alone, but as a pattern of many.

The little volume with the simple title of "Adjutant Stearns" is written by the father of the young man whose life is told of in its pages. Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1840, Frazar Augustus Stearns was, at the time of the breaking out of the war, a student in Amherst College, of which institution his father is President. He was a young man of strong nature, of fixed principles, of pure morals, and of deep religious convictions. He was simple-hearted, manly, generous, made to be beloved, and full of all good promise. At the first summons of war he was ready to answer, but it was not until after the disastrous day of Bull Run that he became so fully convinced that duty called him to the army that his friends were constrained to let him go. Meanwhile he had been preparing himself by careful study and training for military life.

"His views in reference to the war," says his father, "and his own duty respecting it, were remarkable for a young man, hardly twenty-one. He not only had clear notions of the great national issues, of the importance of a nation, and the terrible consequences of successful rebellion, but felt that he himself had a special call to fight, and die if necessary, for his native land. He revolved the matter and conversed upon it in a calm, cheerful, but earnest and martyr-like spirit. He took up the dread work of war, not for honor, not for pay, not for adventure, but animated by a sublime patriotism, under the influence of those high inspirations which stirred the hearts of the old warriors of Israel, and which, under Providence, '*organize victories.*' A certain sacred enthusiasm, which seemed to come in upon him from without, bore him on steadily from the beginning till it had conducted him up to the altar of sacrifice.

"No opposing argument could be advanced which he had not considered. He studied himself, and believed that he had adaptations for the military life; that he had courage, self-control, power of command and influence over men, and that he could inspire at least some of them with elevated sentiments of patriotism, and perhaps with something like sacred enthusiasm. He thought the country was in need of educated men, of moral and religious men, of officers who would act from principle, who would feel for the privates, and take care of them, who would work hard to make them soldiers, and perhaps Christian soldiers. These views often came out in confidential conversations."

He received a commission as First Lieutenant of Company I in the Twenty-first Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers, which in the autumn of 1861 was stationed at Annapolis. Here he attracted the attention of General Reno, who offered him a position on his staff. But thinking that his company stood in need of him, and unwilling to accept promotion before he had given full evidence of deserving it, he declined the proposed honor, and in a letter home he wrote: —

"I have left everything to fight for my country. If, in the course of events, I should prove a good soldier, fit to command men, and an able officer, and if God in his great mercy should spare my life, my successes would then, of course, be measured, at least in some degree, by my advancement. A good officer is always known; and, if you will excuse me for saying so, the qualifications of a good officer are, besides courage, intelligence, energy, good breeding, and a certain knack and power in commanding men."

In another letter he said: —

"I am getting along finely, and the men appear to like me. I am very pleasant, but not familiar, off duty, and *very strict on duty*. The men take an interest in drilling, with one or two exceptions, and those I '*put through*.' You know me well enough to know that I can tolerate anything but indifference and laziness."

And again he wrote: —

"A man ought not to be cowardly in such a cause; and how can you terrify one who can look *death* in the face, and has made up his mind that his life is his country's, and *expects* death at every turn? If I can serve my country better by *dying* now than living, I am ready for it."

And again, in the same spirit: —

"I am very sure I am quite ready to die an *ignominious* death, as a private or officer, or do anything for our beloved country."

In January, 1862, his regiment formed part of Burnside's expedition to North Carolina; in the battle of Roanoke Island, on the 8th of February, he was twice wounded, and displayed such gallantry as to receive official commendation from his colonel. His wounds were but slight; on the 9th of March he wrote: —

"I am well provided for in every respect, and am as comfortable as can be, and thank God for it! My health is very good, and I am taking good care to keep it so. God only knows what a day may bring forth. He only can tell what may happen to me on the morrow; but always remember that *any hour* or *any moment* may bring you news that I am killed or dangerously wounded. If either, then God's will be done, and I hope I may always be prepared for any issue."

This was the last letter he ever wrote. On the 14th of March the battle of Newbern was fought. It was a hard fight, and, just before victory declared itself for our arms, the brave young soldier fell in the very front of battle.

"At this moment," wrote his commanding officer, "the noblest of us all, my brave, efficient, faithful Adjutant, First Lieutenant F. A. Stearns, of Company I, fell mortally wounded, the first among the twenty-five patriotic volunteers of the Twenty-first who laid down their lives for their country at the battle of Newbern. As he was cheering on the men to charge upon the enemy across the railroad, he was struck by a ball from an English rifle fired from a redan at the right and rear of the central breastwork, on which we were advancing. The fatal missile entered his left side, and, passing through his lungs, went out just below the collar-bone on the right breast. Corporal Welch, of Company C, noticing his fall, returned and remained with him during the battle. He lived about two and a half hours, though nearly unconscious from the loss of blood, and died without a struggle a little before noon."

"He set us," wrote the same officer, Colonel Clark, "an almost perfect example in all his conduct. His faithfulness, efficiency, and bravery, were only surpassed by the spotless purity and complete correctness of his private life. . . . . In short, he always behaved like a real gentleman and a sincere Christian. To me, the loss is quite irreparable. However, I surrendered myself, my family, my friends, my all, to the disposition of the Great Ruler, who directs us in all our ways, when I left my peaceful and happy home to fight the battles of freedom, and I will trust Him to the end."

An Irish private in the Twenty-first wrote to a countryman of his in Amherst: —

"Among the dead is our First Lieutenant F. A. Stearns, the noblest soldier that the world ever afforded; I fear too brave for his own good. He was beloved by all that knew him in his own regiment; and in fact, as far as he was known in the army. I carried him off the battle-field. I tell you, Mr. ——, that that was a hard thing for me. I carried him to the beach, to go on board of the boat to go home. I carried him over a river, where I was up to my arms in water. The rest of the boys were strangers, and I tell you that I was not, for when he was living he was a dear friend to me. Lieutenant Sanderson is gone home with him. General Burnside presented the Twenty-first regiment with a cannon, for great valor on the battle-field. We send it home, to be erected as a monument over Lieutenant Stearns, the star of the regiment."

The following extract is from the letter of a colored boy, who had formerly lived with the deceased as a servant in his father's family, but was at this time servant of the Assistant Surgeon of the Twenty-first Regiment.

"The death of my brave young master has prevented me from giving you the particulars until the present time. I say that he was brave, because I know it. After I came out here, a strong friendship grew between us, and I came to the determination to do everything in my power to promote his happiness; but this resolve never did him much good. On the morning of the battle of Roanoke, I met him in the gangway of the boat; we shook hands. He says, 'Charlie, we shall have a hard fight to-day.' I looked up in his face; all I saw was a pleasant smile. I turned away, thinking he was a brave man. In the battle of Roanoke he was wounded. I saw him the next day, and asked him how he felt during the engagement. He said, 'I had no time to feel.' The morning before the battle of Newbern we walked out on the guard of the boat. I said, 'Mr. Frazar, suppose you should be killed?' He took my hand, and said, '*Charlie, I shall.*' I could not stand this, and turned to go, but I felt the pressure grow stronger, and stopped. My throat was full of something hard. My eye fell when I looked at him, and he let me go. I think he had something to say, but he never said it to me...... When the sad tidings came to me that he was shot, I took lint, bandages, and wine, &c., and ran to the spot where he was, but all was over. A corporal of Company C attended him as long as he lived. He was conveyed to a shed adjoining the hospital. It is useless to tell the many attempts I made to restore him to life, but all proved fruitless. I closed his eyes, and pressed that cold hand to my lips. I can say no more; but I send you this to let you know that his old servant closed his eyes. — P. S. I send his Testament, that his father gave him, by this mail."

Beautiful is that memory which receives and deserves such tributes as these letters pay. Long shall such a memory be cherished and honored.

Not less honored and cherished shall be the memory of John Hanson Thompson, sergeant in the One Hundred and Sixth Regiment New York Volunteers. Of him, too, his father, the Rev. J. P. Thompson, has written, in the little volume called "The Sergeant's Memorial." He was born on September 3d, 1842; he died on the 16th of March, 1863; — a short, but well-filled and rounded life. As a child he was the abiding comfort and joy of the house. His boyhood was full of variety of experience, but he always carried with him, wherever he went, "a gentle, obliging disposition, careful and considerate habits, pure and manly ways, helpful ingenuity, and delightful enthusiasm for whatever was noble and good." He was thoughtful and serious beyond his years; his nature was tender, truthful, generous, and loving. When the war broke out, he was a pupil at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. He had previously been, for two years, at a military school, and the knowledge of drill and tactics which he had thus acquired caused him to be chosen "Captain of the 'Ellsworth' or Phillips Cadets, — a company of some seventy boys, whose daily drills gave a new life to Andover Hill during the summer of 1861." At this time he wrote: —

> "I thank you for the Manuals. I am studying them continually, and practising with my company. We have two drills a week from Captain Oliver, U. S. A., and ours is the best-drilled company in town. I am trying to go further than mere head-work, by a private drill daily with a heavy musket I have borrowed. It is fine exercise, and good for my own military training, as I am careful to learn every motion rightly and on time. I am strong for war; it seems to me that the South needs a lesson which cannot be taught by 'compromise' or 'starvation.' Do you want me to go, or do you only not object if it be necessary? I stand ready to go at once, if I can find a suitable place. Should a dozen of our boys volunteer, I would be one; but it would be hard to enlist in a strange company that one knows nothing about. I think, when there is another call, and colleges and schools respond, Phillips boys will not be behind."

He was, indeed, ardent to enter the service of the country, but he acquiesced in his father's opinion, that it would be better for him to pursue his studies yet some time longer, at least until a pressing need for the services of volunteers should appear. That need* came in May, 1862, when the alarm was sounded from Washington that the capital was in danger. Then his father had no desire to restrain longer the youth's patriotic ardor. He had, meanwhile, entered Yale College.

> "The exigency upon which the long-coveted enlistment was made to hinge had plainly arisen, and the boy's heart was wild with joy when a telegram, signed with his father's name, summoned him to lay down his books and take up his musket. His classmates had never seen him so jubilant even in the merriest of college sports. In twenty-four hours he was enrolled as a private in Company G of the Twenty-second Regiment [New York National Guards, — three months' men], and was on his way to join the regiment at Baltimore. It was well for father and son that both had so long and carefully weighed the question of duty, that when this new peril of the country came there was nothing left but for the one to say, Go, and for the other to march."

The short term of enlistment passed quietly at Bolivar, in the routine of guard and picket duty, the daily drill, and the harder service of the pick and spade. At the expiration of the three months, he wrote: —

> "'In looking back over the last three months, I can only feel glad that I have had the experience here, and do not grudge the sacrifices made. I am in better health and spirits than when I started. And, in looking forward, I have for a few days considered the whole subject carefully, and think I had better go again, for three years or the war, — that it is my duty to go. This is the sum of all. I have always wanted to go to the war. After long waiting, I have tried the experiment. And having seen the hardest service, except a fight, I leave it to you whether my letters have been grumbling complaints. I am in for it, and like it; but as to re-enlisting, if you "don't see it," I will do my duty in college, as heretofore.'"
>
> "One so ready to do his duty, in any sphere," continues his father, "could not be long in learning to what sphere he was now called. Of course he did not wish to re-enlist as a private, though willing to do even that, if his country's need required it; but he felt himself competent for a higher post. 'I may say, without boasting, that I have a better theoretical knowledge of, and have had more practice in, all military movements, than half of our officers; while, for general education, my advantages have been far better, whatever my knowledge may be. I have tried thoroughly to understand all military tactics. I cannot think it is my duty to go as a private for three years, as long as we have so many

ignorant officers. As an officer, it would be my duty to go, because I think I know enough, and have the full spirit of the thing, and don't care much for anything else.'"

In September, 1862, he obtained a sergeantcy in the One Hundred and Sixth Regiment New York Volunteers, and for a time had almost the entire instruction of his company, then stationed on the Knobly Mountains, near New Creek Station, Virginia. The following extracts from his letters show the spirit by which he was animated.

"I am doing the best I can to teach the men all things in the most exact manner. I drill them five hours daily. It is hard work to manage some of the men; that is, they are old and want *reasons* for everything. If I say, 'You must remove the paper from the cartridge before loading,' some one says, 'I never load that way, I shan't do it.' '*Sir!* put that ball in without the paper.' 'Why?' 'Because I tell you to'; and at last in goes the ball.

"'Company, fall in for drill!' 'Where are we going?' 'Never mind where you are going,—*fall in*,' say I. And though I often have to repeat orders, and repeat again, I never had a man refuse to obey, and always after he has obeyed I tell him all I can to explain his trouble. But they are learning rapidly to obey promptly."

"Yesterday was Company A's first appearance on dress-parade, and I have the satisfaction of learning, from many sources, that in all respects 'we' were equal to the other companies, and that in our 'order arms' we surpassed the whole. I do not tell this to boast, but because it is a great gratification to me to know that, if I am now sick, Company A first got some good from me."

"At first the non-commissioned officers of Company A tented together, thus securing for themselves some extra comforts, and enjoying much pleasurable intercourse. 'Five such abolition, slavery-hating, vigorous-prosecution-of-the-war fellows you never saw in any one space, ten by ten.' Their evenings were given to studies and discussions in science, literature, and economics; geology and history being pursued in the way of regular recitations."

This mess being broken up, he occupied a Sibley tent with twelve privates. There "he best showed his aptitude for a soldier's life."

"His ingenuity devised many contrivances for the compact and orderly arrangement of equipage and utensils, and multiplied the comforts and enjoyments of the men. Said one of them, himself a mechanic, 'The Sergeant was always proposing some new ideas for our comfort; he would draw a plan, and teach us how to make this and that (pointing to various racks, &c. in the tent), so that he cared for us like a brother.' Said another, 'We used to watch for him to come in, he had such a pleasant way with him; he always had a kind word for every one in the tent.' And they all testified, 'In all the time he was with us, we never knew him to get angry; we never heard from him an uncouth expression, nor saw in him any improper or ungentlemanly action.'

"To divert the men from cards, he proposed making a set of chessmen, a large part of which he carved with his own knife. His Sibley tent with thirteen inmates, poorly lighted by day or night, with a stove in the centre, occupying the place of a table, afforded much smaller accommodations for reading and writing than the old wall tent for five. But he maintained in it order, comfort, and good cheer."

After a serious illness, he writes: —

"I can only lay my illness to poor cooking, — half-cooked beans, and once or twice our meat was tainted a little. It is a shame that, when Uncle Sam gives us such abundant rations, and of good quality, we have them ruined by the cooks. I am doing all in my power to have more care given to these matters, but cannot say much; for a sergeant should set a good example to the men by not grumbling."

As weeks and months wore away in the camp at New Creek, he grew more and more impatient for an active participation in the war.

"As to war and politics, I am glad that little 'Rapid' is so fairly squelched. Give us leaders that will fight; we want men to march us on to Richmond. For the love of country, don't make our great and noble army guard railroads. Regiments spoil for want of work. All our boys want to advance, fight, end the war, and return home. And this is so everywhere. We all need fighting officers."

He writes to a college classmate, whom he addresses as "dear Chalk": —

"So, Chalk, you may give it out as rather improbable whether I return to college. Remember me to the class, and at your next Delta Kappa meeting, as one who thinks it his duty, and the duty of every man, to go and *fight* in this time of need. And more particularly the duty of such as you are, who have good habits formed, and are ready and quick to learn; — that intelligence and refinement may prevail in our army, and that it may not be left to the scum and scourings of the land to win the battles and claim the laurels. Every one of us ought to say in future years, 'I used that gun in '62, '63, — or better, that *sword!*'

"I know we want education; but where is the good of education without your country? And where is your country without your men to fight and make it?"

This last sentence shows the character of the man.

Almost every day brought its own incidents, sometimes its special lessons of fact or principle.

"On Friday I was on picket on the Winchester road. Two blacks came with a four-horse wagon, one a young man of twenty-five years, the other a man of fifty. They stopped to show their passes, and the old man jumped out of the wagon to light his pipe by our fire. 'Are you a free man?' I asked. 'Yes, sir, I paid a thousand dollars for myself; then I bought my wife and my daughter.' 'Well, that was bully for you; but what did you want to buy yourself for? did n't you have a kind master?' The old man took his pipe from his mouth, and looked at me. '*No slave ever had a kind master*, sir. You get a little bird and put him in a cage, and feed him, and take care of him, and all that, but you open the door and away he go: *he know.*' I told him he was well worth a thousand dollars. Why is this county excepted in Lincoln's proclamation?"

The desires of his heart for service in battle were not to be gratified. The exposures and hardships of winter life in camp brought on illness, from which he had but partially recovered when a fresh exposure led to a new attack, under which he sunk after a few days, dying in the firm faith of a Christian soldier, who had tried to do his duty. His last words were those of prayer.

"Great truths and great principles," it has been well said, "are for the most part established by great sacrifices." And when such sacrifices as this dear boy and his companions in service and in death are laid upon the country's altar, who shall doubt that the reward will be found in the freedom, justice, and prosperity of the future?

James Sewall Reed was captain of a company raised in

California in the autumn of 1862, to count on the quota of Boston, Massachusetts. A finer body of men than the California Hundred, as they were called, was scarcely to be found in any State. They reached Massachusetts in January, 1863, and formed Company A of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry. On the last Sunday that they spent in California, they attended the church of the lamented and honored Starr King. He addressed them in words which found a true echo in their own hearts.

> "God bless you," said he, "brother Americans, for your readiness, for your zeal, for your pure offering of devotedness, which to-day add force as well as illustration to the pleadings of the Gospel with our hearts! You are not 'weary' of the call and the strain of patriotism, — you seek the opportunity of pledging strength, and skill, and blood, and breath to our country's integrity and honor. Heaven hear our prayers for you, and cover you with its benediction!..... May the flash of your blades, if you are called into battle, be the dawn of a better age for your country!..... Go, brethren, do your tremendous duty with dedicated hearts; in the fear of God, which roots out all other fear; in allegiance to Christ; with the New Testament very near your hand, and its appeals very sweet to your souls! 'Be not weary with well-doing,' though your marches be long, and your hope of speedy success denied. In due time you shall reap, if you faint not; and, if those you leave at home be not cowards and traitors both, you shall reap, though you bleed, though you be maimed, though you die; you shall reap in your country's redemption and renewal, in the honor that will invest your names in future years, in your reward in the better world."

The wife of Captain Reed has written a brief and beautiful account of her husband's life.* He was born in Milton, Massachusetts, April 3d, 1832. He had an ardent, impulsive, enthusiastic character, and in 1849, during the rage of the "gold fever," he became so desirous to try his fortune in California, that his parents reluctantly gave their consent, though he was a boy but little more than seventeen years old. His experiences were rough, hard, and wearisome, but "he was always cheerful, he made the best of every event, was never discouraged, and always found something pleasant among the darkest scenes."

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* Printed as an Appendix to Dr. Morison's Sermon, the title of which stands among those at the head of this article.

"At this time, all who are acquainted with California history will remember that the moral dangers to which a young man was exposed were neither few nor small; and older, stronger men often fell victims. But from the first, Sewall had absolutely set his face against these things, and such was the natural purity of his character, his innate love of goodness and truth, that what to many was enticing to him was disgusting, and few passed through the ordeal of those early California days more free and uncontaminated than he. His good mother's teachings here proved their value: he reverenced that mother, and did not forget her while away."

In 1856 he took an active and useful part in the Vigilance Committee, and was conspicuous in all undertakings that required courage and ability. He travelled in search of fortune up and down the Pacific coast, during 1857 and 1858. He spent the 4th of July, 1858, at Fort Langley, and being on British ground, he determined that an American flag should float over his tent, at least, on that day.

"So the previous day," writes his wife, "he set himself to work to make a flag that should be a reminder of his home, and that flag is now in my possession. An old red-flannel shirt furnished the material of that color, an old white shirt was torn up for the white, while a blue blanket furnished the field for the stars. He could not make the stars to suit him, and so he cut the figures '76 out of some white, and sewed it upon the blue; and this flag floated over his tent on that day on that British soil."

In speaking of his travels, he said: —

"I have travelled about some in my life. I have been south as far as latitude fifty-six degrees, and here I am at fifty degrees north. I have lived under Chilian, Mexican, and English governments, and the only way a man can truly prize our own glorious Republic is to see and travel in foreign lands. I am a thorough American, and I glory in it."

In 1859 he returned home for a short time, and was married.

"In September of the same year," continues his wife, "we returned to California. Sewall now determined to settle down, and enjoy the pleasures of domestic life, which possessed an especial charm for one who had been so long a wanderer. He purchased a ranch, some sixty miles from San Francisco, and there, in quiet happiness, he devoted his time to its cultivation. We had lived there about a year, when, even in our distant home, we heard the nation's cry of alarm at the fall of Sumter; and when he heard of the mustering of armies, and knew that danger was threatening that land he loved so well, he would often say to me, 'If I were only a single man, I should certainly go East, and join the army.' Even as early as this, he began again the study of military science, and interested himself in all pertaining to it, and in the summer of 1861 he joined a company of men as private, who met for drill and instruction in military matters; but, knowing full as much as any of them, he was frequently the instructor. During this time his mind was unsettled, his thoughts were often dwelling on the danger that was threatening that land he loved, and I have often heard him say, 'that if this, the best government the sun shone on, was destroyed, he should not wish to live.' He would have joined the army at this time, had it not been for me; but I *could not* give him up. In November, 1861, we again returned to San Francisco, — an excellent situation being offered him there, together with a better opportunity to serve his State as a military man; for at that time it was seriously thought that there would be trouble there. A new zeal had been given to the different military organizations, and he was soon re-elected captain of his old company, — the First Light Dragoons, — having resigned that position when in Lower California. Here I hoped he would be content, and gratify his love of military life as captain of that splendid company, but his heart was with those noble men who were sacrificing their all for their country, and again and again was the unwelcome subject discussed between us. I *had* felt that there were plenty of men here, that there was no lack of material, and that his services were not needed; but when I heard that men were less willing than formerly to volunteer, and that drafting even must be resorted to in Massachusetts, I felt that it was my duty to give up my precious husband to the cause. I saw that *good* men were needed, and I knew how admirably adapted he was for the life; and I, too, loved my country too well to see her destroyed, without doing my all to save her. I had no sooner given my consent than he proceeded to act, and, with other Massachusetts men, formed a plan, the result of which you know."

Nothing can add to the force and pathos of these tender and patriotic words. For some months Captain Reed acted as Major in command of a battalion. "While employed in that capacity he was killed, near Drainsville, Virginia, on the anniversary of Washington's birthday, the 22d of February, 1864. His funeral was at the church in Dorchester, Massachusetts, where he had been married a little less than five years before."

"We see in this, as in other histories, by what providential ways our young men have been prepared to take the self-sacrificing and heroic part which they have taken in the terrible conflict in which we are engaged. The cost of this war, in tears and blood, to uphold our government, and save it from becoming a wreck and ruin, is indeed great; but who shall say that it is too great, so long as it brings out characters like these, and holds up to us such types of self-forgetting manhood?"

The text of the memorial sermon by Dr. Morison was chosen well. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Surely these soldiers of the cause of freedom, justice, and union, soldiers of humanity, have shown their great love for God and man, and have laid down their lives for their friends. Their devotion shall not be in vain. Dear friends and brothers! your love inspires our hearts, and shall make us worthy of you!

With the record of one more noble life we must conclude our selection from the full roll of the dead on the field of honor,—our too brief register of those

"Whom neither shape of danger can dismay,
Nor thought of tender happiness betray;
Who, not content that former worth stand fast,
Look forward, persevering to the last,
From well to better, daily self-surpassed."

Walter Symonds Newhall was born in Philadelphia, October 31st, 1841. He was a manly child from his very cradle, full of spirit and will, full, too, of tenderness and truthfulness. "He was brought up with a reverence for authority which he always preserved, notwithstanding his extreme independence and self-reliance, and which served to make him a good soldier, able both to command and to obey."

"He was not fond of study," says the writer of the account of his life, "and never particularly distinguished at school; but he was the hero of the play-ground. He had a real passion for out-of-door amusements, and excelled in every athletic exercise. He was preeminent among his fellows in all games, whether of speed, strength, or skill; the heartiness with which he entered into the sport, and which never failed or flagged, made each eager to secure him for his side."

He became, as a young man, one of the best and most noted cricketers in the country. "The qualities needed for a good cricketer are a quick eye, a cool head, a steady hand, a strong arm, a swift foot, and an active body; good humor, equanimity, self-reliance, and discipline." All these Walter Newhall possessed in a high degree, and his training in cricket and other athletic games was fitting him for the severe strain and perilous duties of military life.

> "By the universal testimony of those who saw him, year after year, at the times when all restraint was thrown off, his companions on the cricket-field, his fellow-students in the laboratory, and his comrades in camp, no profane or impure word ever fell from his lips, and in the midst of his magnificent manhood he led a blameless life. . . . . . Walter Newhall was no child of sickly sentimentalism, or unreal, precocious piety, no would-be saint: he was the merriest and bravest of boys, the foremost in fun and frolic, the hero of the playground, a prince of good fellows. He could play ten-pins and billiards as well as ball and cricket; he could ride and swim and shoot; he was the very type of gallant youth, — and yet he was reverent, temperate, chaste as an ideal knight. The crowning grace of his perfect manhood was his Christian purity."

Walter Newhall was among the earliest to respond to the President's first call for troops, in April, 1861. He at once joined a cavalry company, in barracks at Chestnut Hill, near Philadelphia. He was at this time between nineteen and twenty years old, — about six feet tall. The young men in the company

> "were nearly all good horsemen, having been used to the saddle from childhood. Walter Newhall was one of the best riders, and by far the finest swordsman of them all. The same dexterity which had given him such advantage with his cricket-bat now showed itself in his perfect command of the sabre, and their drill-master said that it would take but little practice to make him the most accomplished swordsman in the army. He was also a capital shot, and soon became remarkably proficient in the manual. His agility and activity were extraordinary. He could run and clear a horizontal bar on a level with his head, without touching it; and jump over his horse, which was more than sixteen hands high, with perfect ease. His grace was as remarkable as his strength."

Disappointed in the hope that the government would accept them as a company, the young men disbanded, and in August young Newhall, having applied for service with General Fremont, was ordered to report at St. Louis, and was there made a Second Lieutenant in the Body-Guard of that general. The next month he was commissioned First Lieutenant. He took an active share in the Missouri campaign of that autumn, and very greatly distinguished himself in the famous and gallant charge of the Body-Guard at Springfield, as well as on other less noted occasions. At all times, under all trials, he was cheerful, confident, full of good humor, patient, generous, modest, and brave. A touching proof of the regard which his company had for him was received

> "through a Philadelphia lady, who went to St. Louis to nurse in the hospitals there. In one of the wards she found a soldier of the Body-Guard, recovering from a fever, a very intelligent, well-informed, manly person, in whose mind solemn thoughts had been awakened by the recent dangers through which he had passed at the battle of Springfield. In the course of conversation the lady mentioned Lieutenant Newhall, and the man's whole countenance lighted up on finding that she knew his officer. 'He is the finest man in the regiment!' he exclaimed, 'and the most popular. He knows how to deal with men; he is always kindly, always treats them as if they were men, and not machines. I have heard one half the men say they would rather serve under Newhall than any man in the service.' He went on to speak of his many virtues, especially his patience and forbearance with the troublesome fellows in the company, adding, 'He is a true Christian. I have seen him sorely tried, and I never heard him swear.'"

After the Body-Guard was disbanded, Newhall applied for service in the army of the Potomac, and in January, 1862, received a commission as First Lieutenant in the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. The regiment took part, during the ensuing summer, in the McClellan campaign toward Richmond, and Newhall was frequently selected for difficult services. He never failed to accomplish well whatever duty he was called on to perform, and gave such proof of gallantry and ability that in the autumn he was promoted to a captaincy. Month by month he won new honor, and stronger confidence, both from his men and his superior officers.

On the third day of the battle at Gettysburg, in July, 1863, "he was employed in the various duties of a staff officer, when a heavy body of cavalry made a violent attack on General Gregg's position on the right wing, endeavoring to turn that flank, with the hope of creating confusion in our rear, and of damaging our trains and communications. It was of vital importance to repel this onset, and our troops made a stubborn resistance. But the enemy advanced rapidly, and some important guns were every moment in danger of being taken. Newhall was sent to order a portion of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry to their support. On reaching his regiment, he found that so many men had been forced to fight on foot and in the woods, that but three officers and sixteen men, a fragment of his friend Captain Treichel's squadron, were mounted, and ready to move on the instant. Not a second was to be lost. He briefly explained his orders to this small party, and hurried them on to the attack. Being on the staff, it was no part of his duty to do more than deliver the order, but to do less than share the danger was not in his nature. They were hidden from sight in a little valley, whence they gradually rose to the top of a hill, not fifty yards from which a regiment of the enemy was in full career against a portion of our line, just then in confusion. The little band instantly charged this vastly superior force, breaking through the flank, and creating a diversion just at the decisive moment. Out of what had been disorder a steady line of our men now advanced, and the golden opportunity of the Rebels was lost. Only a score of the Third had ridden down upon the enemy, and but six of these noble few escaped unhurt. Newhall had made straight for the battle-flag, and, raising his sabre, charged like a thunderbolt upon the color-bearer; but the latter suddenly lowered the spear-head of the banner, and struck his antagonist full on the chin with terrible force, shattering his jaw, tearing his cheek to pieces, and knocking him senseless from his horse. When he recovered his consciousness, he found himself lying between the two lines, a shell occasionally bursting near him. His wound was bleeding profusely, his arms were gone, and he had been evidently left for dead. He found, however, that he had strength enough to walk, and hastened towards our lines. Coming in at a point where there was some slight confusion. under a very hot fire, he rallied the men, who were becoming unsteady. and then made the best of his way to the rear to find a surgeon. There he was joined by his friend Charles Treichel, who since they had ridden into the fray together in the morning, with all the fire of their first charge at Springfield, had lost a horse, had his arm shattered by a ball, been taken prisoner, and made his escape. Late in the day Newhall's brothers found them both lying in a little farm-house, among their companions in the charge. Walter was exceedingly lame

> and bruised, in consequence of the fall from his horse, and his wound was so stiff and swollen that he had the greatest difficulty in articulating, but he was in high spirits over the victory. In a day or two he was well enough to be moved, and was sent home.
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> "His strength soon began to return, and his wound slowly healed. ..... By the end of August he had not entirely recovered his strength, and was ordered to the sea-shore for a few days. He left home most unwillingly, but came back perfectly restored, and immediately declared his intention of returning to the army. His leave had not yet expired, and he was entreated to stay at least a week longer, but one day was all that his affection would concede to his sense of duty. He felt that he was needed at camp, and he bade a last farewell to those dear ones, who, though they knew it not, were to see his face no more."

Just before Christmas, 1863, Newhall received leave of absence to spend the holy season with his family at home, where he hoped to meet two other brothers who were also in their country's service. On his way,

> "before reaching the Rappahannock, he was obliged to cross a small stream, one of those little runs which intersect that country in every direction, and such as he had forded and swam a hundred times. It had usually very little depth or width, but recent heavy rains had swollen it considerably, and converted the bottom into a morass. He plunged in, but about half-way his horse became mired, and began to struggle. Walter instantly perceived the danger, and waved to his orderly not to follow. He then quietly attempted to quit his saddle to swim to shore, but as he was in the act his frightened horse reared and fell over upon him. There was one moment, one supreme moment, before he disappeared, and he called to his orderly, in a calm, clear voice, 'Go for my brother,' and sank. His body was recovered in half an hour."

He was buried on the 22d of December. He had indeed gone home to keep Christmas. Two months afterwards, his commander, General Averell, wrote to his father: —

> "It will be long ere the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac forget WALTER NEWHALL. His character was a model for all who had the pleasure of knowing him. It is difficult for me to say wherein he lacked of being perfect. He was without fear, and certainly without reproach. Dignified without affectation, reticent, but not taciturn, his graceful but impressive manners charmed all who ever saw him smile. In the execution of orders he never hesitated, and he possessed that rare quality in an officer, the power of inspiring his men with perfect confidence.

"His purity and his principles had a living force, which made itself felt throughout his command. It is yet felt, and he still lives, not only with his comrades, but with

"Your friend and servant,
"WM. W. AVERELL, B. G."

No words can add honor to a character that deserved such praise as this.

Such are the records of the lives of some of the youths who have formed part of our national army. Shall we mourn for them, that they have thus early been lost to their country and their friends?

"Alas! but Morison fell young;
He never fell, — thou fall'st, my tongue.
He stood a soldier to the last right end,
A perfect patriot and a noble friend;
But most a virtuous son. —
All offices were done
By him so ample, full, and round,
In weight, in measure, number, sound,
As, though his age imperfect might appear,
His life was of humanity the sphere."

"It is not growing like a tree
In bulk, doth make men better be;
Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sere;
A lily of a day
Is fairer far, in May,
Although it fall and die that night;
It was the plant and flower of light.
In small proportions we just beauties see:
And in short measures life may perfect be."

No, we mourn not for them. We rejoice rather in the force of such fair examples; we rejoice in the assurance that such examples are not rare; that so much youth and strength and noble service are but the types of more that still remains; that our living army is worthy of the dead. In sacred, solemn, glorious, and tearful joy we lay these blessed offerings on the altar of sacrifice, — on the altar on which the dead were ready to lay whatever sacrifice might be required of them for the sake of the everlasting principles of freedom and of justice, for the sake of the perpetuity of those institutions which are the safe-guards of the equal rights of man. In the immortal words of President Lincoln, at Gettysburg: "It is for us to be dedicated to the unfinished work which they have thus far so nobly advanced. It is for us to be dedicated to the great task remaining before us, — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion, — that we highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Art. VII. — 1. *United States Treasury Reports for* 1861, 1862, 1863.

2. *Opinions delivered by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, on the Constitutionality of the Act of Congress declaring Treasury-Notes a Legal Tender in Payment of Debts.* Albany, 1863.

3. *Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, sustaining the Constitutionality of Legal-Tender Notes,* delivered at Rochester, April 4, 1863.

4. *Opinions of* Hon. J. J. Clark Hare, *and of* Hon. George Sharswood, *of the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia, on the Constitutionality of the Acts of Congress of February* 5, 1862, *declaring United States Notes Lawful Money and a Legal Tender.*

No political or economical questions have a more immediate bearing on the concerns of daily life, than those which relate to the currency. It is the instrument by which the business of individuals and of government is transacted. A defective currency is a hinderance to a prosperous career, and adds an oppressive burden to the weight of public misfortune.

The paper money created by the government under the stress of the present war has been generally accepted by the people. It performs all the offices of money as a medium of exchange.

It represents all sums from the largest to the smallest. It passes readily from hand to hand, and is of equal value in all parts of the country. Considering the character of the struggle in which we are engaged, this surely may be regarded as a financial achievement of no ordinary merit. But for the currency thus furnished, the Northern States would have afforded a spectacle very different from their present prosperous activity, and the conduct of the war, on the vast scale rendered necessary by the extent of the rebellion, would have been impossible.

This currency has been attacked, not because it has any fault as currency, not because it has failed in any particular to do the work of money, better than gold and silver could do it, better than bank-notes could do it, and as well as any national currency ever did the work, but because it is unconstitutional. The government, it is said, has no right to make paper money. It is restrained by the supreme law from making anything but metallic money.

The legal-tender notes have been issued by hundreds of millions. They have gone into the pockets of the people, and into all the avenues of trade. They are performing all over the country the innumerable exchanges of daily business. It would be a great misfortune, with infinite ramifications of mischief, public and private, if they should be converted into so much waste paper. Sudden loss would fall upon thousands, and a sudden deficiency of currency, with all its ruinous embarrassments, would fall upon all, the government included. Yet waste paper these notes are, if Congress had no power to issue them. The question of their legality, therefore, is of great practical importance to every one.

It has also a theoretical interest, because the principles involved affect essential powers of the government, and indeed the very nature of the Constitution. The question has not yet been presented to the supreme tribunal of the nation, but it is discussed with ability in the opinions placed at the head of this article. These opinions may be regarded as favorable specimens of the manner of reasoning employed by the two schools into which the expounders of the Constitution are divided. One of these is the liberal school, which ascribes to the government very extensive powers, implied from the language of the Constitution and the purposes of its creation. The other may be termed the narrow school, which would restrain the government to the exercise of those powers only which are expressly granted by the organic law.

The decisions of the courts in all the cases above mentioned were in favor of the constitutionality of the legal-tender notes. In the New York Court of Appeals there were two dissenting opinions out of seven, one only of which two — that of Chief Justice Denio — has been published. In the Supreme Court of New York there was no dissenting voice. In the District Court for the city and county of Philadelphia two of the judges — Stroud and Hare — sustained the legality of the notes, and Judge Sharswood denied it. Only the opinions of Hare and Sharswood have been printed. Both of these gentlemen are known to the profession by the learned and valuable works they have contributed to the science of the law. Their opinions in the case referred to display eminent ability, and are marked by the characteristics of the school to which each respectively belongs. That of Judge Hare is philosophical. His views are broad and general, embracing not the law only, but the causes of the law. The argument of Judge Sharswood is clear, and presented with skill. It is compact, terse, and demonstrative, if the premises on which it is founded be admitted. But it is a verbal argument, supported not by the spirit, but by the letter of the law, and so also is that of Chief Justice Denio, and the result is, not life to the government, but death, "for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." The reasoning of these learned judges reaches a conclusion they did not intend, for it proves, even more clearly than the arguments of the others, that a government exactly limited by the words of a written constitution is no government at all, cannot perform the functions of one, and that such a constitution must either be liberally interpreted, according to its spirit and general intention, or be disregarded.

It may be deemed by many unnecessary to discuss this subject here at all, as it is treated with so much ability in the decisions referred to, and as those decisions were in favor of the legality of the notes. There are, however, some views of the question which do not lie within the province of a legal argument; and on a matter so important and so delicate in its sensibilities as the currency, it is well that popular opinion should be strengthened by other than technical reasoning. Many of our readers do not often see, or care to see, the opinions of courts, but all are interested in knowing what sort of money the country is to have during the war and after it, and what power the government may rightfully exercise over money. The opinions cited refer only to the legal-tender notes, but the principles which sustain them apply also to the system of banks established by the government for the purpose of creating a national currency. An attempt to show that such a currency is needed by the country, and always has been needed, that it is both the duty and the right of the government to furnish it, and that, until the present time, this duty has never been adequately performed, may, perhaps, not be considered inappropriate.

Power over the currency is granted to the government by the Constitution in these words: "Congress shall have power to coin money, and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin." It is contended that this language limits the power of Congress to the creation of coined or metallic money, and that the intention of the framers so to limit it is proved by their debates in the Convention. Let us concede this, for the sake of argument, and what is the result? If, by reason of irresistible causes, the currency actually used by the people and the government is not and cannot be coin, then the government has no power over the money of the country. The restriction imposed by the letter of the law has destroyed a necessary power. If this be so, it follows that it is constitutional to sacrifice the restriction rather than the power.

Mere barter is inconsistent with even the rudest civilization. Men must, therefore, agree upon some commodity which all are willing to receive for the products of their industry. This commodity thus becomes an instrument of exchange, or money. It may be of any material, and has been, — gold, silver, copper, iron, leather, shells, tobacco, paper; that which makes it money is the fact that it is received, by common consent, as the equivalent for the things that men wish to exchange.

That it may be so received, however, in an advanced state of society, it must have value, natural or artificial, and must be portable, and capable of subdivision, so as to represent different values. Gold and silver, as they possess these qualities, and others in an eminent degree, have been used in all ages as a medium of exchange. They are useful in the arts, and have, therefore, intrinsic value; they are scarce, and have, therefore, a large value in a small bulk; they are capable of minute division; they are almost imperishable, and may therefore be preserved for long periods of time, and they are liable to slight fluctuations in value. For these reasons, every one is glad to get them, and because every one is glad to get them, they may be exchanged for anything. They are therefore emphatically money, and the term, when used in a strict sense, is applied exclusively to them.

The value of a piece of gold or silver depends on its purity and weight. If at every exchange it were necessary to ascertain these, the utility of the precious metals as money would be greatly diminished. Some certificate of their value is obviously a great convenience, if not a necessity. The state therefore impresses on the metal a stamp, certifying its weight and fineness. To satisfy the needs of commerce there must be pieces of different value, bearing a certain fixed relation to each other. Government establishes this relation. Government enforces contracts, and itself uses money in its most important transactions. "To coin money and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins," and to make the money created by itself a legal tender in payment of debts, is and must be, for all these reasons, the duty and prerogative of government, because it only can accomplish the necessary objects.

Notwithstanding the manifold advantages of gold and silver as a medium of exchange, it was soon discovered, as society advanced, that they could not supply the wants of a commercial community where daily transactions are numerous and the values transferred large. They are cumbrous; a moderate sum is too heavy to be carried about the person, and the expense and risk of transporting large sums across land or water are great. The process of counting coins is laborious, and occupies much time. They are unsafe to keep or to carry, as they tempt robbers. They are liable to be lost by fire, shipwreck, and other accidents. For these reasons a substitute was needed; and unless one had been found, a varied and extensive commerce, either foreign or domestic, would have been impossible. This substitute is paper, and the use of it as a currency instead of metal was almost as important to the advancement of civilization, as the use of gold and silver was instead of direct barter. By means of paper money, the largest value may be carried, transported to any distance, and counted as easily as the smallest. It is able to pay any sum, however large or however small. Because it has no intrinsic value, by the use of certain precautions, it may be and is rendered far less perishable and destructible than gold and silver. For these reasons it is infinitely superior to gold and silver. It lacks but one quality possessed by these, — that of intrinsic value. One who has a gold or silver dollar has what is itself valuable, if not as money, then as an article of merchandise; one who has a piece of paper representing a thousand dollars has what is in itself of no value at all.

This defect would have prevented the use of paper as money, had not a remedy for it been found. That remedy is credit, the child of good government, of social order, of the arts, of improving science and morals, all tending to create commercial integrity and punctuality. It was at an early period discovered that a written promise, by a responsible party, to pay a certain sum in coin, would be accepted as readily in exchange for commodities as the coin itself. The immense superiority of paper over coin for all the purposes of money was immediately appreciated. Written promises began to circulate from hand to hand, from city to city, from nation to nation, wherever there was anything to buy or to sell. Every onward step in civilization, every increase of wealth, every improvement in the arts, every new field of commerce, gave a fresh impulse to the use of this magical instrument, added to its power, and multiplied its services, until at length it banished coin from the larger avenues of trade, and became itself, almost exclusively, the currency of the world, both for governments and the people.

It is needless for our purpose to trace the progress of paper currency, from the first written promise to pay, to its present enormous growth of bills of exchange, private notes, bank-notes, bank checks, book accounts, bonds, and public securities, which form the means of payment by which modern business is transacted. It is sufficient to state, that it has in these forms almost entirely, except in small retail dealings, superseded the use of coin, which does not now perform five per cent of the exchanges, either in this country or in England, though in some of the less commercial nations of Europe it plays a more conspicuous part. Except in very small sums, no one carries coin about him, pays or receives it, sends it to a distance, or keeps it in his house, if he can avoid doing so. Such is the habit of modern English and American society, during periods of peace and security. Paper money is almost the universal money, and the province of coin is narrowed down to furnishing a security against the excessive issue of bank-notes, and to supplying small change and the means of occasionally making payment for foreign imports.

These facts have a direct and most important bearing on the question before us.

We have already seen that it is the duty and the prerogative of a government to supply a *currency* to the people, because a currency or medium of exchange is necessary to business, because government alone can supply one, because the government itself requires such a medium, and because there must be a legal mode of paying debts. As this is a necessity, it may be stated as the natural law of all governments, and just so far as any is without the power to meet that necessity, it is without the power to perform the functions of a government. The character of this law is not altered by the material of which the currency is made. Whether it be of gold or silver or copper or paper, if it be the currency which actually exists, and which by force of controlling circumstances must exist, the duty and the power of the government attach to it, simply because of its existence.

Now the currency almost exclusively used in this country for many years has been paper. Before the present war, when specie was in circulation, probably not more than one per cent of the vast exchanges of the country, amounting to hundreds of millions daily, was made in coin. Even the national treasury, though professedly based on the principle of a metallic currency, could not perform its functions without resorting to paper in the shape of transfer drafts and notes. All the State governments, all municipal corporations, transacted their business in paper. Paper is the money of the country, both for the government and the people. To make a paper currency, therefore, directly or indirectly to regulate its value, to maintain its stability, and to prevent the abuses and evils to which it is liable, is the duty of the government, and because its duty, its right also.

The foundation of paper currency, as stated already, is credit, which is the result of public confidence. To create and support that confidence is, therefore, a duty of government, whether the currency be issued by itself or by others. The term paper currency is here used in its largest sense, and includes all instruments of writing which are evidences of debt, and thus means of payment, as bonds, book accounts, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank checks and notes. The laws of all civilized nations sustain the credit of these by furnishing means for the recovery of their value, and providing for their circulation by assignment, indorsement, or mere delivery.

Bank-notes are evidences of debt. They are promises to pay on demand a certain sum in coin to the bearer. They require no indorsement, but pass by delivery. They are called paper money, because they perform all the functions of money, differing only from gold and silver in their want of intrinsic value. This defect is practically remedied by their convertibility into gold and silver, at the pleasure of the holder. Bills of credit, issued by a government, are also paper money, if intended to pass as such.

The superiority of bank-notes to coin in cheapness and convenience has caused them to be universally used in commercial countries, and especially in our own, where from various causes a cheap currency, easily transmitted to distant places, was demanded. Notwithstanding the abuses and dangers to which banks are liable, notwithstanding the heavy calamities they have caused, the vast advantages they offer have made them more and more a necessity as wealth and business increased. They have grown with the growth of the country from three, at the time when the Constitution was made, to over sixteen hundred, their present number. Almost all payments are made in their notes, except the smallest, even when banks are paying coin. Though exchangeable at will for gold or silver, the people prefer them either to pay or to keep. They have become a necessity, they, or some substitute for them, for the increase of business far transcends the power of the precious metals to make the exchanges, and a return to metallic money would reduce commerce to a thousandth part of its present importance. It would be as easy to return to turnpike roads instead of railroads, or to sailing vessels instead of steamers.* Bank-notes have thus become really money. They have become also practically, by the operation of custom and opinion, a legal tender, and never more so than when they are not convertible into gold or silver.

These facts are sufficient to prove that a government which has no power over paper money has no power, in the present state of the commercial world, over money, has no power to furnish a currency either to the people or to itself, and fails, therefore, in an essential attribute of government.

This was soon discovered by ours. The makers of the Constitution were inspired with a dread of paper money by the unfortunate result of that which was issued by the Continental Congress to enable it to carry on the war of independence. Under the influence of this feeling, unable to foresee the future, ignorant of the true nature of currency, (for the science of political economy was then in its infancy;) ignorant of the immense power of paper money for good as well as for evil, they attempted to guard against its dangers by depriving both the National and the State governments of the power to create it. The latter, expressly; the former, it is said, impliedly.

But paper money erelong proved too strong for the Constitution. It appealed to the people in language that could not be resisted. It offered them rapid wealth, progress, and power. It offered them commerce and manufactures, farms and plantations. It offered to clear the forest, to drain the swamp, to make roads through the Western wilderness, to build ships and cities. It offered to do the work of the government better and more cheaply than anything else could do it. By the disasters its mismanagement produced, it invoked guidance and a knowledge of its uses and powers. It became a necessity both for government and people. As steam does now, it said to both: "I am your faithful, untiring, wonder-working servant. I am also your master, for you cannot do without me. I bestow my treasures only on intellect and knowledge, for though my power is beneficent, it is also dangerous. Study my nature, use me with skill, or beware of explosions and collisions."

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* See the Ways and Means of Payment, p. 116, by Stephen Colwell, an instructive and interesting work on currency.

It thus became obvious that the natural law which invests every government with power to attain the ends of government, power to exercise its own necessary functions, power to satisfy the wants and demands of the people which can in no other way be satisfied, must and does invest ours with these powers, whatever the letter of the Constitution may be, and whatever was the intention of its founders.

Paper money has forced both the general and the State governments to recognize its presence and its power; but because the restrictions imposed by the Constitution have been partially effectual, the result has been, from the first, confusion in the currency which it was the object of those restrictions to prevent. A national currency, of uniform value throughout the country, and of positive intrinsic value always, was the object sought by the Constitution. Gold and silver coins would be such a currency. But an exclusively metallic currency was soon found to be impossible. Paper money properly regulated would also be such a currency. But paper money, it was argued, the government is forbidden to supply. Nevertheless, paper money was a necessity. It was a thing the people must and would have, and they got it by a construction of the Constitution which violates its spirit and purpose, though not its letter, and, as usually happens in such cases, has introduced all the evils which the letter was intended to prevent.

The Constitution declares that "no State shall emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts." The object of this provision is manifest. If every State could at pleasure create paper money, as they would necessarily vary as to skill in management, extent of resources, and the business of their people, a currency either for the use of the people of all the States, or of the national government, of uniform value, would be impossible. Nevertheless, the States did virtually emit bills of credit and make them a legal tender. They did not do this directly, and thus evaded the letter of the law, but they did it indirectly, by creating corporations with the exclusive privilege of emitting promissory notes, which speedily filled all the avenues of circulation and became practically a legal tender, during *permitted* suspensions, as well as when they were paid in coin on demand.

The mischievous consequences of this system were soon felt. An uncertain, fluctuating, often worthless paper currency flooded the country. There was no money for the people which was money everywhere, and none for the government. The Constitution intended to provide both, but unluckily those who made it were ignorant that paper money, growing out of the necessities of commerce, would become a power stronger than the Constitution.

But money the government must have, and money which was really money, of uniform value everywhere throughout our extended empire; and the rapidly increasing business of the country demanded it with a voice that could not be denied. What, then, did the government do? It followed the example of the States. It evaded the letter of the law, but, unlike the States, it did so to preserve its life and spirit. It interpreted the Constitution to meet the iron necessity of the case.

"The Constitution," it was said, "invests the government with power to establish a *uniform* system of taxation, to regulate commerce between the States, to make war." This power being granted, all means "necessary and proper" to carry it into effect are granted also. Paper money is one of those means,—paper money of uniform value throughout the country. To carry on the business of the government or of the people by means of metallic money is simply impossible. True it is that the Constitution grants to the government the power only to *coin* money and regulate its value. But the government may and must do indirectly what it is thus forbidden to do directly. It may create a national bank, founded on its credit, with power to issue notes, which, thus supported, will command universal confidence and become a sound currency of uniform value, "both for the people and for the government."

And so it happened. Twice has the government been forced to establish a national bank by reason of the manifold evils of the currency supplied by the States, and on each occasion the object was fully accomplished; a safe and uniform currency was furnished to the government and to the people.

The wisdom of the general intention of the Constitution was thus vindicated. That intention was to furnish a national currency for a government acting immediately upon the people, and for a people scattered over an immense territory, to whose commerce, therefore, a currency of uniform value was all-important. For this purpose the Constitution granted to Congress power to create money and regulate its value, and prohibit that power to the States. But when the Constitution was made, recent experience of the misfortunes caused by the abuse of paper money had inspired a universal dread of it. The Convention was influenced by this feeling. They could not foresee the commanding part paper money was destined to play in the business of the country, nor that a time would soon come when a "hard money" currency would be wholly impossible, whether for the people or the government. Therefore they attempted to fetter the future by confining the power of the government to the creation of metallic money.

The attempt failed, as all such attempts must, and the government did, in fact, as already stated, get indirectly the power denied to it by the letter of the Constitution. The history of this failure is instructive, and may be told in a few words.

Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, the wants of the country demanded a currency larger than the precious metals afforded, to supply the place of the bills of credit issued by the States under the Confederacy. Many new banks were chartered, and these, from various causes incident to a country where capital was scarce, resources ample, and the people active and eager, were so badly managed, that in four years they all suspended specie payments; so that a worthless currency, the very evil the Constitution intended to avert, was brought again upon the people. Some sort of money, both for them and for the government, became necessary, and this money, it was evident, could not be coin, but must be paper. To supply this want, the first Bank of the United States was chartered, in 1791. Its object was, as the fiscal agent of the government, to furnish a sound national currency. But the power of Congress to establish a bank for this purpose was doubted, and an elaborate argument by Mr. Hamilton was necessary to prove that this power was implied, because it was necessary to the exercise of all the chief powers, and the attainment of all the legitimate ends of government. The bank answered the purpose for which it was intended. It restored the currency to a healthy condition, and it supplied to the people and to the government a circulating medium composed of paper and coin, which was of equal value throughout the country. As the agent of the government, it performed its exchanges and other business, and furnished a place for the safe keeping of its treasures.

The charter of the bank expired in 1811. The jealousy of State rights, and dread of a money power under the control of the government, prevented its renewal. Immediately the number of State banks increased, and the currency was unduly enlarged. Then came the war of 1812, and in 1814 all the State banks suspended specie payments.

Again the natural laws of trade, as well as the natural laws of government, enforced obedience by the penalties inflicted for their violation. A national currency was imperiously demanded alike by the commerce of the country and by the government, and this want, it was obvious, could be supplied only by the government. Past experience, as well as the example of other nations, especially of England, indicated a national bank as the best instrument yet discovered by which this object could be accomplished. Accordingly, another Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816. Like the former, it was entirely successful. It restored the State banks to a healthy condition, and it furnished, in its own notes, both to the people and to the treasury, a currency of uniform value in every nook and corner of the country, more valuable than gold or silver, and always convertible into gold and silver, whilst, without expense to the government, it collected and distributed the revenue, and afforded a safe place of deposit for its treasure. The duty of government was thus adequately performed, and the general intention of the Constitution carried out. The government did, indeed, "coin money," and it also created and "regulated the value" of that sort of money, which, by reason of the increasing wealth and business of the country and the advance of civilization, had usurped, to a great extent, the place of the precious metals.

The charter of the bank expired in 1836. For twenty years it had perfectly fulfilled the purpose for which it was created. It had been managed with entire integrity, with eminent ability, and with signal success. It had gained the confidence of the commerce of the country, foreign and domestic, and of all those classes of the people who are conversant with the use of money, and to whose business good money is of paramount importance. But neither this confidence, nor enlightened opinion, nor the example of other nations, nor the experience of the past, nor the threatened calamities of the future, sufficed to save it. Like its predecessor, it fell a victim to partisan selfishness, popular ignorance, and democratic passion. Its charter was not renewed. Why, it is not pertinent to our topic to explain; neither would it be a pleasant task, for it would be to tell a story of astonishing folly and wickedness.

The bank was destroyed by the mob, represented and led by General Jackson, himself a concentrated mob. The government abdicated its authority over the currency, and refused to perform its duty to the people. Immediately the retributive action of violated natural law commenced. An overgrowth of State banks sprung up to fill the void created by the destruction of the national bank. These were managed with very various degrees of honesty and skill, and a formidable power, open to temptation and liable to most dangerous abuse, the very power the Constitution intended to prohibit to the States, was left without guidance or control to the impulses of its own reckless will. Hundreds of State banks, scattered throughout the country, with unlimited privilege to issue "bills of credit," and make them practically a legal tender in payment of debts, many of them created as instruments of fraud, managed often by cliques of speculators to serve their own purposes by creating fluctuations in price, habitually lending money to men without capital or credit, often themselves without capital,— this was the system which superseded the Bank of the United States. Paper money that could perform the functions of money was as impossible under such a system, as safe steamboats or railroads are impossible in the hands of ignorance or reckless cupidity. As steam-boilers on our Western waters from time to time exploded, destroying annually hundreds of lives, until Congress passed laws to regulate their construction, so, after the check of the National Bank was withdrawn, the State banks have continued periodically to explode, scattering about them wrecked fortunes and ruined hopes.

Since the fall of the Bank of the United States, the State banks have six times suspended specie payments in a period of twenty-eight years, viz.: —

From May 11, 1837, to August 2, 1838.
" Oct. 9, 1839, to Jan. 15, 1841.
" Feb. 6, 1841, to March 18, 1842.
" Sept. 26, 1857, to Feb. 3, 1858.
" Nov. 23, 1860, to March 9, 1861.
" Dec. 30, 1861, to the present day.

Each of these suspensions, except the last, caused by the war, was preceded by an inflated currency, by high prices, by overtrading, by riotous speculation, and by a commercial panic. Each was accompanied by disastrous losses to individuals. Notwithstanding the lesson afforded by each catastrophe, the same career of folly and extravagance was repeated.

More deplorable, however, than the loss of property and the unhappiness it produces, is the gambling spirit of speculation created and stimulated by the constant fluctuation in prices which is the necessary result of giving to hundreds of corporations unlimited and irresponsible power over the currency. They represent and share the passion for rapid gain which their operations encourage. They increase their profits by increasing their circulation. Every expansion, by raising prices, causes a demand for another. At length the day of reckoning comes. Alarm is excited. The banks, to avoid suspension, contract their loans and their issues. Money becomes scarce.

Merchants fail because they cannot get it. A universal panic ensues, the banks suspend, and the currency in the hands of the people varies in value according to the character of the several banks by which it is issued, and such credit as it has is local. It is, therefore, unfit as an instrument of exchange between distant parts of the country, and performs very imperfectly the functions of money in any.

The constant alternation of high prices and of low prices, caused by the expansion and contraction of the currency, whilst it enlarges the class of stock-speculators, affects the character of all business. It makes it dangerous. It invests it with the power of rapid gains, and attaches to it the risk of sudden and unforeseen loss. These are the characteristics of gambling, and it matters not whether the implements of the game be cards and dice, or lots and stocks, cotton and dry goods. The reckless and extravagant spirit of gambling influences to a great extent all the pursuits of our business, and if much of this has been the result of the vast undeveloped resources of the country, constantly tempting enterprise to bold adventure, more of it and the worst of it have been caused by the abuse of the terrible power of paper money.

This short history may serve to show how the government has performed its duty of furnishing a currency to the people. It has indeed "coined money" during the whole period of its existence, but from 1788, when its action began, to 1862, when the act creating the legal-tender notes was passed, only whilst a national bank was in operation, that is to say, only for forty years out of seventy-four, has it attempted to create and regulate that which was practically and really the money of commerce and of daily business. For thirty-four years, nearly one half of its constitutional life, the government has left the people to get along as best they could with the bills of credit which, under the name of bank-notes, were issued by authority of the States, with what results we have seen. The forty years of a national bank were years of a sound and uniform currency, proving that the difficulty lies, not in the subject itself or in want of power in the government, but in other causes that fetter its action.

But money is necessary, not to the people only, but to the government. To provide money for the people is a duty; to provide money for itself is indispensable to all its operations. Before the first national bank was established, in 1791, the government was obliged to employ State banks as its fiscal agents, and to pay and receive their notes. From 1811, when the charter of that bank expired, to 1816, when another national bank was established, the treasury was reduced to the same necessity; and during each period suffered such loss, risk, and inconvenience for want of money, notwithstanding the power of the government to "coin money," that it was forced to provide itself with a different sort of currency. When in 1833 the public deposits were removed from the last Bank of the United States, again the government resorted to the agency of State banks, and was obliged to use the money furnished by these, instead of the admirable currency which had been recklessly destroyed. Certain institutions were selected for the purpose, and the popular name they received, "pet banks," sufficiently indicates the motives which directed the choice and the purposes they were expected to serve, while the list above given of the suspensions of the State banks from 1837 to 1841 shows the sort of money furnished by them to the government.

The evil was intolerable. That panics and suspensions, a money market alternately "tight" and "easy," the crash of credit and the failure of merchants, periodically overspread the country with all the evils that the Constitution intended to avert when it forbade the States to emit bills of credit or make anything but gold and silver a legal tender, was not the point. Let the States and the people take care of themselves, was the cry, and let the government take care of itself. But how to do this was the question. State banks always had failed to serve the needs of the government, a United States bank had succeeded always. But against the latter the popular sentiment of the country was too strong and decided to be resisted. Neither party, however urgent the need, dared to propose another "representative of the moneyed aristocracy," another "monster of tyranny and corruption," another "political engine," another "gigantic monopoly," to make the "rich richer, and the poor poorer," to control the ballot-box and to subvert the liberties of the people. These were the party cries of the day, to whose ferocious discord the multitude had long been marshalled and marched to victory. They were in some degree justified by the conduct of the Bank in the later part of its career. It defended itself when unjustly attacked; it became the subject of a fierce party contest; passions were roused by the struggle, the temptation to abuse power was strong, opportunity incessant, the stake large, the triumph of victory would be sweet, the loss and mortification of defeat hard to bear. The Bank was attacked because it refused to become a partisan tool in the hands of the administration. Because of that attack it did become, almost necessarily indeed, the political engine of a party opposed to that administration. As the battle waxed in fury, it grew almost as reckless and unscrupulous as its adversary, and it did not fall with dignity. It lost all, honor included.

Thinking men may perhaps justly infer from such a history, that a national bank is impossible under our form of government. An attempt will surely be made by a party in power to convert it into an instrument for party purposes, and it will become such whether it yields to or resists the attempt; if it yields, the administration will use it; if it resists, it will be attacked, and then the opposition will use it. The Bank of England was founded in 1694. From that time to this it has grown in strength, in completeness of organization, in diversity of action, in credit and usefulness. During that long period of one hundred and seventy years, it has been the fiscal agent of the government, transacted all its business, and furnished both to it and to the people a sound and satisfactory currency in peace and war. Its notes have always been the money of the government and of the people; since 1834 they have been a legal tender in payment of debts, except those of the bank, and always at par with gold or above it, except during England's great war with France and Napoleon, when for twenty-five years it suspended specie payments. Whilst the war lasted, both the government and the people were amply supplied with money acceptable to both, viz. the notes of the bank, which varied in value from par to thirty per cent discount, which for a short time only fell so low as that, but were usually from fifteen to twenty per cent, and which rose to four per cent at the close of the war, when the bank resumed specie payments, having carried the finances of the nation and the business of the people through an unprecedented contest so successfully, that both had prospered during the war as they had never before prospered during peace. This wonderful institution has grown and flourished through foreign war and civil war and revolution, keeping pace with the growth of English commerce and power; during the whole of its history, it has been connected with the government, yet it has never become a party engine or participated in party strife; it has been managed with entire integrity and with consummate ability, and to-day its credit is as firm, its wealth greater, its usefulness more extensive than ever.

Immediately after the fall of the Bank of the United States, extravagant overtrading, stimulated by improvident issues of State bank paper, caused the disastrous panic, crash, and suspension of 1837. The "pet banks," which had received the deposits, encouraged by their possession to undue expansion, were unable to return them. Irredeemable bank-notes became again the "money" of the government. What was to be done? Better money, "hard money," if possible, government must have. A safe place for the deposits was equally necessary. How to get either was a difficult question. In this dilemma a special session of Congress was summoned in September, 1837, and Mr. Van Buren, the President, addressed to it a message, which, read by the light of subsequent experience, is very instructive. It was indeed surprising, as he said, that at a time of profound peace, and in the midst of unbounded prosperity, a government free from debt and with a surplus revenue should suddenly find itself without money, and a country teeming with the wealth of intelligent enterprise and successful industry should be covered with the wrecks of ruined fortunes. The cause of the disaster, he thought, was paper money, issued without restraint by banks, constantly tempted to over-issue by their own interest, and by the demands of rash speculation and the wild spirit of adventure natural to men trading on borrowed capital. The obvious remedy was hard money, a return to the currency which the Constitution intended to provide. A national bank had been tried twice. To try it again would be impossible, "because a majority of the people are irreconcilably opposed to that measure; they consider such a concentration of power dangerous to their liberties; and many of them regard it as a violation of the Constitution." The State banks had been tried three times, and had wholly and disastrously failed. The only thing, therefore, left for the government to do, was to collect the revenue in coin, to pay it out in coin, and to keep its treasures in its own vaults under the care of its own officers. In other words, to provide money for itself, and leave the State bank-notes, with all their risks and evils, for the people. These notes had become the currency of the people by their own choice.

> "At the time when the Constitution was framed," says Mr. Van Buren, "there were but three or four banks in the United States; and had the extension of the banking system, and the evils growing out of it, been foreseen, they would probably have been specially guarded against. The same policy which led to the prohibition of bills of credit by the States, would doubtless in that event have interdicted also their issue as currency in any other form. The Constitution, however, contains no such prohibition; and since the States have exercised for nearly half a century the power to regulate the business of banking, it is not to be expected that it will be abandoned."

Doubtless the framers of the Constitution would have prohibited bills of credit issued by the States in the shape of bank-notes, could they have foreseen the disastrous consequences of paper money poured forth without limit by hundreds of unguided, unrestrained, and irresponsible corporations, each acting for its own interest; and doubtless, too, they would have conferred on the central government power not to "coin" money merely, but to create for itself and for the people a paper currency also, and regulate the value thereof, could they have foreseen that paper was to become practically the circulating medium of commerce in its largest as well as its smallest exchanges, and therefore essential to both the government and people. Their object was to provide a sound, uniform, and exclusive *national currency*, which, as they were not gifted with prophetic power, they supposed might consist of gold and silver. They therefore gave to the general government authority to coin gold and silver, and denied this authority to the States, particularly prohibiting them from issuing any paper currency at all, or making anything but gold and silver a legal tender. And how was this wise plan defeated? By the narrow construction of the Constitution according to lawyer's logic, instead of statesman's logic. By the letter of the law, bank-notes are not bills of credit emitted by the States; by the letter of the law, Congress has power merely to "coin money," that is, to make metallic money only.

Mr. Van Buren's advice was followed, but not immediately. The Independent Treasury system was established in 1846. Meanwhile paper money had again exploded in February, 1841, the banks suspending specie payments till March, 1842. From 1846 to 1862, the government, divorced at length from banks, divorced from the business of the people too, collected its revenue in its own coin, kept it in its own vaults, and paid its creditors in coin, assisted to some extent by a paper money of its own, treasury-notes, and drafts, neither of which performed the part of a circulating medium for the country. It has been said by some that this accumulation and pouring forth of coin strengthened the paper currency in the hands of the people; and by others, that the keeping of a large mass of gold and silver unproductive was an unnecessary loss to commerce. Be that as it may, the benefit, if any, was incidental to the system, and not its object, which was to provide a currency for the government only, leaving the people to manage as best they could with the bills of credit emitted by the States. These were regarded as a constitutional currency, notwithstanding their prohibition by the Constitution, and there could be no doubt that the metallic money, coined, collected, safely kept and paid out by the government, was constitutional also. The scheme of the Constitution was thus, it seems, constitutionally defeated. A national currency, which the Constitution intended to secure, was denied to the nation, whilst a State paper currency, the very thing which the Constitution intended to prevent, was imposed upon the people. This was done by the narrow school of constitutional lawyers and the "hard money" school of politicians.

Instructed by disastrous experience, many of the States began in 1838 to try various plans to regulate the paper money issued by the banks, to prevent imprudent expansion, and to provide some security for their notes, even in case of suspension. The States thus attempted to do the duty left undone by the government. But all their efforts could not prevent the suspension of 1841, nor could these efforts and the influence of the Independent Treasury prevent the terrible crash of 1857, more calamitous and destructive than any that had preceded it, and which shattered in an instant the hopes and fortunes of thousands.

A wonderful thing indeed is this machine called paper money. Useful and dangerous as steam, or fire, or gunpowder, it must not be trifled with by careless or ignorant hands; but to those who know its laws and obey them, it is full of blessing.

The Independent Treasury existed from 1846 to 1862. It was well managed, and answered the purpose for which it was intended. It kept the deposits and transacted the business of the government as safely, though not so cheaply and conveniently, as the Bank of the United States had done. It supplied a perfectly sound currency for the use of the government; the Bank furnished one as good for the people also. Considering, however, that a national bank had become an impossibility, the Independent Treasury was successful. It did its appointed work, performing its functions with ease in a country alive with industry, teeming with riches, overspread and underlaid with boundless sources of wealth ever tempting to bold enterprise, — with a people so full of exuberant life and elastic power, that they made no more of bank explosions and money panics than a boy does of a tumble on the ice. It was successful during prosperity and peace. At length came war, — something very different from the explosion of banks and collapses in the money-market, — as different as an earthquake from an ordinary storm. Suddenly, in 1861, the flames of war burst forth in our hitherto tranquil and happy country, and it was soon apparent that they would spread far and burn long.

Money has been called the "sinews of war," which cannot be carried on without it. It was especially necessary to our government, for the leading Rebels, plotting and intending treason, had used the official authority with which they were intrusted before the veil was lifted to plunder the treasury and the arsenals. Large sums were needed at once, and the revenue of years, perhaps of many years, must be anticipated. The usual expedient in such cases is to borrow. But what could our government borrow? The country was full of capital which its owners were more than willing to lend. It was full of material wealth,—wool, iron, coal, leather, grain, cattle, horses, stores of all kinds,— which the people were eager to sell. It was full of mills, factories, and workshops, as well as of skilled workmen, who were ready to put forth their energies to meet the crisis. It was full of brave, patriotic men, burning to fight in defence of their outraged flag. The country had everything necessary for war in profusion, except one thing, without which all others are useless. It had no money. Neither the government nor the people had any money. There was, indeed, a certain amount of coin, and a large amount of bank-note currency. But the former was wholly insufficient in quantity, and speedily disappeared, as it always does in times of public danger and general alarm, whilst the latter was deficient in quality. It had failed too often in peace to be tried in the stress of a great war.* The banks suspended from November, 1860, to March, 1861. Actual hostilities began in April, 1861. The banks came forward to the aid of the government, lent it one hundred and fifty millions in specie, and immediately suspended, December 30, 1861. The suspension still continues.

The one hundred and fifty millions were soon spent, and were immediately withdrawn from the channels of circulation. Irredeemable bank-notes of various shades of local credit did not suit the government. It required a currency of uniform value in all parts of the country. Such a currency did not exist. How, then, could the government borrow? Obviously it must first create a currency, and then borrow it. It must create some sort of money which the people could receive in payment for their labor and the products of their industry, which they could pay as taxes, which could represent the capital they were willing to lend to the nation.

The government yielded to this necessity. It issued its own notes, four hundred millions of them, payable at no definite period, receivable for all loans made to the United States, and a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except interest on those loans and duties on imports. These provisions give an actual value to the notes superior to that of bank-notes, so that, being preferred by the people, they may take the place of the latter and thus become a national currency. They are rapidly becoming the national currency. They are like the notes of a suspended bank in one respect, — they are promises to pay coin when the promisor is able. In all other respects they differ from bank-notes. They are issued by a sovereign power, which receives them in payment for debts due to it, and obliges individuals to receive them in like manner. They are issued on the credit of the nation, not on that of a private corporation. A vast domain, the richest in the world, in *gold* and *silver*, in coal and iron, in cotton and tobacco, in wheat and corn, in stone and timber, in flocks and herds, is mortgaged to secure them. Thirty millions of people of the most industrious, energetic, and enterprising race on earth have indorsed them. If thus supported, they are the best currency that ever a nation had, — better than gold and silver, — such a currency as was never dreamed of in the philosophy of the framers of the Constitution.

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* See Treasury Report of 1862, p. 7, on the impossibility of resorting to the use of State bank notes.

Why, then, are they not at par with gold and silver? They are now* (May, 1864) much lower than the notes of the Bank of England were at any time during her war of twenty-five years with revolutionary France and with Napoleon. The reason is, that ours is not a foreign, but a civil war, waged against the very existence of the nation. Should the nation be destroyed, its promises to pay when it is able would become worthless, and so subtle, malignant, determined, and powerful are its enemies, North and South, and so numerous and difficult are the problems to be solved by the government, that no man can predict when and how the war will end. No one in England believed that a failure to crush the power of Napoleon would destroy the British empire, and overturn all order, law, and government. Every man in America knows that, unless the Rebels, South and North, open and covert, can be put down, this American empire of ours will certainly be divided, most probably shattered into fragments, and that, in the strife of sections and factions which such a catastrophe would cause, treasury-notes would become worthless, and a good deal else more valuable would become worthless too. On the other hand, it is becoming daily more apparent that the Northern people have power to conquer the South, that their intelligence is able to cope with the difficult questions of the future, and dispose of them, as they have disposed of those of the past,— that they have determined again to be a nation, and to have a country, and that with such leaders as Lincoln and Chase they are likely to execute their purpose.

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* One dollar in gold is worth $1.80 in paper.

These views of the future prevail according to the opinions and passions, the hopes and fears of parties and sections, and are influenced constantly by the vicissitudes of the contest. A Union victory on a battle-field or at the polls depresses the price of gold; a Rebel victory in the South or at a Northern election sends it up. Jefferson Davis, the Southern armies, Generals Longstreet and Lee, and the Northern Democrats, are the bulls of the gold market; Lincoln, Chase, Grant, Sherman, and Meade, our brave troops, and the loyal and patriotic men of the North, are the bears. Gold will fall as they rise in power, and the legal-tender notes, if skilfully managed by the treasury, as the great war draws to a successful close, will increase in value, and when it ends be at par everywhere, and, like the notes of the Bank of the United States, sometimes, and in some places, above par.

The government was thus forced, by inexorable necessity, to provide a currency for the people and for itself. Paper money proved too strong for the narrow school, too strong for the Constitution, if the doctrines of that school be correct. The fact was revealed, more clearly than ever, that paper money is really the money of the people, and must be the money of the government also. To deny to it, therefore, the power to create and regulate the value of a paper currency, was to deny all power over money; was to say that it should not furnish good money to the people when they most needed it, or for its own use, when good money was absolutely necessary for the defence of the nation.

A government thus weak where and when strength is essential, is no government at all. It lacks what every government must possess or perish,—sovereign power to attain its legitimate objects. These objects are, as the Constitution expresses it, "the common defence and general welfare." To secure these, men unite and form communities and nations, and invest governments, whatever may be their form, with the absolute despotic power which every people must of necessity possess over their own destiny. They do this because they cannot themselves originate and execute the measures required to accomplish these objects, and because less than sovereign power is not sufficient. The power of the people over these measures consists in their privilege of choosing the persons to whom their power is intrusted; and according to the number of the people who possess this privilege, and the number of those invested with power over whom they exercise it, are they more or less a free people. A government so restricted by its organic law, that it cannot do for its people things essential to their welfare, yet which they cannot do for themselves,—that cannot defend either itself, or the nation of which it is the trustee, from destruction,—is a contradiction, a falsehood; and when the hour of trial comes, it will do one of two things,—it will either vanish and give place to something that has life and reality, or it will take the necessary power and use it, leaving it to the people afterwards to say whether it has done well or ill.

Such a government was our old Confederacy. It professed to be a union, but was merely a league of States. It professed to form a nation, but had no national authority. The States had too much power, the federal government too little. It acted upon States, not upon individuals; by means of States, not by its own officers. It could not command; it could only request, and possessed no authority to coerce compliance. It was not really a government, for it could not govern; it was not a power, for the essential attribute of power is the ability to enforce obedience. It was a sham, an unnatural, unreal thing,—a machine that could not do its work; and it was thrown aside for one that could, as mail-coaches have been thrown aside for railway trains.

The new machine was our present Constitution. The Convention that made it, in order to create "a more perfect union," planned a national government for national purposes, acting directly on individuals and property by means of its own officers, and supreme within its sphere, leaving to the States State power for local purposes, exclusive and supreme also within its sphere. This is the theory which the Convention intended to carry out; and the Constitution is nothing more than the written plan of the machine called government, by which this theory was to be made effective in practice. A government must have power to attain its objects, just as a steam-engine must have power in order to work. Now power, whether of the people or of steam, has its own laws, which cannot be altered by any human contrivance, and those laws must be obeyed by those who use it, under penalty of failure, or worse than failure, for disobedience. The intention of the Convention was to create at once a nation and a confederacy,* and their model was the British empire, which is both a confederacy and a nation. They invested, therefore, a central or national government with the power of the people of the nation, for general or national purposes, and State governments of the people of each State, for local purposes, with a reservation to the people and to the States of all power not thus granted to the central government. Whether this reservation be possible, whether it does not violate the natural laws of power, is an important question not now to be discussed.

It is evident that the successful working of this machine must depend upon the proper distribution of power to its several parts. To maintain its nice balance and harmonious action, each part must move freely within its appropriate sphere. If the Convention made a mistake in giving too much central or too much local power, their plan will fail unless the defect can be remedied. It is obvious also, that, as this machine is to operate upon human interests which are always changing, by means of human agencies which are equally changeable, nothing short of supernatural wisdom could have enabled the Convention to invent a machine that would provide for the unknown exigencies of the future, or to foresee whether limitations imposed might not become absurd, or things by them regarded as local might not become national in their character, and thus be withdrawn from State power into the province of the national power, as has happened in the case of slavery. Regarded at first as local in its nature, it afterwards grew to be a gigantic interest and influence, affecting all other interests, claiming to rule the nation, and, failing in that, attempting to destroy it. Rightfully, therefore, does the central power consider slavery as now within its proper sphere, take possession of it, and govern it.

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* Federalist, No. 39.

The Constitution is not, nor can it be, more than a written plan or description of a government, intended to reduce to fact and practice the theory of national and federal, or, in other words, central and local power, which its makers desired to establish. It is an enumeration or list of the powers which each must have, to perform its part. If they have left any out of this list essential to the ends of government, or of that system which they sought to found, if they have so restricted necessary power as to render it inefficient, if they have not given, or have prohibited, to the States privileges essential to their functions, it is for us to correct their errors; for the Constitution belongs to us, the people of 1864, not to our ancestors of 1787, who are resting in their quiet graves. They were too wise to pretend to be infallible. They knew that mistakes there might be in the letter of their written plan, but that there could be none in the scope, spirit, and intention of that plan. Ample power they intended to grant to the general government for national objects, restricted power to the States for local objects. Let this be done, let this essential, primary, dominant law of the Constitution be obeyed, and it will stand through all the changes of the future. Therefore into their list of particulars, or "express powers," as the narrow school phrase it, they introduced general terms, by which the letter of the law may be rendered pliable to its spirit, as the exigency of changing circumstances or errors discovered by experience may require. The national government is "to provide for the *common* defence and *general* welfare of the *United States*." How? By exercising all the powers herein granted. But suppose some necessary powers or power which time shall disclose to be necessary, through inadvertence or error or ignorance, have not been granted, or have been unwisely restricted. Shall the letter of the law prevail against its spirit, shall it kill the life of the law and of the government created by the law, which life is its ability to attain its purposes? The Constitution answers these questions. "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and *all other powers* vested by this Constitution in the *government of the United States*, or in any department or officer thereof."

These words have received too narrow a construction, even from the liberal school. They have been interpreted to mean a grant of authority to use all means conducive to the execution of enumerated powers. But this reading gives no effect to the important words, "all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States." What are those *other* powers? Obviously, such as must of necessity belong to a government, but which are not, or may not be, expressly granted by this Constitution, though necessarily implied by it, and therefore vested in the government. No other construction will satisfy the words, for those immediately preceding them, "the foregoing powers," and those immediately following, "or in any department or officer thereof," include all the enumerated powers. These are distributed by the Constitution, severally to the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary; nowhere else are powers vested in the "government of the United States," as a whole, as a unit, mentioned. Is it not, therefore, a fair interpretation of these words to say, that, as they refer to powers existing, but not expressly granted, they refer to something real, to such powers as time may reveal to be necessary to maintain and perfect the plan or theory of government designed by the Constitution, and are therefore vested in the government by the Constitution, whether expressly mentioned or not?

One power which every government of a civilized people must possess is that of providing both for itself and for the people a circulating medium, for the simple reason that it is a matter of absolute necessity to both, which the government alone can supply. A circulating medium which the people do in fact use, which both they and the government, by reason of controlling natural causes, must use, is the currency to which the power and the duty of the government must apply. Whether it be made of paper, or leather, or iron, or gold and silver, or any other material, it is money if the people do and must use it as money; and the government must use it too, and create it and regulate its value, or be shorn of an essential prerogative and fail in the performance of an important duty. Had our Constitution omitted entirely a grant of power over money, the power must have been implied; for without it the government would have been unable to perform any of its functions. But the power was not withheld,—it was given, though in language which confines it to one sort of money only, coin,—whilst, in process of time, it has happened that paper money has become practically that which, far more largely than coin, both the people and the government must use.

The restriction implied in the language of the Constitution refers, not to the power, but to the mode in which it is to be exercised. Now, the power is the principal thing, the manner of using it subordinate;—the first is permanent, the second changeable; the first substance, the second attribute; the first essence, the second accident. Therefore, if one of the two must be sacrificed, the second must yield to the first; for without the first, the government is wholly impotent either for its own preservation or the well-being of the people. The truth of this reasoning will be more apparent if we suppose the intention of the Constitution, according to the doctrine of the narrow school, to prohibit the use of paper money altogether, to have been actually carried out,—that there were no bills of credit emitted either by the States or the general government, and no bank-notes. It might become physically impossible for the government to *coin* money. It is supposable that mines may yet be discovered in California or elsewhere so rich as to render gold and silver too plentiful and cheap to be used as money. Should they become as cheap as iron, they would be useless as instruments of exchange. Or they might become so scarce as to be valueless for currency, or they might disappear altogether, as they have done now. Should the government coin them, they would instantly vanish. They would fly, as they have flown, into brokers' chests, bank-vaults, behind the wainscots, under the hearths, into stockings and old coffee-pots of farm-houses. Should it become, or if it now be, *impossible* for the government to "coin money," whilst yet it is possible for it to create and regulate the value of money which the people do use and must use, is it not absurd to say, that such a physical impossibility destroys the power? that, because the power cannot be exercised in one specified way, it cannot be exercised at all, though another way, equally beneficial, be open? that we who now own the Constitution must relinquish the advantages of a necessary power, out of superstitious regard to a restriction which time has shown to be useless and unwise? Surely this reasoning would be unworthy even of a *pie poudre* court.

The Bank of the United States was established, not merely to perform the duties of a fiscal agent for the government, but to furnish a sound and uniform currency to the people. Such a currency, it was argued, was necessary to commerce, and the power to supply it was therefore incident to the power granted by the Constitution to regulate commerce. Thus the limiting effect of the letter of the law, "to *coin* money," was avoided. But this reasoning does injustice to the subject. Power over *money*, whatever its form, if it be really the money of the country, is one of the substantive powers of the government, essential to its action, and is not incidental to any other power, except in the sense that all the powers of government are mutually assisting and supporting and necessary to each other. The people must have a currency, but they cannot themselves make one and regulate its value; therefore the government must do it. Neither can they make and execute laws, lay and collect taxes, administer justice, hold intercourse with foreign nations, carry on war, &c., and therefore these are the functions of government. The power to create and control money is just as essential, and was therefore granted in the Constitution. Without it, most of the other powers would be useless, and its own special objects could not be attained. In truth, this division of powers is artificial. Government is a unit, is an individual, with a will, a conscience, thoughts, purposes, ends to attain, ability to act; and, as when a man thinks, desires, wills, plans, labors, eats, walks, runs, or fights, it is the vital force of the man acting in these different ways, not several distinct faculties of action; so when a government makes laws, imposes taxes, declares war, borrows money, coins money, &c., it is not separate powers to do these things, each moved by a jerk of its own string, that are acting, but the supreme power of the people intrusted to the government which thus exerts itself, in various directions and forms, as occasion requires. Unfettered action within its legitimate province — in other words, sovereign power for the accomplishment of its proper ends — must belong to every government, or it must fail, and failure by government to perform any of its functions means public disaster. The Constitution gave to ours the money power, and withheld it from the States, because it belonged legitimately to the former, and not to the latter. The narrow school of constructionists have reversed the plan of the Constitution. They have given the money power to the States, and denied it to the nation, with what results we have already described.

What, then, is the authority vested by the Constitution in the government? The answer is, All that is necessary to maintain the system the Constitution meant to establish; namely, a great republican empire, with a central power surrounded by local powers, each acting in its appropriate sphere. Whatever is consistent with this system is granted, whatever inconsistent withheld, whether expressly mentioned or not.

It is absurd to say that the Constitution intended to grant less power to the government than is necessary for its preservation and for the accomplishment of the objects for which it was created. Therefore, as Judge Hare has well expressed it, whilst Congress cannot pass laws for ends not permitted by the Constitution, the Constitution should be so read as not to prevent the failure of the end for which it was made.

It is assumed in the foregoing argument, that the language of the Constitution conferring on Congress power "to *coin* money and regulate the value thereof," confined the power to the creation of metallic money and was meant to prohibit paper money issued by the government; so that, as the States were forbidden to emit bills of credit, gold and silver coin was intended to constitute the only currency of the future nation. This strong inference is drawn less from the words of the law than from the discussions in the Convention about the law when it was made. These discussions have their value. They reveal the dominant opinions and sentiments which governed the Convention, and are a guide to enable us to discover the intention of the founders. They are entitled to respect; but they are not authority, nor were they deemed such by the Convention. The law itself is the result of the conflicting views, the careful deliberation, the ultimate convictions, after debate, of a majority of the members; and the law alone is the legitimate expression of those convictions, not the debates. Moreover, the law does not belong to those who made it, or to those who ratified it in 1787, but to us; and any fair interpretation of it that suits our needs is a legitimate interpretation, although it may differ from the opinions expressed in the debates.

Looking, then, only to the Constitution itself, what power over the currency does it confer on the general government?

Sovereign power over the money of a nation, as a general rule, belongs to all governments. It is fair to infer, therefore, that a departure from this universal rule, if intended, would have been expressly stated. But the restriction in question is not expressed, but implied from the language of the law. Congress shall have power to "coin money," that is, to stamp certain marks on pieces of metal, by which they become money. Undoubtedly that is the true meaning of the words, and such is the power granted, and it has been constantly and now is exercised by the government. But why may not the government also create and regulate the value of a paper currency? Paper and coin circulate together; why may not power over each exist and regulate both? Because it is not expressly granted, is the reply. But it is not inconsistent with that which is granted, nor is it prohibited,* and it is a power that belongs to every other government under the sun. Restrictions on power, which do distinguish our government, are all expressly mentioned in the Constitution: they are restrictions either on the general government, or on those of the States, or on both. Powers denied to both are such as were deemed inconsistent with republican liberty or a republican form of government; as to pass bills of attainder, *ex post facto* laws, or to grant titles of nobility. Those prohibited to the States only are such as would trench upon national interests, which are exclusively the province of the general government; as, to enter into any treaty of alliance or confederation, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to coin money, to emit bills of credit, to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, to engage in war, &c. These powers belong of necessity to every national government. They are therefore, in our system, denied to the State governments, because they are not national, but act only upon local interests. It would seem to follow, that for this very reason they belong to the general government, unless expressly prohibited. The States are forbidden to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Why? Because such laws would interfere with contracts made between citizens of different States. But Congress can pass such a law. Why? Because, among other reasons, the power is necessary to establish a bankrupt law, uniform in all the States. In like manner, the States are forbidden to emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a legal tender. Why? Because such powers are inconsistent with a uniform national currency, which it is the duty of the government to provide, which all other governments have authority to provide. There would be as many currencies as States, did the States possess these powers, and debts might be legally paid in the currency of one State, which would be worthless to creditors in another; and thus one benefit of the union, of nationality, — easy commercial intercourse, — would be injured or destroyed. But bills of credit issued by the general government would be the currency of the nation, and, if they were made a legal tender, would be such in all the States. Why, then, may not these powers be implied also because they are not prohibited, since they are in harmony with all other powers of the general government? Authority to coin money is indeed expressly given, because the precious metals are the ultimate basis of all money, and because to coin them is the usual and regular mode in which the power of government has always been and is generally exerted. To emit bills of credit, and to make them a legal tender, are exceptional acts, resorted to as an expedient to meet a temporary difficulty. They were forbidden to the States for reasons already given, but these reasons do not apply to the general government, and the inference is that the prohibition does not. Looking, therefore, to the language of the Constitution, and to the system it was intended to establish, the conclusion is obvious, that Congress has power to emit bills of credit, and to make paper money a legal tender, because that power is prohibited to the States, and not to Congress.

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* The Convention refused to *prohibit* the power. See opinion of Judge Davies, in Opinions of the New York Court of Appeals, referred to above, p. 25.

This argument places the power to create a national bank, or a system of national banks, such as Mr. Chase has established, and an exclusive national currency, such as he proposes to create, or to issue legal-tender notes, on higher ground than to regard it as incidental to the war power, or to the power to regulate commerce or to collect taxes. The power to make and regulate a national currency must belong to the nation, or there can be no national currency. It is expressly granted as to metallic money, and that is the basis of all money. The precious metals support a paper currency, and they alone can give it value. Can government have power over the support, and not over the thing supported,—over a cause, and not over its effects? Congress can coin money. When it does so, immediately follows a train of consequences in the shape of paper money, so vast in their influence that they affect the well-being of every individual in the nation. But with these results of its own action, we are told, Congress has no concern, and cannot control them, however disastrous they may be, although the States may control them, each in its own way, and by action, without concert or system, convert into an instrument of evil what, properly managed, would be the source of universal benefit. Every argument which proves that Congress must have power to coin money, proves also that it must have power over paper money; for the one is the offspring of the other, and they are inseparable companions. The reasoning which proves that power to coin money or emit bills of credit should be denied to the States, proves also that power to do both should belong to the general government. The two powers cannot coexist in the Federal and State governments without destructive confusion, but they may coexist in the national government, and the result of their harmonious action will be financial security and order. Our experience with a national bank shows this, as does also the history of the Bank of England.

The government can in no way so entirely control the paper currency, which is the inseparable consequence of its action in coining money, as by issuing its own notes. For the security of such notes, and their convertibility into coin, the faith of the government and the whole of its resources would be pledged, and they would necessarily be received in payment for taxes and all debts due to the government. Higher security than this no paper money can have, provided always that the government be solvent, and its authority established. They would, therefore, command universal credit, and be of uniform value throughout the nation; and these are the essential attributes of a national currency. They would displace the notes of State banks, and prevent the evils which, as we have already stated, State banks have caused. The government notes might, without injustice or inconvenience, be made a legal tender, should temporary necessity require such a measure, because their value would be the same in all the States.

The power to issue such notes is not inconsistent with the power to coin money. Both may be, and have been, exercised by our government at the same time. Neither is the power to make such notes, as well as gold and silver, a legal tender, inconsistent with the power to coin money, or forbidden in the Constitution. The States, not the general government, are prohibited from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender. No express power is granted to the government to make any sort of money a legal tender, yet it is a power which government must and does possess. It possesses the power, therefore, without limitation. It may exercise it with regard to its own notes, yet gold and silver may still remain a legal tender, as they now are. The two kinds of currency may advantageously circulate together, as coin and bank-notes have done heretofore. Government notes, in the normal condition of the country, would be at par with gold and silver, and far more convenient for the purposes of business. They would, therefore, practically be made a legal tender by the custom of business, as bank-notes were before the war. They would also become so during war, if there were no bank-notes, for there would be no gold and silver, and money of some sort the people must have. Government, therefore, by exercising its power, would be giving legal sanction to what custom proves to be necessary, would prevent unfair advantages by either debtors or creditors, and, whilst it maintained its own credit, would enhance the value of the currency in the hands of the people.

A word more as to the presumed intention of the founders to make gold and silver the only currency of the nation. Notwithstanding the evidence of the debates, and granting to it all the force claimed, it is unjust to impute to our fathers any such design. Why did they refuse to invest Congress with power to create a paper currency? Was it not because, from recent experience, they thought a paper currency dangerous, whilst they knew that a metallic currency was safe? What they really intended, therefore, was to provide against a dangerous paper currency, not against a safe one. The country was suffering from the losses caused by the unredeemed Continental money, and from the irredeemable bills of credit issued by the States. It was exhausted by a long war, its great resources were undeveloped and unknown, the vast regions of fertility since added to its domain a *terra incognita*, capital was scarce, and commerce in its infancy. The nation as it now stands, even without the rebellious States, — its intelligent and energetic millions, its great cities, its gigantic agriculture, its foreign and domestic trade, its steamers and railroads and telegraphs, — is a result which the sober judgment of 1787 could not have predicted, nor could the most creative imagination have painted such a vision of power and grandeur. Could the founders have foreseen it, — could they have foreseen, also, that commercial credit and its offspring, paper currency, were the chief instruments that caused this wonderful outgrowth of prosperity; that this currency was to become something very different from Continental money; that it was a machine whose powers were to them unknown, but which was destined to work miracles in every branch of industry; that it would become almost the only money used, and indispensable to all business; that its nature was to be dangerous in ignorant hands, but safe as beneficent when skilfully managed; — could all this have been revealed to the framers, is it conceivable that they would have done what Judge Sharswood says they meant to do, — "exclude forever, in any possible case, the possibility of paper money"? No, it is not conceivable, even though they said so themselves; and unless they said so expressly in the Constitution, their opinions, founded in necessary human ignorance of the future, do not bind us. Mere justice to their memory should induce us to disregard intentions or opinions which we know would not have been theirs, could they have seen with our eyes or beheld the light which now shines with midday clearness, but which, when they worked anxiously for us, was below the horizon. It dishonors their illustrious names to impute to them folly or absurdity, and surely no folly or absurdity can be greater than the attempt to limit the business of this country to the use of a metallic currency, or to declare that what is necessarily the money of the people must not be regulated by the government of the people. Doubtless, when the framers declared that Congress should have power to "provide and maintain a navy," and to "establish post-roads," they "intended" that the navy should consist of wooden sailing vessels, and that the post-roads should be turnpike-roads. These were the only sort of ships and the only sort of roads that they knew anything about. Let us suppose that in 1787 the power of steam as a mechanical force had been first discovered; that rude experiments had been made to apply this novel force to propel boats on water and cars on land, which had been unsuccessful, causing disastrous explosions and loss of life. Steam would, no doubt, have inspired universal dread; and we can imagine that, under its influence, the Convention might have inserted in the Constitution, that ships of war should forever be moved by sails and the mails carried on turnpike-roads in four-horse coaches. Would such a declaration bind us? Had it been made, would it have prevented iron-clad steamers for our navy, and railways for our post-roads? Such are the arguments of the narrow school. They reason clearly enough from their petty premises and within their little sphere, but the conclusions they reach are absurd. One is tempted to ask them, in the language of a Spartan chief, "Why do you speak so much to the purpose of that which is nothing to the purpose?"

If the foregoing reasoning be correct, it proves that our Federal government, like every other government, must have, and by the Constitution has, power to create for its own use and that of the people an exclusive national currency, and that this power was granted by its founders when they gave it authority to "coin money," and denied to the States either the privilege to do that or to emit bills of credit. We have endeavored to show also, that, because of a false and narrow interpretation of the Constitution, the design of its makers has been defeated, and power over the money of the nation has been practically given to the States, and denied to the general government. As a consequence, the money forced upon the government and upon the people has been the paper currency of numerous banks, of every variety of management and responsibility, causing from the beginning infinite mischief to business by periodical suspensions, and frequent embarrassment and loss to the treasury. A remedy for these evils was twice sought and found in a national bank, established notwithstanding the violent opposition of the narrow school, and finally destroyed by that school. At length has come a great civil war, testing, by its stern necessities, the value of our political system and the force and character of our people.

Difficult emergencies reveal truth, and this war is teaching us many valuable lessons. Among them is the principle that a national currency is essential to the people, and that it can be created and maintained only by the supreme power of the nation. This truth is in the Constitution, but it has not been recognized either by our law or our practice. Neither Bank of the United States was founded on this truth, but, as already stated, the right to charter it was claimed, not as the exercise of the inherent, essential, and constitutional power of government over currency, but of a power subordinate and incidental to the authority to regulate commerce, it being a means "necessary and proper" for that purpose. The legitimate power of the government was therefore timidly and partially exerted, when it successively established those banks. It did not venture to control the currency directly, or to give it, by its own action, security and uniformity. The government did not attempt to make an *exclusive* national currency. State rights and the narrow school would have bristled in angry resistance to such a scheme. The national bank issued its own notes, on its own security, and the government had no power either to prevent an excessive issue or to provide for their redemption in coin. The State banks continued as before to issue their notes, and the control so beneficially exercised over these by the national bank was not official authority, but the result of its large capital, of its skilful management, and of its commanding position as the fiscal agent of the government.

These influences, however, did in fact restrain the local banks, whilst they gave to the notes of the national bank a credit so high, that they were everywhere and always at par with gold and silver, and often above par. Such were the effects of even a partial execution of the plan of the Constitution. This slight infusion of national power sufficed to create a good currency. The design of the Constitution was, to render the money created by the government exclusively the money of the nation, by prohibiting State money altogether. This the Bank of the United States could not do, but what it did to some extent carried out that design. The credit it derived from the government made its notes a uniform currency for the nation, and enabled it so to control the State banks that their notes became also safe and sound, though this result was not immediately obtained, nor without much difficulty.

Had a national bank, ably and honestly managed, been in existence when the present war broke out, the government would have had no difficulty for want of a currency. It would not have been obliged first to create money and then to borrow it, as Mr. Chase has done with such distinguished success; but it would have been obliged to exercise a more direct control over the bank than, according to the narrow school, the Constitution permits. The government would have done, no doubt, what the English government did in its long war with France and Napoleon. It would have deposited its own bonds or notes with the bank as security for any currency required, authorized the bank to suspend specie payments, and made its notes a legal tender for debts, public and private. But we had no national bank, and therefore the government was forced to issue its own notes.

This article has so far exceeded all reasonable limits, that we have no space left to do anything like justice to the system of a national currency planned by Mr. Chase and sanctioned by Congress. We believe it to be founded on true principles, both of finance and constitutional law, — principles whose commanding nature this war has made manifest. The demand for such a system became imperative under the stress of inexorable necessity, and fortunate indeed has it been for the country that the right man appeared at the right time and in the right place to meet that demand. At length, for the first time in its history, the national government has exerted the power and performed the duty confided to it by the Constitution. It has provided for the people and for itself a national currency. The system is intended to be permanent. The currency is meant to be exclusive of all other paper money, to be of uniform appearance and uniform value throughout the country. It is stamped with the impress of the government, attesting its national character, as coins are. It is issued by the government, not directly to the people, but to voluntary banking associations for circulation among the people. Its convertibility into coin, in the normal condition of the country, or into lawful money when there is no coin, is secured by a deposit of government stocks of sufficient value with the Treasury, and by being made redeemable by the Treasury. The faith of the nation is pledged to the holders of the notes.

Their uniform value being thus provided for, the next object was to render them, together with coin, issued also by the government, the exclusive currency of the nation. State banks are too firmly rooted in the habits and too strongly supported by the sentiments of the people to be abolished by a mere act of authority. Sudden change would be injurious to the business of the country and to the interests immediately connected with these banks. Mr. Chase therefore proposes the gradual substitution of the national institutions for the State banks, to be accomplished by a moderate tax on their circulation, by offering them inducements to become themselves receivers and distributers of the national currency, and by imparting to that currency a value so superior that it will be universally preferred, and take the place of all other.

Such a currency, if the scheme be successfully carried out, will be national, because it will be exclusive and controlled by the national authority; it will be safe and of uniform value everywhere, because supported by the wealth, the faith, and the power of the nation. It will therefore have every attribute of good money, which the Constitution intended to provide, and be free from all the evils of State paper money, which the Constitution intended to prevent.

We discuss now merely the principles on which this national system is founded. Its success in practice will depend on the wisdom of its details and on the ability with which it is managed. A great point was gained, and the truth of the Constitution vindicated, when Congress asserted its power over the currency by establishing this system and by issuing the legal-tender notes. Both have been gladly accepted by the people. So far, they have perfectly accomplished their purpose. They have poured into the treasury ample means to prosecute a gigantic war, and covered the country with the prosperity of peace in the midst of war. In connection with Mr. Chase's admirable plan of borrowing money directly from the people, and from all classes of the people, they have strengthened the ties which bind the people to the government. Volunteer soldiers fill our armies, volunteer loans fill our treasury. The government receives taxes with one hand and pays them as interest to tax-payers with the other. The people as owners of the debt created by the war, and as holders of the notes secured by that debt, have a double motive for supporting the government, by which alone it can be paid. In every sense, the war is made by the people and for the people, and the ability of Mr. Chase has so contrived it that the very evils of the war — debt and taxation — have multiplied the motives for carrying it on to a successful issue, by adding to the interests staked upon success. Let the Union be restored, and both the debt and currency will be safe. Things more valuable also will be saved, and such a future of prosperity and power be opened to the country, that erelong the great war will be remembered only for the blessings it has brought, the wisdom it has taught, and the glorious memories it has bequeathed.

ART. VIII.—1. *The American Conflict: a History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America,* 1860-64: *its Causes, Incidents, and Results; intended to Exhibit especially its Moral and Political Phases, with the Drift and Progress of American Opinion respecting Human Slavery from* 1776 *to the Close of the War for the Union.* By HORACE GREELEY. Illustrated, &c., &c. Vol. I. Hartford: O. D. Case & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. 648.

2. *The Southern History of the War. The First Year of the War.* By EDWARD A. POLLARD, Author of "Black Diamonds," &c. Corrected and Improved Edition. Richmond: West and Johnston. 1862. Reprinted by C. B. Richardson, New York. 1864. pp. 389.

IN spite of the popular theory, that nothing is so fallacious as circumstantial evidence, there is no man of observation who would not deem it more trustworthy than any human testimony, however honest, which was made up from personal recollection. The actors in great affairs are seldom to be depended on as witnesses either to the order of events or their bearing upon results; for even where selfish interest is not to be taken into account, the mythic instinct erelong begins to shape things as they ought to have been, rather than as they were. This is true even of subjects in which we have no personal interest, and not only do no two men describe the same street-scene in the same way, but the same man, unless prosaic to a degree below the freezing-point of Tupper, will never do it twice in the same way. Few men, looking into their old diaries, but are astonished at the contrast, sometimes even the absolute unlikeness, between the matters of fact recorded there and their own recollection of them. Shortly after the battle of Lexington it was the interest of the Colonies to make the British troops not only wanton, but unresisted aggressors; and if primitive Christians could be manufactured by affidavit, so large a body of them ready to turn the other cheek also was never gathered as in the minute-men before the meeting-house on the 19th of April, 1775. The Anglo-Saxon could not fight comfortably without the law on his side. But later, when the battle became a matter of local pride, the muskets that had been fired at the Redcoats under Pitcairn almost rivalled in number the pieces of furniture that came over in the Mayflower. Indeed, whoever has talked much with Revolutionary pensioners knows that those honored veterans were no less remarkable for imagination than for patriotism. It should seem that there is, perhaps, nothing on which so little reliance is to be placed as facts, especially when related by one who saw them. It is no slight help to our charity to recollect that, in disputable matters, every man sees according to his prejudices, and is stone-blind to whatever he did not expect or did not mean to see. Even where no personal bias can be suspected, contemporary and popular evidence is to be taken with great caution, so exceedingly careless are men as to exact truth, and such poor observers, for the most part, of what goes on under their eyes. The ballad which was hawked about the streets at the execution of Captain Kidd, and which was still to be bought at street-stalls within a few years, affirms three times in a single stanza that the pirate's name was Robert. Yet he was commissioned, indicted, convicted, and hanged as William Kidd. The marvels of Spiritualism are supernatural to the average observer, who is willing to pay for that dulness from another world which he might have for nothing in this, while they seem mere legerdemain, and not of the highest quality, to the trained organs of scientific men.

History, we are told, is philosophy teaching by example. But how if the example does not apply? Le Verrier discovers Neptune when, according to his own calculations, the planet should not have been in the place where his telescope found it. Does the example redound to the credit of luck or of mathematics? The historian may give a thoroughly false view of an event by simply assuming that *after* means *in consequence of*, or even by the felicitous turn of a sentence. Style will find readers and shape convictions, while mere truth only gathers dust on the shelf. The memory first, and by degrees the judgment, is enslaved by the epigrams of Tacitus or Michelet. Our conception of scenes and men is outlined and colored for us by the pictorial imagination of Carlyle. Indeed, after reading history, one can only turn round, with Mont and say, *What know I?* There was a time when the reputation of Judas might have been thought past mending, but a German has whitewashed him as thoroughly as Malone did Shakespeare's bust, and an English poet made him the hero of a tragedy, as the one among the disciples who believed too much. Call no one happy till he is dead? Rather call no one safe, whether in good repute or evil, after he has been dead long enough to have his effigy done in historical wax-work. Only get the real clothes, that is, only be careful to envelope him in a sufficiently probable dressing of facts, and the public will be entirely satisfied. What's Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba? Or is Thackeray's way any nearer the truth, who strips Louis the Great of all his stage-properties, and shows him to us the miserable forked radish of decrepitude?

There are many ways of writing what is called history. The earliest and simplest was to record in the form of annals, without investigating, whatever the writer could lay hold of, the only thread of connection being the order of time, so that events have no more relation to each other than so many beads on a string. Higher than this, because more picturesque, and because living men take the place of mere names, are the better class of chronicles, like Froissart's, in which the scenes sometimes have the minute vividness of illumination, and the page seems to take life and motion as we read. The annalist still survives, a kind of literary dodo, in the "standard" historian, respectable, immitigable, — with his philosophy of history, and his stereotyped phrase, his one Amurath succeeding another, so very dead, so unlike anything but historical characters, that we can scarce believe they ever lived, — and only differing from his ancient congener of the monastery by his skill in making ten words do the duty of one. His are the fatal books without which no gentleman's library can be complete, his the storied pages which ingenuous youth is invited to turn, and is apt to turn four or five together. With him something is still always sure to transpire in the course of these negotiations, still the traditional door is opened to the inroad of democratic innovation, still it is impossible to interpret the motives which inspired the conduct of so-and-so in this particular emergency. So little does he himself conceive of any possible past or future life in his characters, that he periphrases death into a disappearance from the page of history, as if they were bodiless and soulless creatures of pen and ink, mere names, not things. Picturesqueness he sternly avoids as the Delilah of the philosophic mind, liveliness as a snare of the careless investigator, and so, stopping both ears, he slips safely by those Sirens, keeping safe that sobriety of style which his fellow-men call by another name. Unhappy books, which we know by heart *before* we read them, and which a mysterious superstition yet compels many unoffending persons to read! What has not the benevolent reader had to suffer at the hands of the so-called impartial historian, who, wholly disinterested and disinteresting, writes with as mechanic an industry, and as little emotion, as he would have brought to the weaving of calico or the digging of potatoes, under other circumstances! Far truer at least to nature and to some conceivable theory of an immortal soul in man, is the method of the poet, who makes his personages luminous from within by an instinctive sympathy with human motives of action, and a conception of the essential unity of character through every change of fate.

Of late years men have begun to question the prescriptive right of this "great gyant Asdryasdust, who has choked many men," to choke them also because he had worked his wicked will on their fathers. It occurred to an inquiring mind here and there, that, if the representation of men's action and passion on the theatre could be made interesting, there was no good reason why the great drama of history should be dull as a miracle-play. Need philosophy teaching by example be so tiresome that the pupils would rather burst in ignorance than go within ear-shot of the pedagogue? Hence the historical romance, sometimes honestly called so, and limited by custom in number of volumes, sometimes not called so, and without any such limitation. This latter variety admits several styles of treatment. Sometimes a special epoch is chosen, where one heroic figure may serve as a centre round which events and subordinate characters group themselves, with no more sacrifice of truth than is absolutely demanded by artistic keeping. This may be called the epic style, of which Carlyle is the acknowledged master. Sometimes a period is selected, where the facts, by coloring and arrangement, may be made to support the views of a party, and history becomes a political pamphlet indefinitely prolonged. Here point is the one thing needful,— to be attained at all hazards, whether by the turn of a sentence or the twisting of a motive. Macaulay is pre-eminent in this kind, and woe to the party or the man that comes between him and his epigrammatic necessity! Again, there is the new light, or perhaps, more properly, the forlorn-hope method, where the author accepts a brief against the *advocatus diaboli*, and strives to win a reverse of judgment, as Mr. Froude has done in the case of Henry VIII. The latest fashion of all is the *a priori*, in which a certain dominant principle is taken for granted, and everything is deduced from x, instead of serving to prove what x may really be. The weakness of this heroic treatment, it seems to us, is in allowing too little to human nature as an element in the problem. This would be a fine world, if facts would only be as subservient to theory in real life as in the author's inkstand. Mr. Buckle stands at the head of this school, and has just found a worthy disciple in M. Taine, who, in his *Histoire de la Littérature Anglaise*, having first assumed certain ethnological postulates, seems rather to shape the character of the literature to the race, than to illustrate that of the race by the literature.

In short, whether we consider the incompetence of men in general as observers, their carelessness about things at the moment indifferent, but which may become of consequence hereafter, (as, for example, in the dating of letters,) their want of impartiality, both in seeing and stating occurrences, and in tracing or attributing motives, it is plain that history is not to be depended on in any absolute sense. That smooth and indifferent quality of mind, without a flaw of prejudice or a blur of theory, which can reflect passing events as they truly are, is as rare, if not so precious, as that artistic sense which can hold the mirror up to nature. The fact that there is so little historical or political prescience, that no man of experience ventures to prophesy, is enough to prove, either that it is impossible to know all the terms of our problem, or that history does not repeat itself with anything like the exactness of coincidence which is so pleasing to the imagination. Six months *after* the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, Mr. Savage Landor, who knew him well, said to us that Louis Napoleon had ten times the political sagacity of his uncle; but who foresaw or foretold an Augustus in the dull-eyed frequenter of Lady Blessington's, the melodramatic hero of Strasburg and Bologne, with his cocked hat and eagle from Astley's? What insurance company would have taken the risk of his hare-brained adventure? Coleridge used to take credit to himself for certain lucky vaticinations, but his memory was always inexact, his confounding of what he did and what he thought he meant to do always to be suspected, and his prophecies, when examined, are hardly more precise than an ancient oracle or a couplet of Nostradamus. The almanac-makers took the wisest course, stretching through a whole month their "about this time expect a change of weather."

That history repeats itself has become a kind of truism, but of as little practical value in helping us to form our opinions as other similar labor-saving expedients to escape thought. Sceptical minds see in human affairs a regular oscillation; hopeful ones, a continual progress, and both can support their creeds with abundance of pertinent example. Both seem to admit a law of recurrence, but the former make it act in a circle, the latter in a spiral. There is, no doubt, one constant element in the reckoning, namely, human nature, and perhaps another in human nature itself, — the tendency to reaction from all extremes; but the way in which these shall operate, and the force they shall exert, are dependent on a multitude of new and impredicable circumstances. Coincidences there certainly are, but our records are hardly yet long enough to furnish the basis for secure induction. Such parallelisms are merely curious, and entertain the fancy rather than supply precedent for the judgment. When Tacitus tells us that gladiators have not so much stomach for fighting as soldiers, we remember our own roughs and shoulder-hitters at the beginning of the war, and are inclined to think that Macer and Billy Wilson illustrated a general truth. But, unfortunately, Octavius found prize-fighters of another metal, not to speak of Spartacus. Perhaps the objections to our making use of colored soldiers (*hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto*) will seem as absurd one of these days as the outcry that Cæsar was degrading the service by enlisting Gauls; but we will not hazard a prophecy. In the alarm of the Pannonian revolt, his nephew recruited the army of Italy by a conscription of slaves, who thereby became free, and this measure seems to have been acquiesced in by the unwarlike citizens, who preferred that the experiment of death should be made *in corpore vili* rather than in their own persons.

If the analogies between past and present were as precise as they are sometimes represented to be, if Time really dotes and repeats his old stories, then ought students of history to be the best statesmen. Yet, with Guizot for an adviser, Louis Philippe, himself the eyewitness of two revolutions, became the easy victim of a third. Reasoning from what has been to what will be is apt to be paralogistic at the best. Much influence must still be left to chance, much accounted for by what pagans called Fate, and we Providence. We can only say, *Victrix causa diis placuit*, and Cato must make the best of it. What is called poetical justice, that is, an exact subservience of human fortunes to moral laws, so that the actual becomes the liege vassal of the ideal, is so seldom seen in the events of real life, that even the gentile world felt the need of a future state of rewards and punishments to make the scale of Divine justice even, and satisfy the cravings of the soul. Our sense of right, or of what we believe to be right, is so pleased with an example of retribution, that a single instance is allowed to outweigh the many in which wrong escapes unwhipped. It was remarked that sudden death overtook the purchasers of certain property bequeathed for pious uses in England, and sequestered at the Reformation. Fuller tells of a Sir Miles Pateridge, who threw dice with the king for Jesus' bells, and how "the ropes after catched about his neck," he being hanged in the reign of Edward VI. But at least a fifth of the land in England was held by suppressed monasteries, and the metal for the victorious cannon of revolutionary France once called to the service of the Prince of Peace from consecrated spires. We err in looking for a visible and material penalty, as if God imposed a fine of mishap for the breach of his statutes. Seldom, says Horace, has penalty lost the scent of crime, yet, on second thought, he makes the sleuth-hound lame. Slow seems the sword of Divine justice, adds Dante, to him who longs to see it smite. The cry of all generations has been, "How long, O Lord?" Where crime has its root in weakness of character, that same weakness is likely to play the avenger; but where it springs from that indifference as to means and that contempt of consequences which are likely to be felt by a strong nature, intent upon its end, it would be hardy to reckon on the same dramatic result. And if we find this difficulty in the cases of individual men, it is even more rash to personify nations, and deal out to them our little vials of Divine retribution as if we were the general dispensaries of doom. Shall we lay to a nation the sins of a line of despots whom it cannot shake off? If we accept too blindly the theory of national responsibility, we ought, by parity of reason, to admit success as a valid proof of right. The moralists of fifty years ago, who saw the democratic orgies of France punished with Napoleon, whose own crimes brought him in turn to the rock of Prometheus, how would they explain the phenomenon of Napoleon III.? The readiness to trace a too close and consequent relation between public delinquencies and temporal judgments seems to us a superstition holding over from the time when each race, each family even, had its private and tutelary divinity, — a mere refinement of fetichism. The world has too often seen "captive good attending captain ill" to believe in a providence that sets man-traps and spring-guns for the trespassers on its domain, and Christianity, perhaps, elevated man in no way so much as in making every one personally, not gregariously, answerable for his doings or not-doings, and thus inventing conscience, as we understand its meaning. But just in proportion as the private citizen is enlightened, does he become capable of an influence on that manifold result of thought, sentiment, reason, impulse, magnanimity, and meanness, which, as Public Opinion, has now so great a share in shaping the destiny of nations. And in this sense does he become responsible, and out of the aggregate of such individual responsibilities we can assume a common complicity in the guilt of common wrong-doing.

But surely the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth; and though we do not believe in his so immediate interference in events as would satisfy our impatience of injustice, yet he achieves his ends and brings about his compensations by having made Good infinitely and eternally lovely to the soul of man, while the beauty of Evil is but a brief cheat, which their own lusts put upon the senses of her victims. And it is surely fixed as the foundations of the earth, that faithfulness to right and duty, self-sacrifice, loyalty to that service whose visible reward is often but suffering and baffled hope, draw strength and succor from exhaustless springs far up in those delectable mountains of trial, which the All-knowing has set between us and the achievement of every noble purpose. History teaches, at least, that wrong can reckon on no alliance with the diviner part of man, while every high example of virtue, though it led to the stake or the scaffold, becomes a part of the reserved force of humanity, and from generation to generation summons kindred natures to the standard of righteousness as with the sound of a trumpet. There is no such reinforcement as faith in God, and that faith is impossible till we have squared our policy and conduct with our highest instincts. In the loom of time, though the woof be divinely foreordained, yet man supplies the weft, and the figures of the endless web are shaped and colored by our own wisdom or folly. Let no nation think themselves safe in being merely right, unless their captains are inspired and sustained by a sense of it.

We do not believe that history supplies any trustworthy data for casting the horoscope of our war. America is something without precedent. Moreover, such changes have been going on in the social and moral condition of nations, as to make the lessons of even comparatively recent times of little import in forming conclusions on contemporary affairs. Formerly a fact not yet forgetful of its etymology was a thing done, a deed, and in a certain sense implied, truly enough, the predominance of individual actors and prevailing characters. But powerful personalities are becoming of less and less account, when facility of communication has given both force and the means of exerting it to the sentiment of civilized mankind, and when commerce has made the banker's strong-box a true temple of Janus, the shutting or opening of which means peace or war. Battles are decisive now not so much by the destruction of armies as by the defeat of public spirit, and a something that has actually happened may be a less important fact, either in conjecturing probabilities or determining policy, than the indefinable progress of change, not marked on any dial, but instinctively divined, that is taking place in the general thought.

The history of no civil war can be written without bias, scarcely without passionate prejudice. It is always hard for men to conceive the honesty or intelligence of those who hold other opinions, or indeed to allow them the *right* to think for themselves; but in troubled times the blood mounts to the head, and colors the judgment, giving to suspicions and fancies the force of realities, and intensifying personal predilections, till they seem the pith and substance of national duties. Even where the office of historian is assumed in the fairest temper, it is impossible that the narrative of events whose bearing is so momentous should not insensibly take somewhat the form of an argument, — that the political sympathies of the author should not affect his judgment of men and measures. And in such conflicts, far more than in ordinary times, as the stake at issue is more absorbing and appeals more directly to every private interest and patriotic sentiment, so men, as they become prominent, and more or less identified with this or that policy, at last take the place of principles with the majority of minds. To agree with us is to be a great commander, a prudent administrator, a politician without private ends.

The contrast between the works of Mr. Pollard and Mr. Greeley is very striking. Though coincident in design, they are the antipodes of each other in treatment. Mr. Greeley, finding a country beyond measure prosperous suddenly assailed by rebellion, is naturally led to seek an adequate cause for so abnormal an effect. Mr. Pollard, formerly an office-holder under the United States, and now the editor of a Richmond newspaper, is struck by the same reflection, and, unwilling to state the true cause, or unable to find a plausible reason, is driven to hunt up an excuse for what strikes ordinary people as one of the greatest crimes in history. The difference is instructive.

Mr. Pollard's book, however, is well worth reading by those who wish to learn something of the motives which originally led the Southern States into rebellion, and still actuate them in their obstinate resistance. To any one familiar with the history of the last thirty years, it would almost seem that Mr. Pollard's object had been to expose the futility of the pretences set up by the originators of Secession, so utterly does he fail in showing any adequate grounds for that desperate measure. As a history, the book is of little value, except as giving us here and there a hint by which we can guess something of the state of mind prevailing at the South. In point of style it is a curious jumble of American sense and Southern *highfaluting*. One might fancy it written by a schoolmaster, whose boys had got hold of the manuscript, and inserted here and there passages taken at random from the Gems of Irish Oratory. Mr. Pollard's notions of the "Yankees," and the condition of things among them, would be creditable to a Chinaman from pretty well up in the back-country. No society could hold together for a moment in the condition of moral decay which he attributes to the Northern States. Before writing his next volume he should read Charles Lamb's advice "to those who have the framing of advertisements for the apprehension of offenders." We must do him the justice to say, however, that he writes no nonsense about difference of races, and that, of all "Yankees," he most thoroughly despises the Northern snob who professes a sympathy for "Southern institutions" because he believes that a slaveholder is a better man than himself.

In narrating the causes which brought about the present state of things, Mr. Pollard arranges matters to suit his own convenience, constantly reversing the relations of cause and effect, and forgetting that the order of events is of every importance in estimating their moral bearing. The only theoretic reason he gives for Secession is the desire to escape from the tyranny of a "numerical majority." Yet it was by precisely such a majority, and that attained by force or fraud, that the seceding States were taken out of the Union. We entirely agree with Mr. Pollard, that a show of hands is no test of truth; but he seems to forget that, except under a despotism, a numerical majority of some sort or other is sure to govern. No man capable of thought, as Mr. Pollard certainly is, would admit that a majority was any more likely to be right under a system of limited than under one of universal suffrage, always provided the said majority did not express his own opinions. The majority always govern in the long run, because it comes gradually round to the side of what is just and for the common interest, and the only dangerous majority is that of a mob unchecked by the delay for reflection which all constitutional government interposes. The constitutions of most of the Slave States, so far as white men are concerned, are of the most intensely democratic type. Would Mr. Pollard consolidate them all under one strong government, or does he believe that to be good for a single state which is bad for many united? It is curious to see, in his own intense antipathy to a slaveholding aristocracy, how purely American he is in spite of his theories; and, bitterly hostile as he is to the Davis administration, he may chance on the reflection that a majority is pretty much the same thing in one parallel of latitude as another. Of one thing he may be assured,—that we of the North do not understand by republic a government of the better and more intelligent class by the worse and more ignorant, and accordingly are doing our best by education to abolish the distinction between the two.

The fact that no adequate reasons for Secession have ever been brought forward, either by the Seceding States at the time, or by their apologists since, can only be explained on the theory that nothing more than a *coup d'état* was intended, which should put the South in possession of the government. Owing to the wretched policy (if supineness deserve the name) largely prevalent in the North, of sending to the lower house of Congress the men who needed rather than those who ought to go there,—men without the responsibility or the independence which only established reputation, social position, long converse with great questions, or native strength of character can give,—and to the habit of looking on a seat in the national legislature more as a reward for partisan activity than as imposing a service of the highest nature, so that representatives were changed as often as there were new political debts to pay or cliques to be conciliated,—owing to these things, the South maintained an easy superiority at Washington, and learned to measure the Free States by men who represented their weakest, and sometimes their least honorable characteristics. We doubt if the Slave States have sent many men to the Capitol who could be bought, while it is notorious that from the north of Mason and Dixon's line many an M. C. has cleared, like a ship, for Washington and a market. Southern politicians judge the North by men without courage and without principle, who would consent to any measure if it could be becomingly draped in generalities, or if they could evade the pillory of the yeas and nays. The increasing drain of forensic ability toward the large cities, with the mistaken theory that residence in the district was a necessary qualification in candidates, tended still more to bring down the average of Northern representation. The "claims" of a section of the State, or even part of a district, have been allowed to have weight, as if square miles or acres were to be weighed against capacity and experience. We attached too little importance to the social prestige which the South acquired and maintained at the seat of government, forgetting the necessary influence it would exert upon the independence of many of our own members. These in turn brought home the new impressions they had acquired, till the fallacy gradually became conviction of a general superiority in the South, though it had only so much truth in it as this, that the people of that section sent their men of character and position to Washington, and kept them there till every year of experience added an efficiency which more than made up for their numerical inferiority. Meanwhile, our thinking men allowed, whether from timidity or contempt, certain demagogic fallacies to become axioms by dint of repetition, chief among which was the notion that a man was a better representative of the democratic principle who had contrived to push himself forward to popularity by whatever means, and who represented the average instead of the highest culture of the community, thus establishing an aristocracy of mediocrity, nay, even of vulgarity, in some less intelligent constituencies. The one great strength of democracy is, that it opens all the highways of power and station to the better man, that it gives every man the chance of rising to his natural level, and its great weakness is in its tendency to urge this principle to a vicious excess, by pushing men forward into positions for which they are unfit, not so much because they deserve to rise, or because they have risen by great qualities, as because they began low. Our quadriennial change of offices, which turns public service into a matter of bargain and sale instead of the reward of merit and capacity, which sends men to Congress to represent private interests in the sharing of plunder, without regard to any claims of statesmanship or questions of national policy, as if the ship of state were periodically captured by privateers, has hastened our downward progress in the evil way. By making the administration prominent at the cost of the government, and by its constant lesson of scramble and vicissitude, almost obliterating the idea of orderly permanence, it has tended in no small measure to make disruption possible, for Mr. Lincoln's election threw the weight of every office-holder in the South into the scale of Secession. The war, however, has proved that the core of Democracy was sound, that the people, if they had been neglectful of their duties, or had misapprehended them, had not become corrupt.

Mr. Greeley's volume is a valuable contribution to our political history. Though for many years well known as an ardent politician, and associated by popular prejudice with that class of untried social theories which are known by the name of *isms*, his tone is singularly calm and dispassionate. Disfigured here and there by a vulgarism which adds nothing to its point, while it detracts from its purity, his style is clear, straightforward, and masculine, — a good business style, at once bare of ornament and undiluted with eloquence. Mr Greeley's intimate knowledge of our politics and instinctive sympathy with the far-reaching scope of our institutions (for, as Béranger said of himself, he is *tout peuple*) admirably fitted him for his task. He is clear, concise, and accurate, honestly striving after the truth, while his judicious Preface shows that he appreciates fully the difficulties that beset whoever seeks to find it. If none of his readers will be surprised to find his work that of an able man, there are many who would not expect it to be, as it is, that of a fair-minded one. He writes without passion, making due allowance for human nature in the South as well as the North, and does not waste his strength, as is the manner of fanatics, in fighting imaginary giants while a real enemy is in the field. Tracing Secession to its twin sources in Slavery and the doctrine of State Rights, and amply sustaining his statements of fact by citations from contemporary documents and speeches, he has made the plainest, and for that very reason, we think, the strongest argument that has been put forth on the national side of the question at issue in our civil war. Above all, he is ready to allow those virtues in the character of the Southern people whose existence alone makes reunion desirable or possible. We should not forget that the Negro is at least *no more* our brother than they, for if he have fallen among thieves who have robbed him of his manhood, they have been equally enslaved by prejudice, ignorance, and social inferiority.

It is not a little singular that, while slavery has been for nearly eighty years the one root of bitterness in our politics, the general knowledge of its history should be so superficial. Abolitionism has been so persistently represented as the disturbing element which threatened the permanence of our Union, that mere repetition has at last become conviction with that large class of minds with which a conclusion is valuable exactly in proportion as it saves mental labor. Mr. Greeley's chronological narrative is an excellent corrective of this delusion, and his tough little facts, driven firmly home, will serve to spike this parrot battery, and render it harmless for the future. A consecutive statement of such of the events in our history as bear directly on the question of Slavery, separated from all secondary circumstances, shows two things clearly; — first, that the doctrine that there was any national obligation to consider slaves as merely property, or to hold our tongues about slavery, is of comparatively recent origin; and, second, that there was a pretty uniform ebb of antislavery sentiment for nearly sixty years after the adoption of the Constitution, the young flood beginning to set strongly in again after the full meaning of the annexation of Texas began to be understood at the North, but not fairly filling up again even its own deserted channels till the Southern party succeeded in cutting the embankment of the Missouri Compromise. Then at last it became evident that the real danger to be guarded against was the abolition of Freedom, and the reaction was as violent as it was sudden.

In the early days of the Republic slavery was admitted to be a social and moral evil, only to be justified by necessity; and we think it more than doubtful if South Carolina and Georgia could have procured an extension of the slave-trade, had there not been a general persuasion that the whole system could not long maintain itself against the growth of intelligence and humanity. As early as 1786 a resident of South Carolina wrote: "In countries where slavery is encouraged, the ideas of the people are of a peculiar cast; the soul becomes dark and narrow, and assumes a tone of savage brutality. . . . . . The most elevated and liberal Carolinians abhor slavery; they will not debase themselves by attempting to vindicate it." In 1789 William Pinckney said, in the Maryland Assembly: "Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice, no master in the State has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single hour." And he went on to speak of slavery in a way which, fifty years later, would have earned him a coat of tar and fathers, if not a halter, in any of the Slave States, and in some of the Free. In 1787 Delaware passed an act forbidding the importation of "negro or mulatto slaves into the State for sale or otherwise"; and three years later her courts declared a slave, hired in Maryland and brought over the border, free under this statute. In 1790 there were Abolition societies in Maryland and Virginia. In 1787 the Synod of the Presbyterian Church, (since called the General Assembly,) in their pastoral letter, "strongly recommended the abolition of slavery, with the instruction of the negroes in literature and religion." We cite these instances to show that the sacredness of slavery from discussion was a discovery of much later date. So also was the theory of its Divine origin, — a theological slough in which, we are sorry to say, Northern men have shown themselves readiest to bemire themselves. It was when slave labor and slave breeding began to bring large and rapid profits, by the extension of cotton-culture consequent on the invention of Whitney's gin, and the purchase of Louisiana, that slavery was found to be identical with religion, and, like Duty, a "daughter of the voice of God." Till it became rich, it had been content with claiming the municipal law for its parent, but now it was easy to find heralds who could blazon for it a nobler pedigree. Men who looked upon dancing as sinful could see the very beauty of holiness in a system like this! It is consoling to think that, even in England, it is little more than a century since the Divine right of kings ceased to be defended in the same way, by making the narrative portions of Scripture doctrinal. Such strange things have been found in the Bible, that we are not without hope of the discovery of Christianity there one of these days.

The influence of the Southern States in the national politics was due mainly to the fact of their having a single interest on which they were all united, and, though fond of contrasting their more chivalric character with the commercial spirit of the North, it will be found that profit has been the motive to all the encroachments of Slavery. These encroachments first assumed the offensive with the annexation of Texas. In the admission of Missouri, though the Free States might justly claim a right to fix the political destiny of half the territory, bought with the common money of the nation, and though events have since proved that the compromise of 1820 was a fatal mistake, yet, as slavery was already established there, the South might, with some show of reason, claim to be on the defensive. In one sense, it is true, every enlargement of the boundaries of slavery has been an aggression. For it cannot with any fairness be assumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to foreordain a perpetual balance of power between the Free and the Slave States. If they had, it is morally certain that they would not so have arranged the basis of representation as to secure to the South an unfair preponderance, to be increased with every addition of territory. It is much more probable that they expected the Southern States to fall more and more into a minority of population and wealth, and were willing to strengthen this minority by yielding it somewhat more than its just share of power in Congress. Indeed, it was mainly on the ground of the undue advantage which the South would gain, politically, that the admission of Missouri was distasteful to the North.

It was not till after the Southern politicians had firmly established their system of governing the country by an alliance with the Democratic party of the Free States, on the basis of a division of offices, that they dreamed of making their "institution" the chief concern of the nation. As we follow Mr. Greeley's narrative, we see them first pleading for the existence of slavery, then for its equality, and at last claiming for it an absolute dominion. Such had been the result of uniform concession on the part of the North for the sake of Union, such the decline of public spirit, that, within sixty years of the time when slaveholders like George Mason of Virginia could denounce slavery for its inconsistency with the principles on which our Revolution had triumphed, the leaders of a party at the North claiming a kind of patent in the rights of man as an expedient for catching votes were decrying the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence as visionary and impracticable. Was it the Slave or the Free States that had just cause to be alarmed for their peculiar institutions? And, meanwhile, it had been discovered that slavery was conservative! It would protect a country in which almost every voter was a landholder from any sudden frenzy of agrarianism! In the South it certainly conserved a privileged class, and prevented a general debauch of education; but in the North it preserved nothing but political corruption, subserviency, cant, and all those baser qualities which unenviably distinguish man from the brutes.

The nation had paid ten millions for Texas, an extension of the area of freedom, as it was shamelessly called, which was to raise the value of slaves in Virginia, according to Mr. Upshur, and did raise it, fifty per cent. It was next proposed to purchase Cuba for one hundred millions, or to take it by force if Spain refused to sell. And all this for fear of abolition. This was paying rather dearly for our conservative element, it should seem, especially when it stood in need of such continual and costly conservation. But it continued to be plain to a majority of voters, that democratic institutions absolutely demanded a safeguard against democracy, and that the only insurance was something that must be itself constantly insured at more and more ruinous rates. It continued to be plain also that slavery was purely a matter of local concern, though it could help itself to the national money, force the nation into an unjust war, and stain its reputation in Europe with the buccaneering principles proclaimed in the Ostend Manifesto. All these were plainly the results of the ever-increasing and unprovoked aggressions of Northern fanaticism. To be the victims of such injustice seemed not unpleasing to the South. Let us sum up the items of their little bill against us. They demanded Missouri, — we yielded; they could not get along without Texas, — we *re*-annexed it; they must have a more stringent fugitive-slave law, — we gulped it; they must no longer be insulted with the Missouri Compromise, — we repealed it. Thus far the North had surely been faithful to the terms of the bond. We had paid our pound of flesh whenever it was asked for, and with fewer wry faces, inasmuch as Brother Ham underwent the incision. Not at all. We had only surrendered the principles of the Revolution; we must give up the theory also, if we would be loyal to the Constitution.

We entirely agree with Mr. Greeley, that the quibble which would make the Constitution an antislavery document because the word *slave* is not mentioned in it, cannot stand a moment if we consider the speeches made in Convention, or the ideas by which the action of its members was guided. But the question of slavery in the Territories stands on wholly different ground. We know what the opinions of the men were who drafted the Constitution, by their own procedure in passing the Ordinance of 1787. That the North should yield *all* claim to the common lands was certainly a new interpretation of constitutional law. And yet this was practically insisted on by the South, and its denial was the more immediate occasion of rupture between the two sections. But, in our opinion, the real cause which brought the question to the decision of war was the habit of concession on the part of the North, and the inability of its representatives to say *No*, when policy as well as conscience made it imperative. Without that confidence in Northern pusillanimity into which the South had been educated by their long experience of this weakness, whatever might have been the secret wish of the leading plotters, they would never have dared to rush their fellow-citizens into a position where further compromise became impossible.

Inextricably confused with the question of Slavery, and essential to an understanding of the motives and character of the

Southern people as distinguished from their politicians, is the doctrine of State Rights. On this topic also Mr. Greeley furnishes all the data requisite to a full understanding of the matter. The dispute resolves itself substantially into this: whether the adoption of the Constitution established a union or a confederacy, a government or a league, a nation or a committee. This also is a question which can only be determined by a knowledge of what the Convention of 1787 intended and accomplished, and the States severally acceded to, — it being of course understood that no State had a right, or at the time pretended any right, to accept the Constitution with mental reservations. On this subject we have ample and unimpeachable testimony in the discussions which led to the calling of the Convention and the debates which followed in the different conventions of the States called together to decide whether the new frame of government should be accepted or rejected. The conviction that it was absolutely necessary to remodel the Articles of Confederation was wrought wholly by an experience of the inadequacy of the existing plan (under which a single State could oppose its *veto* to a law of Congress), from the looseness of its cohesion and its want of power to compel obedience. The principle of coercive authority, which was represented as so oppressively unconstitutional by the friends of Secession in the North as well as the South four years ago, was precisely that which, as its absence had brought the old plan to a dead-lock, was deemed essential to the new. The formal proposal for a convention, originated by Hamilton, was seconded by one State after another. Here is a sample of Virginian public sentiment at that time, from the "instructions to their representatives," by several constituencies: "Government without coercion is a proposition at once so absurd and self-contradictory, that the idea creates a confusion of the understanding; it is form without substance, at best a body without a soul." Oliver Ellsworth, advocating the adoption of the Constitution in the Convention of Connecticut, says: "A more energetic system is necessary. The present is merely advisory. It has no coercive power. Without this, government is ineffectual, or rather is no government at all." Earlier than this Madison had claimed "an implied right of coercion" even for the Confederate Congress, and Jefferson had gone so far as to say that they possessed it "by the law of nature." The leading objections to the new Constitution were such as to show the general belief that the State sovereignties were to be absorbed into the general government in all matters of national concern. But the unhappy ingenuity of Mr. Jefferson afterwards constructed that theory of strict construction which would enable any State to profit by the powers of the Constitution, so long as it was for her interest or convenience, and then, by pleading its want of powers, to resolve the helpless organization once more into the incoherence of confederacy. By this dexterous legerdemain, the Union became a string of juggler's rings, which seems a chain while it pleases the operator, but which, by bringing the strain on the weak point contrived for the purpose, is made to fall easily asunder and become separate rings again. An adroit use of this theory enabled the South to gain one advantage after another by threatening disunion, and led naturally, on the first effective show of resistance, to secession. But in order that the threat might serve its purpose without the costly necessity of putting it in execution, the doctrine of State rights was carefully inculcated at the South by the same political party which made belief in the value of the Union a fanaticism at the North. On one side of Mason and Dixon's line it was lawful, and even praiseworthy, to steal the horse; on the other, it was a hanging matter to look over the fence.

But in seeking for the cause of the rebellion, with any fairness toward the Southern people, and any wish to understand their motives and character, it would be unwise to leave out of view the fact that they have been carefully educated in the faith that secession is not only their right, but the only safeguard of their freedom. While it is perfectly true that the great struggle now going on is intrinsically between right and privilege, between law and license, and while on the part of its leaders the Southern revolt was a conspiracy against popular government, and an attempt to make a great Republic into a mere convenient drudge for Slavery, yet we should despair of our kind did we believe that the rank and file of the Confederate armies were consciously spending so much courage and endurance in behalf of barbarism. It is more consoling, as it is nearer the truth, to think that they are fighting for what they have been taught to believe their rights, and their inheritance as a free people. The high qualities they have undoubtedly shown in the course of the war, their tenacity, patience, and discipline, show that, under better influences, they may become worthy to take their part in advancing the true destinies of America.

It is yet too early to speculate with much confidence on the remote consequences of the war. One of its more immediate results has already been to disabuse the Southern mind of some of its most fatal misconceptions as to Northern character. They thought us a trading people, incapable of lofty sentiment, ready to sacrifice everything for commercial advantage,—a heterogeneous rabble, fit only to be ruled by a superior race. They are not likely to make that mistake again, and must have learned by this time that the best blood is that which has in it most of the iron of purpose and constancy. War, the sternest and dearest of teachers, has already made us a soberer and older people on both sides. It has brought questions of government and policy home to us as never before, and has made us feel that citizenship is a duty to whose level we must rise, and not a privilege to which we are born. The great principles of humanity and politics, which had faded into the distance of abstraction and history, have been for four years the theme of earnest thought and discussion at every fireside and wherever two men met together. They have again become living and operative in the heart and mind of the nation. What was before a mighty population, is grown a great country united in one hope, inspired by one thought, and welded into one power. But have not the same influences produced the same result at the South, and created there also a nation hopelessly alien and hostile? To a certain extent this is true, but not in the unlimited way in which it is stated by enemies in England, or politicians at home, who would gladly put the people out of heart, because they themselves are out of office. With the destruction of slavery, the one object of the war will have been lost by the Rebels, and its one great advantage gained by the government. Slavery is by no means dead as yet, whether socially in its relation of man to man, or morally in its hold on public opinion and its strength as a political superstition. But there is no party at the North, considerable in numbers or influence, which could come into power on the platform of making peace with the Rebels on their own terms. No party can get possession of the government which is not in sympathy with the temper of the people, and the people, forced into war against their will by the unprovoked attack of proslavery bigotry, are resolved on pushing it to its legitimate conclusion. War means now, consciously with many, unconsciously with most, but inevitably, abolition. Nothing can save slavery but peace. Let its doom be once accomplished, or its reconstruction (for reconstruction means nothing more) clearly seen to be an impossibility, and the bond between the men at the South who were willing to destroy the Union, and those at the North who only wish to save it, for the sake of slavery, will be broken. The ambitious in both sections will prefer their chances as members of a mighty empire to what would always be secondary places in two rival and hostile nations, powerless to command respect abroad or secure prosperity at home. The masses of the Southern people will not feel too keenly the loss of a kind of property in which they had no share, while it made them underlings, nor will they find it hard to reconcile themselves with a government from which they had no real cause of estrangement. If the war be waged manfully, as becomes a thoughtful people, without insult or childish triumph in success, if we meet opinion with wiser opinion, waste no time in badgering prejudice till it become hostility, and attack slavery as a crime against the nation, and not as individual sin, it will end, we believe, in making us the most powerful and prosperous community the world ever saw. Our example and our ideas will react more powerfully than ever on the Old World, and the consequence of a rebellion, aimed at the natural equality of all men, will be to hasten incalculably the progress of equalization over the whole earth. Above all, Freedom will become the one absorbing interest of the whole people, making us a nation alive from sea to sea with the consciousness of a great purpose and a noble destiny, and uniting us as slavery has hitherto combined and made powerful the most hateful aristocracy known to man.

ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*Notices of the Press.—The Life and Times of John Huss; or the Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century.* By the Rev. E. H. GILLETT. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 16mo. pp. 8.

SHALLOW and ignorant critics have abounded wherever there has been a book-market.

> "If Mævius scribble in Apollo's spite,
> There are who judge still worse than he can write."

But never has there been such a swarm of bad critics as now infest the literary domain of America. Their numbers are a result of the literary fertility of the country, and of the vast extent of its intellectual semi-cultivation. The annoyance they occasion is in proportion to their number, while the injury they inflict is greater than their feeble natural powers would seem capable of effecting.

Every editor of a newspaper or other periodical either assumes to be a critic by virtue of his position, or keeps one as an attendant on whom the mantle of editorial infallibility descends in ample folds. With readiness proportioned to his ignorance, he is quick to pronounce judgment on the merits of every work that comes under his view. Nothing lies beyond his grasp, or daunts his confidence.

The evil springing from the customary method of book-noticing is in truth a serious one. There is scarcely a journal in America which maintains a correct critical standard, or to which an intelligent man can turn with any assurance of finding in its reviews of new publications either honesty or intelligence of judgment. The fault lies partly with the public, partly with the writers of notices, partly with the publishers. The larger part of our reading public, consisting of persons of imperfect education, of much general and inaccurate information, inappreciative of the value of careful criticism, does not seek or demand it. The critics generally share in the common want of thorough cultivation, and are fully aware that criticism of a high order is not expected of them, and that their errors will be undiscovered, or disregarded. They are for the most part poorly paid, and must write hastily and without due preparation by special study. The publishers, being advertisers whose good-will is to be conciliated, too often make their favor dependent on the skill with which their publications are puffed. Hence the common criticism of new books is characterized by indiscriminate eulogy. The most worthless productions are praised; just severity of judgment is almost unknown. Nor is this the worst. A practice has lately been adopted by certain publishers by which a fraud upon the public is attempted, and the character of criticism still further degraded. With the copies of books sent to newspapers or other periodicals is sent also a printed slip, containing a laudatory notice of the work, prepared exclusively for the purpose of forestalling an independent judgment, and of substituting for it an opinion calculated to secure the publisher's profit. This elaborate application of the art of puffing is disgraceful alike to its authors and to such editors as make use of the copy thus supplied to them. And that the number of these is large is obvious from the fact that one of these publishers' puffs may often be found reproduced, with very slight alterations in its form, in many journals, under the guise of an original criticism. Thus the public is misled not only as to the merits of a book, but as to the real opinion of those who profess to pass judgment upon them.

Thus the true function of criticism is degraded, and its power lost. Criticism is one of the noblest portions of the art of literature. Its end is to form and maintain a correct taste, and its methods demand long and careful preparation. The ideal literary critic is one who unites to natural justness of mind quickness of perception, delicacy of feeling, and insight of imagination. His love of truth is not simply an intellectual quality, but has its foundation in moral integrity. His powers have been trained by study of the best products of literature in ancient and modern times; and his opinions, carefully formed, will be held with equal modesty and confidence. His training will have rendered him not only sympathetic with the manifestation of original genius, and genial in its appreciation of all real merit, but also severe in his condemnation of pretension and inaccuracy, of false reasoning, of corrupting thought. Holding a just, and therefore a high, notion of his office as a public instructor, he will qualify himself for special work by faithful study, and make himself able to instruct the learned no less than the ignorant. He will be as conscientious in the bestowal of praise as of blame, and his criticism will have the authority of fairness, frankness, and honesty. Such is the ideal critic. That there is need of critics who shall approach this ideal will not be questioned. M. Vapereau, in the volume for 1864 of his excellent *Année Littéraire*, in speaking of M. Boissonade, a distinguished and admirable critic of the time of the first Napoleon, says, and his words apply with as much force to American as to French criticism: "With such a judge, how far are we from the different sorts of criticism in vogue to-day! Now we have a trenchant and cavalier criticism which imposes its decrees, which insolently develops its improvised opinions upon the subject or the title of a book, in place of reporting the opinions of the author who is to be judged. . . . . Too often the account given of a book is only an act of complaisance, or the satisfaction of an animosity, and truth and justice have little place in the midst of the clouds of incense, or in the pin-pricks or the strokes of the dagger. Boissonade has fixed principles, but he makes no display of them, and they are perceived only in the firmness of his judgment. . . . He has no violent severities, no soft complaisances. He knows how to strike hard without ceasing to strike fair; to praise happily without flattery. In fact, when one sees him employ in the service of criticism this uprightness of character and justness of mind, this taste united with knowledge, this authority without pedantry, this simple and true elegance without labored refinement, this conscience without heaviness, one regrets that these judicial qualities were not exercised upon greater subjects, in a more living and freer literature; but they are therefore not the less estimable, and the man who possessed them not the less worthy of sympathy."

The fault most prevalent in American literature is inaccuracy. It shows itself under various forms, — in looseness of thought, in carelessness of statement, in extravagance of rhetoric, in exaggeration of phrase, and in the display of half-assimilated learning. And in these particulars the common American critic is the worst of sinners.

The prevalence of this fault is not a matter of merely literary concern; it is not of interest alone to men of learning and letters that those who thus dishonor a noble profession should be discredited and brought to shame. It is a matter affecting the national character, and the correction of the fault is a patriotic duty. Inaccuracy in literature is a moral offence. It is one of the most insidious forms of untruthfulness. It makes the progress of truth, and consequently of all that depends on her advance, hard and slow. Many of the worst doctrines inculcated in the name of Christianity are supported by means of inaccurate, that is to say false, literary statement, or argument. Many a dangerous fallacy in politics depends for its existence on the reiteration of inaccurate assertions. Many a scientific error rests on the repetition of inaccurate observations. Half the lifetime of a sincere student is occupied in the search for truth hidden under the rubbish of immemorial lies. The historical investigator is constantly perplexed, delayed, and humiliated by the contradictory inaccuracies of what are called authorities.

And it is this evil which our critics, with their snap judgments and their ignorant pretensions, aggravate and extend. The lover of literature, the lover of his country, who understands that the success of democratic institutions depends on the intellectual and moral training of the people, and that this training is greatly influenced by the character of the books afforded them, must feel that a state of things in which the office of criticism is so degraded, and in which the few competent critics seem often to have no sense of the responsibility under which they labor, is one which it behooves him to correct by every means within his power. There was never such motive for good and honest work in every field of learning and literature as is supplied by the conditions of this country. Genius is not indeed to be had to order, but the demand for sound, faithful, thorough work may be answered.

We have been led into these reflections by the little pamphlet of which the title stands at the head of this notice. It is a specimen of publishers' advertisements of a special book, made up of the favorable notices of the press. In this case it happens that the book thus advertised is one upon which we have already pronounced judgment. Our readers may remember a notice of Mr. Gillett's Life of Huss in our number for January, 1864, in which we showed that the author's preparation was inadequate, and his learning insufficient, for the proper accomplishment of the task he had undertaken; that the book was defaced by mistakes and inaccuracies of statement, and that the style in which it was written was often inelegant and incorrect. We now propose to give Mr. Gillett and his publishers the benefit to be gained by the setting forth of the opinions of other reviewers, contrary, not to our opinion, but to the evidence on which we based our judgment of the work.

Had Mr. Gillett announced his book as a compilation at second hand from authorities easily accessible to the student, it might have passed as a well-meaning, but somewhat clumsy work, with many faults of execution, but on the whole a useful contribution to popular information. But when he announces it as an original elucidation of an important period of modern history, the result of "rare opportunities of access to the necessary documents," and at the same time shows his ignorance of the German language, while professing his acquaintance with it, by stating that Schmidt's "History of *the Dutch*" (*Geschichte der Deutschen*) has been of material aid to him, we are bound to expose such pretensions, and are enabled to appreciate the meaning of his claim to "rare opportunities of access to the necessary documents," seeing that many of these documents exist only in the German tongue.

The publishers begin their advertisement with the bold statement that "this important and valuable, as well as attractive work, ... has been received with almost unexampled favor by the press." And they support this assertion with commendatory extracts from eighteen notices from newspapers, and eleven from reviews. It would be surprising indeed if newspaper critics generally had sufficient knowledge to give any value to their judgments on the merits of a work such as this.

And it would not be worth while to attend to what they might say concerning it, were it not obvious that their opinions carry weight with some readers, or at least are supposed to carry weight, since otherwise it would hardly be for the interest of the publishers to reprint them. It seems certain then that their criticisms, however incompetent they may be, do harm.

The New York Examiner says: "The work of Mr. Gillett reminds us of the best historical writings of our times," — a vague phrase, indeed, but intended to convey the impression that the book has qualities similar to those of the works of Macaulay or Hallam, of Prescott or Bancroft. The Christian Intelligencer specifies so far as to say: "His description of Bohemia, prior to the advent of Huss, is a masterpiece, and reminds one of the very highest efforts of Bancroft in descriptive composition." In support of this statement we will quote a single sentence from the passage referred to, which will serve to show what appreciation the reviewer has of Bancroft's "highest efforts." In speaking of Charles IV. of Bohemia, Mr. Gillett says: "No one can trace his career of manifold activity, — using every art to extend and consolidate the empire, — discarding the sword and the warlike aims of his predecessors, but regaining by treaty and stratagem more than they had lost, — studiously avoiding all collision with the Papacy, yet adroitly grasping every advantage which its necessities afforded him, — and not perceive that under his liberal patronage the cause of learning and of letters would necessarily enter on a career of brighter prospects." (Vol. I. p. 13.) That is to say, No one can trace a *career* that discards the sword, that avoids collision, &c., without perceiving that the cause of learning would enter on a *career* of brighter prospects. If such writing as this reminds one of Mr. Bancroft's "highest efforts," it must be by the rule of contraries. Comparisons of this sort, easily made, but wholly without substantial foundation, are not surprising when met with in the columns of a newspaper, but they are in a high degree discreditable if found in a journal which professes to hold a high standard of scholarship, and which ought to be looked to with confidence for correct critical judgments. Thus when the Princeton Review declares that "the author of this work takes rank with Sparks, Bancroft, Irving, Prescott, Hopkins, and others," and when the Theological Eclectic speaks of the work as entitled "to be placed on the same level in the department of church history with that occupied by Bancroft and Prescott in secular history," it is evident that either the learned conductors of these reviews have an imperfect sense of the responsibility attaching to their office, or have adopted a convenient and meaningless phrase to save themselves from the trouble of conscientious examination and criticism. We must admit, however, that all scholars are not judges of style, and that there may be perceptions so dull as to see no difference in merit between that of Mr. Gillett and of Mr. Bancroft or Mr. Prescott. But there is another quality of an historical work which is not a matter of opinion, but of evidence, and upon which if a critic undertakes to pass judgment, he gives the measure of his knowledge or his honesty, — that quality is its accuracy.

Thus the New York Methodist says: "The book has other merits besides those of historical accuracy and interest." The Independent says: "The author's researches are ample." The New York Evening Post declares: "He has given to the subject of the Bohemian reformation the careful examination of a conscientious student." The Literary Gazette characterizes the work as "a calm, patient, thorough, historical contribution." The Methodist Quarterly Review speaks of it as exhibiting "thorough research into original and contemporary sources." The Christian Examiner praises the author's "faithful and painstaking labor." Now all this commendation betrays only that the critics knew less than the author, and had not the honesty to say so. The book does give evidence of much labor, but not of "accuracy," not of "ample research," not of "the careful examination of the conscientious student," not of historical thoroughness or fidelity. These are questions of fact which are easily settled by reference to the book itself. How can an author who writes on the Bohemian reformation make "thorough research into original and contemporary sources" without a knowledge of either the German or the Bohemian language? Does it display "the careful examination" or "the painstaking of a conscientious student" to neglect the acquisition of these languages, a knowledge of which was essential to the fit performance of his task. But our chief business now is not with Mr. Gillett, but with his critics. They are primarily responsible for the production of such works. If Mr. Gillett had felt that his book would be exposed to careful, sincere, discriminating criticism, he would, it is probable, have tried to make it really worthy of praise; he would certainly have been less ready to publish so unscholarly a work. It would be far better that there were no criticism, rather than such misleading and ignorant parade of judgment.

It is time that a true, sound, learned critical spirit should show itself at least in those of our journals which are professedly literary and critical. The days in which we live are serious; they demand honesty of thought and life, honesty in literature and in manners; and if our critics and censors themselves be not honest, and care not for truth, and regard not simplicity, what is to be expected of those whom they influence by their writings?

2.— *The Veil Partly Lifted, and Jesus Becoming Visible.* By W. H. FURNESS. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. 16mo. pp. 301.

THE title of this book provokes a doubt whether the object towards which the writer's labors are directed can, in the nature of things, ever be reached by human wit or human imagination. It professes to *partly* lift the veil which hangs over the personality of Jesus Christ, and the author intimates a belief that the day is coming when that veil will be wholly lifted, and who Jesus was, as well as what he was, will be plainly and perfectly revealed.

Now this is an expectation which we cannot see reason to share. On the contrary, not only the general tone of much of the Saviour's indirect reference to himself constrains us to regard him as having come into the world to be the *medium* rather than the *subject* of a revelation, but we infer as much from his express words when he says that "no one knoweth who the Son is but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, *and he to whomsoever the Son shall reveal him.*" Nothing is said here of the Father's revealing who the Son is; the revelation of the Father himself is made the one all-important thing.

We question whether it was meant that we should seek to *know who* he was; whether, for instance, in regard to the mode of his generation, his miracles, his ascension, and the line between his personality and the Divine, we ought to expect in this world ever to come to a perfect understanding. No one doubts, however, that Jesus did and does invite all men to see and study and be *what* he was, and that wisdom dictates our so doing. In other words, it is important, and ought to be interesting, as no other study is, to have, so far as we have any, a clear, consistent, and practical idea of one who claims in the Gospel to sustain such a momentous relation to mankind. It is in the highest degree desirable to approximate as nearly as the nature of things will admit to a just biography of the world's great Master and Model.

Of all the attempts with which we are acquainted to express in words just what the Jesus of the Gospels was, what he meant, what he sought, what were his most characteristic traits, — in short, to represent him, and bring him near to living men as to-day's helper and Saviour, — we know none so successful as the one made in the book before us.

We are not insensible to the occasional slips of thought, of judgment, perception, and taste in the working out of the humanitarian idea here so well presented. We feel that the writer is sometimes more nice than wise; that he sometimes leaves the solid for the shadowy; that sometimes, for the sake of avoiding a gap in a favorite theory, he indulges in a criticism which his characteristic simplicity would have forbidden or forborne. Particularly do we feel constrained to express our dissatisfaction with some of the suppositions contained in the chapter entitled "The Naturalness of Certain Fables found in this History," in regard to which it seems to us that a simple confession of inability to see the conformity of apparent facts to the author's theory would have been the true course to take, rather than resort to so hard an expedient, for instance, as he adopts, to make the caution of Jesus seem natural about *telling no man* of the transfiguration until he should have risen from the dead. Still we feel that the errors and excesses in the execution, when compared with the justness and beauty of the conception which inspires his labors, are as the small dust in the balance.

The style and spirit of this book are of the purest and sweetest description. Here, in clean and undefiled English, in sentences of transparent simplicity, good sense and manly and magnanimous sentiments speak directly to our hearts. And this charm of style we feel to be, not something wrought out by the rhetorician's art, but something born of the love of truth and the majestic simplicity of the idea which has to express itself. The pure stream tells here of the pure fountain.

The spirit which this book breathes is reverence for humanity as the manifestation of God, and for Jesus as its highest incarnation and glorification. There is a popular prejudice against the humanitarian school of Gospel interpreters, that it seeks to detract from the inspiration of Christ. But certainly in the present instance, so far from wishing to weaken faith in the inspiration of one, the writer labors to revive faith in the inspiration of all men. He holds that there is a spirit in man, and that the inspiration of the Almighty gives men understanding. To him conscience is a spirit within us bearing witness with our spirits that we are the children of God. He recognizes reason as a revelation. So far from disparaging the supernatural in Christ, he maintains that nature is full of the supernatural. He feels that

> "All truth is from the sempiternal source
> Of light divine."

If we had not inspiration ourselves, we could not appreciate that of Christ.

He may seem in the eyes of a superficial criticism to underrate the miracles of Christ's history, but if it appears so, it is only because he magnifies the wonders of our common human life, to which he regards the marvels of the Gospels as designed to draw men's reverent attention, — an effect which, on a soul at once truly philosophical and pious, they must certainly produce.

We may regard Dr. Furness's treatment of his great subject under two heads, as respects his view, first, of the origin, character, and value of the four Gospels, and, secondly, of the person but for whom they would never have existed.

The chapter on the "Genesis of the Gospels," which closes the volume, we regard as an admirable illustration of what has been said (by Goethe and others) of the importance of imagination in the writer or interpreter of history.

The author convincingly exhibits the evidence which the Gospel narratives contain, in their very style and structure, of their own truthfulness and authenticity. And we sympathize entirely with Dr. Furness in his amazement that critics of those records, professing in general to be such reverent pupils of nature, should, comparatively, so disregard in this field the beautiful marks of nature and truth.

We have also to thank Dr. Furness for his earnest, faithful, and eloquent assertion of the integrity of the Gospel narratives, — we mean, of the impossibility of dissecting away the extraordinary from the ordinary out of the story, any more than of detaching nerves from muscles throughout the human body without drawing away the life-blood. We only wish that, while thus admirably dealing with the events of Christ's history, he had applied as faithfully an analogous treatment to the *discourse* of Jesus. For we find it impossible to reconcile with his theory, as we understand it, how a man, of the ingenuousness and freedom from enthusiasm which he ascribes to Jesus, could speak of himself in comparison and connection with other men, and use the first personal pronoun precisely as he does, without having a certain access to knowledge on certain subjects which other men have not, and a certain right of assurance in demanding to be believed and obeyed, — a certain relation, in other words, to the common Father, of which the highest human wisdom and goodness are an inadequate explanation.

We are aware that we enter here the region of nice distinctions. We are aware that Dr. Furness claims that it was the transcendent *degree* in which Jesus possessed the wisdom and goodness of man that gave him such confidence to speak as *the* Son of God in an eminent sense, the teacher, the guide, the Saviour of man. But our difficulty lies in seeing how the good-sense, humility, modesty, which we assume to be among the best traits of humanity, and which Jesus in so many instances eminently evinces, could let him use the style he does in regard to his work and place, if there were nothing distinguishing him *in kind* on the divine side from the rest of men.

At the same time, we desire to do all justice to a view of Jesus which commends itself by so many charms to our best sense and sensibility. Furthermore, it is one of the most grateful offices of charity which rejoices in the unity of truth more than in the discords of men, to try to see how nearly earnest inquirers come together, when they can be brought to understand each other and themselves,—to meet them at those points where, losing sight of self, they catch for a moment glimpses of the harmony of truth in the "larger ether" of the upper regions, to which their longing for truth has led them. And in much of the wrangling about "authority," "miracles," "inspiration," among different sects and schools of Christians, we often feel that the disputants would find themselves much nearer together than they imagine, if they always took care to use words with a clear consciousness of their meaning.

When Dr. Peabody (who we suppose may be regarded as on the extreme conservative wing of the liberal army) writes a book called "Christianity the Religion of Nature," and when Dr. Furness contends that *all nature is a revelation of the supernatural*, and *all revelation is natural*, a thoughtful mind recognizes the foreshadowing of a day when such thinkers shall agree. Again, when Dr. Furness writes of the miracles,—

> "Although, in their external form, as material facts, I cannot yet demonstrate their full conformity to physical laws, yet I believe that the time will come when this will be done; . . . . while in their moral imports and relations, in their spiritual and most vital aspects, they are in exquisite harmony with the laws of the spirit, and with the character of the most exalted person that I know,"—

is there a great gulf between him and the Lowell Lecturer, when *he* writes,—

> "How know we that the works of power and love alleged to have been wrought by Christ will not, in an age of higher spiritual philosophy, assume their place in the order of nature, as precisely what should have been anticipated *a priori* in connection with a theophany,—as the very works which could not but have proceeded from the Divine attributes incarnated in a human form,—as bound to the personality of Jesus by the same constant laws of cause and effect which make our daily deeds and words proceed naturally from our limbs, muscles, active powers, and mental habitudes?"

We might quote many passages from eminent living writers in the English Church, in proof of a growing recognition of (at least) "the right to treat the whole question of supernatural agency as an open one." But we shall content ourselves with two. Mr. Jowett says, "As the idea of nature enlarges, the idea of revelation also enlarges; it was a temporary misunderstanding which severed them";—and a perhaps still more significant admission occurs in a recent letter of Rev. R. B.

Kennard to the Bishop of St. David's on the late Baden Powell's views: "The solution which has obtained most general acceptance with philosophic divines is perhaps some modification of that proposed by Bishop Butler; namely, that the distinction popularly drawn between the natural and supernatural exists only relatively to our partial and most imperfect insight into the nature and extent of that 'wonderful order' established from everlasting by Him who, in the magnificent language of the prophet, 'inhabiteth eternity.' Our notions of what is natural will be enlarged in proportion to our greater knowledge of the works of God and the dispensations of his providence."

Does *he* take a low view of Christ who says, as Dr. Furness does, —

> "I do most fully believe that in the history of Christ we have an account of a new, original, unprecedented development of spiritual force, a new communication of the life of God to the soul of man," and that "we might say that, so far from his being out of the course of nature, nature culminated in Christ, and that, of all that exists, he is the one being profoundly human, pre-eminently natural"?

One of the brothers Hare says, in "Guesses at Truth," — in answer to certain persons who "would fain suppose" the Gospel "to have come down all at once from heaven, like a meteoric stone from a volcano in the moon, consisting of elements wholly different from anything found upon earth," — "It is no disparagement to the sun that he should be preceded by the dawn." This figure brings us back to Dr. Furness's book, which opens with the thought that the newness of Christ's teachings consisted not in the *matter*, but in the *manner*. In him the dreams of the dawn were turned into the revelations of the noonday. And then, too, his religious instinct drew forth from under the rubbish of traditions, speculations, and ceremonies that passed for religion, the great primal truths of the soul and laws of life, and these he made men feel as never before.

But what gave him this singular power? How could *he* speak with authority?

Here is another of those words which have passed somewhat too vaguely through men's minds in the great controversy about Christ. Dr. Furness says it was the authority of truth with which Christ spoke, — of truth, which his hearers felt when spoken by one who was faithful to it as God's word and will. Now Dr. Furness's opponent will say, "No, the authority with which Christ spoke was God in him." But does not such arguing show a want of spirituality. Is not truth God? Is not God spirit — light — love?

Again, the popular and traditional idea is that the authority of Christ is proved by his miracles. Dr. Furness admits that Jesus himself "appealed to what he had done as evidence of his truth, *as well he might, seeing that it was done with so single a mind, and without any self-reference.*" His opponents, however, insist that it was the *power* shown in them, as being more than human, which proved his divine mission. Here, we think, is an unfortunate narrowness on the part of the supernaturalists in neglecting to lay a proper stress on the moral quality of the wonderful work as an element of evidence to the divinity of the worker. Dr. Peabody, in one of the Lectures already quoted, says to his hearers, "Were an undoubted miracle to be performed this moment in your sight, and were he who performed it to connect with it such statements with regard to unseen, spiritual, future things as you had never heard before, there is not one of you who would not believe all that he said." But we doubt the correctness of this assumption. We do not believe that a mere miracle would have any such effect, *independently of the nature of the doctrines it accompanied and the felt character of the teacher. If* the doctrine commended itself to our highest and deepest sense, and *if* the teacher were one whom we felt instinctively to be godlike in his purity, magnanimity, and his whole character and spirit, then we should accept a miracle of mercy or of majesty as giving a fitting completeness to the evidence of his Divine authority.

We hold, then, that there is a vagueness of thought in regard to the *miraculous authority* of Christ in which the Church has long indulged itself, for which Dr. Furness's way of looking at things affords a corrective.

A similar intrusion of barren wonder into the place of enlightened and effective belief, is shown in the popular exaggeration of the *official* element in Christ's being and doing, and corresponding insensibility to the free working of his native qualities. On this point, in the chapter entitled "The Childlikeness of Jesus," especially in the five or six pages beginning at page 139, Dr. Furness seems to us peculiarly happy. Too long has a so-called faith in Christ, based not upon personal acquaintance and sympathy, but upon public tradition and custom, thrown a cloud around him, and removed him from the clear sight and calm study of men. To a vast proportion of men, Christ is a name for a strange, abstract being, belonging neither to this world nor to any other, — a mysterious figure passing across the field of vision opened by the Scriptures, speaking and acting in some mechanical and magical manner, saying and doing things which somehow operate as a charm upon the salvation of a certain thing, no less mysterious, called the *soul.* When men awake from this strange dream to feel that the *soul* is the *man*, they will be better prepared than now to recognize and revere the unity and humanity of the perfect man who came to guide them into the way of life.

We believe that the time is to come when Christians, both Unitarian and Trinitarian, will thank Dr. Furness for the good service he has done, for the noble work to which he has given himself, in his unwearied effort to express and impress upon others his feeling of the adaptation of the Gospel to the native wants of the human heart, its conformity to human reason, its accordance with true taste, and its sufficiency for the highest cravings of the spirit.

To borrow the beautiful words of Dr. Goulburn, in speaking of Christian charity, "The time shall come when these brothers, so dissimilar in training, so opposite in experience, so different possibly in some of the judgments which they have formed of God's ways, shall meet never to part again. 'The Lord said unto Aaron, Go into the wilderness to meet Moses. And he went and met him in the mount of God, and kissed him.' So shall it be with true Christians, whose history, discipline, sentiments, have here taken a course which seems far enough asunder. A meeting and a greeting is reserved for all of them in the mount of God,—let them see to it, as Joseph said to his brethren, 'that they fall not out by the way.'"

We agree with one of our contemporaries, that the appearance of Dr. Furness's book is especially timely, following that of Renan's, and building up out of the same materials what the French sceptic labors to destroy. And we rejoice to see that thus far reviewers of sects and schools differing widely from him in opinion show such a truly evangelic sympathy in Dr. Furness's labors to reproduce and represent to his fellow-men the man Christ Jesus, as the one whose humanity proves his divinity, and who is so fine an image of God, because he is so perfect a specimen of man.

3.— *Gesammelte Werke von* JAKOB PHILIPP FALLMERAYER, *herausgegeben von* GEORG MARTIN THOMAS. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann. 1861. 3 vols.

JAKOB PHILIPP FALLMERAYER was born on the 10th of December, 1790,—the son of a peasant in the Tyrol; he died on the 26th of April, 1861, one of the leading writers of Germany. A scholar, indefatigable in research,—a thinker, bold in forming and vigorous in expressing his opinions,—there is no position he might not have won had he chosen the popular side and flattered the general prejudice. But too honest to sacrifice his convictions to his interest, he submitted to the loss of the honors he could afford to despise, while he satirized the persecutions he had the courage to brave. To us, so far away from the contentions of the land he loved, — untouched by its passions, unaffected by its fears, — the man and his history are of little interest by the side of the colossal question he gave his life to investigate. Yet a word as to his personal career will not be without use, if it serve to make clearer the authority of his writings.

At an early age he attracted the notice of some observing ecclesiastics, who endeavored to save him for the future good of the Church by putting him into the Cathedral school at Brixen. But weary of the restraints of the cloister he took advantage of the revolt of the Tyrolese, in 1809, to escape to Salzburg, where he taught private pupils, and studied Hebrew. After two years of intense application to theology he went to the University of Bavaria, then at Landshut, to study law. But his supreme calling was, as he soon discovered, to history and languages, — to that profounder criticism of our day which is rewriting history by the aid of philology, which is revolutionizing literature by the aid of history. His early experience set him forever against the ecclesiastical life, with its narrowness and bigotry and tyranny; but, as in all the deep thinkers of the time, there was in Fallmerayer a profound reverence for the genius of Christianity, uncorrupted by the perversions, undefiled by the abuses, of a later age. As a French writer has well said, there was in him, on the one side, a spirit of bitter defiance to the exterior organization of the Church, and on the other, that moral force, that religious elevation, that luminous and tender spirituality, which Christianity never fails to inspire in a soul so loyal to the truth it unfolds. But to a mind so active and so ardent as Fallmerayer's, the tumult of the times soon forbade the seclusion of study. After the great battles in 1813, and the accession of Austria to the coalition against Napoleon, Bavaria was compelled to side with Germany in those final struggles in which she threw off the domination of France. And Fallmerayer, being a Bavarian, entered the army as a lieutenant. At Hanau he fought so well that his bravery was commended in presence of the army. At Brienne, at Bar, at Arcis sur Aube, he showed again how the good scholar makes the good soldier. After the first treaty of Paris he served with the army of occupation on the left bank of the Rhine; and when the war again broke out, he was appointed on the staff of his general. But his corps was not called into action, and, after the final treaty of peace, went into garrison at Lindau on the Lake of Constance, where he devoted his leisure to languages, — to Modern Greek, Turkish, and Persian. In 1818 he left the army and became a teacher in the Gymnasium at Augsburg, whence he was transferred to that at Landshut, and was afterwards made a Professor of History in the Lyceum there. In 1831 he accompanied the Russian statesman, Count Ostermann-Tolstoï, in a journey to the East, which lasted three years; in the course of which they visited Egypt and Syria, Cyprus and Rhodes and the islands and coasts of the Ægean, the Peloponnesus, and Constantinople. Upon his return to Bavaria, as the reward of his liberal opinions, he found his professorship gone, and himself in painful uncertainty as to the future. In 1835, however, he was made a member of the Academy of Sciences in Munich, and in 1837 again began his wanderings, living at times in Italy and Switzerland, in Paris and Geneva. In 1840 he went again to the East, — down the Danube to Constantinople and Trebizond. After a year spent in Constantinople, devoted to the study of Turkish, and further travel in the East of Europe, he returned in 1842 to Munich. From 1843 to 1847 he travelled in Italy and Austria and the Rhine country, and in 1847 went for the third time to the East, — to Palestine, where he first heard the distant rolling of the thunder in the West. In the spring of 1848 he received in Smyrna the notice of his appointment as Professor of History in the High School at Munich, and he turned his face for the last time homeward. Chosen at once a member of the National Assembly at Frankfort, he sided with the people; but neither a doctrinaire nor a diplomate, he displeased both extremes. Though he voted against the adjournment to Stuttgart, he followed his friends thither, to see them scattered like a noisy mob by the cavalry of Wurtemberg, and the Parliament of 1848 — the last peaceful attempt, after more than four hundred years of struggle between freedom and despotism, to reconcile the princes and the people under a constitution which should assure the rights it recognized — vanish like a phantom from the world it had haunted. As in Italy, devotion to the nation became treason to the state. Deprived of his professorship, and banished from Bavaria, he took refuge in Switzerland; but in 1850, after the granting of an amnesty to the leaders of the Rump Parliament, he returned to Munich, with the intention of exchanging forever the fevered activity of Germany for the gracious repose of the East. But his health and other circumstances preventing, he continued to live in Munich till, in April, 1861, in the night, suddenly, the earthly slumber was deepened and lost in the eternal rest.

In the year 1185 the family of Comnenus were driven from the throne of Constantinople by a terrible revolution, provoked by the savage cruelty of Andronicus, the reigning sovereign. In 1204, however, his son, Alexios, took possession of Trebizond as head of the empire of which that city was made the capital. But for nearly three centuries nothing was known of its history. Ducange, two centuries ago, had declared it to be covered with an impenetrable veil. Gibbon had given it up for lost. In 1824 the Academy of Sciences at Copenhagen proposed it as the subject of a prize. With great industry, and with singular skill, by the aid of manuscripts discovered in Vienna and in the library of the Cardinal Bessarion at Venice, Fallmerayer restored to the world the annals of an empire, the wonders of which fill the songs of the Middle Age.

The History of the Peninsula of the Morea was the next work by which Fallmerayer excited the attention of the scholars whose enmity he provoked. The first part appeared in 1830, the second upon his return from the East, in 1837. It was the work in which he proclaimed his great heresy, that not a drop of the ancient Greek blood flows in the veins of the Modern Greeks. Upon this theory, however, we are not now to comment. The Slavic irruptions in the sixth and seventh centuries were unquestionably violent and destructive, but that they swept away the entire population of the Greeks of the Morea or of the islands, is very far from probable. The material revolution may have been in favor of the Slaves, but the intellectual supremacy remained with the Greeks. With marvellous tenacity, the Greek language and the Greek ideals survived the dilution of the Greek blood. The Slaves became Greeks. As a curious point of scholarship merely, we may wonder that Fallmerayer should have spent the last half of his life in defending, with so much passion, the theories he had advanced in the first half. But behind the learned controversy lay a political question. It was not to a dry dispute about a buried fact that Fallmerayer gave the exactest study, the profoundest meditation, of all the fiery energies of his soul, for so many years of a restless and crowded life, but to the most important problem of the nineteenth century, — the process of civilization in Eastern Europe, the destiny of the Oriental world. The two great elements in the development of European civilization have been the Roman and the German. In the eternal order of things, a third element, the Slavic, was now to come into play. In Russia and Prussia, in Austria and Turkey, were more than seventy millions of Slaves waiting for the signal to advance, — the insurgents of the Peloponnesus were but the *avant garde* of the Muscovites.

In spite of their moral abasement and their physical weakness, the Byzantine Greeks had cherished the traditions while they had inherited the wealth of that empire, which, upon the banks of the Bosporus, had succeeded in the East, in long but feeble descent, to the dominion of Rome. They knew the value of the treasures they guarded. Heirs of the monuments and the palaces, the manuscripts and the art, which, within the walls of Constantinople, had escaped the desolation of Europe, they added to the remembrance of their intellectual eminence a consciousness, however confused, of the permanence of their nationality. The floods of fire with which the Franks swept from the face of the earth the sacred emblems of their ancient descent, and their national life, still surge in the hearts of the Greeks in their undying hatred of the West. All through the later history of the Greeks, Fallmerayer recognized but one expression of terror and wrath at the destruction wrought by the Franks in the taking of Constantinople in 1204. The yoke of the Turks, to which they succumbed in 1453, was easier to bear than the domination of the Latins. What the Ottoman invasion of the fifteenth century has been to Europe, the Frank invasion of the thirteenth was to the Greeks. Political servitude is less galling than ecclesiastical tyranny. The persecutions which were inflicted, with mingled derision and brutality, by the Western Christians upon the Eastern Church, inspired in the Greeks a profound horror of the Latin rule. "I would rather see the turban of Murad over the gate of St. Sophia," said the Greek archon Notaras, not long before the entrance of the Turks, "than the hat of a cardinal of Rome."

It was in 1827 when the Greeks were making their last desperate effort for the recovery of their political freedom, lost so many ages before, — for the maintenance of their intellectual inheritance, threatened by an obstinate, unyielding barbarism, — that Fallmerayer uttered these sentiments, — a scandal to Catholic Europe, — at once a satire upon its conceit and a defiance of its bigotry. These heroic Hellenes were to him but a confused horde of Slaves, masking the advance of the great enemy of Europe. Behind them, crouching like a tiger, was Russia, pitiless, irresistible. To weaken the Ottoman empire was to subvert Germany. "Destroy Constantinople, and damn up the Bosporus," cried Fallmerayer to the statesmen of Europe, in the fever of his passion, many years before the war in the Crimea, "or the Cossacks will be upon you." There is nothing, indeed, in the history or the character of the Slavic nations more remarkable than this restless craving after the milder skies and the more fruitful lands of the provinces of Byzantium. From the fifth to the ninth, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the stream of migration flowed southward, turbulent and obstinate. It tends to-day in the same direction. "No longer content with the birch-juice of the north, Gog craves the oranges of the South. The grapes of Kerasant taste sweeter to him than the whortleberries of Smolensk."

That he who rules in Constantinople is the master of the earth, has been since the foundation of the city the ineradicable conviction of men of every nation and every religion throughout the East. Allied in faith and kindred in blood, the Slaves in their fond conceit already fancy themselves masters of a realm extending from Sparta to Tobolsk; and their king, with his gilded palaces on the Moskwa and in Sebastopol, now builds another facing the rising sun on the heights of the Golden Horn. Let Russia once possess Constantinople, said Fallmerayer, and with it — the swift consequence of its victory — the "Illyrian triangle" from the Danube to Cape Mattapan, and it is master of the Old World. The future of Europe lies upon the Bosporus. From the earliest days of which we have knowledge in the history of the human race down to these, it is perhaps the third time that a problem so momentous is given to men to solve. Islam is the representative of the reason. As the Sultan is not the Turkish monarchy, so the Sheich-ül-Islam is not Islam. Islam is not an organization, it is an impulse and a protest. Had the Christian Church of the fourth and fifth and sixth centuries blended with the spirituality of Athanasius the rationalism of Arius, Fallmerayer contended that Islam might never have appeared. The prophet of Mecca came as the avenger of religious freedom. But as Greece encountered and vanquished the Zoroastrian East, so Germany, in beating back the followers of Mohammed, saved to the world that absorbing and tender faith which the ruthless tyranny of reason would have destroyed forever.

In the ceaseless struggle of the age to apply the results of history to the problems of nations, no living writer perhaps has been more conspicuous than Fallmerayer. He was by no means a pessimist, but he recognized how slowly the good breaks through the bad; how the iron law of necessity connects the present with the past. Earnest in his convictions, he was fervid in his style. In his descriptions of natural scenery there is an idyllic grace, a charm of sentiment, a beauty of language, so fascinating that you forget the scholar and forgive the sceptic. The stillness of the palm groves and the murmur of the streams, the fragrant air and the gorgeous sunset, the mystery of ruins and the luxury of life, — all the sadness and all the splendor of the East, — are nowhere rendered more vividly than in the *Fragments* which Fallmerayer wrote home to Europe as he wandered in Asia. In the schools of Northern Germany they can find no better example of style than his. Well might Abd-ül-Medschid, in silent reproach of Germany, decorate him with the brilliant order of Nischan-Iftichan.

The civilization of that great world which stretches from the Bosporus to the Indus, — its social and intellectual life, its aspirations and its promise, — have been revealed to us but in part. What Herodotus was to the Greeks, Hammer-Purgstall may perhaps be said to be to us, the discoverer of that Oriental life which, as in the past, is also to have its office in the unknown drama, in the mystery of the future. At present, however, there are but two forces which struggle for mastery in Europe, — Rome and Moscow. Unlike the dominion of Alexander, or Charlemagne, or Tamerlane, or Napoleon, the empire of Russia has never been dependent upon a single life. The Czar is not a person. Like the Pope, the Czar is an idea. But between Pope and Czar there is ever a third party intervening, — who shall say with what success in the end? — which, like the Litæ in Homer, shrivelled and squint-eyed, limps after the mighty of earth, — which, soft-footed as Ate, knowing neither remorse nor rest, sweeps over the heads of mortals from land to land, accomplishing ever the fate which pursues them that will withhold the rights of men, — that third party, it is the Chorus of the Eumenides, — it is Revolution.

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4. — *Field Tactics for Infantry: comprising the Battalion Movements, and Brigade Evolutions, useful in the Field, on the March, and in the Presence of the Enemy.* By Brig.-Gen. William H. Morris, U. S. Vols., Late U. S. Second Infantry. New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1864. 18mo. pp. 146.

Tactics are not merely the drill, but the art of manœuvring troops in action, in the presence of the enemy; and include their formation in battalions, or battle array. Briefly, then, tactics consist in arranging troops in those orders or methods which enable them to use their arms with the greatest effect.

The first weapons invented by man to destroy his fellow-man were probably the club, the bow and arrow, the sling, the knife, and afterwards the sword. The art of war was yet in its infancy, and the rude combats of early days were fought without regard to military array or order, and decided rather by strength and courage than by skill. The nomadic tribes of Asia and Northern Africa were the first to use the horse in warfare. Their soldiers were mounted on fleet, hardy horses, and armed with the bow and sling. Hovering in clouds around an enemy, they endeavored to destroy him by flights of arrows and missiles, and to appall by apparently impetuous and fiery charges, without ever actually coming to blows. At this day, the Apaches and Camanches of New Mexico, and other nomadic tribes of Indians roaming over the vast plains between the Mississippi and the Pacific, armed with similar weapons, use precisely the same tactics.

Armed chariots, drawn by three or four horses, yoked side by side, and elephants with scythes to mow down the opposing ranks, were also used by the Asiatics, but history speaks of them in too uncertain a manner to enable us to draw conclusions as to their tactics; and they were swept away by the rude shock of the Greek and Roman armies.

In the warfare of these nations, who in turn overthrew all their enemies, and conquered the then known world, the sword and the spear ranked first, as the most effective and destructive weapons, and formed the armament of certainly three fourths of their troops. They had indeed a sort of light infantry, the *peltastes* of the Greeks, and the *levis armatura* of the Romans, equipped with bows, slings, and light javelins for hurling, which corresponded to the skirmishers of the present day, but they were little felt in battle. Their cavalry, too, never attained much importance, and, like the "light-armed," was chiefly used for ravaging the invaded country, and skirmishing. It was their heavy-armed infantry which conquered the world. Their defensive armor rendered missile weapons comparatively harmless. The combat was decided by the hand-to-hand shock of the sword and spear, and to render that shock irresistible while guarding against the effects of the enemy's attacks was, in those days, the perfection of tactics. Accordingly, the ancient troops were formed in masses many ranks deep, which overthrew the opposing forces by their mere weight and impetus. Such were the famous Greek phalanxes, sixteen ranks in depth, with the spears of the rearmost rank extending several feet in front of the first, which overthrew and scattered the Persian hosts like chaff before a whirlwind. But the phalanx, irresistible in the charge, from its weight and compactness, was powerless when in disorder, or when taken in flank.

The Romans, during their long and incessant wars, brought the tactics of the sword and spear to their highest perfection. With them the order of battle was in three lines, drawn up one behind the other, each line eight ranks in depth. While each line possessed the necessary mass and weight for the charge, it was more easily rallied when in disorder, and the disasters of the first could be retrieved by the second and third.

With the irruptions of the Northern barbarians, and the advent of the Dark Ages, Roman tactics, perfected and proved in so many fierce and bloody battles, disappeared with Roman civilization. It is difficult, from the confused records which have come down to us, to gain an accurate notion of the tactics practised during the Middle Ages.

By the invention of gunpowder, and the introduction of the musket and of cannon, a new system was rendered necessary. Defensive armor, no longer impenetrable by missiles when made of iron and lead and projected with all the force of gunpowder, had to be laid aside. The line of battle was reduced from many ranks to three, and then to two, as the increasing destructiveness of fire-arms lessened the efficiency of the mass in the charge.

For a long time after its introduction, the musket was only a missile weapon, and comparatively useless in hand-to-hand fighting, for which the sword and the pike (the successor to the spear) were used. In Marlborough's days, and even in Frederick the Great's, no aim was taken. The musket was pointed from the breast instead of the shoulder, and the officers, with their swords, would level the line of barrels to prevent their men from firing too high. A portion of the troops were still armed with the pike and sword, being destined to make the charges, and for close quarters, as those provided with the musket were intended for defensive or stationary fighting; and while the pikemen were unable to withstand the fire of the musketeers, the latter were helpless when charged hand to hand by the former. They were consequently placed together for mutual support, and were equally indispensable in the formation of armies.

The invention of the bayonet, however, by rendering the musket a hand-to-hand as well as a missile weapon, soon banished the pike. It was at length discovered that picked men, good marksmen, sent out singly, or in small parties, could render essential service by annoying the enemy. Hence arose the system of skirmishing. And in the development of this branch, the American colonists, taught by their Indian wars, and the patriots who fought the Revolutionary war and won our independence, were the pioneers. The British column, driven in disgraceful retreat from Lexington by a few farmers skirmishing each "on his own hook," was a lesson often repeated during our protracted struggle for national life and liberty, and one which the citizen soldiers of revolutionary and republican France were the first to heed.

Halleck in his "Elements of Military Art and Science," says: "Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body, and drawn up in two lines. The cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery was distributed along the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, two of cavalry and two of infantry; in moving by a flank they formed only two very long columns." These tactics developed the musketry fire to its fullest extent, but were the worst adapted to the use of the bayonet. The wars of the French Republic and Empire under Napoleon wrought almost as great a revolution in the tactics as in the civil and social polity of Europe. Instead of forming a whole army in a single huge, unwieldy body, and that deployed in one or two long, thin lines, incapable of attack, and weak to defend, troops were organized into divisions of eight or ten thousand men, composed of the three arms in proper proportions, and each containing, in itself, all that belongs to a separate army, and equally able to operate independently, either on the offensive or defensive. This formation is exactly analogous to that of the Roman legion, and restored to modern warfare all, and more than all, the mobility of the Roman armies, which, equally with their discipline and tactics, was the cause of their military success. To this mobility, and their almost invariable custom of attacking, the continued success of the French during the greater part of these wars is to be attributed. Discarding the fire of the musket, they relied much on the bayonet for the attack, and, advancing to the charge in deep column, covered by clouds of skirmishers, which annoyed and drew the fire of the enemy, would carry the strongest positions without firing a shot. As may be supposed, these columns frequently lost tremendously. Marshal McDonald, at the battle of Wagram, led a column of fifteen thousand men, but fifteen hundred of whom remained unscathed; but he penetrated and broke the enemy's centre, and won the day. Such very dense columns, however, were rarely used, and even then sometimes failed, as was the case with Ney's column at Waterloo. Tremendous and almost irresistible in their impulsion, like the ancient phalanx, they were unwieldy, and powerless when taken in flank, while among troops so massed artillery made terrible ravages.

By the stern experience of these titanic wars, the bayonet and the column were proved to be the means for the attack, the musket and the line, which developed its fire to the fullest extent, for the defence. And these tactics have come down to our day. Then, however, the rifle was unknown in warfare. The troops were armed with the musket, having a range of effective fire limited to one hundred and fifty yards. In firing at an object six hundred yards distant, the recruit was taught to aim one hundred and thirty feet above it. Now, a line of battle six hundred or even eight hundred yards distant is completely within effective range of the service rifled musket. In cannon, too, the disparity between those used in the wars of Napoleon and our modern guns is equally great. And besides the increased range of rifled guns, their mobility and consequent efficiency and destructiveness have been quadrupled by improvements in the weight of the piece and the structure of the carriage. These great improvements in the range and death-dealing power of fire-arms have augmented tenfold the difficulties and dangers of storming any position with the bayonet. The dense column, which in Napoleon's wars decided the battle, will soon be as obsolete as the Greek phalanx. The bayonet itself may be driven from use before the improved rifle, as the old spear and pike were by the musket. An assertion of Halleck, in his "Elements of Military Art and Science," published as recently as 1846, that "the rifle is useless for the great body of infantry," best illustrates the great change that has taken place in the arms of troops within the last ten or twelve years. In our army the rifle has almost entirely superseded the musket, and the same is true of the British service, and, indeed, of all the European armies.

It is observable, too, and worthy of mention, that, as in our early struggles we demonstrated the value and necessity of skirmishers, and introduced the first of those changes which made an entire revolution in military tactics, so now in this war we are making new discoveries, and learning by experience the real worth of the different arms, and the tactics which will best bring out their advantages. In this respect we are many years in advance of European powers. The tactics of fifty years ago can be changed only by the stern lessons of a dearly bought experience. The repulse of Magruder's heavy columns at Malvern Hill, of Burnside's at Fredericksburg, of Lee's and Longstreet's at Gettysburg, by the annihilating fire of lines of infantry and artillery, decides the question of hurling dense masses in the face of such unobstructed fire; and will deter any American general from butchering his troops in such attacks, sanctioned though they are by the example and precepts of the Great Captain.

Therefore, it has become necessary in attacking to advance in line or in light columns, and to weaken the enemy by a heavy and concentrated fire preparatory to the charge. Nor is the change in defensive tactics less marked. Formerly a line of battle armed with the short-range, smooth-bore musket offered a totally inadequate defence to the attack in column, and bodies of troops massed immediately in rear of the line were relied on to repel the attack by vigorous counter-charges with the bayonet. Now the best manner of arranging troops for defence, when the ground permits, is to place the second line in such a manner that it can fire over the first. But this can only be done on a declivity or hill-side, or where buildings or artificial defences are used. Such, to some extent, was the arrangement adopted by the Rebels at the battle of Fredericksburg. Their first line was posted behind a stone wall running along the foot of the heights, while multitudes of sharpshooters, lining the summits and sides, and occupying the houses, served as a second line, and fired over the first.

The comparative value and importance of cavalry is greatly diminished by the improvements in fire-arms. Halleck, and indeed all the standard military writers, rate the cavalry as second in importance, infantry being first, and artillery third. But in our present war it is proved that artillery is of far greater value than cavalry, and should be ranked second to infantry alone. While artillery, participating in every engagement, has become an indispensable arm of battle, and in some of the hardest fought actions has proved almost the first arm, cavalry has never appeared on the battle-field with effect, and there is scarcely an instance during the whole course of the war of a charge of cavalry upon infantry. Such cavalry as the cuirassiers of the Old Guard, who under Murat could overthrow and trample under foot whole divisions of infantry, is no longer possible. Our cavalry indeed relies more on the carbine or Sharp's rifle than on the sabre, and fight oftener on foot than on horseback. Its chief value is to scout and reconnoitre, to cover the movements of our own army and watch those of the opposing one, and to make raids through the enemy's country, and on his lines of communication and supply.

The object of General Morris's brief treatise upon infantry tactics is to afford instruction in the formations and movements of troops which recent experience has shown to be most required. They are, in the main, of a simpler and more expeditious character than those formerly prescribed, their chief object being to attain simplicity, celerity, and the least fatigue and exposure to the men. The little volume forms an essential supplement to the earlier works on the subject. It is clear and compact, and deserves to be thoroughly mastered by the officers now in service. It is a valuable addition to our military literature, and, like all of Mr. Van Nostrand's publications, it is carefully printed and appears in a style of unexceptionable excellence.

5.— *The Small House at Allington. A Novel.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1864. 8vo. pp. 273.

THIS work of Mr. Trollope can be read with pleasure by every one. It contains a fair picture of English country life. The characters are well conceived, and as a rule consistently supported, and there is a pleasant dash of humor and satire about it, not, however, so severe as to disturb the intellectual repose of the most kind-hearted matron.

Mr. Trollope has for some ten years or more been growing in popularity and esteem, which are not undeserved. He has, moreover, won the especial regard of Americans from his honest, though unsuccessful, attempt to gain some insight into American institutions. He caught, indeed, the salient points of our manners and held them up to view with great fairness and good-humored pleasantry, but he was himself aware of his incapacity to penetrate much below the surface, and discover and disclose the great principles and controlling ideas that are shaping and directing the New World. He is, indeed, more a novelist and a teller of stories, than a philosopher. His style is clear and masculine. His plots are well conceived. His characters are for the most part natural and well drawn.

Mr. Trollope's chief characteristic as a novelist is the microscopical power of his mind, the power of tracing the moral effects of minute circumstances and minute actions. It is this that gives him so intimate a knowledge of female character. He can give a name to the "trifles light as air" that influence women, and disclose those subtle springs of action, the workings of which must often be almost inscrutable to those who are moved by them. In this he excels even Thackeray, who had himself a large feminine element in his mind, by which he was enabled to detect the motives which influence women so nicely, that his cold analysis stirred all womankind into a not unjustifiable indignation. Trollope, however, surpasses Thackeray in this respect, and we suspect has received much of his training as a writer from his mother, the novelist, which would account for his superiority.

Trollope has also great skill in the arrangement of circumstances. He knows the power of reserve, and of what efficiency it is in gentility, scholarship, and the priesthood, but above all in novel-writing. He indeed understands this rather too well, for in this last novel he has left the fate of his heroine undecided at the end of the book, which of course necessitates the reading of another work to discover it.

Another strong point in Mr. Trollope is his power of depicting the different forms of the Anglo-Saxon tender passion, — the love of property; and his representations of the conflict between these and the love of woman are the best parts of his present book.

In fact, Mr. Trollope's books are such as a healthy man, in good spirits, with a shrewd observation, a good memory, a pleasant humor, and excellent faculties of expression, would naturally write. The ideas of the characters are the same ideas you meet with in ordinary society, — neither better nor worse, — and the author never obtrudes his own. His characters are made, rather than shown by circumstances, the hands of the clock seeming to move the works.

Trollope has been compared to Thackeray, and is supposed by many persons to pretty nearly fill the place that that great master has lately left vacant. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Trollope differs from Thackeray in almost every respect. Trollope is a simple observer, a nice and discriminating observer indeed, but one whose knowledge of men stops at their manners, or at the obvious motives that influence individuals or artificial and social classes of men. Thackeray's chaacters — that is the best of them — are characters conceived as unities, acting from a centre according to an organic law, and are types of real classes of mankind. Such is Major Pendennis, or man as snob; Colonel Newcomb, or man as chevalier. Such characters come not by observation alone, but are the choice fruits of long meditation on the nature of the heart of man.

This difference can perhaps be best seen by a comparison between the humor and satire of Trollope, and those of Thackeray, than which nothing perhaps more expresses the peculiar nature and quality of a writer. For into the wit and humor of a writer enter the disposition and qualities of his mind and heart; since nothing reaches the mental retina through the humorous medium alone, but bent and colored by the other elements, intellectual and moral, that make up the individual's character. Thus the wit of Swift, who was morose, disdainful, and a professed misanthrope, was of a nature corresponding. Being without sympathy for his fellows, he never wrote humor. The humor of Thackeray, of Addison, of Cervantes, was that which sprang through introspection from a sympathetic, deep, and loving heart. Trollope rarely looking below the surface, his humor, like that of Scott, is usually that of droll circumstance and odd conjuncture.

Thackeray, had, moreover, a mind sceptical and inquiring, though rather timid. Trollope is never troubled by doubt, and manifests no disposition to inquire. Thackeray was a novelist by accident, and a moralist by nature. Trollope is nothing if not a novelist. Trollope cannot indeed be compared with the great masters of English fiction, with Fielding, Steele, or Thackeray. He may be more fairly compared with Jane Austen. He is not so perfect a painter of manners, but he resembles her in nice discrimination between similar characters, in his power of drawing women, and in his selection of subjects.

In the present book Mr. Trollope has produced several very good characters, and one very poor one, on which he seems most to pride himself.

We have two English country gentlemen, very well conceived and supported, the Lord de Guest and Squire Dale; — the Lord de Guest a short, thick man, a breeder of cattle, an amateur ox-rib-poker, stupid, moral, proud, and benevolent, "every inch an earl," such a character as England alone produces and Englishmen alone admire; the Squire a narrow-minded, caustic Englishman, with a kind heart, but wonderful skill in concealing it. The best characters by far in the book are the Misses Dale. Fresh and natural, they show in their conversation the vivacity, kindness, and foibles which are the charm of their sex. Trollope's characters from high life, like Mr. Palliser, are not, we think, well done, whether as caricatures or originals. As an original, Mr. Palliser is untrue, and it it not very amusing to caricature a mathematical formula, which he approaches as near as is possible in the present state of the science.

The great blemish in "The Small House at Allington" is the character of its hero, Mr. Eames, whose development stopped at the asinine phase. It has become a fashion, introduced by Thackeray, to take, not Crichtons, but natural gentlemen for heroes. Trollope has gone far beyond Thackeray in his present book. Philip, Clive, Newcomb, Dobbin, though not sublime, are in many respects admirable. Trollope has introduced a hero thoroughly contemptible. It is not, to be sure, a man's fault to be an ass, as he would, doubtless, if the choice were left him, change himself for the better. There is, therefore, no objection to Trollope's taking an ass for a hero, though his readers might have their prejudices against it.

Mr. Trollope seems to feel embarrassed by the qualities of his *sui-generis* hero at the end of the book, for though he evidently designed him for the heroine, he could not bring himself to unite such a charming girl as Miss Dale to such an ill-made piece of nature's journey-work as Mr. Eames. As the history of Mr. Eames will give us an abstract of the book, we will make a short sketch of it. A "hobbledehoy," that is, a being who matures late in life, a person of natural, not forced or hot-house growth, such a man is Mr. Eames. Mr. Eames is in love with the heroine, Miss Lily Dale. Long he has sighed for her in secret, as he wanders over the grassy meadows, and switches off the heads of many flagrant flowers. He goes to London as a clerk. He does not tell his love to Miss Dale, but, aware of the hungry nature of concealment, and that the food of a boarding-house is not generally sufficient to enable a man to support such a parasite, he confides his passion to his fellow-boarders, but particularly to one Cradell, who, by a rare stroke of genius and the nicest mental manipulation, is represented as a little more of an ass than the hero. Mr. Eames soon has a vacation, and goes to visit the object of his affection, with the confidence inspired by whiskers, spurs, and kid gloves. Before going, however, he takes occasion to declare his love for Miss Amelia Roper, the daughter of his boarding-house keeper, which, considering that his strong point is a quiet morality, strikes the reader as a peculiar first step towards declaring his love to another. Mr. Trollope admits this to be rather a blemish than a fine point in his hero.

One Mr. Crosbie has, meanwhile, seen, conquered, and engaged the fair Miss Lily. Mr. Crosbie is also only a London clerk, but there are clerks and clerks, and Mr. Crosbie is a swell. Mr. Eames, how—

tells his love to Miss Dale and retires, wishing, with the nice instinct of a man of honor, that she may be deserted by Mr. Crosbie, and that he may beat him to death with his fists, — a thought of awful pregnancy. Thus far he does not stand very well: his growth has not only been late, but very little, and that little very bad; therefore an English bull, a *deus ex machina,* is introduced to elevate the character of the hero, — with some sacrifice, it must be confessed, to that of the plot. Mr. Eames takes his first great step to manhood and a higher social position. He rescues an earl from an angry bull. Meanwhile Mr. Crosbie, the successful aspirant, is in an agony of doubt. A host of the strongest passions that can agitate the human breast, which in the ardor of pursuit he had left behind, now in the repose of victory catch up with and assault him. Thoughts of club-dinners soon to be abjured, of the houses of the great soon to be closed upon him forever, of brilliant assemblies, of great jams, of suppers, of the vacuous smiles of noble dames, — these thoughts assail his mind, "beseeching and besieging," and drive it to doubt and despair. At length he yields to them, jilts Miss Dale, and engages himself to the daughter of an earl. This gives occasion for our hero, Mr. Eames's second great step towards manly development. He meets Mr. Crosbie in a car. After much perspiration and meditation Mr. Eames concludes that Heaven has given his enemy into his hands to spoil him, and that he will not disappoint it. On Mr. Crosbie's leaving the car, therefore, Mr. Eames, in the face of Great Britain, takes him by the throat with one hand and wildly handles him about the head with the other, giving him a black eye.

We are compelled at this point of our hero's dizzy ascent to greatness to pause and take breath, for a slight discursus on boxing in literature. We have all read a hundred tales, and heard a hundred stories, in which a moral youth or clergyman attacks a villain, and no one case do we remember in which the moral youth or clergyman does not knock the villain down. In fact, the point of these stories consisting in this alone, their moral grandeur would be seriously affected if, instead of the pale, reverend x knocking down the brawny ruffian y, the ruffian y should knock down the reverend x. Would that these tales were true to nature! But in our position as critic, — obliged by the sacred law of his office to state and demand truth, however disagreeable, — we are compelled to say that immorality is not inconsistent with great proficiency in the pugilistic art; and if we must have fistic encounters in books, pray let the good be knocked down occasionally for the sake of truth, however repulsive to our sentiments.

In the present case we should doubt the propriety even of a successful assault. Certain crimes deserve either the severest punishment or simple disdain. It would afford little satisfaction (to a man, at least) to stick a pin into the murderer of one's father; as little to black the eye of a man who had jilted one's mistress. Moreover, Mr. Crosbie, as a man of the world, must be supposed to have known that a painter could with his brush easily remove all signs of his black eye, and the mental anguish of several chapters would not have been necessary.

Mr. Eames, after these two strides of manhood, puts off the "hobbledeboy" and assumes the man, and forthwith jilts Miss Roper, for which, strangely enough, the author does not provide him with a black eye. The heart of the noble Lord de Guest is finely touched by the last exploit of his hero, and he bids him tell Squire Dale, the uncle of the heroine, "that if he'll put a little stick under the pot to make it boil, the Earl will put a bigger one"; which, translated from the language of the nobility into the vernacular, means that, if the Squire will portion his niece, the Earl will give Mr. Eames several hundred pounds. Mr. Eames, having then consulted with this beef-eating earl of sixty as to the time and manner of making love, again proposes to Miss Dale. She, however, declares that, having loved Mr. Crosbie once, she shall love him to the end, — a sentiment of very doubtful propriety, — and here the volume ends.

A sequel to this story will soon be published. A young, accomplished, unmarried heroine, in that state of "lovely melancholy" which, being produced by love, can be cured only by the same delicious disease, at the end of a story, demands and has a legal right to a sequel. No author with any sensibility can thus abandon his own offspring to a life of cold celibacy, when, by a simple stroke of the pen, he can provide her with a paragon of a husband, and make her happy for life.

In the continuation of this work we would suggest that Mr. Eames marry the widow Cradell, *née* Roper, with her tale of children. That a new character be introduced with some of the characteristics if not of a hero, at least of a gentleman, to console Miss Dale. Or else that Miss Dale marry Mr. Crosbie, widower and dyspeptic. After all, why should an Englishman be blamed for preferring good dinners to love for a lady, however worthy? The one is a deep religious sentiment; the other, a dainty pastime. By making Mr. Crosbie a dyspeptic, the author might, without destroying the consistency or religious character of this hero, or having recourse to the vulgar method of leaving him a fortune, yet marry him to Miss Dale, — for the strictest code of morals does not require a dyspeptic to go to club-dinners.

In closing this book, we cannot avoid a reflection on the difference between American and English life it makes manifest. There is hardly intellectual and physical life enough in the sum of the lives of all the characters, from the heroine to the Earl, to keep an American schoolboy's holiday awake.

6.—*The Federalist. A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays, by* ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAY *and* MADISON. *Also, The Continentalist and other Papers, by* HAMILTON. Edited by JOHN C. HAMILTON. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. clxv., 659, and vi.

IN our last number we noticed at some length Mr. Dawson's new edition of the Federalist. We can, therefore, be more brief in our remarks on Mr. Hamilton's, which follows hard at its heels.

Mr. Hamilton retains the arrangement of the essays which was adopted in the first *collective* edition, that of 1788. This seems to have had the sanction of Alexander Hamilton, who supplied the publisher of that edition with the manuscript of the later papers. As this is the order to which all past references have conformed, it seems to be unwise to depart from it at this late day, unless there be better reason than appears, to suppose that the change was made by an unauthorized hand. Mr. Hamilton, we think, has acted judiciously in adhering to it.

In the present edition we have the revised text furnished by those of 1802 and 1810, with the corrections made by Mr. Madison at a later date. So, at least, we understand a somewhat obscure statement on page xci. Mr. Hamilton has minutely collated his text with that of Mr. Dawson, and given the results at the end of his volume. The variations are, for the most part, of slight consequence. But the list is valuable, if for nothing else, that it shows how little the original work has gained or lost by repeated handling. It would have been made more valuable, had the various readings been introduced at the bottom of the pages to which they belong, and had the collation specifically included all the leading editions. Into the comparison of the texts we need not now enter. Our preference, taking for granted the proper supplementary apparatus, would be for that of the McLeans in 1788. But both Mr. Dawson and Mr. Hamilton are against us, and we do not press the point.

The very singular controversy as to the authorship of certain papers claimed both by Hamilton and Madison is discussed by the present editor at great length, and with no small ingenuity. As to several of the papers his arguments are very strong, but it is hard to believe that in such a dispute one of the parties must have been wholly right and the other wholly wrong. The curious reader will wait with interest for

Mr. Dawson's second volume, in which the subject (if we rightly interpret a passage in his "Introduction") is to be examined. Mr. Hamilton insists emphatically on the evidence supplied by the internal characteristics of the papers themselves. But it may be that he has not utterly exhausted the soil, and that further analysis may yet add something to the body of this evidence. Whether the result would be altogether confirmatory of his view, we do not undertake to say. Secondary and imperfect as such proof must often be, and overstrained as in its application it will be without the nicest touch and the coolest judgment, still, in an auxiliary point of view, it cannot be slighted; and in a case like the present, where the declarations of honorable men are irreconcilable, there is little else to build upon. This sort of evidence cannot, indeed, always be definitely set forth, because it is so delicate, and acts so much by suggestion and impression. For this reason, we can hardly expect that this question of authorship will ever be comfortably disposed of.

Mr. Hamilton has increased the value of his edition by prefixing to the Federalist proper a series of earlier papers written by his father under the title of "The Continentalist." And he has given us in full Hamilton's first "Plan of Government," as read by him in the Convention at Philadelphia. If with the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States we had found the first Constitution of the State of New York, which is so often referred to and dwelt upon in the Federalist, and is much less accessible than the other two documents, the addition would have been welcome and useful.

This is a very convenient edition for common use. The editor could not well have added the historical and other illustrative notes now so much needed, without swelling the volume to a cumbrous bulk, or curtailing his Historical Notice. For the sake of a brief, pithy, unpedantic commentary, given page by page, in the natural place, his readers might perhaps have pardoned a little compression of the introductory matter.

7.—*An Introduction to Municipal Law. Designed for General Readers, and for Students in Colleges and Higher Schools.* By John Norton Pomeroy, Counsellor at Law. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. xxxviii. and 544.

The superlative epithets lavished by a sycophantic criticism on mere literature, whether in verse or prose, often have all the effect of irony, and, so far from elevating mediocrity in the public esteem, tend to si it into contempt. But in science, or in some department of exact knowledge, it is by no means strange that the last book should be, if by a competent author, as it is frequently pronounced to be, "the best book of the kind ever written." No man of both sense and learning will write such a book, unless he is distinctly aware of some want that needs to be supplied,—of some purpose now to be attained only by the consultation of several and scattered authorities, which may be subserved by a single manual,—and unless he is conscious of the requisite erudition and ability to prepare such a manual. To be sure, one can never pronounce with certainty how long such a work may continue the best; for its appearance may so clarify the mental vision of its readers, as to suggest new wants and new appetences in the same department, and thus its very excellence may lead to its early supersedure.

We should be inclined to employ superlatives with reference to the book before us, if there were the opportunity of using comparatives in speaking of it. But we believe that it has the distinction of being the *only* book of its kind. Yet it is surprising that this void should have remained to the present time in our educational literature,—that there should have been no text-book on the law adapted to the wants of the general reader or scholar. This book comprises what every educated man ought to know, and very little else. It displays care, thoroughness, and deliberation on the part of the author. It has a symmetrical and well-knit skeleton. It is laid out with unusual skill. The plan comprehends equally theory, history, and existing fact,—the theories that so underlie legal organisms and procedures as to be implied and presupposed by them; the history that is indispensably necessary to account for things as they are; and the actual condition of law and its administration, fully and expressly as regards America and Great Britain, briefly and incidentally as regards Continental Europe.

The Introductory Chapter of more than fifty pages is devoted chiefly to definitions, and to the various divisions and classifications of law, as to its subject-matter, its origin, its modes of promulgation (including a specification of the diverse classes of courts), and the several categories under which the whole or a portion of it may be considered. The First Part relates to the genesis of the law,—"its means, methods, and forms of development." Of course large space is here given to the unwritten law,—to the method in which judicial decisions acquire the sacredness and prestige of statutes, and to the wide difference in this respect between England and the United States on the one hand, and the nations of the European Continent on the other. The Second Part treats of the "National Sources of English and American Law," defining, as regards English law, from which our own is for the most part derived, the relative influence of the aborigines of Great Britain, the several conquering and invading nations, the feudal system, the maritime codes of the Middle Age, and the Roman law since its study has been revived. The Third Part describes our Municipal Law as it is, and enters very much at large into the rights of person and property, and the modes in which those rights are to be asserted and vindicated, with the most lucid explanation of the legal processes, maxims, and terms which are so apt to make the language of a court-room a "Babylonish dialect" to all the uninitiated.

A book of this kind should have peculiar merits of style. As to the first requisite, perspicuity, Mr. Pomeroy is faultless. This perspicuity is effected, too, without sacrifice of the next requisite, conciseness. Indeed, it is the marvel of the book that such a multitude of things can, without confusion or obscurity, be stowed in so limited a space. As regards the mere graces of style, there is nothing either to reprehend or to admire. There are no vulgarisms, or solecisms, or mannerisms, no traces of affectation, no ambitious writing; while, on the other hand, we are not, as in reading many portions of Blackstone's Commentaries, compelled to own in the mere diction, independently of its uses, a rare and brilliant beauty. Mr. Pomeroy is a correct and good writer, without any striking or fascinating rhetorical power.

We welcome this book as supplying a need which has been deeply felt in our higher seminaries of education. Law ought to be a part of a college course; but it cannot be studied to advantage without a text-book. This work is precisely what was wanted for such uses, and is adapted to be equally serviceable, whether employed as furnishing a syllabus of subjects for oral instruction, or as a manual for recitation. We are glad to know that it has already been adopted by several of our colleges. We trust that the example will be generally followed. We do not expect, indeed, by a single book or course of instruction, to graduate students learned in the law. But the prime object of our apparatus for what we call liberal education is to propound and open subjects to be pursued in after life; and the range of interest, curiosity, and research in mature years is determined chiefly by the more or less comprehensive scope of the youthful *curriculum.* Our educated men, other than lawyers, generally know as little of the law as they do of Sanscrit; and the chief reason is, that this has not been among the departments forced upon their cognizance by the educators through whose hands they were passed over to their own tuition.

8. — *Life and Times of* BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. By JAMES PARTON. New York: Mason and Brothers. 1864. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 627 and 707.

THIS work will add greatly to Mr. Parton's already well-established reputation as an historical biographer. It is a book of larger scope, of wider interest, and of greater importance than either of his previous productions. While displaying the same vivacity of mind, the same liberality of sentiment, the same ardor of feeling, and freshness of style, and fertility of illustration as his former writings, it evinces deeper research, more confirmed principles, and a greater maturity of judgment and temperance of statement. It is the book of an author master of his own powers and confident of his strength.

Without adding much in the way of new material to our knowledge of Franklin's life, which indeed was impossible after the exact and thorough biography, and the admirable and very complete collection of the writings of Franklin, by President Sparks, Mr. Parton has so used the materials at his hand, has illustrated them from so many sources, and has worked them up with such skill, as to present a living and animated portrait of his great subject, full of interest and instruction, not only to those hitherto unfamiliar with the details of Franklin's life, but also to those hitherto best acquainted with them. He deserves the gratitude of Americans for the manner in which he has accomplished his task, by which attention will be still more drawn to the example, and a fresh sympathy be awakened in the character and career, of Franklin.

There are a few passages in the book which a just criticism might condemn, — vivacity of style occasionally passing the bounds of good taste, and imperfect reflection appearing in the guise of deep thought; but these are slight blemishes on the general excellence of the work. There are very few biographers in English literature who narrate as well as Mr. Parton, or who sustain the interest of the reader so steadily; few who enter with clearer insight into the characters of the men concerning whom they write, or show quicker perceptions of the relations of circumstances. In this, as in his other works, though perhaps in a less degree than in them, Mr. Parton shows occasionally a defective moral judgment in regard to the nature of certain actions and opinions; but his intention is invariably correct, and when he errs in his estimate of men, this fault springs not so much from want of principle as from want of firmness and consistency of thought, combined with a generous but superabundant charity. His error springs from no perversity or twist of mind, such as disfigure and discredit the work of Mr. Carlyle, the great imaginative biographer.

In Franklin's life Mr. Parton had a subject peculiarly fitted for his genius. Franklin is the ideal type of the Yankee. His virtues and his faults are alike those of the Yankee; and his career is not less typical than his character. The lesson of his life is well worthy the study of those who would understand the actual nature of the American people and the growth of American social and political institutions, and of those, too, who hope for and believe in the development of a nobler and higher type of national character under the influences of liberty, justice, and equal rights organized in those institutions. We commend Mr. Parton's book most warmly to all such.

9.—*Beadle's Dime Books.—Novels and Library of Fiction; Biographies; Song-Books; School Series; Hand-Books for Popular Use; Hand-Books of Games, &c.; &c., &c.* New York. 1859–1864. 12mo.

A young friend of ours was recently suffering from that most harassing of complaints, *convalescence*, of which the remedy consists in copious draughts of amusement, prescribed by the patient. Literature was imperatively called for, and administered in the shape of Sir Walter Scott's novels. These did very well for a day or two,—when, the convalescence running into satiety of the most malignant type, a new remedy was demanded, and the *clamor de profundis* arose. "I wish I had *a Dime Novel.*" The coveted medicament was obtained, and at once took vigorous hold of the system. The rapidity of cure effected by it induced us to investigate somewhat more deeply into the attractions and character of the "Dime Books" of all kinds, and a pile of forty-five volumes—all, with the exception of a few double numbers, sold at ten cents each—lies before us, being merely a selection from among them.

These works are issued by Messrs. Beadle & Co., of New York, in virtue of an enterprise started in the year 1859. They already amount to several hundred separate publications, and circulate to the extent of many hundred thousands. This need hardly be stated to any one who is in the way of casting his eye on the counter of any railway book-stall or newsdealer's shop. But the statistical statement, from authority, may excite some interest,—that, up to April 1st, an aggregate of five millions of Beadle's Dime Books had been put in circulation, of which half at least were novels, nearly a third songs, and the remainder hand-books, biographies, &c. After this we are prepared for colossal statements as to the millions of reams of paper employed, &c. The sales of single novels by popular authors often amount to nearly forty thousand in two or three months.*

It might be thought we should dwell on this evidence of abundant and quick sale somewhat less cursorily, but the American public is used not only to the assertion, but the fact, of enormous, marvellous sales of cheap literature. What these books are in themselves, and why they meet with this sale, is quite another matter, which we propose to consider shortly.

The forty-five volumes before us may be presumed to be a fair selection from the various classes. We have fourteen works of what may be called fact, i. e. biographies and tales of historic character, to which may be added an edition of the National Tax Law. We have pertaining to polite literature, oratory, and poetry, fourteen volumes, namely, five "Speakers" (two of Dialogue and three of Soliloquies), five volumes of Songs, one of Verses "suitable for albums, &c.," a Manual of Etiquette, another of Letter-Writing, and one volume of "Fun." Lastly, we have two volumes of the Library of Selected Fiction, and thirteen of Beadle's Dime Novels.

The statement is made, that the editors and publishers carefully revise all works sent them by untried hands; and as many of the works of fact and literature mentioned above bear no special name, we must suppose them to have a kind of editorial sanction. The biographies in our possession are ten in number: Garibaldi, Daniel Boone, Kit Carson, General Wayne, David Crockett, General Scott, Pontiac, Paul Jones, Lafayette, and Tecumseh. They do not all require special mention, as most of them concern individuals whose lives have been long before the public in the fullest manner. The first biography issued — namely, that of Garibaldi — claims to be something original, not a servile copy of "memoirs" by Dumas or others, but resting on the original documents of the South American republics. This being so, the author might have spared a vast part of his moral reflections, and bursts of ecstatic admiration, which would have left him room to give at length the adventures of the campaigns in the Two Sicilies, so vastly more entertaining and important than the struggle in the La Plata states.

Our readers will be pleased to know that the author of the Life of Tecumseh does not attempt to settle who was the author of his death.

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* Over 350,000 copies of the Dime Song-Book No. 1 have been sold. The Dime National Tax Law has reached a circulation of more than 200,000 copies. The first edition of the Dime Novel "Seth Jones" was of 60,000 copies. Sales almost unprecedented in the annals of booksellers. A Dime Novel is issued each month, and the series has undoubtedly obtained greater popularity than any other series of works of fiction published in America.

Neither in this nor any of the other nine biographies is there anything which a pupil at our public schools could not get out of a good encyclopædia. The general style is loose and flat beyond conception. We are treated to such choice morsels as this: "It is the loftiest merit of a great commander, that he woo the basilisk Bellona, who tricks herself out and flounces herself in all the colors of the rainbow, and yet who caters at privation and waste, at terror and pestilence, and whose embrace is death — only when justified by considerations of right." Truly a noble amplification and correction of one line in Macbeth and one in Il Penseroso!

In addition to these, we have two volumes of biographies of "Men of the Times," — short notices, of fifteen or twenty pages each, of the prominent generals in the present war. Our historical series is completed by three volumes of Tales, containing the well-known, thrice-told adventures by flood and field of Kenton, Boone, Brant, &c. As the facts have been so often narrated, it would seem the duty of the editors to pay as much attention as possible to the setting, style, descriptions of character, &c., and we are accordingly favored with such acute estimates as this, speaking of a British spy in the Revolution: "He yielded his life a sacrifice to his loyalty to a king who cared nothing for suffering humanity or the rights of his subjects, so long as he could wring from their earnings the wherewithal to swell his income and minister to his pleasures." Alas poor George III. and his daily leg of roast mutton!

The treatises on polite literature and the arts of elocution and composition should be briefly noticed. We have among them three "Speakers" and two books of dialogue. These, especially the "Comic Speaker," are in no respect better or worse than other well-known volumes of the kind. The "Patriotic Speaker" does contain several pieces we have not yet seen incorporated elsewhere, and as a whole do not wish to see again. The five volumes of Song-Books, which have in general had a very extensive circulation, are good, — made up of prime old favorites, and choice productions of more recent date. The "Knapsack Song-Book" must be excepted, however, as containing a very inferior selection. The book of Verses, for Albums, &c., is bad. The selections are generally wholly without point, from very inferior authors; and when an esteemed and beautiful piece is taken, it is hashed up in the following style. Sir W. Jones translated thus: —

> "On parent knees, a naked, new-born child,
> Weeping thou sat'st, while all around thee smiled.
> So live, that, sinking to thy last, long sleep,
> Calm thou mayst smile, while all around thee weep."

But this will not do; the word "naked" shocks our refined ears. Hear the alteration: —

"Clasped in thy nurse's arms, O gentle child,
Thou didst first *weep* while all around thee *smiled*.
So live, that, sinking to thy last, long sleep,
Thou mayst *smile*, while all around thee *weep*."

Better have kept the original Persian; — and how kind to put *weep* and *smile* in italics!

The books of "Fun" read like scrap-books composed of the Editor's Drawer in "Harper's Magazine." There are some really good jokes. The Manuals of "Etiquette" and "Letter-Writing" are what such manuals always are, — full of second-rate gentility, and what is rather furniture polish than that of society. "Turning up the sleeves on sitting down to table, as some persons do, is gross in the highest degree." We should think so! But there are many useful and true things in these books, and they might be read advantageously by so-called ladies and gentlemen.

We come now to the novels. The "Library of Select Fiction" offers us two examples of reprints, — John Neal's "White-Faced Pacer" and Mrs. Gaskell's "Lois the Witch," here called "The Maiden Martyr." The latter is well known as an admirable tale. The former is graphic and characteristic, but surely, when purporting to describe the youth of the gallant Captain Nathan Hale, it need not inflict on him an entirely supposititious and unnatural family, when his own father, brothers, and sisters are so well known in Massachusetts.

But the original novels, Beadle's Dime Novels, of which the favorite authors are Mrs. Ann S. Stephens, Mrs. Metta V. Victor, Edward S. Ellis, Esq., and A. J. H. Duganne! Ten of these novels have we faithfully read through, and more up-hill work in the main we never had; and this while Anthony Trollope and Dickens are living, and Thackeray is only just dead. We shall give abstracts of some of them, to show of what sort they are.

"Malaeska." By Mrs. Ann S. Stephens. An Indian woman loses her white husband by her father's hand; carries their son to his grandfather in New York, which, though the scene is laid in the last century, is always called Manhattan; is forbidden to declare herself. Attempts to reclaim her boy to a savage life, — fails, — returns to her tribe; for a wonder (why?) is not murdered; settles down in the scene of her widowhood, where she finds her son on his wedding-day, and reveals his parentage, — a revelation resulting in his suicide and her death. This is all in the regular dialect. Malaeska has the Great Spirit and hunting-grounds always on her tongue's end. Mr. Danforth, her father-in-law, is the old-fashioned, stern father, doting on his grandchild, but hating his son's wife. Of the style two specimens will suffice. Page 7, "It was early in *May*," etc. etc.; p. 9, in describing the very same place and time, "The heavy piles of foliage was [*sic*] thrifty and ripe with the warm breath of *August*." Each chapter — save the mark! — is introduced by a poetical quotation, which on p. 119 is thus: —

> "Wild was her look, wild was her air,
> Back from her shoulders streamed the hair;
> The locks that wont her brow to shade
> Started erectly from her head;
> Her figure seemed to rise more high,
> From her pale lips a frantic cry
> Rang sharply through the moon's pale light,
> And life to her was endless night."

Constance de Beverley, thy wrongs are not yet avenged!

"Alice Wilde," by Mrs. M. V. Victor, is very much better; but the characters — the refined gentleman who affects the disguise of a backwoodsman, the young lady at once perfectly masculine and perfectly feminine, and her mad lover — are all cruelly unnatural, and but little relieved by the negro humor. The word "shall," we need not say, has but rare admission into Mrs. Victor's style. The same writer gives us the "Backwood's Bride," — more masculine young lady, more hair-breadth 'scapes, and the addition of a cruel, unnatural father, who suddenly is awakened to a sense of his daughter's misery, by no means at its highest point. The humors of Aunt Debby are delicious, but monotonous. Some terrible mistakes in style occur: — Page 7, "*Whom*, he was bound, should not have a single one." P. 23, "It was him"; and on p. 25, the common but silly vulgarism, "illy," — as if "well" and "ill" were not adverbs. In "Uncle Ezekiel," an insolent, loquacious, detestable Yankee-notion-monger appears as the protector of a lovely young lady against the wiles of her aristocratic English relatives, and marries her to his *protégé*, a young backwoodsman. This of course gives a fine opportunity for all the conventional falsehoods about England and the English, who yet appear even in this book more amiable than in Sam Slick. Mrs. Victor describes her heroine's home, when necessary, as in the wildest part of the prairies, but contrives to get an admirable girl's school and academy founded close by as soon as she is old enough to attend them. "Maum Guinea," by the same author, is one of the thousand stories of negro life which owe their style, character, and very existence to "Uncle Tom's Cabin." "The Unionist's Daughter" has its scene laid in Tennessee. In order to increase the interest, Mrs. Victor confesses that she has taken liberties with the chronology. But it is a little too bad to introduce a Tennessee gentleman as ostracized for voting the Union ticket in 1860. Does Mrs. Victor remember for what candidates the vote of Tennessee was given? "The Reefer of '76" is a very weak dilution of Cooper's sea novels, almost wholly without an attempt at plot. Mr. E. S. Ellis's "Seth Jones" and "Trail Hunters" are good, very good. Mr. Ellis's novels are favorites, and deserve to be. He shows variety and originality in his characters; and his Indians are human beings, and not fancy pieces. "Godbold the Spy," and "The Land Claim," are commonplace, pointless, — old fun, old adventures, old scenes. "Massasoit's Daughter," by A. J. H. Duganne, is geography run mad. The scene is laid in Massachusetts. Mr. Duganne begins by laying a reef of rocks along the shores of Cape Cod (p. 11). He then establishes a flourishing colony of Narragansetts at Wachusett (p. 16). A score of miles south of this hill is Massachusetts Bay (p. 17), whose shores are inhabited by Pequods; a reach of rocks environs the mouth of the Mystic (p. 24); and the Indian of Wachusett is in the habit of launching his canoe on the rivers of the Penobscot, Merrimac, and Piscataqua, even to the *far* Connecticut (p. 73). These exquisite touches of geography quite overshadow the minor absurdities of an English sailor, in the year 1615, feeling conscientious scruples about selling an Indian into slavery, and the like.

Why these works are popular is a problem quite as much for the moralist and the student of national character as for the critic. It is a satisfaction that, being so, they are without exception, so far as we can judge, unobjectionable morally, whatever fault be found with their literary style and composition. They do not even obscurely pander to vice, or excite the passions. And it is a striking fact, to be learned from Messrs. Beadle & Co.'s account of sales, that the best books on their list are those for which there is the greatest demand. This fact should serve to stimulate them to endeavor to secure superior excellence, and to elevate the character of their books. If a novel as good as those by Mr. Ellis sells twice as fast as one by an inferior author, it is for their interest to obtain the services of other writers of not less merit than he. With such established popularity as they have obtained for their publications, a serious responsibility rests upon them. They are wielding an instrument of immense power in education and civilization. They are bound to use it, not alone with reference to their own profit, but with constant regard to its effect upon the public. By discarding poor works, by publishing books of real excellence and interest, exact in statement, careful in style, and true to nature, they may do much to form a correct public taste, and to supply with sound information a vast body of readers not likely to be reached by any other literature. They may become, what we have no doubt they desire to be, real public benefactors. They can find no more honorable employment than that of supplying at a low cost to their immense constituency the popular masterpieces of English literature both of the past and of the present time.

The success of Messrs. Beadle & Co.'s undertaking has led other publishers in New York and Boston to engage in similar enterprises. As yet none of them, so far as we are aware, has reached any great magnitude. But we wish them all success, and regard the competition thus established as likely to be of service in raising the character of cheap literature generally.

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10. — *My Cave Life in Vicksburg. With Letters of Trial and Travel.* By a Lady. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. 196.

This is a curious and entertaining little book. It gives an interior view from the Southern side of one of the most interesting episodes of the war, and affords very striking pictures of the sufferings, exposures, and strange vicissitudes of fortune which many persons in the Confederate States have undergone during the progress of the rebellion. The actual scenes and occurrences of war, its distresses and its horrors, have been so far from our experience, our Northern communities have been so free from any of its immediate material evils, and the course of our lives has flowed with so little change in its wonted channels, that it has been, and will always be, difficult for us to realize the extent and nature of the retributive suffering that has fallen upon individuals and communities at the South.

"My Cave Life at Vicksburg" reads like the narrative of an experience almost as remote from us as that described in "A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow," — a book which in some respects it resembles. But notwithstanding this seeming remoteness, it is impossible not to feel that it relates to what is really near to us, and to events which concern us very intimately.

The husband of the author was an officer in the Rebel army, and the sympathies of the author are plainly with the South; but there is nothing offensive to Northern feeling in the book, and the narrative is of a nature to awaken a friendly interest and compassion for its writer. There have, indeed, been few more interesting stories of the war.

Incidentally, and quite without the design of the author, the book affords striking glimpses of the semi-barbarism and the dulness of human feeling produced by slavery. To break up a system the effects of which are so inevitably degrading both to the whites and to the blacks, and to redeem them both alike to humanity and civilization, are worth all the cost, all the effort, and all the sacrifices of the war.

11. — *Hints to Riflemen.* By H. W. S. Cleveland. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. 260.

This is a very timely treatise. Its object is to promote a general interest in a subject of national importance, and the book is so well done that it cannot fail to accomplish its end. It treats, in the main, of the general principles of rifle practice, of the merits of different classes of guns, cartridges, &c., and of the special varieties of rifles now in use. It is full of practical information, alike for the sportsman and the soldier, it is written in a clear and popular style, and its precepts and suggestions are enforced by illustrations and arguments drawn from long experience and careful investigation.

Mr. Cleveland is an old sportsman, and has long been known as an authority on the subject of which he writes. His book is of especial value at the present time, when no man should feel that he accomplishes his duty to the country unless he acquires the knowledge of the use of arms.

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12. — *Lucasta. The Poems of* Richard Lovelace, Esq., *now first edited and the Text carefully revised. With some Account of the Author, and a few Notes.* By W. Carew Hazlitt, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: John Russell Smith. 1864. pp. xlii. and 293.

Three short pieces of Lovelace's have lived, and deserved to live: "To Lucasta from Prison," "To Lucasta on going to the Wars," and "The Grasshopper." They are graceful, airy, and nicely finished. The last especially is a charming poem, delicate in expression, and full of quaint fancy, which only in the latter half is strained to conceit. As the verses of a gentleman they are among the best, though not of a very high order as poetry. He is to be classed with the *lucky* authors who, without great powers, have written one or two pieces so facile in thought and fortunate in phrase as to be carried lightly in the memory, poems in which analysis finds little, but which are charming in their frail completeness. This faculty of hitting on the precise *lilt* of thought and measure that shall catch the universal ear and sing themselves in everybody's memory, is a rare gift. We have heard many ingenious persons try to explain the *cling* of such a poem as "The Burial of Sir John Moore," and the result of all seemed to be, that there were certain verses that were good, not because of their goodness, but because one could not forget them. They have the great merit of being portable, and we have to carry so much luggage through life, that we should be thankful for what will pack easily and take up no room.

All that Lovelace wrote beside these three poems is utterly worthless, mere chaff from the threshing of his wits. Take out the four pages on which they are printed, and we have two hundred and eighty-nine left of the sorriest stuff that ever spoiled paper. The poems are obscure, without anything in them to reward perseverance, dull without being moral, and full of conceits so far-fetched that we could wish the author no worse fate than to carry them back to where they came from. We are no enemies to what are commonly called conceits, but authors bear them, as heralds say, with a difference. And a terrible difference it is! With men like Earle, Donne, Fuller, Butler, Marvell, and even Quarles, conceit means wit; they would carve the merest cherry-stone of thought in the quaintest and delicatest fashion. But with duller and more painful writers, such as Gascoyne, Marston, Felltham, and a score of others, even with cleverer ones like Waller, Crashawe, and Suckling, where they insisted on being fine, their wit is conceit. Difficulty without success is perhaps the least tolerable kind of writing. Mere stupidity is a natural failing; we skip and pardon. But the other is Dulness in a domino, that travesties its familiar figure, and lures us only to disappoint. These unhappy verses of Lovelace's had been dead and lapt in congenial lead these two hundred years; — what harm had he done Mr. Hazlitt that he should disinter them? There is no such disenchanter of peaceable reputations as one of these resurrection-men of literature, who will not let mediocrities rest in the grave, where the kind sexton, Oblivion, had buried them, but dig them up to make a profit on their lead.

Mr. Russell Smith has been singularly unfortunate in his choice of editors. Some of the books he has chosen for reprinting perhaps deserved no better fate; but be that as it may, only one of the works in his series has been more than tolerably edited. We mean the five volumes of Chapman's translations, by the Rev. Mr. Hooper. And even those, though most faithfully collated with the original editions, are disfigured with some extraordinary blunders in the notes, and not a few lapses in the text. For example, "treen *broches*" (Hymn to Hermes, 227) is explained "branches of trees"! It means simply "wooden spits." In the Bacchus (28, 29), Mr. Hooper restores the corrupt reading which Mr. Singer (for a wonder) had set right. He prints

> Nay, which of all the Pow'r fully-divined
> Esteem ye him . . . . . ?"

Of course it should be "powerfully-divined," for otherwise we must read "Powers." But we have so much for which to thank Mr. Hooper that we will not consider too nicely with him.

Of all Mr. Smith's editors, however, Mr. W. Carew Hazlitt is the worst. He is at times positively incredible, worse even than Mr. Halliwell, and that is saying a good deal. Worthless as Lovelace's poems were, they should have been edited correctly, if edited at all. Even dulness and dirtiness have a right to fair play, and to be dull and dirty in their own way. Mr. Hazlitt has allowed all the misprints of the original (or by far the greater part of them) to stand, but he has ventured on many emendations of the text, and in every important instance has blundered, and that, too, even where the habitual practice of his author in the use of words might have led him right. The misapprehension shown in some of his notes is beyond the belief of any not familiar with the way in which old books are edited in England by the job. We have brought a heavy indictment, and we proceed to our proof, choosing only cases where there can be no dispute. We should premise that Mr. Hazlitt professes to have corrected the punctuation.

> "And though he sees it full of wounds,
> Cruel one, still he wounds it." (p. 34.)

Here the original reads, "Cruel, still on," and the only correction needed was a comma after "cruel."

> "And by the glorious light
> Of both those stars, which of their spheres bereft,
> Only the jelly 's left." (p. 41.)

The original has "of which," and rightly, for "their spheres bereft" is parenthetic, and the sense is "of which only the jelly 's left." Lovelace is speaking of the eyes of a mistress who has grown old, and his image, confused as it is, is based on the belief that stars shooting from their spheres fell to the earth as jellies, — a belief, by the way, still prevalent in New England.

Lovelace, describing a cow (and it is one of the few pretty passages in the volume), says, —

> "She was the largest, goodliest beast
> That ever mead or altar blest,
> Round as her udder, and more white
> Than is the Milky-Way in night." (p. 64.)

Mr. Hazlitt changes to "Round was her udder," thus making that white instead of the cow, as Lovelace intended. On the next page we read, —

> "She takes her leave o' th' mournful neat,
> Who, by her toucht, now prizeth her life,
> Worthy alone the hollowed knife."

The original was "prize their life," and the use of "neat" as a singular in this way is so uncommon, and the verse as corrected so halting, that we have no doubt Lovelace so wrote it. Of course "hollowed" should be "hallowed," though the broader pronunciation still lingers in our country pulpits.

"Fly Joy on wings of Popinjays
To courts of fools *where* as your plays
Die laught at and forgot." (p. 67.)

The original has "there." Read, —

"Fly, Joy, on wings of popinjays
To courts of fools; there, as your plays,
Die," &c.

"Where as," as then used, would make it the "plays" that were to die.

"As he Lucasta nam'd, a groan
Strangles the fainting passing tone;
But as she heard, Lucasta smiles,
Posses her round; she 's slipt meanwhiles
Behind the blind of a thick bush." (p. 68.)

Mr. Hazlitt's note on "posses" could hardly be matched by any member of the *posse comitatus* taken at random: —

"This word does not appear to have any very exact meaning. See Halliwell's *Dictionary of Archaic Words*, art. *Posse*, and Worcester's Dict., *ibid.*, &c. The context here requires *to turn sharply or quickly.*"

The "*ibid*, &c." is delightful; in other words, "find out the meaning of *posse* for yourself." Though dark to Mr. Hazlitt, the word has not the least obscurity in it. It is only another form of *push*, nearer the French *pousser*, from Latin *pulsare*, and "the context here requires" nothing more than that an editor should read a poem if he wish to understand it. The plain meaning is, —

"But, as she heard *Lucasta*, smiles
Possess her round."

That is, when she heard the name *Lucasta*, — for thus far in the poem she has passed under the pseudonyme of *Amarantha*. "Possess her round" is awkward, but mildly so for Lovelace, who also spells "commandress" in the same way with a single *s*.

"O thou, that swing'st upon the waving eare,
Of some well-filled oaten beard." (p. 94.)

Mr. Hazlitt, for some inscrutable reason, changes "haire" to "eare" in the first line, preferring the ear of a *beard* to its hair!

"The radiant gemme was brightly set
In as divine a carkanet;
Of which the clearer was not knowne
Her minde or her complexion." (p. 101.)

The original reads rightly "for which," &c., and, the passage being rightly pointed, we have, —

> "For which the clearer was not known,
> Her mind or her complexion."

Of course "complexion" had not its present limited meaning.

> ". . . . my future daring bayes
> Shall bow itself." (p. 107.)

"We should read *themselves*," says Mr. Hazlitt's note authoritatively; of course a noun ending in *s* is plural. Not so fast. In spite of the dictionaries, *bays* was often used in the singular.

> "Do plant a sprig of cypress, not of bays,"

says Robert Randolph in verses prefixed to his brother's poems; and Felltham in "Jonsonus Virbius,"

> "A greener bays shall crown Ben Jonson's name."

But we will cite Mr. Bayes himself: —

> "And, where he took *it* up, resigns the *bays*."

> "But we (defend us!) are divine,
> [Not] female, but madam born, and come
> From a right-honorable wombe." (p. 115.)

Here Mr. Carew has ruined both sense and metre by his unhappy "not." We should read "Female, but madam-born," meaning clearly enough "we are women, it is true, but of another race."

> "In every hand [let] a cup be found
> That from all hearts a health may sound." (p. 121.)

Wrong again, and ruinous to the measure. Is it possible that Mr. Hazlitt does not understand so common an English construction as this?

> "First told thee into th' ayre, then to the ground." (p. 141.)

Mr. Hazlitt inserts the "to," which is not in the original, from another version. Lovelace wrote "ayër." We have noted two other cases (pp. 203 and 248) where he makes the word a dissyllable. On the same page we have "shewe's" changed to "shew" because Mr. Hazlitt did not know it meant "show us" and not "shows." On page 170, "their" is substituted for "her," which refers to Lucasta, and could refer to nothing else.

Mr. Hazlitt changes "quarrels *the* student Mercury" to "quarrels *with*," not knowing that *quarrels* was once used as an active verb. (p. 189.)

Wherever he chances to notice it, Mr. Hazlitt changes the verb following two or more nouns connected by an "and" from singular to plural. For instance:

> "You, sir, alone, fame, and all conquering rhyme
> File the set teeth," &c. (p. 224.)

for "files." Lovelace commonly writes so; — on p. 181, where it escaped Mr. Hazlitt's grammatical eye, we find, —

> "But broken faith, and th' cause of it,
> All-damning gold, *was* damned to the pit."

Indeed it was usual with writers of that day. Milton in one of his sonnets has,

> "Thy worth and skill *exempts* thee from the throng," —

and Leigh Hunt, for the sake of the archaism, in one of his, "Patience and Gentleness *is* power."

Weariness, and not want of matter, compels us to desist from further examples of Mr. Hazlitt's emendations. But we must also give a few specimens of his notes, and of the care with which he has corrected the punctuation.

Page 76, in a note on "flutes of canary" too long to quote, Mr. Hazlitt, after citing the glossary of Nares (edition of 1859, by Wright and Halliwell, a very careless book, to speak mildly), in which *flute* is conjectured to mean *cask*, says that he is not satisfied, but adds, "I suspect that a flute *of canary* was so called from the cask having several vent-holes." But flute means simply a tall glass. Lassel, describing the glass-making at Murano, says, "For the High Dutch they have high glasses called *Flutes*, a full yard long." The origin of the word, though doubtful, is probably nearer to *flood* than *flute*. But conceive of two gentlemen, members of one knows not how many learned societies, like Messrs. Wright and Halliwell, pretending to edit Nares, when they query a word which they could have found in any French or German dictionary!

On page 93 we have, —

> "Hayle, holy cold! chaste temper, hayle! the fire
> Raved o'er my purer thoughts I feel t' expire."

Mr. Hazlitt annotates thus: "*Rav'd* seems here to be equivalent to *reav'd* or *bereav'd*. Perhaps the correct reading may be 'reav'd.' See Worcester's *Dictionary*, art. Rave, where Menage's supposition of affinity between *rave* and *bereave* is perhaps a little too slightingly treated."

The meaning of Lovelace was, "the fire *that* raved." But what Mr. Hazlitt would make with "reaved o'er my purer thoughts," we cannot conceive. On the whole, we think he must have written the note merely to make his surprising glossological suggestion. All that Worcester does for the etymology, by the way, is to cite Richardson, no safe guide.

"Where now one *so so* spatters, t'other: no!" (p. 112.)

The comma in this verse has, of course, no right there, but Mr. Hazlitt leaves the whole passage so corrupt that we cannot spend time in disinfecting it. We quote it only for the sake of his note on "*so so.*" It is marvellous.

"An exclamation of approval when an actor made a hit. The corruption seems to be somewhat akin to the Italian '*si, si*,' a corruption of '*sia, sia.*'"

That the editor of an English poet need not understand Italian we may grant, but that he should not know the meaning of a phrase so common in his own language as *so-so* is intolerable. Lovelace has been saying that a certain play might have gained applause under certain circumstances, but that everybody calls it *so-so*, — something very different from "an exclamation of approval," one should say. The phrase answers exactly to the Italian *così così*, while *sì* (not *si*) is derived from *sic*, and is analogous with the affirmative use of the German *so* and the Yankee *jes' so.*

"Oh, how he hast'ned death, burnt to be fryed!" (p. 141.)

The note on *fryed* is, —

"I. e. freed. *Free* and *freed* were sometimes pronounced like *fry* and *fryed;* for Lord North, in his *Forest of Varieties*, 1645, has these lines: —

'Birds that long have lived free,
Caught and cag'd, but pine and die.'

Here evidently *free* is intended to rhyme with *die.*"

"Evidently!" An instance of the unsafeness of rhyme as a guide to pronunciation. It was *die* that had the sound of *dee*, as everybody (but Mr. Hazlitt) knows. Lovelace himself rhymes *die* and *she* on p. 269. But what shall we say to our editor's not knowing that *fry* was used formerly where we should say *burn?* Lovers used to *fry* with love, whereas now they have got out of the frying-pan into the fire. In this case a martyr is represented as burning (i. e. longing) to be fried (i. e. burned).

"Her beams ne'er shed or change like th' hair of day." (p. 224.)

Mr. Hazlitt's note is, —

"*Hair* is here used in what has become quite an obsolete sense. The meaning is outward form, nature, or character. The word used to be by no means uncommon; but it is now, as was before remarked, out of fashion; and indeed I do not think that it is found even in any old writer used exactly in the way in which Lovelace has employed it."

We should think not, as Mr. Hazlitt understands it! Did he never hear of the golden hair of Apollo, — of the *intonsum Cynthium?* Don Quixote was a better scholar where he speaks of *las doradas hebras de* *sus hermosos cabellos.* But *hair* never meant what Mr. Hazlitt says it does, even when used as he supposes it to be here. It had nothing to do with "outward form, nature, or character," but had a meaning much nearer what we express by temperament, which its color was and is thought to indicate.

On p. 232 "*wild* ink" is explained to mean "*unrefined.*" It is a mere misprint for "*vild.*"

P. 237, Mr. Hazlitt, explaining an allusion of Lovelace to the "east and west" in speaking of George Sandys, mentions Sandys's Oriental travels, but seems not to know that he translated Ovid in Virginia.

Pages 251 – 252:

> "And as that soldier conquest doubted not,
> Who but one splinter had of Castriot,
> But would assault ev'n death, so strongly charmed,
> And naked oppose rocks, with this bone armed."

Mr. Hazlitt reads *his* for *this* in the last verse, and his note on "bone" is: —

"And he found a new jawbone of an ass, and put forth his hand and took it, and slew a thousand men therewith.' (Judges xv. 15.)"

Could the farce of "editing" go further? To make a 'splinter of Castriot' an ass's jawbóne, is a little too bad. We refer Mr. Hazlitt to "The Life of George Castriot, King of Epirus and Albania," &c., &c., (Edinburgh, 1753,) p. 32, for an explanation of this profound difficulty. He will there find that the Turkish soldiers wore relics of Scanderbeg as charms.

Of his corrections of the press we will correct a few samples.

P. 82, for "fall *too*," read "fall *to*" (or, as we ought to print such words, "fall-to"). P. 83, for "star-made firmament," read "star, made firmament." P. 161, for "To look their enemies *in* their hearse," read, both for sense and metre, *into*. P. 176, for "the gods *have* kneeled," read *had*. P. 182, for "In beds they tumbled *off* their own," read *of*. P. 184, for "in mine one monument I lie," read *owne*. P. 212, for "Deucalion's *black*flung stone," read "backflung." Of the punctuation we shall give but one specimen, and that a fair average one: —

> "Naso to his Tibullus flung the wreath,
> He to Catullus thus did each bequeath.
> This glorious circle, to another round,
> At last the temples of a god it bound."

Our readers over ten years of age will easily correct this for themselves.

The volume is dedicated appropriately enough to Mr. Hazlitt's father, who once edited an edition of Montaigne with as little knowledge of French as his son has shown of English.

13.— *Man and Nature, or Physical Geography as modified by Human Action.* By George P. Marsh. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. pp. 560.

Mr. Marsh's former volumes on the history and etymology of the English language did more, we think, than anything before written by an American, to win respect for our scholarship abroad. Disclaiming any attempt at strictly scientific method, and without having made philology a specialty, they showed a knowledge at once so particular and comprehensive, and a scholarship so securely up to the level of the latest achievements in that study, that they took rank at once as the most interesting, and in many high qualities the most valuable, contribution to our knowledge of English since Horne Tooke. The present work shows the same breadth of view, the same power of various illustration, the same conscientiousness of statement, the same integrity of judgment; and we cannot but think it fortunate that the United States should be represented in a country where scholarship is valued by a man who is himself a type of our highest civilization, and whose whole tone of thought and balance of character show that we are no longer provincial.

As men grow older, they become more Aristotelian and less Platonic. They want something more solid than the ideal butter of speculation to make their parsnips palatable, and they would rather have one parsnip grown in the solid earth of observation and experience, than all the air-plants that ever grew in the thin atmosphere of theory. What is true of the individual man seems to be true also of the race. Facts grow to be of more and more value, and the main concern is to be sure that they are what they pretend to be. The value we set on accurate knowledge is remarkable, and shows how dear truth is, after all, to the human heart. A country parson or doctor with a good thermometer, and the single talent of exactly observing and recording its readings for fifty years, runs a fairer chance of having his works remembered and cited after his death than one in a thousand of his contemporary authors. There is a vast difference, however, in the quality of fact-collectors. There are the indiscriminate gatherers, impelled by an irresistible magpie instinct, who add to their indigested heap whatever is light enough to be carried, and hoard with equal pleasure a glass bead or a gold coin of Syracuse.

> "They have strange places crammed
> With observation, the which they vent
> In mangled forms."

And there are the rarer minds, impelled by a real hunger for knowledge, who select and classify, making a museum, and not a mere collection. Yet even the former class are not without their value, and

Athenæus has been of more service to posterity than many far superior men.

There is a charm also in personal observation, and we like to associate the man with the fact. It is this that gives a special interest to such books as White's Selborne, and the ornithologies of Wilson and Nuttall. Mr. Marsh belongs to the higher order of men, who organize experience, who make inductions as well as gather the materials for them. His mind drains a vast surface of knowledge, and he not only sees clearly to the farthest corners of earth through the windows of books, but his own eye is watchful, and his memory carries a fact observed in Vermont till he can match and confirm it in Egypt or Italy. We have found his book a delightful one. It suggests thought and pleases the fancy at the same time; for while it implies long study, and has the peculiar library aroma in it, yet its character is such that it seems as if all its books had been found in running brooks, and you are now in the forest, now on the mountain, as you read. It deals with the two subjects most interesting to man, — himself and the world he lives in, — and shows how the two, naturally friendly, become hostile for want of mutual understanding. You have science drawn from the highest sources, and facts from the humblest. Side by side with Humboldt, whose intelligence laid the whole earth under contribution, we find a neighbor from Vermont with his thermometer, or his bit of experience about a saw-mill.

Some of the facts cited by Mr. Marsh to show the wasteful and short-sighted energy of man as a destroying agent, almost seem to justify the old cynical view of the race as a tribe of ants. One would think that we were gradually eating out the heart of the old tree Igdrasil, till it was in danger of crashing down about our ears before long. Consider, for example, that we are burning up forests so fast in our lucifer-matches as to risk the extermination of the pine; that our unthrifty woodcraft is changing the climate and productions of entire provinces; that we are draining the earth of its vital sap as if it were a sugar-maple. As we read, we feel a ghastly apprehension, like that of Chaplain Schmelzle, lest suddenly all the oxygen be abstracted from the air. But, on the whole, Mr. Marsh's volume is consoling; for, proving as it does the power of man for mischief, it suggests also that the same prodigious force, intelligently organized and guided, may be equally potent for remedy and the restoring of equilibrium. One striking reflection suggested by it is the usefulness of every particle of organized and unorganized matter, not only for special and immediate ends, such as food, warmth, light, and the like, but also as parts of a mighty and intelligible system. We are incidentally led, too, as Mr. Marsh more than once pointedly hints, to reflect upon the rights and duties of government, as preventive and advisory, and to feel that there is a common interest which vastly transcends the claims of individual freedom of action. A book so interesting and instructive, which will lure the young to observe and take delight in Nature, and the mature to respect her rights as essential to their own well-being, which pleads the cause of birds and beasts and trees, we welcome as a public benefaction. We hope it may find its way into every school and town library in the country.

14. — *Lyrics of a Day: or Newspaper-Poetry.* By a Volunteer in the United States Service. New York: Carleton. 1864. 12mo. pp. 160.

Whittier is the only one of our older poets whom the war seems adequately to have inspired. On most of them, as on Hawthorne, our greatest imaginative genius, of whose powers we cannot bear to think that they "are frozen at their marvellous source," its influence seems to have been benumbing. Bryant, it is true, gave us one noble lyric, but has been too busy in more useful, if less grateful service, which has put the whole country forever in his debt, to have his intense and thoughtful patriotism set us the tune of our feelings in verse. Generally, the noise of the guns seems to have scared away or silenced our singing-birds. But the author of the volume before us (Mr. H. H. Brownell) is a true stormy-petrel, whom the war of elements seems rather to make joyous than to daunt. In him the nation has found a new poet, vigorous, original, and thoroughly native. His poetry shows the singular and charming combination of the sailor and the scholar. It is off soundings, in blue water; there is the rush of sea and the rattle of spray in it, and our terrible typhoon seems to put him in spirits and give him the full wakefulness of all his faculties. We have had no such war poetry, nor anything like it. His "River Fight" (published since the volume) is the finest lyric of the kind since Drayton's "Battle of Agincourt." The poem "At Sea" (p. 83) shows the range of his quality in its pathetic tenderness. His faults are a want of clearness, here and there, from over-condensation in spots, and in some of his finest pieces a crowding of incidents to the injury of effect as a whole. But it is a volume to make one breathe deeper and tread firmer, and stirs us like a beating to quarters for the good fight. Nor should we forget to say, that neither sentiment nor humor is wanting in its place.

Cambridge: Stereotyped and Printed by Welch, Bigelow, & Co.

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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCV.

OCTOBER, 1864.

Art. I. — *The Life of Frederick William von Steuben, Major-General in the Revolutionary Army.* By Friederich Kapp. With an Introduction by George Bancroft. New York: Mason Brothers. 1859. 8vo. pp. 735.

The author of this volume is by birth and education a German. An exile in 1848 for having believed in the possibility of a united Germany, and dared to act from his belief, the first months of his residence in the United States were passed in travelling through Texas on horseback: a journey which resulted in a History of American Slavery, and decided the part which he was to take in the politics of his adopted country. Then establishing himself at New York, he studied law, was admitted to the bar, and in a few years obtained a large and lucrative practice.

So intelligent a man could not look upon the working of institutions so different from those of his native country without curiosity as to their origin and growth, the circumstances from which they sprang, and the men who moulded them. This carried him to American history; and, finding German names there, he naturally asked himself what German elements had entered into this new civilization, and how far their existence and value had been recognized. First among them in the most important crisis of our history was the military element, directly transplanted from the camp of the Great Frederic, by one who had listened to the master's teachings and fought under his eye.

And thus the Life of Steuben was undertaken by Mr. Kapp, not as a literary recreation, but as a serious answer to a serious question.

For the American portion of this inquiry the materials were abundant. Steuben's papers, which, at his death, had passed into the hands of his Aid, Colonel Benjamin Walker, were given some twenty years ago by Colonel Walker's heirs to the New York Historical Society. The same institution has the Gates papers, which contain the greater part of Steuben's correspondence with Lafayette in 1781, and valuable letters addressed to him by Gates, Armstrong, and other officers with whom he was officially connected. In the Greene papers, yet unpublished, there were sixty-two letters bearing directly upon the subject. Some important papers were found among the manuscripts of Duponceau; in Dr. Sprague's rich collection of autographs; and among the materials collected by Judge Jones, the historian of Oneida County, for a Life of Steuben, which he had once purposed to write, — materials which, having relinquished his own design, he liberally communicated to Mr. Kapp. Still more valuable were the documents which had been accidentally left among the papers of Colonel Walker when that gentleman's heirs gave the Steuben papers to the Historical Society of New York: "opinions on military matters, muster-rolls, army lists, complete returns, order-books, letters," — "a necessary supplement" to the main collection. The historical student will easily conceive the delight with which Mr. Kapp first discovered these "priceless documents" amid heaps of old bills and business records, long since useless, and the equal delight with which he received them from the hands of their intelligent owner, Mr. Mann, to be used first for his own purposes, and then deposited by the side of their companions amid the treasures of that noble institution which has done and is still doing so much for the study of American history.

Continuing his researches, our author found a living commentator for this mass of documentary records, — a man who could tell him how Steuben looked and walked and talked, how his voice sounded, how his eye lighted up and his face glowed when he spoke of the great men he had lived with, and the great things he had helped them do, and how that eye and that face looked when death suddenly laid his hand upon them. Steuben's last words, "Do not be alarmed, my son," had fallen upon his ears sixty-five years before, and there he still was, a hale, hearty man, older by twenty years than his adopted father lived to be, but with his recollections of him unimpaired, and his love exalted by an experience of life which in its protracted course had given him no friend so kind, so disinterested, and so true. John W. Mulligan was this old man's name, and a rare privilege he held it to be enabled to talk of his friend to one so able to appreciate him. We, too, once heard him speak of Steuben, heard him describe the evacuation of New York, and tell how he and hundreds with him felt when they saw the British boats push off from the shore, and the British fleet drop reluctantly down the bay. But he also has passed away, and the last link between the gallant old German and the living generation is forever severed.

Thus far Mr. Kapp's researches had gone on smoothly. He had examined everything that was to be found in New York, Philadelphia, Albany, and Utica. Public institutions and private collections had been thrown open to him without reserve. One place only remained to be explored,—the Archives at Washington. From one door only was he rudely turned away,—the door of the building in which the servants of the people preserve the original and authentic record of the people's history.

For Steuben's European life the materials were less complete and far more difficult to reach. His position in the Prussian army had not been so prominent a one as to make it necessary for him to commit the daily record of his actions to paper, and the mention of him which occurs here and there in the official documents of the Seven Years' War, though always honorable, is always brief. Mr. Bowen, in the valuable memoir of Steuben which he contributed to Sparks's American Biography, was compelled to pass over his early history as a period of which "nothing was known." Yet for Steuben, as for all men, that early history was the key to his later history, and when we remember that he came to the United States at the age of forty-seven, we shall see how impossible it is without it to understand him as a man, even if we could appreciate his services as a soldier.

Here Mr. Kapp's connection with Germany stood him in good stead. Familiar with historical research, he knew what to ask for and where to go; and the result of his persevering and well-directed labors is two chapters, which give us interesting glimpses of the child and the boy, and a satisfactory view of the man.

We have entered into these details, because we wished to show from the beginning what strong ground Mr. Kapp stands on as a biographer. The historian's claim to our confidence is founded upon the industry and intelligence with which he collects his documents, even more than upon the skill with which he uses them. It is not impossible to make an interesting picture out of scanty materials, but it requires a high sense of historic responsibility to hold back your hand from your pen until you have become satisfied that there is nothing left for you to discover.

On first approaching his subject, Mr. Kapp felt strongly tempted to confine himself to a selection of Steuben's letters and despatches, with a running commentary. A more careful study of them convinced him that there were too many breaks in them to permit him to do this and give a faithful picture of his hero. Germany possesses a classic work of this kind,—the Life of the celebrated jurist Feuerbach, by his son, the no less celebrated philosopher. Carlyle, too, has tried his iron hand at it in his own way, in the letters and speeches of Cromwell. And, wherever the materials are not too abundant, it is the surest way of conveying a correct idea of a man's character, habits of thought, and actions. But it would have been a sad mistake in Mr. Sparks to have sent out his eleven volumes of selections from Washington's letters without an independent narrative of his life. And we greatly doubt whether the record of Steuben's services would have reached so wide a circle of readers in the eight or ten volumes which it would have required to do justice to the sixteen folios of the Historical Society, with all the additions made to them by Mr. Kapp's researches, as through the lucid and comprehensive narrative into which he has woven them.

Not but what we hope that Steuben's letters, and the letters of the other leaders of our great Revolutionary struggle, will some day be published. In no other way can the difficulties against which they contended, and the inadequate materials with which they carried on the contest, be fully understood. In no other way can the lessons of that period of our history be made fully available for the present and the future. For there is scarcely a rule of action illustrated by that war which does not apply with equal force to this, and scarcely a mistake in the conduct of this which might not have been avoided by a careful study of the history of the Revolution.

In the use of his documents Mr. Kapp has employed an intelligent and judicious criticism, equally free from the two equally dangerous extremes of credulity and scepticism. He weighs evidence calmly and carefully, and draws his conclusions with great fairness. We have verified his references far enough to be convinced that they are exact. If he errs, it is in good faith: never from wilful carelessness, and still less from wilful misrepresentation. He is nowhere guilty of the meanness of mutilating quotations and suppressing evidence. Steuben is his hero, and, if not altogether a hero after his own heart, yet one whom he can hold up to the world without blushing. He claims for him all that he believes to be his due: and as you read the evidence that he founds the claim upon, you cannot accuse him of having asked too much. Even in the only three passages in which we are not prepared to accept his conclusions, we are not disposed to call his sincerity in question.

We think that he has been unjust towards Lafayette. Steuben, who had fought in the trenches at Prague thirteen years before Lafayette was born, and who, during the longest and bloodiest of all the wars of the century, had won himself a place in the military family of a man whose confidence was never given lightly, was not prepared to look up to the chivalrous young Frenchman, who, when they first met, had been only twice under fire, with the affectionate reverence with which Americans looked up to him. Nor did it soften the veteran's feelings towards his young colleague, that, while Lafayette's ample fortune permitted him to live according to his rank, he was compelled to depend even for the necessaries of life upon an inadequate and irregular pay. Moreover, Lafayette was a Frenchman, and Steuben loved to recall the days when he had fought against Frenchmen and "helped make them run." Lafayette was mercurial. Steuben, though hot-blooded and quick, was dignified and punctilious. Lafayette had embraced the cause of the young republic with the enthusiasm of a heart fresh from Plutarch and Livy, Raynal and Rousseau; Steuben had put on the American uniform as he would have put on the uniform of Austria or Sardinia, for higher rank, higher pay, and the chances of glory. One, in short, was just entering upon life, with rank and fortune in possession, and glory within reach; the other had already passed through more than half its course, seeing friendships cool and illusions fade by the way, and with nothing but a small competence and dependent rank as the reward of his blood and toils.

When these two men were brought together on the same field of action, it was hardly possible that there should not be frequent clashings between them. Frederic's veteran listened with ill-concealed contempt to the military opinions of the "mousquetaire noir," and the young Marquis, sure of the friendship of Washington, sure of the attachment of the army, may sometimes, perhaps, have given himself too little thought of the claims of a military adventurer, however deserving of respect.

In these differences, Mr. Kapp — naturally, we grant, but still, we think, somewhat too decidedly — takes sides with his countryman. In Lafayette's military character he finds little to justify the hopes that were formed of him. And even in the juster estimate which he gives of his diplomatic services, the same unfavorable bias appears; circumstances and collateral influences are expanded to their utmost proportions, and, instead of the active, efficient, and persevering enthusiast, who hurried to and fro, from Europe to America, from France to Spain, giving neither sleep to his eyes nor slumber to his eyelids till his end had been attained, we have a vain, frivolous character, of little ability and less weight in the conduct of great affairs. We have dwelt with pain upon this portion of Mr. Kapp's volume, for to our minds there are few things more painful than the misappreciation of an historical character by one whose general sympathies would lead him to view it aright. But fortunately it forms a very small part of the work, leaving its general accuracy of statement and opinion unimpaired.

Another of his conclusions in which we cannot fully concur is his unqualified condemnation of Congress in its treatment of Beaumarchais. De Loménie, it is true, bears him out in all he says; but is De Loménie fully borne out by the facts? Certainly not, if Beaumarchais's executor is to be trusted, who assured Mr. George Sumner that he had been "fully, largely, and generously paid."* The question is one of the most important and difficult in the diplomatic history of our Revolution, — too important and difficult, indeed, to be discussed in a subordinate paragraph, and on which, for the present, therefore, we must confine ourselves to simple expression of doubt.

There is one more point upon which we cannot fully accept Mr. Kapp's views. The crowd of foreign officers who beset the doors of Congress and the tent of the commander-in-chief with their claims and pretensions, gave serious umbrage to native officers, and added materially to the perplexities and heart-burnings occasioned by questions of rank. Steuben himself speaks of these barons and marquises, for they dealt freely in titles and orders, with scarcely less severity than Washington. Yet Steuben could not have felt, what must always have been present to the mind of Washington, that the foreign officer was usually contending for rank and pay only, while the native American was fighting for his birthright. To distinguish between a high-minded and honorable adventurer like Steuben, and an abmitious incendiary like Conway, was not always an easy task; and even the examples of Lee and Gates might have been accepted as demonstrations that birth within the political limits of the same empire did not carry with it the same feelings as birth upon the same soil. On more than one occasion it was held necessary to select native citizens for services of peculiar responsibility; † nor, when foreigners grew importunate in their calls for promotion and important commands, could Americans easily forget that, except in the case of Duportail, Launoy, Radière, and Govion, the positions which these foreigners actually held were of their own seeking. Their sacrifices of position at home, and money on their voyage hither, were like the sacrifices which the lottery gambler makes when he buys a ticket with ready money in the hope of a prize, but with a perfect knowledge that it may bring him nothing but a blank.

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* See an oration delivered before the municipal authorities of the city of Boston, July 4, 1859, by George Sumner, Preface, note. Mr. Sumner has studied this subject with the calm and earnest deliberation which he carried into all his investigations; and it is sad to think how much in this, as in so many other things, our country has lost by his early death.

† Marshall, surely an unimpeachable witness, speaks of the desertions during the terrible winter at Valley Forge as confined to the foreigners. Life of Washington, Vol. I. p. 226, 2d edit.

Washington's opinion upon this subject was decided, and expressed without modification;* and on such subjects Washington's opinion must be accepted as embodying the opinions of Greene and Knox and the men in whom he most confided. Mr. Kapp is far from justifying the conduct and pretensions of this mixed rabble of "hungry adventurers." The sensitiveness which he manifests is neither unnatural nor unbecoming. It was perfectly natural that he should feel the wrong done to our naturalized citizens by the Know-Nothingism of our own day. It was highly becoming that he should express his sense of it strongly. But the native American of 1776 was in a very different position from the native American of 1853; and they who would have been the first to look coldly upon the self-imposed champions of a struggle for political independence, would have been the last to approve an unjust and narrow-minded contest for political supremacy.

And now, having frankly expressed our dissent from the only parts of his work with which we cannot fully and heartily agree, we will endeavor, with Mr. Kapp's guidance, to follow the gallant German through the vicissitudes of his adventurous career, from his cradle within the walls of the stern old fortress of Magdeburg to his grave under a hemlock of an American forest.

The name, which, passing through the variations of Stoebe, Steube, and Stoeben, finally took its place in modern history under the form of Von Steuben,† first appears in the thirteenth century, in the list of noblemen who held feudal manors and estates as vassals of Mansfeld and Magdeburg. Like the other nobles of the part of Germany to which they belonged, they became Protestants at the beginning of the Reformation, and, like the rest of the minor nobility, grew poor by the changes introduced into the system of warfare, while the territorial princes grew rich by the confiscation of Church property. During the Thirty Years' War, the branch from which the General descended was separated from the parent stock, and won distinction through its successive generations by the pen and the sword. One among them, his grandfather, an eminent theologian, was known by an "able commentary on the New Testament and the Apocalypse." Another, his father's elder brother, was distinguished as a mathematician, a writer upon military science, and the inventor of a new system of fortification. His father, Wilhelm Augustine, was educated at Halle with his two elder brothers, entered the military service of Prussia at the age of sixteen, was married at thirty-one, when a captain of engineers, and, after having served with distinction in the great wars of the century, and filled positions of confidence and trust under Frederic the Great, died in honorable poverty at the age of eighty-four, on the 26th of April, 1783.

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* See Washington to Franklin, Sparks, V. 32; stronger to R. H. Lee, IV. 423 and 446; to Gouverneur Morris, VI. 13.

† Pronounced *Stoyben*.

Of his ten children only three, two sons and a daughter, lived to grow up; and of these the subject of our history, Frederic William Augustus Henry Ferdinand, was the eldest. At the time of his birth, November 15, 1730, his father was stationed at the fortress of Magdeburg on the Elbe, and while he was yet a child, he followed him, as the duties of service called him, to Cronstadt and the Crimea. When the father returned to Prussia, the son was barely ten years old. Thus all the associations of his infancy and childhood were military, — "guns, drums, trumpets," fortifications, drills, and parades. Before he was fully turned of fourteen, another chapter was added to his rude experience of life: he served under his father as a volunteer in the campaign of 1744, and shared the perils and hardships of the long and bloody siege of Prague.

Fortunately his father, who had received a good education himself, felt the importance of giving the best that he could command to his son. And fortunately, too, the Jesuits' Colleges of Neisse and Breslau afforded the means of thorough elementary instruction. Here young Steuben laid the foundations of a superior knowledge of mathematics, and acquired a tincture of history and polite literature. And here he formed an idea of the importance of intellectual culture, which led him, when first called into active life, to turn to account every opportunity of adding to his store.

About his profession there could be no doubt. Even if all his early impressions had not filled him with aspirations for military glory, there could have been no question about the surest road to distinction under Frederic the Great. At seventeen he entered the army as a cadet. In two years he became an ensign; in four more, a lieutenant; and first lieutenant just a year before the breaking out of the Seven Years' War. Of this period two letters are the only words of his own that have been preserved, and those words are in bad French. But the thoughts are those of an ardent young man, who knew his profession and loved it, and asked nothing from fortune but a chance to distinguish himself. "Yes, my dear Henry, if there is a war, I promise you, at the end of a second campaign, that your friend will be either in Hades or at the head of a regiment."

And soon the war came, — the great Seven Years' War; not, indeed, a war of principles and ideas, — a political war merely; yet in military science the connecting link between the great wars of Eugene and Marlborough, and the development of strategy by Napoleon. Steuben's part in this war was neither a prominent nor a brilliant one. The first campaign found him a first lieutenant. The last left him a major, and in temporary command of a regiment. He was wounded at the battle of Prague in May, 1757, and shared the triumph of Rossbach in November. The next year gave him a wider field. The brilliant, dashing, dare-devil hero of this war was the General von Mayr, the illegitimate son of a nobleman, and an uneducated, self-made soldier, one of those men whom war raises to rank and fortune, and peace sends to the jail or the gallows. Forced into the army by necessity, he had resolutely made his way to a command, fighting with equal desperation under different banners, and entering, at last, the Prussian service. Frederic, who wanted just such a man to oppose to the enemy's

Croats and Pandours, put him at the head of a free corps, where his dauntless courage and enterprising genius had full play. Steuben became his adjutant-general, and followed him through his brilliant campaign of 1758. At the beginning of 1759, death, which had so often passed the bold adventurer by in the field, came to him in his tent, and then Steuben returned to his regiment with a knowledge of the management of light infantry, and a habit of cool and prompt decision in the tumult of battle, which he could hardly have learned so quickly or so well in any other school.

He was soon appointed adjutant to General von Hülsen, fighting with him in the unsuccessful battle of Kay, in July, and wounded in the murderous battle of Kunersdorf, where Frederic commanded in person, and having, something like Melas at Marengo, won a victory and prepared his bulletins, was defeated with terrible slaughter on the same day, and by the same enemy. Then for two years, from August, 1759, to September, 1761, we lose sight of him. But that he passed them in good service is evident from his reappearance as Aid to General Knoboch when Platen made his brilliant march into Poland against the Russian rear. And here for a moment the names of father and son appear together, for the elder Steuben, as major of engineers, built the bridge over the Wartha which the younger Steuben crossed; too swiftly, perhaps, to clasp his father's hand, or do more than exchange a hurried glance of recognition as the headlong torrent of war swept him onward. Some skilful marching comes next, with overwhelming odds to make head against, and the scene closes for a time with a blockade and a capitulation; a blockade in an open town, desperately defended, till ammunition and provisions failed, and half the town was on fire, and an honorable capitulation, with flying banners, and beating drums, and all the honors of war.

In this surrender, Steuben was the negotiator, and by its terms he followed his general and brother officers to St. Petersburg as prisoners of war. But the imprisonment was a pleasant one, for the Grand Duke Peter, a warm admirer of Frederic, took him into special favor; and as it proved, in the end, a surer path to promotion than active participation in a victory;

for he did his king such good service with the Grand Duke, that on his return to Prussia he was made captain, and raised from the staff of a subordinate general to that of the great commander himself. And here his military education received its highest finish; for besides what he learnt in the daily performance of his duty under the king's own eye, he was admitted to the lessons upon the higher principles of the art of war which Frederic himself gave to a limited number of young officers whom he had selected, not for birth or fortune, but for talent and zeal. And thus it was as Aid to the king that he took part in the siege of Schweidnitz, and saw the curtain fall upon the checkered scenes of this long and bloody war. The king, well pleased with his services, bestowed upon him a lay benefice, with an income of four hundred thalers.

Peace came, and with it an unsparing reduction of the army. "Lieutenant Blücher may go to the Devil," was the expressive phrase with which the future marshal was sent back to private life; and among the reasons assigned for Steuben's withdrawal from the army is dissatisfaction with the new position assigned him in it. However this may be, we find him, soon after the peace of Hubertsburg, travelling for amusement, staying a short time at Halle and Dessau, then going to Hamburg, where he made an acquaintance that was to exercise a decisive influence upon his future career at a decisive moment, — the acquaintance of the Count St. Germain, — and last to the baths of Wildbad in Suabia, where he was presented to the Prince of Hohenzollern Hechingen, and, through the influence of the Princess of Wurtemberg and Prince Henry of Prussia, received the appointment of Grand Marshal of his court.

In the busy idleness of this petty court Steuben passed nearly ten years; acceptable to the Prince for his intelligent devotion and strict performance of his duty, acceptable to the courtiers for the dignified amenity of his manners and the justice of his dealings. He had leisure for reading, of which he had once been fond, and for society, in which he was well fitted to shine. The Prince loved travelling, and Steuben travelled with him wherever he went,— to other courts of Germany, and, welcomest duty of all, to Paris, where his rank opened for him the doors of the most celebrated saloons, and procured him the acquaintance of the men he most desired to know. So contented was he with this mode of life, that he purchased a small country seat by the name of Weilheim; and thus, but for that "vice of courts," which has ever reigned in them supreme, he might have floated pleasantly on the easy tide to the French Revolution, and drawn his sword once more with comrades of the Seven Years' War under the banners of the Duke of Brunswick.

But Steuben was a Protestant, the descendant of Protestants from Luther's day downwards; the court was Roman Catholic, and with priests about it who found it hard that a heretic should stand so high and live so intimately with their sovereign. How they intrigued against him, and how cunningly they strove to sow dissensions betwixt the Prince and his Grand Marshal, we can readily conceive, although the story has not come down to us in all its details. But Steuben, well knowing that, whatever the immediate result of the actual contest might be, there could be no return to the tranquillity which had formed the chief charm of his position, discreetly bowed to the blast and resigned, carrying with him into private life the esteem of the Prince, and the friendship of many eminent men whose friendship he had won under the Prince's auspices.

Once more a free man, he seems to have experienced some return of military ambition. For a moment there was a prospect of war, and could he have obtained, without much effort, the rank he felt himself entitled to, he would have entered the service of the Emperor. But his heart was so little in it, that he neglected even to present himself to Joseph, as his friends the Prince de Ligne and General von Ried urged him to do, and the negotiations which he had indolently begun were suffered to fall through. In 1769 the Margrave of Baden had conferred upon him the cross of the order of "La Fidélité"; and now, on resigning his grand-marshalship, he first turned his steps toward Carlsruhe, the seat of the Margrave's court. Even quieter than that of Hechingen was the life that he led here. Absolute master of his time, and of a competent income, he could go whither he would, still sure of meeting or making friends everywhere. A visit to the country-seat of the Baron von Waldener in Alsace brought him once more into contact with the Count St. Germain; and in the winter of 1776, while

Washington was struggling through the Jerseys and striking his daring blow at the German mercenaries in Trenton, Steuben was making at Montpellier the acquaintance of the Earl of Warwick and Earl Spencer. So intimate did they become, that he resolved to extend his circle of travel and make them a visit in England.

Paris lay in his way, and as the Count St. Germain had recently been made Minister of War, he could not resist the temptation of passing a few days there and congratulating him on his advancement. It was early in May, 1777. Franklin had already taken up his residence at Passy, and was drawing young and old around him. Silas Deane had been in France almost a year. Arthur Lee was there, too, busy, active, jealous, suspicious. Beaumarchais was gliding to and fro, as adroit, keen-eyed, and subtile as his own Figaro. Paris was unconsciously vibrating to the touch of the lightning-tamer, and preparing to hail him as the breaker of misused sceptres.

But it was not of this that Steuben was thinking as he rode through the Barrière on the 2d of May; and as soon as he had made himself comfortable at his hotel, he wrote to tell the Count of his arrival, and that he should wait upon him at an early day.

"Do not come to Versailles," was the answer. "In three days I will see you at the Arsenal, and will send an officer to conduct you thither. We have important questions to discuss together."

At this interview, for the first time perhaps, certainly for the first time with any approach to personal interest, he heard the story of the revolted colonies, of their perils and their resources, of the sympathy which France and Spain felt for them, and of the danger that, with all their courage and resolution, with all the secret aid of their European friends, they might still fail for want of a man like him to organize and discipline their citizen soldiers. Here was glory, here was fortune, here was a field such as no European war could afford, for applying the lessons of his great master, and demonstrating the superiority of the system which they both believed in so firmly.

Steuben was taken by surprise. At first, the difficulties and objections rose before him in formidable array. St. Germain answered him at length, trying to meet them all. "What would you advise me, not as a minister, but as a friend?" "Sir, as a minister I have no advice to give you on these subjects; but as your friend, I would never advise you to do anything which I would not do myself, were I not employed in the king's service."

Thus ended the first interview. Next day they met again. Twenty-four hours' reflection had removed some doubts, awakened some hopes. It was but a distant sound of the trumpet, but the old spirit — the spirit formed in infancy, cherished through boyhood, and accepted in manhood as the chief spring of action — was stirred again.

With many warnings to be cautious, to keep away from Versailles, and not allow himself to be too freely seen in Paris, St. Germain gave him a letter to Beaumarchais. Beaumarchais introduced him to Deane, Deane took him to Franklin. The interview was an unsatisfactory one. Franklin told him, with "a manner to which he was then little accustomed," (not the court manner, that is, but one that he became well accustomed to in the sequel,) "that he had no authority to enter into engagements, and could not advance him anything for the expense of his voyage."

This was not the way to speak to a man whom the Great King had honored with his confidence. Steuben returned to Beaumarchais to say that he should go back immediately to Germany, and did not want to hear anything more about America. Next day he went to Versailles. St. Germain seemed hurt at his decision, but he invited Steuben to pass a few days at his house. This, at least, could not be refused. After dinner, the Spanish ambassador, Count Aranda, came in, not, perhaps, altogether by accident. "Here is a man," said St. Germain, as he presented Steuben to him, "who will risk nothing, consequently he will gain nothing."

When Steuben formed at Montpellier the acquaintance of Earl Spencer and the Earl of Warwick, he formed at the same time the acquaintance of the Prince de Montbarey, who, like most of the men of distinction with whom he was brought into connection, conceived a high opinion of his talents and an affection for his person. He too was at Versailles, and Steuben, as St. Germain had doubtless foreseen, went to wait upon him. Another sharp attack upon his resolution by another friend. "I can determine nothing until I return to Germany," was his answer. But the idea had taken possession of his mind, and his friends, when they saw him turn his steps homeward instead of going to England, must have felt almost sure of him.

July was near its end when he reached Rastadt. A letter from Beaumarchais was there before him, telling him that a ship and money were ready for him, and that Count St. Germain expected his immediate return. A letter from the Count himself urged him to hasten back to Paris.

Just at that time the Prince Louis William of Baden was at Rastadt, and Steuben, who placed great confidence in his judgment, told him the story, and showed him the letters. Prince Louis, a lieutenant-general himself in the service of Holland, could see no room for hesitation. And thus, between two princes, three counts, and the adroitest of negotiators, the aide-de-camp of the most absolute of kings surrendered himself to the service of the most democratic of republics.

There were still difficult details to arrange. First, Frederic's consent to transfer to Steuben's nephew, the Baron von Canitz, his canonry of Havelsberg, which now brought him an income of four thousand six hundred livres. Then the fixing upon a definite character to present himself in, and securing, as far as possible, the means of making his application to Congress successful.

It was already known in France that a strong feeling had been excited in America by the facility with which the Congress had given commissions to foreign officers. On the very day that Steuben returned to Paris to resume his negotiations, Washington, from the camp in which he was watching the movements of Sir William Howe, wrote Franklin "that every new arrival was only a new source of embarrassment to himself, and of disappointment and chagrin to the gentlemen who came over." * It was evident that no Major, no Colonel Steuben could be advanced to a position in which he could introduce the reforms the French Minister felt it to be so important to

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* Sparks, V. 33.

effect, without seriously offending the just susceptibilities of the native officers. The refusal to confirm Deane's contract with Du Coudray was one of the objections which Steuben had urged after his interview with Franklin. And yet St. Germain and Vergennes were both convinced that, without a reform in the organization of the American army, the money and stores of France would be given in vain.

It was decided, therefore, that Steuben should assume the rank of a lieutenant-general, an assumption imperfectly borne out by his actual rank of general of the Circle of Suabia; and, to meet the objection that the American agents had no authority to treat with him, that he should merely wait upon them to announce his intention of serving one or two campaigns as a volunteer, and ask letters to the leading members of Congress.

He had not yet seen Vergennes. On the third day after his return Montbarey introduced him to the Minister in a special audience. "You are determined, then, to go to America?" said the veteran diplomatist.

"Do you think the idea extravagant?" asked Steuben.

"On the contrary, it is the road to fame and distinction; but I strongly recommend you to make an agreement beforehand, and not rely too implicitly on republican generosity."

Steuben replied, that he should make no conditions; but that, if the republic should prove ungrateful, he expected that the King of France would not, and that Count Vergennes and the Prince de Montbarey would not allow his services to go unrewarded.

The Minister was instantly on his guard. "You know very well that it is impossible for us to make conditions with you. I can only say to you, Go, succeed, and you will never regret the step you have taken."

His preparations were now made rapidly. With St. Germain he discussed the reforms he proposed to introduce into the American army. From Beaumarchais he received as a loan the money for his outfit and passage. He chose four officers for aids, — De l'Enfant, De Romanai, Des Epinières, and De Ponthière. Not knowing English, he required a secretary and interpreter; and at Beaumarchais's house he found Peter S.

Duponceau, familiar some thirty years ago to the citizens of Philadelphia as a hale old man, long known to the legal world as a skilful lawyer, to publicists as the translator of Bynkershoek, to the world of letters as the author of a treatise on the Chinese Language which won the prize of the Institute of his native France; but then a gay, light-hearted young Frenchman of seventeen, with a remarkable talent for the study of language, and a premonitory passion for English, which won him at the Benedictine convent where he studied the nickname of *L'Anglais*. Two vessels were upon the point of sailing for America with part of the arms and stores furnished by Beaumarchais under the name of Hortalez & Co., and the royal commissioner gave Steuben his choice of the two. By the advice of Count Miranda he fixed upon the "Heureux," a twenty-four-gun ship, which was to sail from Marseilles under the name of "Le Flamand." Steuben also assumed a new name, Frank, and, as a protection in case of capture by the English, received despatches under that name to the Governor of Martinique. Cheerful, self-reliant, nothing doubting but that two or three years would see him safely returned with a full purse and laurelled brow, to talk over his campaigns in the saloons of Paris and at the watering-places of Germany, he embarked with his military family on the 26th of September, 1777, just fifteen days after the battle of Brandywine, and while the weary and half-trained band which, before another campaign, he was to form into a disciplined army, was slowly making its way to the position whence in eight days more it was to make its bold dash upon Germantown.

The Flamand's passage was long, boisterous, and perilous. At last the land came in sight, and on a bright, clear 1st of December the vessel entered the harbor of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Steuben saw for the first time the flag of the Republic waving over an American fortress.

As soon as General Langdon learned that the anchoring ship held a Prussian lieutenant-general, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, he hastened on board to welcome him; and, taking him and his suite in his barge, brought them to the landing, whither the whole town was flocking to gaze at and greet them. Meanwhile, the guns of the fortress fired a lieutenant-general's salute, and the ships in the harbor, displaying their flags, joined in the national welcome. At that day's dinner Steuben first heard of the surrender of Burgoyne, and hailed the tidings as a happy omen. The day following he visited the fortifications, and the next reviewed the troops. One of his earliest cares, also, was to write to Washington and Congress, expressing his desire "to deserve the title of a citizen of America by fighting for her liberty." With his own letters he forwarded copies of those which Franklin, Deane, and Beaumarchais had given him. On the 12th of December, he set out for Boston.

Here his chief entertainer was John Hancock, just returning to private life after honorable service in Congress; and often during the five weeks that the bad roads kept Steuben waiting for the answers to his letters, his feet trod that long flight of steps and crossed that hospitable threshold, which but a few months ago still remained to tell of the olden time and Boston's provincial splendor. At last Washington's answer came, courteous, though formal, and referring him to Congress as the only body authorized to accept offers of service and make appointments. At the same time Hancock informed him that he had been directed by Congress to make every preparation for securing him and his suite a comfortable journey to York, in Pennsylvania, where Congress was then sitting. Hancock was not the man to do this work negligently. The ground was covered with snow, and sleighs, with five negroes for drivers and grooms, were prepared for the baggage, and saddle-horses for the general and his suite. A purveyor, too, accompanied them to provide provisions and quarters. The enemy were in possession of Newport and New York, and made frequent incursions into the interior. A roundabout course, extending to four hundred and ten miles, was the only route Steuben and his party could take without exposing themselves to unnecessary danger. The journey began on the 14th of January, and it was the 5th of February before they reached York. Thus at the very outset Steuben gained what to his military eye was an invaluable view of a large section of his new country.

And now opens the serious chapter of Steuben's American life. The Congress at York was not that wise Congress which had declared independence, and launched the new "ship of state" upon its perilous voyage, but that weak and divided Congress which had opened its ears to calumnies upon Washington, and almost resolved to set up Gates as his rival. Gates himself, with a brain whirling with the excitement of unmerited success, was enjoying the good dinners and warm quarters at the temporary seat of government, while Washington was starving and freezing with his army in the huts and hovels of Valley Forge. How was Steuben, with his five weeks' stock of English to distinguish between the true hero and the false one?

St. Germain had chosen his man well: an experienced and scientific soldier, for no other could have done such work as he was appointed to do; a man experienced in men also, and both too wise and too honorable to become the tool of a faction. Gates loaded him with civilities, and urged him to stay at his house. But meeting the civilities with polite appreciation, he refused the dangerous hospitality.

It soon became apparent that, in counselling Steuben to assume a rank unknown in the American army, Vergennes, St. Germain, Montbarey, and Miranda had proved themselves wise in their generation. Dazzled by the claim which was so well borne out by his professional knowledge and personal dignity, Congress appointed a special committee to wait upon him and listen to his proposals. They were not such as Congress had been in the habit of receiving, for he told them that he asked for neither rank nor pay; that he wished to enter the army as a volunteer, and perform any duty which the commander-in-chief might assign him; and that commissions for his aids, and the payment of his actual expenses, were the only conditions for which he should stipulate, leaving the question of ultimate compensation to be decided by the success or failure of the struggle. No time was lost in idle discussions. The committee reported without delay. The next day he received a formal entertainment from Congress as a mark of special honor, members and guests gazing upon him, as, in his rich uniform, and with the star of his order, which never left his breast, he sat at the right hand of President Laurens, and auguring well for the army which was to be trained by a man of such a keen eye and soldierly bearing. When all was over, the President handed him the resolution of the Congress: —

> "*Whereas*, Baron Steuben, a lieutenant-general in foreign service, has in a most disinterested and heroic manner offered his services to these States as a volunteer, —
>
> "*Resolved*, That the President present the thanks of Congress, in behalf of these United States, to Baron Steuben, for the zeal he has shown for the cause of America, and the disinterested tender he has been pleased to make of his military talents, and inform him that Congress cheerfully accept of his services as a volunteer in the army of these States, and wish him to repair to General Washington's quarters as soon as convenient."

Steuben lost no time in setting out for camp. The ovations continued. At Lancaster the German population felt all their national pride revive at the approach of such a German; a subscription ball was given in honor of his arrival. While he was yet some miles from camp, Washington came out to meet him and conduct him to his quarters. There a guard of twenty-five men had been stationed with an officer at their head. Steuben would have declined the honor, saying that he was merely a volunteer. "The whole army," said Washington, "would gladly stand sentinel for such volunteers." The next day the troops were mustered, and Washington accompanied Steuben to pass them in review.

During part of his life, at least, Washington was a soldier at heart. When he first heard the bullets whistle, he found "something charming in the sound."* He had often said, that "the most beautiful spectacle he had ever beheld was the display of British troops" on the morning of Braddock's defeat.† And even after he had declared that "he scarcely could conceive the cause that would induce him to draw his sword again," ‡ he wrote Lafayette, that, "as an unobserved spectator, he would be glad to peep at the Russian and Austrian troops at their manœuvrings on a grand field day." § Thus, when

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* The discovery of a letter of Washington's with these very words in it confirms Walpole's story, hitherto called in question as inconsistent with Washington's character. See Irving, Vol. I. p. 124, note.

† Sparks's Life of Washington, p. 62.

‡ Letter to Marquis de la Roueri, Oct. 7, 1788. Sparks, Vol. V. p. 9.

§ Sparks, Vol. IX. p. 145.

Steuben came to him as a Prussian veteran, he felt that there was a bond between them which they might both cheerfully acknowledge. And perhaps he also felt that to bring him at once before the army as the object of uncommon honors was the surest way of preparing the army to look up to him as a man capable of imparting to them the knowledge and habits in which they were so universally deficient.

It was a great relief to Washington's mind to find that he had no longer an unprincipled intriguer like Conway to look to for the reform of discipline, but "a gentleman, a man of military knowledge,"* and with that knowledge of the world without which the highest military knowledge would have been of no avail. But it was a serious drawback that he could talk with him only through an interpreter, even though the interpreter were Hamilton or Laurens. At no time in the course of the war had the condition of the army been more distressing. The life at Valley Forge was a daily struggle with cold and hunger; the log and mud huts in which the troops lived were an imperfect protection against the rigor of the winter, made doubly severe by the want of proper clothing and nutritious food. The frequent failure of supplies had familiarized the minds of the men with the idea of mutiny, and brought the officers to feel that, if not almost justifiable, it was at least inevitable. There was no assurance of greater regularity or abundance in the future to help bear up against the pressure of the present. Out of the original force of seventeen thousand men, there were three thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine without clothes enough to enable them to mount guard or appear on parade. From desertion and disease five thousand and twelve men were all that could be called out for duty; and these were so imperfectly armed, that muskets, fowling-pieces, and rifles were found in the same company, with a few bayonets scattered here and there; guns and bayonets alike rusty and unfit for service. These, however, were the men with whom Washington had manœuvred in front and on the flanks of the well-armed and well-disciplined army of Sir William Howe; had fought the battle of the Brandywine, where a portion of them under Greene had marched four miles in forty-nine minutes, seizing and holding a favorable position for covering the retreat of the main body; and the battle of Germantown, where a dense fog and an error of judgment were all that saved that wing of the British army from defeat and capture. And they had done all this because they possessed what Burgoyne* attributed to the Northern army, — "the fundamental points of military institution, — sobriety, subordination, regularity, and courage. . . . . Their panics were confined and of short duration; their enthusiasm extensive and permanent." It was to the honor of Steuben's sagacity that, with an eye accustomed to the faultless equipments and precision of movement of Prussian troops, he should have detected those fundamental points, or the capacity for acquiring them, under the rags and rusty equipments and in the awkward "Indian file" of the American troops.

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* Sparks, Vol. V. p. 244.

One of the characteristic acts of the Conway cabal had been the creation for Conway of the office of inspector-general, with powers so extensive as to justify the expression of "imperium in imperio," which Marshall applies to the organization of the commissariat.† But, happily for the army, the conspiracy was detected before he entered fully upon the performance of his duties, and thus one of the immediate results of the attempt to forward the malignant aims of a vile intriguer was to prepare the way for a high-minded and honorable man. In another way, too, the Providence that watched over us had educed good from this evil. Mifflin, the quartermaster-general, though originally a member of Washington's family, and intrusted by him with this responsible office "from a thorough persuasion of his integrity," ‡ had proved false both to Washington and to his country; neglecting his official duty, and entering deeply into the plots of the intriguers. During the hardships of this trying winter, he had held himself aloof from camp, and contributed nothing, either directly or indirectly, to the feeding or clothing of the army. At last a committee was sent by Congress to take counsel with Washington, and see what could be done to avert the dangers of a dissolution, or starvation, or mutiny,* which were becoming more and more imminent every day. One of the effects of their exertions and representations was the appointment of General Greene as Mifflin's successor. One of the chief obstacles to the establishment of discipline was thus removed, and if zeal and energy could accomplish it, the army would henceforth be fed and clothed.

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* Letter to Lord G. Germain. Sparks's Correspondence of the Revolution, II. pp. 96, 97, note.

† Marshall's Washington, Vol. I. p. 215, 2d ed.

‡ Sparks, Vol. III. p. 68.

Steuben's first step was to draw up a plan of inspectorship, and, after revising it, with the assistance of Greene, Hamilton, and Laurens, submit it to Washington for approval. Washington approved and transmitted it to Congress. There was no time to lose. Winter was passing, and the moment for opening a new campaign drawing menacingly near. "Will you undertake to execute this plan?" asked Washington. "With your support and assistance, I will," replied Steuben.

He began by drafting from the line a hundred and twenty men as a guard for the commander-in-chief, and a military school for himself. These men he drilled twice a day; and striking from the outset an effective blow at the prejudice (one of England's legacies) which led officers to regard the drilling of a recruit as a sergeant's and not an officer's business, he took the musket into his own hands and showed them how he wished them to handle it. At every drill his division-inspectors were required to be present, and doubtless many officers and soldiers were present, too, without requisition. "In a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little manœuvres with excellent precision."

Hitherto every attempt to instruct the soldiers had been begun according to rule, by the manual exercise; and sometimes from one cause, and sometimes from another, every such attempt had failed. In nothing does Steuben's superiority to a mere martinet appear more decidedly, than in his passing the manual by, and beginning with manœuvres. The sight of men advancing, retreating, wheeling, deploying, attacking with the bayonet, changing front, and all with promptness and precision, made an impression upon the spectator which no perfection in the mere handling of the musket could have produced. The actors, too, moved by a common impulse, felt that confidence in themselves which men always feel when acting harmoniously together, and learnt, from the outset, to look with double confidence upon the man who had awakened them to a consciousness of their deficiencies by "skilfully yielding to circumstances" in the development of their capacities. Every scholar of this school became an apostle of reform. The army that looked on and admired longed to be permitted to share in the lesson. Battalions came next, then brigades, and then divisions. It was on the 24th of March that the elementary manœuvres began, and by the 29th of April American troops, for the first time since the opening of the war, were able to execute the grand manœuvres of a regular army. On the 5th of May Steuben was appointed by Congress Inspector-General, with the rank and pay of major-general.

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* Nearly Washington's words. See also, for a vivid picture of the state of things at this time, Washington to Wayne, Sparks, Vol. V. p. 232; and to Governor Clinton, p. 238.

Steuben's success is easily explained. His heart was in his work. He was up before day; smoked a single pipe; swallowed a single cup of coffee; had his hair carefully dressed; his uniform was carefully put on; then, as the first sunbeam appeared, he was in the saddle and off for the parade-ground. There was no waiting for loitering aids. No part of his work was beneath him. He took the guns into his own hands, examined the equipments with his own experienced eye. Not a voice was to be heard but his and that of his officers as they repeated his orders. Not a mistake passed unreproved.

The conviction that he was thoroughly master of what he was teaching them would hardly have reconciled officers and men to his severity and "sudden gusts of passion," if they had not been equally convinced of his justice. Once, at a review near Morristown, Lieutenant Gibbons, a brave and good officer, was arrested on the spot and ordered into the rear, for a fault which it afterwards appeared another had committed. At a proper moment the commander of the regiment came forward and informed the Baron of Mr. Gibbons's innocence, of his worth, and of his acute feelings under this unmerited disgrace. "Desire Lieutenant Gibbons to come to the front, Colonel." "Sir," said the Baron to the young gentleman, "the fault which was made, by throwing the line into confusion, might, in the presence of an enemy, have been fatal. I arrested you as its supposed author; but I have reason to believe that I was mistaken, and that, in this instance, you were blameless; I ask your pardon: return to your command. I would not deal unjustly by any, much less by one whose character as an officer is so respectable."* All the while he was saying this it was raining violently, and the men who saw him standing there, hat in hand, before his subaltern, heedless of the rain that poured down upon his unprotected head, never forgot the scene.

Thus far all went on well. Even in their tatters, the men began to feel a pride in being soldiers. If some officers were still compelled to mount guard in an old blanket cut into the shape of a dressing-gown, they knew at least how to perform the duties of officers on guard. Washington, in a general order, praised their progress, and thanked the man to whom they owed it. But a reform in drill was but a small part of the real work to be done. The whole organization of the army required reform. "The internal administration of a regiment and a company was a thing completely unknown." "The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company," but some were three months' men, some six, some nine. There was a constant ebb and flow, a constant coming and going. Accurate returns of such regiments were out of the question. "Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade"; sometimes it contained but thirty men, and a company but a single corporal. The men "were scattered about everywhere." Officers acted as if the army were but a nursery of servants: each claiming one, many two or three. And thus many hundred soldiers were converted into valets. But on the regimental books they still held their places unchanged; and long after many of them had ceased to belong to the army even as valets, pay was still drawn in their names from the impoverished treasury. Leaves of absence, and even dismissals, were given by colonels, and sometimes by captains, at will.

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* North, in Thacher's Military Journal, 416.

While men went and came in this manner, and were thus employed, there could be little hope of preserving the public property intrusted to their hands. Every musket was valued at eighteen dollars with a bayonet, and at sixteen without one. And yet for every campaign from five to eight thousand muskets were required to replace those lost by negligence, or carried off by the men whose terms of enlistment had expired. With the most methodical and systematic of men at their head, it had been utterly impossible to introduce method and system into this ebbing and flowing mass.

Steuben aimed at the correction of all these abuses; but unfortunately, in asking for the powers which he deemed essential for the accomplishment of his task, he asked for some which seemed to trench upon the rights of other officers. Some of the major-generals became alarmed. All the brigadiers, it was apprehended, would resign if his demands were complied with. Whatever Washington's private opinion may have been, he publicly conformed to the public opinion, and issued in June the general orders by which the office continued to be regulated till 1779. These orders not only defined the duties, but greatly limited the powers, of the Inspector-General. Steuben saw the cause, understood it, foresaw, too, the consequences, and deplored them: but, faithful to his resolution, adapted himself to circumstances, and continued to labor with unabated energy in his daily drills and special reforms.

Events were already demonstrating the excellence of his work. In May, 1778, Lafayette, upon the point of being cut off from the main body of the army, was able to save his men by an orderly retreat, in which their good discipline was manifest. Washington, however, anxious for Lafayette's detachment, ordered out the whole army to support them, and in less than fifteen minutes the whole army was under arms and ready to march. At Monmouth, not long after, at the sound of Steuben's now familiar voice, Lee's broken ranks rallied and wheeled into line under a heavy fire, as calmly and precisely as if the battle-field had been a parade-ground.

But the roar of the cannon stirred the old soldier's blood, and he began to feel keen longings for more exciting work than teaching manœuvres and examining reports. It so chanced, also, that, most of the brigadiers being called away by Lee's court-martial, Washington found it necessary to give Steuben the temporary command of a division on the march to the Hudson in July, 1778. And thus, when directed to resume his duties as Inspector-General, all the vexation and disgust he had felt at the obstacles which had been thrown in his way were renewed, heightened by the refusal of De Neuville, the inspector of Gates's army, to receive orders from him as Inspector-General. Steuben now talked freely of his dissatisfaction, objected to the position which he had hitherto worked in so cheerfully, and more than intimated his intention to resign unless his desire for a command in the line were complied with. Washington did not approve of Steuben's aims, but he appreciated his services at their full value, and continued to treat him with his wonted urbanity, freely acknowledging how much he had done, but carefully abstaining from everything that might have been interpreted into an encouragement of his new pretensions. It was with Congress to decide what the inspectorship was to be, and what place the inspector was to hold in the line.

Steuben accordingly went in August to Philadelphia, where Congress was once more sitting in the old hall where the Declaration of Independence had been made. But it was there with a task to perform to which legislative bodies are altogether unequal, with a responsibility weighing upon it which none but a strong executive could have borne, vainly trying to govern by treasury boards and boards of war, — to call out the resources of the country by requisitions and recommendations, and to decide questions which demanded immediate decision as they decided upon laws and acts which demanded careful study and deliberate discussion. It was, too, shorn of some of its brightest ornaments, disturbed by internal dissensions which it no longer had the self-control to conceal, and with a spirit poisoned by jealousy of the army on which it depended for its existence.

It was to this Congress that Steuben brought his claims, and, finding no encouragement of his wishes, he abandoned the idea of obtaining a regular command in the army, and contented himself with preparing and laying before Congress a new plan for the permanent establishment of the inspectorship. The difficulty in regard to Neuville was speedily settled. He was made responsible to the Inspector-General, thus soothing Steuben, whose value was felt, and irritating to resignation the Frenchman, whose value was doubted. A committee was appointed to consider his new plans concerning the inspectorship, and Congress seemed ready to proceed at once to the discussion of them. But the unfavorable turn which things were taking in Rhode Island afforded an opportunity for postponing the matter indefinitely, and Steuben was requested to go to the assistance of General Sullivan. But by the end of August, Sullivan's expedition being ended before he could reach him, although he travelled with the utmost despatch, he again found himself with the main army. When the army removed to Fredericksburg, he was once more actively engaged in the dull routine of manœuvres, drills, and reports.

He seems meanwhile to have become convinced that this was the field in which he could do the most good, and with the exception of an occasional return of his longing for a more dazzling glory, he resolved henceforth to content himself with the glory of being useful. To induce Congress to place his department upon a permanent footing was now his immediate object; and when the army went into winter quarters, he again repaired to Philadelphia. It was an irritating business for a hot-tempered, earnest man, convinced of the correctness of his views, — convinced, too, that, important as many other things which Congress was busy about might be, there was none in the wide circle of their competency more important than this. All Washington's influence, all the force of Hamilton's representations, were employed in his favor, but still week after week wore away, and February, 1779, was near its end before the question was seriously taken up. Then at last a series of resolutions, embodying nearly the substance of his later plans, as revised and approved by Washington, was passed; and, much as they fell short of his original expectations, he was glad to find himself in a position to set himself effectively to work.

But he had not idled away the winter in attendance upon Congress. To make his inspectorship successful, it was necessary that every officer should be provided with a uniform system of regulations for the order and discipline of the troops. He had congratulated himself at the outset that no existing work had attained to a sufficient degree of popularity to make it a general standard.* He had found every colonel, almost every captain, with a system of his own, and agreeing only in marching their men in Indian file. The ground, therefore, was free, and to fill it aright he composed that volume so long known in the army of the United States as Steuben's Regulations, or the "Blue Book." And here again we see his superiority over mere formalists and drill-masters. With a thorough knowledge of all that had been done, he knew also what it was possible to do. Fully aware that in European armies a man who had been drilled three months was still held to be nothing more than a recruit, he was equally aware that in the American army he could not count upon more than two months for transforming a recruit into a soldier. Accordingly, taking less the Prussian system than his own perfect familiarity with the subject for guide, and with a wise consideration for the English prejudices which had struck such deep root in the American mind, he set himself to his task, with Fleury and Walker for assistants, De l'Enfant for draughtsman, and Duponceau for secretary; and by the 25th of March the first part of his work was ready for the action of Congress, having already received the sanction of Washington and of the Board of War. On the 29th, Congress resolved to accept and print it.

Here again Steuben's patience was put to a severe test. The printing of his book cost him more oaths than the composing of it. There were but two copper-plate printers in Philadelphia, and one of them so bad that it was found necessary to throw away above six hundred prints. Only one binder was employed, and, though a good one, the attractions of privateering were so great, that neither he nor the printer could keep men enough together to do half the work they were called to do. Steuben was anxious to have two copies richly bound,—one for the Commander-in-Chief, and one for the French Minister,—but in the whole city there was not gold-leaf enough to gild them. His temper failed him more than once, but fortunately the men he had chiefly to do with were Pickering and Peters, who admired and loved him too much to take offence at his sallies. Pickering, in one of his letters, enters into a full explanation of the causes of delay, and closes with a delicate appeal to Steuben's better feelings. "Should I again discover marks of extreme impatience and even asperity in the Inspector-General, I will impute them to his anxiety to introduce a perfect order and discipline in the army, and to his zeal in securing the safety and independence of America." Peters writes with a happy mixture of jest and gravity, promising "to distinguish between the Baron Steuben uninformed and the Baron Steuben acquainted with facts and difficulties,—between the Baron Steuben in good humor and the same gentleman (zoönically) angry and fretted."

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* The military bibliography of that period is briefly given by Washington in a letter to a young officer: "Bland (the newest edition) stands foremost; also an Essay on the Art of War; Instructions for Officers, lately published at Philadelphia; The Partisan, Young and others." — Sparks, Vol. III. p. 154. Among General Greene's books is a "New System of Military Discipline by a General Officer," published by R. Aitken, printer and bookseller, Philadelphia, 1776, with an appendix containing nine sections of "rules, maxims, &c.," some of the most original of which are, "Nothing but principle can conduct a man through life," "Bad habits are more difficult to correct than to prevent," "The mind must be prepared before it can receive," "That attack has least effect which is most obstructed," &c., &c.

At last the work was done; copies were sent to Governors of States, and distributed through the army; and for the first time since the war began American officers had a clear and definite guide for the performance of their duties.

Steuben made no delay in putting his theories into practice. He reviewed all the regiments, and ordered the introduction of the system of manœuvres contained in the Regulations. Regiments were formed into battalions, each battalion consisting of a definite number of men. To make sure that the arms and equipments were fit for immediate use, and that the men were not merely men on paper, but actually in the ranks, he continued his rigorous monthly inspections. In these inspections there was no trifling, no hurrying over details. Seven hours were not thought too long for the inspection of a brigade of three small regiments. "Every man not present was to be accounted for; if in camp, sick or well, he was produced or visited; every musket handled and searched, cartridge-boxes opened, even the flints and cartridges counted; knapsacks unslung, and every article of clothing spread on the soldier's blanket and tested by his little book, whether what he had received from the United States within the year was there; if not, to be accounted for. Hospitals, stores, laboratories, every place, every thing, was open to inspection, and inspected." The exact, careful man was sure to be praised, and often rewarded; the careless to be sternly reproved.

The crowning labor and complement of all was the establishment of a system of minute written reports according to prescribed forms, extending throughout the whole army, and embracing every department of the service.

In all this work Steuben was but adapting established principles to the exigencies of a new case. But in the formation of the light infantry he became an inventor, sending back a lesson from the New World to the Old, from Frederic's pupil to Frederic himself. The wars with the Indians had taught Americans to fight like their adversaries,—in loose bodies, instead of close masses, each man using his rifle or musket to the best advantage, according to his own judgment. These bodies of skirmishers had turned the day against English and German regulars at Bemis's Heights and Stillwater. Steuben organized them into a light infantry with a drill and discipline of their own. Frederic, meditating upon the suggestions of the American war, saw how much such troops might be made to assist the operations of his dense masses, and accepted the improvement. The other armies of Europe followed his example, and from that time they have formed an essential part of every great army, and done important service on every great battle-field.

It was soon evident that a new spirit had entered the army. Encampments exhibited the regularity of scientific disposition. Reviews displayed in officers and men familiarity with complex evolutions, and that harmony of movement which gives thousands the appearance of a single body under the control of a single will. Inspections demonstrated the possibility of enforcing neatness and exactness, and bringing responsibility home to every door. The treasury, which had been repeatedly called upon to pay the services of men who had long ceased to render service of any kind, was relieved from a heavy burden by the introduction of exact rolls and regular reports. The war office, instead of having to count upon an annual loss of from five to eight thousand muskets, could enter upon its record that in one year of Steuben's inspectorship only three muskets were missing, and they were accounted for. The opposition and jealousy which had clogged his first steps gradually gave way before the perfect demonstration of his success. Officers ceased to shrink from labor with the example of industry like his before them, or to consider any part of their duty as beneath them when they saw him come down from so much greater a height to do it. "Do you see there, sir, your colonel instructing that recruit?" he one day said to North. "I thank God for that, sir."

And no sooner did the soldier find himself in the presence of the enemy, than he showed even more evidently the change which had taken place within him. Hamilton declared that, till he saw the troops forming and manœuvring at Monmouth, he had never felt the full value of discipline. The only use which the few soldiers who were provided with bayonets had hitherto made of them had been as forks to roast their meat with, but within less than four months from the organization of the inspectorship by Congress, — on the night of the 15th of July, 1779, — these same soldiers took Stony Point at the point of the bayonet.

Henceforth Steuben's life becomes so mixed up with the general history of the army, or so filled with minute details, that it is impossible to follow it step by step, within limits like ours. It was not all at once that he could carry out his far-reaching views. The army was once more to be remodelled, and he passed weeks at Philadelphia in close communication with Congress and the Board of War, keeping up all the time a correspondence with Washington, to whose wishes, from first to last, he was ever ready to conform his own. But Congress again wearied and vexed him by delays, for which the embarrassed condition of the public finances was but a partial justification, and which caused, at times, "the loss of months where it was dangerous to lose days." Private jealousies and personal claims still continued to interfere with the introduction of essential changes. They who have studied the history of this period in the letters of the actors know that not all our statesmen were wise, not all our officers high-minded, not all our citizens more devoted to their country than to their pockets. There were times when the whole country seemed heartily sick of the war; and when, perhaps, a Wood or a Seymour, a New York World or an Evening Express, might have stirred up thousands to open resistance, or lured them on to treason to their children and their God. For a time, too, the condition of our finances seemed hopeless. The currency was worthless, the public credit gone. The "promise to pay" of the United States or of the individual States was not worth the "promise to pay" of a private citizen; and it was not until the treasury board had been replaced by a skilful financier, that the real wealth of the country could be brought to the support of its real interests. In his personal as well as in his public capacity Steuben suffered from these things. But he suffered without losing heart, if he sometimes lost patience; and before the war was brought to a close, he had the satisfaction of seeing himself recognized as the true organizer of the American army.

Meanwhile he rendered other important services. He accompanied Reed in his survey of the fortifications of Philadelphia. He rendered valuable service on Washington's staff,—the best staff, in many respects, which the world had ever seen. He wrote elaborate opinions and plans of operations, which contributed much to Washington's assistance in forming his own opinions and plans. He taught the etiquette of receptions and intercourse, when the new French Minister visited camp. And, trifling as such cares may appear when compared with the grave duties of a general in the midst of such a war, they cease to be trifling when we consider how important it was that the Minister's despatches should represent us as not wholly devoid of a knowledge which the Old World prized so highly. He did service, too, of a more difficult nature, when he was sent, without any ostensible command, to supply at West Point the deficiencies of General Howe; and when, under the presidency of Greene, and with some of the best officers in the army for his colleagues, he sat in judgment upon André. And in all these various duties he demeaned himself so wisely, so tempered and controlled his ardent nature, and manifested throughout such elevation of sentiment and such pure devotion to his adopted country, as to prove that Pickering had interpreted his character well when, in the midst of his perplexities, he wrote him, "Courage, dear Baron; those talents which know how to do good without giving umbrage and causing jealousy, are always sure to triumph ultimately over all obstacles."

But next to what he accomplished as inspector, his most important services were those he rendered in Virginia in the winter of 1780 and 1781, and during the memorable and decisive siege of Yorktown. When Greene was appointed to the command of such fragments of the Southern army as had survived the fatal day of Camden, Steuben went with him, because there was "an army to be created." With Greene his relations had been of the friendliest and most intimate kind, from the day when they sat down with Hamilton and Laurens, in Steuben's straitened quarters at Valley Forge, to discuss the first draft of the inspectorship. And now they set out from Philadelphia together for the field on which they both felt that the fate of the war was to be decided. Riding the whole of the first day in company, how pleasantly they journeyed on, and how confidentially they talked, Duponceau, in his old age, dearly loved to tell; recalling with special satisfaction the evening at Chester, where Greene, to his astonishment, turned the conversation upon the Latin poets, and talked about them like a man who had studied them well.

Greene's chief reliance for men and supplies was Virginia; and as it was by the organization of the means of reinforcement and support that the serious work was to begin, he directed Steuben to take command there, and do whatever his judgment suggested for the accomplishment of it. Jefferson was then Governor of the State, and governing in a way which has afforded his adversaries an ample field of crimination, and cost his eulogistic biographers much labor to defend. The disorder of the finances was great, but, being an evil common to the whole country, cannot be accepted as an excuse for the utter prostration of the government. The departments were without a head. The Executive acted only by expedients. Resources were wantonly wasted by neglect and peculation. The public arms were scattered, the soldiers and recruits naked. The militia was so thoroughly demoralized, that they plundered with a wantonness that would have excited wonder in hirelings. A body of volunteers had been raised at great expense for six months' service. Before they were all collected the time was so nearly run out, that it was thought better to dismiss them at once, than to send them to the support of the Southern army. Other corps were raised with the same shortsightedness, and dismissed to save the expense of feeding them.

Steuben saw that the fate of Virginia was bound up with that of the Carolinas, and that the surest way to defend her was to strengthen Greene's army. The militia that refused to follow the Southern commander beyond Ramsay's Mills, because, unless they set out for home immediately, the time they were called out for would expire before they could reach it, might have enabled him to follow up the blow which had almost shattered Cornwallis at Guilford, and avert the invasion which cost Virginia some blood and much treasure. In spite of obstacles, Steuben persisted in his labors. It was by his energy and judgment that Arnold's invasion was so far checked that the traitor was able to accomplish but a part of the evil he had meditated. It was to him, too, that part of Lafayette's success was owing; the old general having prepared the way which the young general followed so happily. But still, of all his hard experience of life, this was the hardest; and it was with an indescribable feeling of relief that he found himself in the lines before Yorktown.

His first siege had been the siege of Prague, as a volunteer, when a boy of fourteen; his last the siege of Schweidnitz, as Frederic's aid, at the close of the Seven Years' War. And now, in the trenches at Yorktown, he saw another great war drawing rapidly to its end, and bringing with it the end of his own long and honorable military career. He was the only American officer who had ever been present at a siege; and here, as on so many occasions, his experience was of great service. It was the only time, too, that he had ever had the command of a division, and fortune so far smiled upon him as to bring on the first overtures for surrender during his turn of duty in the trenches; thus giving him the privilege, so highly prized by soldiers, of being in actual command when the enemy's flag came down.

When the victorious army returned northward, he returned with it to resume his place as Inspector-General: a minute, laborious, and for most men a wearisome round of monotonous duties, but which, under the influence of the spirit which he brought to them, were now universally recognized as the basis of good military organization. Never was the discipline of the troops more perfect than during the last two years of the war; and it is surely not claiming too much for Steuben to say that the sense of duty and subordination which that discipline cultivated was not the least among the causes which enabled an impotent Congress peacefully to disband an injured and irritated army.

His last public service during the war was a journey to Canada to make arrangements for taking possession of the military posts which were to be ceded to us at the signing of the peace, — a service for which his familiarity with the laws and usages of war peculiarly fitted him. Another service which he rendered was in the formation of plans of a military academy, and we commend to the attention of those whose duty it is to watch over our great institution at West Point a careful meditation of that part of his project in which he provides for full professorships of history and geography, of civil and international law, and of eloquence and *belles lettres*. It was probably from him, too, that the first suggestion of the "Cincinnati" came, and, had his counsels been followed, the disbanding of the army, instead of being done stealthily, like something that Congress was afraid to do, would have been done in the broad daylight, with the solemnity with which a great people performs a great duty.

And now, the war being at an end, he would gladly have gone back to Europe to enjoy his glory, and talk over his American life with his old friends. But in coming to America he had made over his benefice of Havelsberg to a nephew, and exhausted all his other resources, — freely exchanging the independence which he had won by long service for the chances of success in the new cause to which he devoted himself. Unfortunately, however, instead of following Vergennes's advice and Lee's example, and making a definite contract with Congress, he had contented himself with their unrecorded acquiescence in his offer to make his compensation depend upon the success of the war. And thus, when the war had succeeded, and he asked for a settlement of his claims, Congress asked for the proof of his contract; and although unquestionable proof of the nature of his original agreement with the Congress committee was given by the members of that committee; although the importance of his services was established by the testimony of the whole army; although Hamilton supported his claims in Congress and out of Congress, and Washington went in his favor to the utmost extent which the limits he had prescribed to himself in his relations with Congress permitted, it was not till after an eight years' struggle with poverty that Steuben obtained a final settlement. Then, indeed, his claims were partly, if not fully, acknowledged, and an annuity of twenty-five hundred dollars settled upon him. How he suffered, meanwhile, he, the large-hearted, free-handed, high-spirited man, from personal privations and public insult; how he suffered, not merely from the actual want of the day, but from the ever-present menace of the morrow, and — keenest pang of all for a heart like his — from the inability to relieve the sufferings of others, — is a story which, fortunately, our limits do not permit us to repeat. We commend it to the serious attention of our readers in the clear, minute, and incontrovertible narrative of Mr. Kapp.

During this interval, most of his time was passed in New York, where his extensive information, refined manners, and genial sympathies made him a general favorite. Disqualified by his age from entering upon a new profession, he could not settle contentedly down in idleness. His papers bear witness to the interest which he took in the political occurrences and questions of the day, as well as to the extent of his reading and his habit of patient thought. Like most of those who had been brought into close relations with the Congress of the Confederation, he was the advocate of a strong and effective central government, and had he lived, would have witnessed the overthrow of the Federalists with as keen regret as Hamilton himself. Among his studies of this period is a plan for a peace establishment of the army, which Washington approved; and a few years later he prepared a plan of fortifications for New York, which became the basis of the plan adopted upon the approach of our second war with England. At one moment, despairing of obtaining a settlement with Congress, he turned his thoughts westward, and drew up a plan for the establishment, with the sanction of the Spanish government, of a colony in the Spanish territories on the Mississippi. But Spain wanted no such colonists, and his memorial remained unanswered. In 1787 he was chosen one of the Regents of the University of New York, — a tribute of respect which must have been singularly gratifying to his feelings. A more important expression was given by New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey to their sense of his services, by large grants of land; and could he but have got money enough to make these grants available, he would have been an independent man.

At length his claims upon the nation were acknowledged. Henceforth he had a fixed income, knew what he could afford to undertake, and how he could afford to live. To take up and settle his lands would afford a pleasant occupation for his declining years. Wherever an old soldier was to be found, he was sure to find a friend, and as disappointment had neither hardened nor embittered his heart, it was to friendship that he looked for happiness. It was too late to think of returning to Europe, even if his pecuniary embarrassments had permitted it. America was now his home. And thus, with such hopes as childless old age may indulge in, and such aspirations as had survived thirteen years of active participation in great events, and ten years' experience of courts, he entered upon the last phase of his career.

The sixteen thousand acres of land which New York had given him lay in Oneida County, about twelve miles north of old Fort Schuyler, the Utica of our day, and formed part of the township which still bears his name. It was a rough, stony tract, fitter for grazing than planting, with a high ridge running across it, from which, as his eye became familiar with the landscape, he could distinguish the highlands of seven different counties, and, gleaming over the tree-tops on the farthest verge of the horizon, the bright waters of Oneida Lake. This was his home during the active months of the year, and when the cold months came, and armies went into winter quarters, he would turn his face southward and resume his station at 216 Broadway, opposite St. Paul's Church. As a landholder, he could indulge his generous impulses, and more than one who had no other claim upon him than what the name of old soldier gave him received a grant of sixty or a hundred acres, either as a free gift or on terms that differed little from it. As a farmer, he could indulge his old habits of methodic organization and a methodic division of his time. Sixty acres were set apart and cleared for the manor-house, which was to be a building suited to his rank and habits of life. Meanwhile he contented himself with a log-house, enlarged after a short time by the addition of a frame-house of two rooms. Here Mulligan, then a young man fresh from Columbia College, and who served him as secretary, was his constant inmate, North, or Walker, or some other old companion, often coming to stay a week or more with him, while some of his nearer neighbors, the most welcome among whom was a Dutch emigrant named Mappa, a gentleman of distinguished ability and high culture, frequently visited him to talk over the questions of the day and the news from Europe. This news he got from the Leyden Gazette, the Galignani's Messenger of those days, and inexplicably strange it seemed to him, at times, especially when he read therein that the Prussian eagles had turned back in ignominious retreat before the tricolored flag of the new republic.

He studied farming as he had studied the art of war, by method and rule, entering everything in his diary, and recording his progress step by step. The minute accuracy of the Inspector-General pervaded the daily habits of the farmer in his clearing. And never, perhaps, even as he rode his war-horse down the line, looking, as one who saw him describes him, "like the god of war himself," did he feel a truer pleasure than when he guided Molly, his quiet little mare, through the stumps and half-worn paths of Steuben. In the evening, chess or a book filled up the time pleasantly, Voltaire being one of his chief favorities, and Gibbon, whose great History had soon found its way across the Atlantic, coming in for a share of his attention. Of German literature, although it had already entered upon the brightest period of its marvellous development, and might have held out, at least in the "Revolt of the Netherlands" and the "Thirty Years' War," great attractions for one who had himself been an actor in a great revolt and a great war, his biographer makes no mention; leaving us thereby to conclude that, like Frederic, he had failed to comprehend this part of the great changes that were going on around him. And thus the last four years of his life glided smoothly away, with little in them to recall Frederic's camp, or the drawing-rooms at Hechingen, but with something of a grateful variety, and much to awaken a placid interest. Loving much and much beloved, he had reached unconsciously, but not unprepared, the brink of the grave.

His last appearance in public was as President of the German Society in New York, when, with drums beating and banners displayed, he marched at its head from the Lutheran schoolhouse in Nassau Street, down Broadway, and through Whitehall, to see its members do their voluntary day's work upon the fortifications of Governor's Island. His last service to the country was in the summer of 1794, as president of the board of commissioners for fortifying the northern and western frontiers of the State, — a work which filled up the whole summer, and was very near ending in his capture by the Indians.

The winter of 1794 began early. In November the ground was already covered with snow. The log-hut began to look sad and lonely in the cold white landscape. Little Molly could no longer make her way through the clearing. North's visit was over. Mulligan was alone with him, with the two servants. The regular time for going to New York was not quite come, but he resolved to anticipate it, and made all his preparations for the journey. The 25th of November came. There was no change in his firm tread, or the clear ring of his voice, or the kindly light of his hazel eye. He played his game of chess, — he listened while Mulligan read, — and at eleven, his usual bedtime, they parted for the night. He had been for some years a communicant of the Lutheran Church, and before he laid his head upon his pillow we may well believe that he had bowed it in prayer. Then came a few hours of sleep, and in sleep the death-stroke, sudden, but not instantaneous, and made bitter by great agony. His servant ran to call Mulligan. "Do not be alarmed, my son," Steuben said, as he saw his young friend rush into the room in terror. The motion of the left side was gone. He asked to be taken up, but returned quickly to bed again. The agony continued. By six he was speechless. It was not till the afternoon of the next day that a physician could be procured. He was still breathing, and for a while sensible. Remedies were applied, and with a momentary gleam of hope. Then he became unconscious, though breathing still. The night wore away, with occasional returns of convulsions, but none of consciousness. The stout frame which had borne up so vigorously against cold and hunger, against sleepless nights and days of toil, struggled painfully with death. The faint breathing alone told that he was yet alive. Towards noon, it grew fainter and fainter, and at half past twelve of the second day he ceased to breathe.

North had been sent for also; but the roads were so bad that all was over before he came. Mulligan had made most of the preparations for the funeral; and as the two mourners talked them over, they remembered that their friend had once pointed out a hemlock-tree on the north of the house as a good burial-place. There, then, they had a grave dug, although the snow around it melted and made it hard to keep it clear; and thither, on the next day about noon, the neighbors, some thirty in all, joining with them, they bore him in silence and laid him down to his rest.

Alas that for this wearied and war-worn frame it should not have been the last rest! But early in the present century the town, which had outgrown the memory of its highest honor, wanted a road, and the engineer who laid it out ran it over Steuben's grave. The coffin was laid bare, remaining exposed for some days to idle gazers and the chances of the weather. It is even said, and we fear with too much truth, that some one, a little more daring in sacrilege, broke it open and tore off a piece of his military cloak. At last the shameful story reached the ears of Colonel Walker, who, hastening to the spot, had the coffin taken up and removed to a neighboring hillside, where, under the shade of primeval trees, with fragrant flowers laughing all around, and within sound of a little brook whose waters chime sweetly with the music of the winds and the birds, a simple slab still bears the name of Steuben.

In the military history of our Revolution, if we class men according to their services, no one after Washington and Greene stands so high as Steuben. For the services which Lafayette rendered, important as they were, were rather the effects of influence and position than of individual superiority. All that Steuben owed to position was the opportunity of action: the action itself was the fruit of his own strong will and thorough knowledge of his science. He was the creator of our regular army, the organizer of our military economy. The impress which he made upon our military character remained there long after his hand was withdrawn. The system of drills and manœuvres which in 1779 he drew up in German to pass through bad French into English, continued to be the system by which all our regulars and militia were formed, until new modifications had been introduced into the art of war by the great wars of the French Revolution. Upon this point the testimony of Washington, Greene, Knox, Hamilton, Pickering, Peters, is uniform and decisive. He claimed nothing to which his claim is not fully borne out by what they wrote and said. His system of reviews, reports, and inspection gave efficiency to the soldier, confidence to the commander, and saved the treasury not less than six hundred thousand dollars.

The private life of a man, so large a portion of whose life was passed in the performance of public duties, affords little room for the growth of distinctive characteristics. There was a slight haughtiness in his manner, which would appear to have been the reflection of his military habit of command, rather than the product of arrogance or unbecoming pride. His pride never seems to have degenerated into vanity, that unbecoming mantle in which so many great men have more than half enveloped their greatness, but was a soldierly pride throughout, founded upon the consciousness of what he had done and was still able to do. In society he always appeared to advantage,—particularly in that test of true refinement, the society of ladies; and if his bow savored somewhat of formality, his vein of compliment and humor was always happy. "Ah, madam," said he, bowing low on being presented to a beautiful Miss Sheaf, and studiously mispronouncing the name, "I have always been cautioned to avoid mis*chief*, but I never knew till to-day how dangerous she was."

Of his generosity innumerable anecdotes have been preserved. Like Goldsmith, he could not withhold even the last penny in his purse when want or suffering asked for it. How often he shared it with the destitute, how bitterly he felt the ungenerous conduct of Congress, which made it impossible for him to give as freely as his heart dictated, how munificently he employed his opportunities as a landholder to provide some old soldier with a home, are things which his contemporaries well knew, and which posterity should not forget.

ART. II. — 1. *Opere Drammatiche di* PAOLO FERRARI. Milano.

2. *Teatro Scelto di* PAOLO GIACOMETTI. Milano.

3. *Le Commedie del* DOTTORE TEOBALDO CICONI. Milano.

4. *Florilegio Drammatico.* Milano. (Containing various comedies by Francesco dall' Ongaro, Luigi Gualtieri, August Bon, Leone Fortis, Riccardo Castelvecchio, Prof. Botto, etc., etc.)

5. *Intorno alla Natura e all' Ufficio dell' Arte Drammatica; Studj di* PROF. F. DALL' ONGARO. (Two articles in the *Politecnico* of Milan, October and December, 1863.)

THE writer of this paper has sometimes found a certain pensive amusement in comparing experiences with other foreigners in Italy, and in noting how they had one and all been confined, as by some fatality, to the same range of authors in their efforts to become acquainted with recent Italian literature. Manzoni, Pellico, Guerrazzi, D'Azelio, and perhaps Grossi: — one counts on the fingers of one hand the inevitable names which embody this literature to such readers, and they must needs have patience and courage if they can persist in the faith that there are modern Italian writers who represent in the literature of their nation something besides its scholarly culture, its religious sentimentality, its revolutionary speculation, and its tendency to seek the romantic and picturesque only in the past. Even when these readers have cleared the bounds set them by the great names mentioned, they must be gifted with rare cheerfulness and enthusiasm, if they can suppress a sigh of disappointment at the barrenness of fields which in English literature teem with continual blossom and harvest.

The student of a language usually turns first to its fiction, and the English student naturally seeks in Italian fiction a class of society-romances corresponding to the novels of Thackeray, Bulwer, Dickens, Brontë, and Stowe, as a means of acquainting himself at once with the best living authors of the language, and the social life of the people. But in fact there are no such romances in modern Italian literature, and the few which do exist may be safely said to reflect the manners, thoughts, feelings, and lives of no class of the modern Italian population. There are, it is true, some brief tales, and even some more ambitious works, which profess to deal with themes and people of the present civilization; but their worth and success may be fairly judged by the fact that the Italians themselves never speak of them, and scarcely know them by name when they are mentioned. A sufficiently just notion of English society, and in lesser degree of our own, may be formed by reading our contemporary fiction; but the only Italian writer who deals attractively with Italian life of the present century — life so various, so interesting, and seemingly so favorable to the purposes of romance — is Ruffini, who writes in English for the English. The Italians who write novels to amuse their own countrymen give them historical romances, of which tedious species of composition they are fond.

The temptation is great to pronounce this absence of the romance of society an absolute want in Italian literature, but one learns to resist the temptation on further acquaintance with the literature and character of the Italians. The want is really supplied from a source which has wellnigh run dry in English letters; and perhaps recognition of this fact, which involves toleration of a defect in ourselves, will help us to bear with a difference in the Italians. Nay, it may be that the wonder after all shall seem, not that they have done so little where we have done so much, but that, with their recent emancipation as a people, and their yet incomplete destiny, they should have surpassed us in another direction.

The Italians care more to have their social life reproduced in the scenes of the theatre than in the pages of narrative fiction. They seem, as a people, to have an utter indifference, if not a positive distaste, for the class of novels which we find so delightful. They neither encourage their own authors to write them, nor do they borrow them from other languages. It is a rare thing to see translations from any of the authors of social romances whom we have named, with the exception of Mrs. Stowe, whose great work unites the most pleasing features of the historical novel and the drama. We have never seen a line from Thackeray translated into Italian; there are versions of Dickens, but he is not liked, and is little read; only the historical romances of Bulwer are translated; while the novels of Scott and of Cooper are endlessly reproduced in every variety of edition.

This peculiarity of taste is partly to be accounted for by the conditions which have formed modern Italian civilization, and which deserve consideration, in whatever light we view the Italians. We have no novels of society, they say, because till now we have had no Italian society. Codini,[*] office-holders, and spies have heretofore formed the recognized and approved society of Italy. And these characters, however favorable for the purposes of satire, were not just the characters with whom a spirited author could amuse his readers, inasmuch as literature existed only by their consent, and was sufficiently obnoxious to them in its very essence, without taking a personally disagreeable form. All the elements which the author would have used in a novel of contemporary life were forbidden him. The virtues which genius must applaud were only to be found in characters dangerous to good government; bad faith, intolerance, pedantry, ignorance, and servility were specially protected and favored by authority against the humorist and the wit. It is true that people in Florence, in Milan, in Naples, lived, loved, married, succeeded, and failed, and experienced all life's good and ill, before the year 1859; and no doubt there were effects enough to be studied in the social situation of the miserable poor, the sordid money-getting middle classes, and the idle, corrupt, and unmanly nobles. But it is only perfect freedom which can produce and enjoy the novel of society as we have it. Under the former governments of Italy, it would have been wholly impossible for an Italian to give in narrative fiction a faithful picture of Italian society. If it was bad, it had been robbed of the power of self-regeneration by a church and a state to which its weakness and wickedness were necessary, and to which the very hope of better things was irreligion and treason. Genius, contemplating these conditions, which it was forbidden to criticise and powerless to affect, had the choice either to take refuge from present sorrow and degradation in dreamful study of the glorious and heroic past, or to utter its cry against the wrong, and pass into prison or exile. That is, if it were genius which could not find expression in drama. The wholly different way in which the comedy, which occupies the same place in dramatic composition that the society-romance holds in narrative fiction, deals with the features of a contemporary civilization, so as to present a picture of the social life belonging to it, has always made it possible even under the most despotic government; and this difference preserves our facts from the fatality of proving too much, and rendering the existence of Italian comedy illogical in the state of things alluded to. From a time long before Goldoni, and ever since the time of that painter of national manners and character, the comedy in Italy has constantly employed itself with the portraiture of the contemporary social phases unseen in Italian romance; and has even, now and then, trusting to what Giacometti calls the providential ignorance of censors, ventured to agitate a question not merely individual, but civil and Italian, and to speak, in the theatre, of the Italians as a people, of their sorrows and of their follies. There is a certain fugitive essence in the drama, taking life from the utterance, the manner of the actor, which might well escape a censor the most vigilant of public tranquillity. But the novel must contemplate and comment; it can leave nothing unexpressed and trust no secret effect to elocution or action. Moreover, while comedy deals with character as it exists and manifests itself in action, narrative fiction must bare the causes which produce character, and reveal all the feelings and explain the circumstances which influence men to action. The novel of society must needs censure conditions in which odious human traits and characters flourish when it depicts them; the play can laugh them to scorn without a syllable of criticism on the state of things to which they owe their existence. Molière was possible under the *ancien régime* in France, but Victor Hugo could not have been.

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[*] *Fogies*, or, in American, *hunkers*. Literally, *pig-tails*.

No doubt, then, comedy owes something of the ascendency which it holds over the social romance with the Italians to these extrinsic causes; but it owes infinitely more to the dramatic temperament of the race. It is a trite thing to say that the temperament of the Italians is dramatic; but the fact acquires wonderful freshness and interest from experimental knowledge of their civilization. It is the first thing in the character of the people which strikes the passing stranger; it is the trait of all others, which develops and grows upon the observation of the sojourner and student of human nature in Italy. The babe seems to suck in the spirit of drama with the milk; the little children are born actors. This spirit modifies and influences the whole life of the people; it shapes the manners of all classes; it inspires every movement and gesture of the least conscious individual of a race without bashfulness. It speaks in all Italian art, which learns, teaches, and perpetuates it, no matter whether it be classic or Christian art. In the Museum at Parma is a bronze hand, dug up with other antiquities at Valleja, of which the fingers are curved inward toward the thumb, with that play of the pantomimic muscles by which the Italian of to-day conveys the idea of fingering money, and which one finds impossible to Anglo-Saxon fibre. In the fragment of an old fresco on the outer wall of the church of Santo Stefano at Venice are two hands held up in the vivacious play of argument, as Italians argue. The *facchini*, who *loaf* every day under the shadow of this wall, make the same gesture as they dispute together, and the artist who painted the saint's hands in the fresco had only to copy the commonest life about him to give the most earnest and vivid effect to his picture. These habits of dramatic dumb-show are not merely forms of individual demonstration, but are the medium in Italy of communicating ideas common to all, and are something as intelligible as language itself. They are the natural utterance of a race which not only finds nothing shocking or vulgar in exuberance of manner, but to which the contrary is cold, dull, and hateful. If possible, we avoid a scene. If possible, the Italian makes one. He seems to find a wonderful zest in the play of his passions. He loves the conflict of emotion, and riots upon the sensations evoked by dispute. Let him be heated with anger, — it is as good as to be moved with joy. To talk rapidly and loudly, to gesticulate furiously, and to express himself with a tempest of his whole person, is his idea of conversation. There is a surface of varnished quiet, which, if he be of gentle breeding, he is apt to present to the stranger; but this is an abnormal state which it bores him to persevere in. With the first impulse of real feeling the varnish cracks away from him, and he bursts forth into passionate demonstration. It is little matter how trifling the affair in hand is; he puts his whole soul into it, if he touches it at all. It may be the Italian unity; it is possibly a question of sixpence, but for the moment it is quite the same to him. No doubt there are exceptions among the Italians to this general type of character, and a quiet, undemonstrative Italian is, like an amiable Englishman, the most delightful person in the world — if you can find him.

The Italian writer of comedy is happy not only in the mobile and dramatic audience for which he writes, but he is peculiarly blest in the society which he describes. The delight which the emotional Italian nature finds in the vivid fables of the stage is hardly to be marred by perception of dramatic excesses which we call theatrical, but in which the more fervid spectator of the South hears only the echo of his own extravagance; and the dramatist may err (according to our colder nations) very far upon the side of exaggeration and romance in his situations and circumstances, without reaching improbability or sacrificing verisimilitude. It is his fortune to celebrate contemporary life, in which love is still made according to the rules of love-making in the old *capa y espada* comedies of the Spanish, with all the picturesque accessaries of confidants, stolen interviews under balconies by moonlight, bribed serving-maids, and the illicit exchange of many *righe di biglietto;* and when he does not care to give his comedy the charm of the jealous difficulty and mystery with which such courtship is invested, he may still copy from Italian married life the pleasant interest of intrigue. In the meanest exigency of his art he is befriended by the characteristics of Italian society, as well as aided by its structure in the conduct of plot and persons. That free-spoken valet and that loquacious and pert maid, who are so dear to his art, and are such odious monsters in English comedy, may be drawn from life in Italy, where there is either very great equality of feeling, or the perfect security of rank which permits freedom in the intercourse of the different classes, and where these convenient persons of the stage actually proffer advice or approval to those socially above them. In the publicity of private life (if the paradox may be pardoned) under skies so lovely that the shelter of a roof and walls is imprisonment, in the promenading at established hours and in certain places, in the idling at *cafés*, and in the thronging to the theatres and other places of amusement, the lazy gossiping on the streets, and the eternal craving either to hear or tell some new thing, this favored dramatist finds the incident, the movement and lightness which his art demands, and which no other life affords so well. Nay, in Italy, where one witnesses the keen interest of crowds in the affairs of others, and the profusion and freedom of comment which the smallest event calls forth in this out-of-doors society, the chorus of the comic opera acquires a sort of truthfulness and probability, and even the soliloquy (that wretched and stupid scapegoat of sentiments which cannot be expressed in dialogue) does not seem so unnatural and grossly offensive to the Italian playgoer, who has not only the habit of uttering his emotions before his fellow-beings, but of not unfrequently obliging the Devil with them when alone. Many old-world formalities, which we have cast aside, but which serve excellently well to garnish plays, are still in vogue with the Italians, and there is no better comedy than to see the encounter and retreat of two Italian fine-ladies, and hear their protestations of civility, their Protean forms of courtesy, their indefatigable expressions of politeness, — unless indeed it be to witness the same scene between two serving-women, who address each other with a high-flown and exuberant courtliness, which is only equalled by the manner of colored people when they stand upon ceremony. But, above all, the comedy is most at home in Italy, because, though the Italians are immovably fixed in the idea that all persons of English blood, and these persons alone, are *originali*, the originals of Italy far outnumber the originals of any other land. This race has so transparent a civilization, the conventional coating, however showy, is so thin upon it, that all the impulses of human nature in action, with which the drama specially deals, are constantly visible. There is, moreover, a curious frankness in its character. As the Italian does not seek to conceal his feelings, but loves to display them, so he is equally ready to discover his peculiar merit or foible, virtue or vice, whatever it may be. Hé is neither proud nor ashamed: *è fatto così!* Indeed, we fancy that men are more openly good or bad in Italy than elsewhere; and there, easy, tolerant society takes them for just what they are worth, and comedy, copying such primitive types of character, has no need to touch them with paint to make them figures for the stage.* But it seems to us that it is just with this opulence of incident, scene, action, publicity of life, and transparency of motive that the subjective art of narrative romance does not care to deal; and we think the play must consequently remain the favorite form of fiction in Italy always, — or if not always, at least till an Italian Cervantes or Le Sage shall arise to paint the contemporary life of his countrymen in a novel.

No doubt it was to these peculiarities of national life and character (which we have so slightly sketched, without thought of presenting a study of Italian society) that the old *commedia d' arte* specially owed its popularity in Italy, — popularity that endured long after culture had pronounced the entertainment rude and puerile, and that survived even Goldoni, whose drama finally banished it from the stage. In this kind of play, for which the author furnished merely the plot and the conduct of the action, and the player supplied the dialogue, the sympathetic, eager, and impatient Italian character must have found something wonderfully pleasing. The spectator had always the shock of novelty, and the spur of freshest expectation, while following the improvisations of the actor, and even the keener satisfaction of immediately and visibly furnishing his inspirations, at times. Among no other people could the *commedia d' arte* have been possible so long, and perhaps this flavor of exclusive ownership endeared its possession to the Italians. In spite of its inherent defects, and the gross abuses to which it must have been subject, it required a supreme dramatic genius to supplant it in the affections of the people, by plays in which the beautiful had perfecter form. The dramatists who preceded Goldoni, Gigli, Martelli, Amenta, Maffei, and Faggiuoli, though gifted and learned men, friends of the classic and the French drama, had not the cunning to prevail against the *commedia d' arte*, and the great Venetian found it in full possession of the Italian stage. And how wisely Goldoni temporized with it, and treated with it while preparing its ruin, and how far he won over its friends by borrowing its own attractions, let any one who will know read that delightful autobiography of the friendly, amusing, earnest old playwright, and those delicious comedies in which constantly recur the standard masks of the *commedia d' arte :* Pantolon dei Bisognosi, sturdy, humorous, and upright Venetian merchant; Il Dottore, learned professor of Bologna, with the wine-stain on his countenance in memory of that remote jurisconsult of the university from whom he was first taken; Arlecchino Bergamasco, stupid rogue and glutton; Brighella, astute rogue and *imbroglione*, and Bergamasco; Columbina, their fellow-servant; and all that company of familiar and pleasant people. One will hardly weary anywhere, we think, of reading these plays, and if one has the fortune to read them in Venice, by the light of such knowledge as he can hardly refuse to have of the living people around him, we believe he shall find it impossible to drowse over them, even on a summer afternoon, when it blows sirocco, and the very swallow ceases for a little, out of sleepiness, to shriek his joy in the Italian sky. For ourselves, we have never found them tiresome or cloying, but always fresh and racy, faithful, full of gentle wit and sweet-blooded humor, easy movement, and blameless delight. And when in Venice the players have relieved our fancy of the care of situation and effect, this delight of perusal has passed into a rapture of seeing and hearing which the acting of no other plays has given. They depict Venice of the last century; but Venetian life must always remain the same in so many things, must always retain so many peculiar and charming features, that the plays of Goldoni still form a picture of the Venetian life about us; a picture so light and graceful, so true in color, so abundant in masterly and exquisite touches, that to praise them enough tempts us past the bounds of sober criticism.

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* Since these speculations were put on paper, we have read with singular pleasure, in the Preface to *L' Ultimo Barone*, by Dall' Ongaro, a corroboration of the opinion expressed of Italian character in this respect. The author says: "*I feel sure we Italians have preserved, far more than any other people, the characteristic lineaments impressed by nature and tradition.*"

It is interesting and curious evidence of the many-sided perfection of a beautiful work, and of how genius builds better than it knows, that these comedies, written expressly with a view to effect upon the stage, afford that pleasure in their perusal to which we have alluded. Never did author write so exclusively and solely for the theatre as Goldoni. He had, indeed, a new Italian theatre to create, and he set about his task in the most business-like manner, as genius always does. His experience of players began very early, when he ran away from school with a band of strollers; and when he began to write comedies, he attached himself to a company of comedians, and, studying the capacity of the actors, kept them in view as well as the persons of the drama while writing his plays. But he was also at the same time a diligent student of human nature, an observer of manners and the world, and a keen discerner of the springs of action; and he was far too great a master to subordinate the incident and action of the play to the effect to be produced by any certain actor. He seems to have adapted the actor to the part, as far as possible, and to have striven to cultivate his power in every case to sustain it, instead of adapting the part to the actor. He cast his own plays, and himself took the brunt of all the green-room angers and jealousies; and he relates in his *Memorie* how he met and overcame the difficulties he had to encounter in his peculiar method of writing comedy, with a cheerful humor, and a graphic description of the character, as enjoyable in another way as his easy, genial, and good-natured comedies themselves.

Goldoni has been called the Menander of Italian drama, and indeed the Venice of Goldoni's time must have been very like the Athens of Menander's. Political conditions prescribed domestic and social life as the sole theme for both; and we are slow to believe that the Greek in the plays now lost irrevocably could within this range have been greater than the Venetian has proven himself in the comedies which we trust shall remain to us forever. For his pleasant and friendly genius, Comedy lived everywhere in Venice: danced and capered before him through the carnival; walked with him in the gay Piazza; talked with him behind her mask at the Ridotto; sat and gossiped with him at the *café;* beckoned him down the narrow streets, and led him into cool little, many-balconied courts, where the neighbors chatted and disputed from window to window; made the fishwives and lacemakers of Chioggia quarrel for his delight; drew aside secret curtains, and showed him giddy wives and fickle husbands, old-fogy fathers bent on choosing husbands for their daughters, and merry girls laughing with love at locksmiths; pointed him out the lovers whispering at the lattices, and the old women mumbling scandal over their *scaldini*. And with his perfect fidelity and truth to this various life Goldoni wrote, in an age of unchaste literature, plays which a girl may read with as little cause to blush as would be given by a novel of Dickens. At a time when in England only the tedious Richardson wrote chaste romances, Goldoni produced plays full of decent laughter, of cleanly humor and amiable morality, in that Venice which we commonly believe to have been Sodomitic in its filth and wickedness. Either her corruption of that time has been grossly exaggerated, or her unfaithful women and rakish men had a curiously simple taste for a drama in which love was virtuous, vice confounded and put to shame, and domestic peace and affection held up to envy and admiration. Thanks to the purity of this great poet, who was also a good husband, a true friend, and upright man, the Italian drama still abides by the laws of decency, and the coarse sops which actors on our own stage throw to the pit are licenses almost unknown upon the Italian scene.

After the age which had given Alfieri as well as Goldoni to the world, there was a pause in the progress of the Italian drama. The immediate successors of the latter were writers whose works are not now represented on the stage, and whose names have no celebrity. Among those who followed him at greater distance is Alberto Nota, a prolific but not very entertaining writer of plays, in which the manner of the great master is imitated, and his inspirations freely borrowed. Dall' Ongaro, in the preface to his *Fasma*, says Nota is to Goldoni what Terence is to Menander, — a copy and an adaptation. His plays are no longer acted nor reprinted, but may be sometimes found in old editions and voluminous repose at the second-hand book-stalls. A far more amusing and original writer, in whom the influence of Goldoni's happiest manner is visible, is Augusto Bon. He was himself a player, and he wrote, like Goldoni, with an immediate view to effect upon the stage; but his efforts lack the unconscious perfection of the master's, and are better seen than read. His most popular comedies are "Ludro and his Great Day's Work," "Ludretto" (little Ludro, Ludro's servant), "The Marriage of Ludro," and "The Death of Ludro." These are all in the Venetian dialect, and abound in racy humor and telling hits. Bon himself represented his Ludro while he lived, and the plays live after him in the delight of the Venetian public. We have seen "Ludro and his Great Day's Work" played to an audience in Venice which it shook from one jest and situation to another with never-dying laughter. The great day's work consists in uniting two lovers whom their fathers kept asunder, punishing a greedy old creditor, and relieving a debtor, and such like commendable actions on the part of Ludro, who is a money-lender, and the agent of everybody in a tight place, be it in love or in debt. There is a touch of pathos in the play, as there is in every genuinely humorous thing, for Ludro, who has the worst reputation of rascal, usurer, and *imbroglione*, is at heart a very good fellow, and sincerely tries to serve others while helping himself. His true character comes out only at the end of the play, when the others do him a tardy and grudging justice. Dickens, in the character of Pancks, who holds the reader of "Little Dorrit" so long in doubt, has produced a like effect in art.

But, after all, we fancy that, though the plays of Bon still keep their hold upon the public favor, the taste for reproductions of the Goldonian drama has passed away. In truth, the vein which Goldoni wrought he exhausted. Within the scope of his peculiar genius, and the bounds set him by political and social circumstances, he touched every theme and painted every character that could be turned into matter of airy and gracious comedy. His plays must always give delight, and they will probably be acted as long in Italy as Shakespeare's among ourselves, though the public forgets and neglects his imitators. The loves of his Florindo and Rosaura, — invariable names and Protean characters, — must always charm by their infinite variety and naturalness. The liar Lelio and the scandalmonger Marzio, no less than Pantolon, Il Dottore, Arlecchino, and Brighella, have the perennial fascination of the vices and virtues they embody. May the Count from the mainland (through whom alone could patrician follies be touched in jealous, aristocratic Venice) live forever! And as for the old-maiden aunt who always attributes her pretty niece's lovers to herself, and will be the foremost *civetta* among the young ladies; as for the young ladies themselves, with their sweet fears of papa Pantolon, their covert flirtations, sly billets, and masquerading escapades; as for the despotic mothers-in-law and jealous wives and husbands; as for the absurd old suitors made to put up at last with the maiden aunts; as for all the good mothers, tender fathers, and happy spouses, the reformed rakes, baffled seducers, and unmasked hypocrites; as for the whole tribe of pert serving-maids, talkative gondoliers, and waiters at *cafés*, and the pleasant generation of *cavalieri serventi*, gamblers, misers, doltish and cunning menials, pompous doctors, high-and-low-bred rogues, the antiquaries, apothecaries, advocates, usurers, — all characters and figures that swarm through those vivid and various scenes, — who that has ever known them would be willing to let them die? For our own part, we had as lief part with the Pendennises out of Thackeray; and these beloved people of comedy have taken place in our heart with Gil Blas and Sancho Panza, in the honest and improving company of Lazarillo de Tormes.

Recent Italian comedy is of a character as different from that of Goldoni as the present age is different from Goldoni's period. The scope of the modern drama is in another direction, and if its aim be not really higher, there is greater nobility in its tone, and it deals less with peculiar characters copied from life than with exceptional situations, which develop traits in men who have no very striking peculiarity to distinguish them from their fellows, while it seeks to enforce, not a moral for a special emergency, but a loftier code of morality for the whole conduct of life. This drama has been of slow growth, but its roots are all in the soil of this century of thoughts and revolutions; its blossoms have been put forth hardily in inclement seasons, and its fruit tastes often of the acrid and bitter experiences of men who cannot forget that they have suffered, and that those whom they seek to amuse have suffered with them. There is scarcely a play, of all those we have seen and read, but has some covert political allusion, or sparkles with outspoken scorn and hatred of the nation's oppressors, according as it was written before or after the time which emancipated speech among the Italians. The patriotic flavor seldom spoils the taste of the whole play by excess; it remains commonly a hint that the poet has lived and felt, and is not a *codino;* but in respect of this feature alone it differs by the widest variance from the Goldonian comedy. Goldoni contented himself with themes purely domestic and social, and if by chance he ever touches a foible of the patricians, he does it by subterfuge, and with a sort of reverence still, while he never mentions the government of St. Mark but with ardent respect and veneration. There is no doubt that Goldoni was greater within his limited range than any of his successors, with their extended liberty, have proved, and there is no doubt that he was cramped in it. Not that a man of genius must needs wish to mix all his thoughts with a tincture of politics, but that the fact that genius cannot utter everything it will, when and how it will, depresses it, and the contrary exalts it. We fancy, however, that, as liberty becomes a habit in Italy, the comedy will lose its political flavor altogether, and that the laughing mask will utter patriotic appeals only in special danger. As yet it is well for every public voice to remind Italians that their battle is only half won, and that without vigilance all may be lost again.

The modern spirit to which the comedy owes its political tints makes itself known also in the social ethics of the plays, and in the presence of certain characters common to nearly all, and in that degree conventional, like the old masks. We of the New World, we

> "New men that in the flying of a wheel
> Cry down the past,"

are somewhat prone to think ourselves sole patrons of the virtue that derides the pretensions of rank, and declares that merit is, and remains, the only true distinction. But the new Italian comedies teach democracy in as many persons as can be made to inculcate it. Mere blood has as little honor on the stage as off it in Italy, where it is at singular discount. In the plays it is apt to be found in the villains, the tedious old women, and the befooled papas, while honor dwells in the bosom of some young man of genius, — inventor, poet, or artist, — who is, in the nature of things, ardently attached to some beautiful and gifted girl of humble station, or, at the worst, to some noble lady disdainful of her nobility. But blood is not always banished from generous natures. It is sometimes suffered to appear in the person of the young count or marquis of no means whatever, of obscure and uncertain lodgings, many debts and doubts, good heart and amiable temper. He is the friend of the poor young man of genius, whose poverty he shares and whose aspirations he pities. His story is familiar to us. In his green youth he loved one who rejected him for a richer suitor, and being blighted, he displays a dry and pleasant wit in the second or third act when he meets this lady, who has found out her mistake, and would not refuse to mend it, being now a widow. He is not at all caustic with her; he tells her, with a cool, agreeable persiflage, that the past is past, but that they two may still unite in making happy two younger and better people, the inventor (or artist or poet) and his betrothed. No doubt there is good in store for this nobleman before the curtain falls, and one does not hate him for the misfortune of noble birth, and the people in the pit are friends with him. They are glad to have him snub, as a real nobleman may snub, the *parvenus;* and how they applaud when he unmasks the villain of the play, doubly foiled in his failure to injure the poor young man of genius and to dishonor his betrothed!

Without gallantries which pass between silly wives and guilty lovers, these comedies certainly are not. But it is noticeable in all, that a modern and decent destiny tends to defeat the seducer and put him to shame, while the husband and wife whom he has sought to injure triumph over him. Commonly, the sentiment of the new comedy is good and sound in every respect. It is Vice, the abominable, who gets laughed at; and the worldly, witty, and elegant rake and the pensive and fascinating adulteress (more sinned against, both, than sinning) are figures which scarcely appear in these honest scenes. Indeed, the morality which banishes them is most pointed, and is perhaps insisted upon a little tediously at times. It has happened in one or two comedies that an erring wife or husband, after a long and bitter repentance, is forgiven and made happy; but this is an amiable weakness of sentiment which may surely be pardoned now and then to plays commonly so sound. It is to be hoped that the drama derives the inspirations of its elevated morality from the ameliorated sentiment of Italian civilization; and no doubt it must react beneficially upon society. At any rate, virtue is now the ruling passion of the comedy, and in the plays she sometimes fixes her abode in bosoms which have been supposed incapable of her. Ciconi has written a comedy to show that there are *White Flies* even among ballet-dancers and their handmaids, and our friend the count (rich for the nonce) rewards the *ballerina's* purity with matrimony. We are sorry to make known to a land of newspapers, that, in dramas in which the morals of such characters have been reformed, the journalist (who is almost a standard *persona dramatis*) is nearly always a most desperate and venal scamp, — a regular *birbante matricolato.* He is a pleasant scamp enough, with an easy and amusing humor, so that, if one had not the evidences of one's senses, it would be hard to believe him guilty of such meannesses as he commits. But this unconscionable and attractive rogue does nothing but take money for puffs, and write down the plays of young poets who do not fee him, and attack the actresses and dancers who reject his advances. He seems withal to move in decent society, and fine ladies laugh at his jokes, which, like those of journalists everywhere, are pointed and brilliant.

In these new comedies, however, which touch modern life at every salient point, and take off fac-simile impressions of the prominent features of society, there is an anomalous absence of all ridicule of the priesthood. In Italy the priests are doubted and misliked by all but the women and the old-womanish men, and as a man and king the visible head of the Church is execrated. Wherever there is freedom of the press and of speech, caricatures of the Pope, of the bishops and priests, swarm in the windows of the print-shops; the political journals find them convenient texts for innumerable articles; half of the popular wit and wisdom, whether proverbial or impromptu, deals with the priests and monks. Few pencils which can make the line of beauty have failed to draw the fair round belly of canonico or bishop. The mysterious cousins and nieces of the clergy are found in the comic papers; and the eating and bibbing of the ecclesiastics is the refuge of every talker hard pushed for a comparison of gluttony. Yet, with all this ridicule, distrust, and despite, the priests are never dragged upon the stage to awaken popular laughter by the spectacle of their faults and their sins. There is but one recent comedy (the *Troppo Tardi* of Ciconi) in which an ecclesiastic appears for other than mere mechanical purposes, and in this case he is made absurd rather than odious. The explanation of this anomalous absence must be looked for in an anomaly of the national character. The Roman Church, though its temples are deserted by all young and thoughtful men, although its ministers are doubted and its crimes are abhorred, is yet most powerful in its hold upon the affections of the Italian people. All forms, vessels, and symbols significant of its spiritual character are revered, and the belief that bad men, rather than any inherent vice of the Church, are to blame for its errors, forms a protection to these guilty agents against a public and degrading humiliation as a class which would also bring shame upon the Church. The satire of the journals is more or less personal; their caricatures of the priesthood are individual portraits. But if a priest were brought upon the stage for scoffing or despite, the offence would cease to be personal, and would be an attack upon religion. This, to their honor, the Italians have never suffered. The very dress of the priests, however well it be known to cover multitudes of sins in real life, is too dear to the people by association with the most solemn scenes of life ever to be introduced in the theatre as the garb of an abominable or contemptible character. Above all, the Church and its ministers are sacred to the women, — the wives, sisters, and daughters of the auditors who decide the fate of plays, — and as no degradation in Italy could be so public, general, and complete, in the eyes of all classes and persons, as the ridicule of the theatre, the common good feeling spares it to the priests, who as an order are certainly not bad solely by their own volition, and who represent a Church which is odious only through the delinquencies of a part of their number.

Among the writers of recent Italian comedy (at some of the characteristics of which we have just glanced), the most popular are Teobaldo Ciconi, Paolo Ferrari, and Paolo Giacometti; but after these come others of no less talent, who have either not written so much, or have failed to hit the popular humor so skilfully. Such are Castelvecchio, Gualtieri, Fortis, Botto, and Dall' Ongaro. The latter (who was born under Austrian rule in Istria, and now lives in exile at Florence) has without doubt more poetical genius than any living Italian dramatist; but perhaps it is the very quality of his genius which makes him less successful than inferior men in the vivid and immediate effects of the theatre. His plays are full of poetic feeling; his themes are chosen according to a theory which he develops in the paper of which we have quoted the title at the head of this article. Believing that the theatre should not merely amuse the people, but should seek to touch their better nature, and exalt their tastes and ideas, he turns to history for his plots, and preferably to Italian history; and holding, moreover, that the form best expressive of modern feeling is that middle species of play between the tragedy and comedy, which the Italians call *dramma*, he is sparing of the comic element, and appeals rather to the sensibilities of his audience than to its laughter. "The drama," he says, "is represented before a public, multiplex, numerous, composed of heterogeneous elements. As a work of art, it must offer the æsthetic qualities which render it accessible to all; as a means of social education, it must exclude every narrow and intolerant doctrine, it must appeal to the grand and general principles admitted in all religions, and graven in indelible characters on the living tablets of the human heart. . . . . . The audience, susceptible in the mass to the same emotions, is *people*, not individuals, and is to be collectively educated and affected for vice or for virtue." These views, he thinks, will hardly please the generation of men who are ashamed of feeling, and "who would not shed tears lest they displace the quizzing-glass in wiping them away. Theirs is French taste, come down from the courts. The *beau monde* has wished to laugh at every cost. But the deeps of the human heart are always the same. A day will come when it will be said to the poet: 'Can you no longer touch the chord of feeling? Make us weep!'" The man proposing to himself the scope here indicated will write plays dear to the heart of the scholar, the thinker, the lover of men; and such are the plays of Dall' Ongaro. But if the rarity of their representation is a test of the practicality of the poet's theory, we must believe that the public or the theatre is not yet prepared to receive it without modification. Dall' Ongaro's most popular piece is *Il Fornaretto*, a drama founded on one of the most pathetic incidents of Venetian history. The hero is the poor baker-boy, who, having picked up the sheath of a knife afterwards found in the heart of a murdered patrician, was condemned on evidence of the possession of the sheath, and guiltlessly suffered death for the assassination. The real assassin confessed the crime afterwards, whereupon it was ordered, and always observed by the Ten, that, before sentence of death should be passed on a culprit, one of their number should cry out to the rest, "*Ricordatevi del povero Fornaretto!*" This play has noble and exalted scenes, but we think it has won its hold upon popular affection in Venice chiefly because it deals with a cruel wrong done to one of the people; and its success is that of a tragedy in the English sense, not that of a drama, and far less that of a comedy. In his *Bianca Cappello*, Dall' Ongaro has failed to win in equal degree the popular favor, because, though the subject is equally patriotic and familiar, it appeals less to popular sympathies, which no dignity of treatment can compel. The poet's latest dramatic work is an exquisitely graceful restoration to living literature of one of Menander's comedies, of which only the plot had remained. The Greek called the play *Phasma*, and the Italian, adopting the title and the plot, has supplied from his imagination the characters, situations, and dialogue; promising that, if ever the true Menander be discovered, he will burn his own in expiation,—which would inflict upon literature, we think, a loss as great as it suffered from the Greek orthodoxy which burnt the first *Phasma.** The comedy has met with success upon the stage, but we fancy it is better to read it than to see it played. It is a poem with passages of gentle humor and feeling, and an interest sufficiently eager, without being intense, springing from the unhappy mother's penance for her fault, and from loves of which the fortunate termination may be foreseen.

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* The following is the plot of *Phasma*, as invented by Menander, and adopted by Dall' Ongaro.

"*Phasma* is the title of a comedy by Menander, in which a woman, married to a widower having an adolescent son by a former wife, kept a natural daughter of her own in an adjoining house, and found frequent occasion of seeing her, without knowledge of her husband or others. She had secretly perforated the wall between the two houses, and arranged as an oratory the room through which the communication was made, concealing the private door with flowers and votive garlands; and so, with the pretext of celebrating sacred rites, she was wont to call her daughter to her and converse with her. By chance the youth, her step-son, once caught sight of the maiden, and, at the aspect of her great beauty, remained confounded as by a supernatural apparition. Hence the name of the comedy. But the truth appearing, little by little, the youth burned with such ardent love for the maiden that nothing would cure him but giving him her to wife. So, with the great joy of the mother and the lover, and with the consent of the father, the nuptials were solemnized, with which the comedy ends." —Elio Donato's comments on Terence.

We speak first of Dall' Ongaro, because we wish to render homage to his earnest and exalted genius before denying him a high place among writers of recent comedy. He is so well known to readers of modern Italian literature as a poet and a writer of singularly clear and delightful prose, that we need hardly celebrate him here. It is mere justice to say, however, that, if his plays are not so popular as those of others in the theatre, they read far better, and that, if he has not directly influenced the drama, the ethics of the modern drama, as he expounds them, have, with some modifications, influenced the recent dramatists in a remarkable degree.

Riccardo Castelvecchio is the pseudonyme of a writer who has contributed several successful plays to the dramatic literature of the time, of which the best is *La Donna Romantica.* He is a Venetian, we believe, or at least Veneto, and some of his comedies are in his native dialect, — a tongue which lends itself most gracefully and effectively to the drama; but Castelvecchio has no claim, either by reason of his quantity or quality, to rank with the first of the modern dramatists. Professor Botto, a Genoese, is the author of a most charming and popular comedy called "Genius and Speculation," which is eminent for its fidelity to modern Italian life and feeling, and worthy of the success it has met. Fortis is by birth a Triestine, and a Jew. He lived many years in Padua, where he embraced Christianity; but for some offence a journal which he published in that city was suppressed and himself exiled. He is now editor of the *Pungolo* of Milan, one of the ablest political journals of Italy, and his portrait, in some form of caricature, may be seen any week in the Milanese comic papers. His best play is "Industry and Speculation, or Heart and Art."

Luigi Gualtieri is a dramatist of much versatility, and his plays enjoy a greater degree of favor than those of the writers just named. They vary in quality from very good to very bad indeed; he calls himself, in comparison with Ferrari, "*pittoraccio di scenarii,*" and "*sovvertitore, se fosse da tanto, di ogni regola e nemico d'ogni scuola.*" Many of his comedies will bear out this unsparing judgment, but others will win for him the homage paid to a more careful artist than the scene-painter, and, if they show him an enemy of schools, will prove him a friend of art. He has more drollery than any of his contemporaries, and he has the gift, most rare among Southern writers, of touching the heart through the simplest and most natural sympathies. One of his pleasantest comedies is *Lo Spiantato* (a racy word, which, if Done-up will not serve, we must translate by circumlocution, signifying the pennilessness of the spendthrift), of which the hero is worthy of a place in our affections with Dick Swiveller, F. Bayham, and other unlucky and worthless favorites; though the tone of burlesque exaggeration running through the character reminds of Dickens rather than of Thackeray. *Lo Spiantato*, having spent a large patrimony, is living by his wits very slenderly, when a dying brother, whom he has not seen for many years, bequeathes to his care an only daughter. This poor young girl is herself the bearer of her father's last wish, and comes to her uncle, whom she expects to find living in luxury, but whom she finds in utter poverty, and just on the point of going out to fight with a nobleman whom he has insulted in his cups. He receives her with tenderness and embarrassment, and, deeply touched by the sense of her helpless dependence, he resolves for her sake to seek to better his fortunes. He is a man of honor, however, and this duel must be fought, or honorably withdrawn from. Arrived at the rendezvous, he proclaims to his antagonist that he has not come to kill him, but to make him his partner in a grand social discovery, involving the abolition of the duel. The duel is not a question of right and wrong, — it is a question of marksmanship. "If the question of honor, of fame, of right, consists in hitting or being hit, what prevents each of us from getting behind a tree, and firing with greater coolness and precision? If you hit my tree, I ask your pardon; *vice versa*, if I hit yours, I expect you to apologize. Behold the grand discovery: to fight without exposing life, sacred interests, the affections of the heart, and family ties!" His enemy responds: "I will not fight with a humanitarian genius like yourself; and if ever I wished to do so, the very trees would shield you." They shake hands, and the *Spiantato* returns gayly to his friends. Full of the best resolutions to go to work and prosper for his niece's sake, he proclaims a fresh discovery: "I have found out the word, — Assurance, ... behold the grand word of the epoch! life-assurance, fire-assurance, assurance against hail-storms and shipwrecks. How many things there are in the world to be assured! I will assure everything: husbands against the fickleness of their wives; young ladies against single life; the body from disease: yes, I am the grand universal assurer!" He accordingly establishes assurance-companies of every sort, plunging at the same time into various speculations, and pursuing many other callings. He practises mesmerism and dentistry; he opens a herald's office, and a matrimonial bureau; he becomes a charlatan of the most unscrupulous, but he remains good-hearted, tenderly fond of his niece, and devoted to that daughter of his landlady who, in the days of his want, gave him shelter and loved him. He is at last rescued from a career of disgraceful prosperity by the young banker who marries his niece, and gives him a place for the legitimate exercise of his ingenuity and enterprise, and the play ends with his marriage to the faithful Lucietta. The plot is slender, it has many improbabilities and exaggerations, and the comedy sometimes tends to farce, but is full of harmless fun and genuine feeling. The charlatanry of the herald is amusing, and smacks of the daring of charlatans dear to literature and humanity, like Dr. Sangrado and the heroes of Spanish books of roguery. "I put out my sign," says the ingenious cavalier Belindo, — "I put out my sign: Heraldic Bearings traced anew, and Genealogical Trees compiled; Antique Origins and Titles of Nobility vindicated. Well, a flood of citizens is precipitated into my office. 'Sir, my name is Aurelio.' 'Sir,' I reply, 'you descend from Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor.' An unfathomably rich banker is called by the sport of chance *Poveri* (poor); he wishes to be noble at any cost. Observe my ingenuity! 'The poor eat *polenta*' (hasty-pudding), said I; 'the *Polentas* are an ancient family of Ravenna; henceforth you are a kinsman of Francesca da Rimini!' Would you credit it? These people not only pretended to believe me, but ended by convincing themselves." As for the society to insure husbands against the fickleness of their wives, the jealous spouse pays down a certain premium, whereupon the company "assumes the following grave obligations: 1. To maintain a strict surveillance through its agents, who are clerks, chambermaids, milliners, dress-makers, hair-dressers, and *concierges*, and who will receive a stipend from the company to watch the wives confided to the company's police; 2. As husbands are always the last to know such trifles, it will be very easy for our agents to discover intrigues by minutely following all the steps of the *surveillée*, listening to all the current rumors, and getting into everybody's confidence. The husband will be notified, and even conducted to assist at flagrant cases of flirtation, — and then, separation and retribution. But he may always rest quietly, as he will receive every month from the company a full report of all his wife's doings and sayings, which he can compare with his own observation. The company's regulations will be published, and society will thus be reformed; for wives, afraid of being subjected to the operation of these rules, will then of their own accord renounce all ideas — *extra domum, extra civitatem*."

Of character and feeling wholly opposite to *Lo Spiantato* is *L'Abnegazione* of Gualtieri. In this play the Countess Ersilia Beregnardo, at Milan, receives from her lover, the Marquis Sforza, at Genoa, a business letter intended for her husband, who at St. Petersburgh receives from the Marquis the letter meant for his wife, in which a guilty love is spoken of. The lover, in a moment of fatal confusion, has placed the wrong address upon each letter. Apprised of his error by the Countess, he hastens to her at Milan, briefly anticipating the return of the Count, and while he urges the sinful wife to fly with him from her husband's anger, the Countess's *protégée*, a poor young girl named Ersilia, appears. Struck by the name, the Marquis resolves upon a bold hazard, in order to save the Countess from exposure and infamy. He will feign that this letter was meant for the *protégée*, with whom he will pretend to have been in love; and, to give character of sincerity to the pretence, he will offer her his hand and marry her. All this takes place at once, and the Count returns to find the Marquis accepted by Ersilia, who has long loved him timidly in secret, and who is only too glad to believe that the love-letter was meant for her. But being really ignorant of the character of the letter, the poor child betrays herself when, confronted by the Count alone, she reads its allusions to a guilty passion. The old Count pities her, but, satisfied that the world will never know his disgrace, he leaves this victim of others' wrong, and returns to his post at St. Petersburgh. Stunned and crushed by this blow to her hopes, Ersilia, out of regard to the Countess, (who, whatever her sins, has always been a gentle and loving benefactress to her,) still resolves to accept the life of abnegation before her, and, in her own desolation, spare the ruin and shame of others. It seems to us that the ensuing scene is written with peculiar pathos, delicacy, and dignity.

"*The Marquis and Ersilia.*

"*Marquis* (*aside*). The Count is gone; do I dare to ask her! (*Aloud.*) Ersilia —

"*Ersilia.* It is you, sir?

"*Mar.* You have spoken with the Count. — Well?

"*Ers.* He will hold himself paid, sir, if you wed me.

"*Mar.* Then he did not believe —

"*Ers.* And who that read this letter would believe it meant for *me*? The Count did not do me this cruel wrong.

"*Mar.* Then all is discovered?

"*Ers.* No,—all is hidden, appearances are saved; and that for you of the great world is enough.

"*Mar.* We have done you grievous wrongs —

"*Ers.* What do you say, my lord marquis?

"*Mar.* But I will never come to disturb your peace. You will have your palace in the city, and in the country. You will dispose as you please of my riches, of my servants, — we will live apart, — nay, distant from each other.

"*Ers.* It is the Countess who imposes these conditions?

"*Mar.* It is delicacy which imposes them; but if you prefer to live with me, in a pure intimacy, — as friends, — as brother and sister —

"*Ers.* Nay, I would rather express a wish —

"*Mar.* Which is?

"*Ers.* That at all times and places you seek to shun my presence.

"*Mar.* You hate me, then, so much?

"*Ers.* (*in a troubled voice*). No, not hate. But your presence must give me great pain.

"*Mar.* And you wish this?

"*Ers.* Yes.

"*Mar.* May I not hope that time will lessen this aversion for me?

"*Ers.* Never, sir.

"*Mar.* You will at least permit me to write you now and then of whatever concerns us both?

"*Ers.* You are master.

"*Mar.* Not master. Rather a man whom you must pardon many injuries.

"*Ers.* What injuries, my lord? I have found the means of repaying the good which my benefactress has done me and my family. I have spared this house a tragedy, for if this marriage did not take place, the Count would seek your life.

"*Mar.* The Count said this? (*Angrily.*) He believes that I marry you out of fear?

"*Ers.* No, sir, — to save a woman's reputation. He believes you sufficiently punished by this marriage with an humble daughter of the people, — who, however, far better than a great lady, will know how to preserve stainless the name of your noble family.

"*Mar.* (*touched*). Your hand, lady. (*Takes her hand with transport.*)

"*Ers.* O no! not here, but before the world, — there, where all is a lie, — there, where you must hide tears under smiles, indifference under the guise of love, the heart-break beneath a show of happiness, — there you shall be my husband, — but here, a stranger."

The marriage takes place, and the separation; Ersilia's sole memento of her husband remaining the fatal, guilty letter, to torment her and turn to anguish the love which she cannot overcome. The Marquis, living abroad, is at one time suddenly called home by a letter, declaring that his wife has hastily left her retirement to visit a lover. He finds her just returned from St. Petersburgh, whither she had gone at the old man's secret prayer to close the dying eyes of the Count, her adoptive father, the man whom her husband has irreparably wronged. Touched with remorse and shame the Marquis renounces suspicions which he, of all men, has least right to feel; but again his jealousy is roused when he finds his wife weeping over a letter. He asks to see it; she falters; he wrings it from her, — it is his own guilty letter to the Countess! At last, through many trials and sufferings, these people find out that they are hopelessly in love with each other. Ersilia learns that her husband has never seen the Countess since their marriage; she forgives him, and they are reconciled.

It seems scarcely possible that the same pen which produced this exquisite drama, with its careful plot, its pure and exalted feeling, and its effective scenes, should also have written a melodrama so wild and chaotic as the "Shakespeare" of Gualtieri. In this astounding play the Swan of Avon is taken up as he holds horses at the door of the theatre, and made scene-shifter by a famous actress (*sic!*) of his time. Miss Ariella makes violent love to him, but Shakespeare explains that he can never be hers, having, "at an age when he could not foresee the future, been constrained by family misfortunes and the will of his father to marry a peasant-woman of Stratford, ten years his senior," by whom he has already four children. In the mean time he writes plays and sells the title of authorship to a poetaster, Lord Makensie, for money to support his growing family. One night, however, when "Romeo and Juliet" is to be brought out, and Riccardo Burbage is rather tipsier than usual, Shakespeare himself assumes the part of Romeo, and, in an access of excitement, proclaims himself author of the play. This fires the virgin breast of Queen Elizabeth with the desire to see Sir William, as he is called; but, far from getting on well with him, the Queen offends Sir William, who revenges himself by reading before a literary society patronized by her Majesty a ballad censuring the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots! For this Sir William is cast into prison, where, refusing to offer any apology to the Queen, he finishes the last scene of his *Amleto* just before being led to the block. He is visited by all the players, with Papà Dryden, stage-manager, the poet Ben Johnson, and Lord Suthampton, his patron; who unite in beseeching him to ask the Queen's forgiveness; but he remains the same stubborn, wrong-headed Sir William he has proved throughout the play. Happily the Queen appears at the last moment, as Shakespeare moves to the door of the prison, and exclaims: —

> "Stop, Sir William! Elizabeth wished to give you a comedy, or a drama, as you please. It may not be so sublime as your own, but

not even one. (*Gives*

rt-poet, a title you would
ation.
picture.)”

tti originali.”
i, Shakespeare was a most
h in the walks of real life,
ys, was always talking a mis-
t for the author of this play
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of biographic drama in which
failed with his Shakespeare is
na, and now living at Milan, the
new Italian kingdom. His plays
n in number: five are farces, four
nd three biographic dramas. These
erona,” “Satire and Parini,” and
en New Comedies.” The Goldoni is
of all the author’s works, and is emi-
uth and fidelity to Goldoni’s character,
ease of action, nor larger artistic truth
ts of Goldoni’s career, around which the
, are well known to the reader of his auto-
18, the company Medebac of Venice brought
ne of the most excellent and popular of his
had a success so great as to rouse into active
enemies of the poet and of the new kind of
he had introduced. Goldoni’s play was called
altra (The Sly Widow), and his enemies re-
rival theatre with *La Scuola delle Vedove* (The
Vidows), in which Goldoni, his comedy, and his
scurrilously ridiculed. As in *La Vedova Scaltra*
lord was introduced, the rival dramatist employed
character to cast despite upon the English and the
ts generally. In rejoinder to this lampoon, Goldoni
d printed an Apology for his *Vedova*, in which he
to the criticisms of his opponents, and severely blamed

the ridicule cast upon the Protestants. This Apology was sent to the press and published without the permission of the government, leaving it optional with St. Mark to suppress it or not. It caused great excitement in the gossip-loving capital, and Goldoni was in danger of prison or exile, unless he himself withdrew the Apology. He stood by it manfully, however, and so completely won the day, that the *Scuola delle Vedove* was suppressed, and the marked censure of the Republic uttered against it. Elated by this success, Goldoni promised his comedians sixteen new comedies for the following year, — a year which he declares to have been so terrible for him that he never could remember it without horror. With this promise the play of Ferrari ends, for he has to deal with the causes that led to the production of the comedies, rather than subsequent events. Goldoni, his wife, and two foolish, pompous Spaniards (father and son), who vainly pay her their court, Zigo (a poetic rival of Goldoni), two false friends, the Medebac comedians, and the noble Grimani, friend to Goldoni, are the characters of the play, and its incidents those indicated. The best scenes are those in which the animosities, jealousies, and rivalries of the players are ridiculed. These are nearly all persons whose characteristics Goldoni has himself described in his Memoirs: the modern dramatist has but grouped them and placed them in action. The scene in which the jealous prompter is obliged to read to his own wife the stage directions for her love-scene with another actor, whom he madly hates, is a masterpiece in its way, and irresistibly amusing. But the equable humor of the whole comedy makes it unusually difficult of quotation, and a matter of regret that our present office is not that of translating one comedy, instead of noticing many. There is great spirit and fidelity to types of Venetian character in the different persons, — especially Grimani and Bartolo his gondolier, — and the play revives that old, mad, pleasure-loving world of masquerades and adventures in Venice of Goldoni's time, with charming effect.

"Dante at Verona" is the dramatization of that episode of the poet's life, when he visited in exile the court of Can Grande. We fear that it derives its chief interest from the fact that Dante is the hero, and certainly the drama's best passages are those the author puts into his Dante's mouth from the *Divina Commedia.* The poet embodies the aspiration for Italian unity, and dreams of a restoration of the Roman Empire under an Italian prince, Can Grande, while around his central figure and great purpose are grouped all the wavering fears, selfish interests, and petty and ignorant ambitions which made his dream impossible of realization. Can Grande, figured as a noble and princely soul, has a mind sufficiently large to grasp the magnificence of Dante's idea; but just as he has fully determined to attempt the reconstruction of the empire, news comes that his signorial arms have been torn down and trampled on by the Guelphs of some provincial town, and the spirit of blind feudal and partisan pride sweeps over him, quenching his high ambition, and he leaves all to go in person and avenge the insult. Dante then retires to Ravenna. This play was written some years before the late war of Italian independence, when Italy was entering on a state of transition similar to that of Dante's time, and the author declares that in the picture of another age he wished to mirror the present. Happily for the world, Victor Emanuel was no Can Grande, and Italy may yet be wholly united under him. In this play, Dante is drawn as that figure of sorrowful majesty which we know, but Ferrari has given a certain warmth and life to a conventional idea, and you feel all the bitterness of the poet's exile, and his troubles and small vexations sting you. The adaptation of lines from the *Commedia* to exigencies of the play is never violent, and is often very felicitous. The writer constantly betrays careful study of history and of human nature, and the life of an old signorial court, with its rude luxuries and magnificence, its turbulence and factions, its *condottieri*, its politicians and intriguers, its buffoon and its gross humors and amusements, is finely and vividly depicted.

Another comedy of the biographic sort is the "Satire and Parini," of which the scene is laid in Milan, about the middle of the last century. Parini was a famous satirist of that time, who scourged the follies and vices of the Lombard aristocracy; and making him his protagonist, the author shows the benefits on society of elevated, impersonal satire, as contrasted with the disorganization produced by the lampoons which were contemporaneously so popular in Milan. Ferrari ridicules in this comedy, among other things, a certain learned society called the *Enormi*, whose president held his place by right of descent, and was a miracle of pompous ignorance and stupidity. Academies of this kind are still to be found in Italy; but they were once the rage, and their erudite members amused themselves with incredible extravagances and puerilities. The Academy of the *Sibillone*, for instance, used to "place a child in the chair, who replied with a single word of hazard or caprice to the problem proposed. The academicians then maintained, in long harangues, that this word exactly solved the problem." Unhappily, the comedy "Satire and Parini" is in rhyme, — a lapse of taste which still seems to please in the Italian theatre.

In his Preface to this comedy, Ferrari is at the pains to disclaim the purpose attributed to him by destructive flattery and unfriendly critics, of restoring Goldoni. He says in clear words which must win the gratitude of every young writer who has been troubled in his study of the masters by the shallow criticism always more or less in vogue: "I venerate and study Goldoni, — not to imitate him, but to learn how to imitate nature. . . . . *Genius cannot be repeated;* and at any rate, I know well how different must be the art proper for a tranquil age like the past, from the art suited to a stormy age like the present." The defence is sound and just. Ferrari wishes he might resemble Goldoni in his conduct of the drama, which may be legitimately imitated, while he denies his wish to ape him in his æsthetic conceptions. And there all originality begins! He is the only dramatist of our time wholly worthy to succeed Goldoni,* and he has indeed learned from Goldoni to do more than Goldoni knew. Ferrari's dialogue is lively and witty, the situations of his plays are good, with many well-contrived surprises, and full of genial humor. But all which he shares with his master is of the nineteenth, and not of the eighteenth century, and so Ferrari is original.

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* "I have found," says Ristori in a recent letter to a friend at Paris, "a new poet, who has written me a new comedy in which everybody is not always laughing. It is called 'Woman and the Sceptic,' and gives me the whole range of feeling; I play it with delight. The poet's name is Paolo Ferrari, — a worthy heir of Goldoni."

His last play is *La Donna e lo Scettico*, to which its own merit and the rendering of Ristori is now giving the greatest popularity in Italy. The title ("Woman and the Sceptic") sufficiently suggests the scope of the drama, and the wish to teach the good through the beautiful is noticeable in all Ferrari's plays; though he wisely refuses to make his moral the first thing, knowing that the poet who does this abdicates his superiority to the moralist, without winning the moralist's applause. While modern Italian life finds due representation in his comedies, the bent of Ferrari's genius is evidently toward the kind of play which we have styled the biographic drama. In this he seems to find scope, and pleasure, and success. It is a species of comedy of which the Italians are extremely fond, and its excellence must be in part judged by its popularity. The lives of literary men, which Ferrari and his imitators chiefly celebrate, do not often afford the sharply-cut incidents and vivid events which the dramatist wishes, and his invention, unless most skilfully employed, must offend an audience acquainted with the biographic facts and mislead one ignorant of them. This drama is materially different from the historical play. There, events interest you in the hero; here the hero interests you in events. The worst that can be said of the biographic drama is that it is subjective; the best is that it pleases.

Paolo Giacometti is a writer who has carried it to excess, and who has succeeded in winning a wide popularity in Italy. He is the author of some forty dramas, of which nearly half are biographic. No career which offers any salient point on which to hang a play seems to be safe from this voluminous and unscrupulous writer. Those who recall the name of Lucretia Maria Davidson — a gifted and precocious American girl, whose facile verse won her even the difficult praises of the London Quarterly, and whose premature death consigned her to the limbo of books on literary biography — will be puzzled to know how her life could possibly be made to serve the purposes of drama. Nevertheless, the Cavaliere Giacometti has made a *dramma storico* of her career, which we have read not wholly without profit, we trust, and certainly not without amusement. In this play, we learn from the lips of the good Abbé Villars (who keeps an *Istituto* for young ladies in the State of Pennsylvania), that "the English are more civilized than the Americans, and they ought to be so, for they came first into the world: their wrong was in not knowing how to civilize us. Enough! George Washington has kindled here his beacon-fire, and I think they have beheld it beyond the sea! And his friend and mine, Benjamin Franklin, has had the daring to civilize the lightnings. Although the period of our existence on the geographic chart numbers only some three hundred and twenty years, *we are no longer those hideous savages we once were!*" No one who reads this will be surprised to learn further from the play that American citizens commonly bear the title of Sir, and cherish a deep-seated hostility to enlightenment of all kinds, and literature in particular, or that the death of Miss Davidson resulted partly from an unhappy attachment for a famous English poet (Sir Giorgio Dorsey, travelling in America for the purpose of kissing the tomb of Washington), which she concealed that it might not divide him from a friend to whom he was betrothed. It would be, of course, unjust to judge this play, and others of its class, by absurdities not palpable to the Italians. It has very great merit of a certain kind, and is played to tearful audiences in Italy. Giacometti never writes comedies, properly speaking; where he does not select some passage of biography, he takes a subject destitute of comic interest, and appends a dramatic sentimentality, or a dramatic sarcasm. It must be said to his credit that his aim is always lofty and pure; in none of the many plays which we have read, in search of something to praise, have we found one objectionable passage, nor any immoral tendency masked under a show of virtuous purpose. We must ascribe to him unaffected conscientiousness, extreme infelicity in the choice of subjects, utter ignorance of Anglo-Saxon life (which he is fatally fond of depicting), perfect mastery of stage effects, superfluous sentiment, and the art of writing the most unreasonably successful plays in the world; he is moreover original — by mere virtue of mediocrity.

The life of Teobaldo Ciconi is one of those lives which give the author (as in the case of Theodore Winthrop) so deep a hold upon the sympathy of his readers as almost to annul in them the faculties by which art is judged apart from the artist. We attribute to this, at least, part of the popularity, or rather affection, which he enjoys. He was born, like Aleardo Aleardi, Dall' Ongaro, and a large number of other Italian poets of the day, under Austrian rule, and his story embraces the usual romance of lofty aspirations duly snubbed with exile. Ciconi was a native of the Friuli, and studied law at the University of Padua, where he took a degree. We believe he never practised the profession of advocate; he early devoted himself to dramatic literature, in which he won great success, translating from the French, besides producing a great many original plays. When the war of independence broke out, in 1859, he entered the ranks of the Italian army as volunteer, and fought bravely throughout that struggle — to die of consumption at Milan in 1863, while yet quite young. He was a man who had cordial friends while he lived, and no one can look upon the likeness of his face without sympathy and tenderness, it is so sad and so winning.

Ciconi was as true to the spirit of his age in letters as in politics, and his comedies unite many of the best characteristics of the modern school. He is, perhaps, superior to Ferrari in the art of lightly sketching slight latter-day people of the world, and he is happiest when dealing with men and women of *buon genere*. But in these sketches there is now and then a hardness of spirit which makes you regret that the author chose to do them, though the hardness contributes to the excellence of the work. Ciconi's dialogue is like that of Charles Reade in "Peg Woffington," — quick, poignant, glittering, and witty, and many of the people in his comedies are like those in Thackeray's novels, — granting the radical differences of Italian and English life. For the rest he seems to have been more affected by the French dramatists than any of his Italian contemporaries, though at last his own heart seems to have echoed the cry of other men's, — "Can you no longer touch the chord of feeling? Make us weep!" In one of his latest plays he has dealt with the saddest problem which vexes the world, — that of the lost woman, — and which Dall' Ongaro says he has solved in a manner more Christian and human than that of the

French authors. It is a singular drama, and is more like the fantasy of a German brain, than the product of the practical, undreamy Italian mind. It is called *La Statua di Carne*, and the living statue is a beautiful, gifted, and wicked girl, who chances to bear a wondrous resemblance to the young wife of Count Santa Rosa. This wife was an humble seamstress, to whom the Count, sick of being loved for his rank and wealth, had never revealed his true character; her devotion in his supposed poverty restored him to faith in God and men, and her early death left him heir to a life-long sorrow. He goes to America, renouncing his identity, and allowing himself to be thought dead by all but one faithful friend. This friend, meeting Noemi, is struck by her strange resemblance to Maria, the Count's dead wife, and writes to him; the Count instantly quits Boston, and repairs to Milan, where he finds Noemi one of the most reckless and boisterous spirits at a pleasant but wicked little supper. The Count, too, sees the likeness remarked by his friend, and, with no thought but of his wife in his heart, he offers this beautiful and heartless wanton his protection, and places all his wealth at her disposal, on condition that she will assume the name of Maria, and live in the room where his wife died. Two hours each day she is to sit before him while he gazes upon the features endeared to him by eternal loss; at all other times she may go where she will, and do what she will. At first Noemi finds this merely tedious; then, piqued by the persistent coldness and indifference of her protector, she tries her arts upon him; failing, she is moved by his fidelity and devotion to his dead wife, and for the first time she believes in love, and loves. Her truth and love are now put to proof, they sustain it, and the Count ends by wedding her. Such is the outline of the play, which has certainly a fantastic charm; but whether it solves the problem of the social evil may reasonably be questioned. The reformation so peculiarly effected by Count Santa Rosa must, we fear, be regarded as exceptional, — though no one need for that matter refuse to recognize the great truth inculcated by the drama: that lost faith can only be recovered through suffering, and that love cannot begin where there is no faith.

In what the eloquent critic, so often quoted, calls Ciconi's last and best comedy, "The Only Daughter," the author deals with better human nature than usual. The humor and events of the whole play turn upon the imbecile fondness of rich parents for their only, spoiled child, to whom they have given a young man of spirit for a husband, just as they would have given her anything else she asked for. As the husband is never permitted to control his wife in anything nor to have any voice concerning her, he has sunk to the place of an unsalaried servant in his father-in-law's house, when his friend Ippolito returns from the acquisition of wisdom in America, — where all the disappointed lovers and adventurous spirits of modern Italian comedies always go. He inspires the husband to assert himself, and Alfredo's self-assertion ends in a separation from his wife; the friends quit Milan together, take service in the Italian army, and re-enter the city with the triumphal army of Victor Emanuel. Meantime, the father-in-law has taken a new house, and the friends, without his knowledge or their own, are billeted upon him. Alfredo's wife returns from the opera at night, finds her husband and seeks to be reconciled with him, — for she has secretly adored him ever since he refused to be her slave, and has nearly broken her heart for him in his absence. The Count Paride, of whom Alfredo has been jealous, and who once refused to fight him on the pretence that they were not equals, is put to open shame before the husband and wife reconciled; he furiously challenges Alfredo, and is answered that a man who has spent his time in fashionable dawdling during that glorious war is not the equal of a soldier who has fought for his country. Ippolito gently adds, "Better by the door than through the window, Count," and shows him out, while virtue and happiness triumph in the re-union of Alfredo and Elena. Ippolito is a character exquisitely drawn, and altogether delightful. His brilliant and crisp surface of wit commands your admiration, and his really kind, friendly and honest heart wins your liking. He has had a love-affair in his first youth with a singer at Verona, who reappears in this play as the pretty widow of a rich marquis. The passages in which they rehearse their former loves are the wittiest and best in the play, — and for sparkle of easy natural repartee have seldom been excelled.

Ciconi seems to have wished in this play to hold up before Italian society a picture of some of its faults, and of the simple manliness that may overcome them. There is sufficient license in parts of the dialogue, but the meaning, as well as the declared intention, is good; and certainly the play is very pleasing.

The comedies of Ciconi are many, and they are all popular, but the two particularly mentioned are the best liked, — which is to say, they are the best. If the author had lived, he would hardly have turned his attention to the historical or sentimental drama, for either is alien to his genius, but he would probably have continued to write his graceful comedies of society, growing better-natured as he grew older. It is the fault of the fine world which he drew so faithfully, that his characters are often so hard, and his words of such bitter persiflage. It cannot be said that he has ever by precept or tendency done conscious wrong to principles which neither men nor literature can violate without degradation.

Like praise may be bestowed upon all recent Italian comedy, in which there is seldom verbal licentiousness, and never the badness of heart which turns the high and the pure into ridicule. The French dramas, for which the repeated invasions of Italy by French ideas had made way, have been wellnigh banished from the stage by the naturally healthy taste of the Italians, fostered and developed by the native dramatists. The merit of writers who have thus succeeded in exiling productions which have great and undeniable attractions for playgoers, stands proved by the fact. All efforts to please innocently must be made with uncommon skill and genius; he who appeals from lust to taste must be master of most persuasive eloquence. The Italians have reason to be proud of the drama which makes this appeal, and the student of Italian life must turn to this drama for that knowledge of society which he would look for vainly in the contemporary romance of Italy. The only novels, as we have said, which are worth reading, are historical; but in the comedies are fairly reflected many of the most interesting features of modern Italian life and thought. You see there a state of society in which all things seem in transition: the old traditions of rank are disputed; suspicion is not only cast upon social prejudices, but well-known and time-honored social vices are openly disgraced; the dignity of man is asserted, the purity of woman is defended, the sanctity of all family ties is honored. Whatever is best in modern doubt works there to the triumph of faith and virtue. In fine, the Italians have a genuine drama, which they may cherish without loss of self-respect. The defects of this drama cannot be denied, however. With all its freedom, its range is narrow, and the life it represents is too exclusively that of the best society; and while it has no exotic growth, it lacks the exquisite raciness of the Goldonian comedy. But, with all its defects, it must be acknowledged that we have nothing to compare with it in English literature. It seems, like the society which it reflects, to be in a state of development and transition, and it is reasonable to suppose that it will enlarge its scope with changing conditions till, like society, it includes and acknowledges all phases of national life.

"The moment," says Dall' Ongaro, in his admirable essay on the drama, "is propitious for the dramatic art. . . . . . Liberty of speech has brought into existence new elements, new ideas, new feelings. . . . . . Liberty has emancipated us not only from the yoke of our tyrants, but has freed us from the moral chains of bigotry, academic and official. The True and the Beautiful! behold the law, behold the evangel of Art! For the rest, any form is good, if it speaks to the heart and moves it. Yet I shall not cease to repeat to the young Italian poets, Write for the Theatre, — that is, for the People. Do not leave this noble office to court buffoons and flatterers of the worst instincts of the vulgar. Write for the people, the whole people, the united people, met before you, your judge, your inspiration, your aspiration. Put yourself in communication with it, live its life, make yourself *populace*, — not to flatter its ignoble passions, but to lift it to the serene region of the ideal, to teach it consciousness of its worth, to show it how is lost, how is won, and, above all, how is preserved, the greatest of all good, the most sacred of all rights, Liberty!"

ART. III. — 1. *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. Chiefly from the Edinburgh Review, corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in Notes and Appendices.* By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. With an Introductory Essay by ROBERT TURNBULL, D. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1858. 8vo.

2. *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic.* By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. Edited by the REV. HENRY L. MANSEL, B. D., Oxford, and JOHN VEITCH, M. A., Edinburgh. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859 – 60. 2 vols. 8vo.

THE human mind is intolerant of finalities. The best statements of one age are bettered by the next, and possess only a transitional importance. Methods are fluid, systems are solid; the former circulate like living sap through the cambium-layer of philosophy, while the latter, like completed cells, soon lose their vitality by becoming rigid and impermeable heart-wood. As crystallizations of the highest thought of the times, systems have great value, for they constitute the chief materials for the intellectual history of the race; but taken as isolated products, their value depends on their intrinsic character. They are salutary or pernicious according as they foster or fetter the free movement of thought. If the former, they communicate a direct impulse to human progress; if the latter, they contribute to progress solely by the reaction they create. No system possesses a stimulative tendency, or can have a permanent influence, which hampers the mind with arbitrary restrictions, and introduces discord into the play of our noblest faculties; which seeks to concentrate thought on the circumference, and avert it from the centre, of our being; which postulates a special faculty of *faith*, and remands to its blind asseveration truths which have been derived from the activity of reason. Least of all can a theory be tolerated which assumes an inevitable antagonism between reason and this postulated faith; for faith and reason, religion and philosophy, stand or fall together. Philosophy is religion comprehended; religion is philosophy felt.

The constructive system of Sir William Hamilton, which is reduced to a single formula in his so-called Law of the Conditioned, exhibits the latest attempt to curb speculation by factitious restraints. The simplicity of this law is equalled only by the ingenuity of its applications. With the guidance of the single principle of Mental Impotence, Hamilton claims to thread his way through many a metaphysical labyrinth whose windings have proved too intricate for his predecessors. He professes to have explained by it the two great principles of Causality and Substance, although of the latter it is to be regretted he has left no exposition. Even the vexed problem of Liberty and Necessity, that fatal quicksand of philosophy which has engulfed so many stout theorists, he claims to have at least bridged over, if not finally and forever to have filled up. In fact, he offers us Nescience organized into Science. So great are the charms of unity and simplicity, and so attractive is an hypothesis which seems to combine them both with competency to account for the given phenomena, that Hamilton's philosophy has found numerous adherents, and exercised a marked influence upon contemporary thought. Its main principle, that the Unconditioned is beyond the sphere of human knowledge, has found acceptance where rejection was to be expected, and has furnished a common ground of agreement between contending parties. In the interest of supernaturalism, it has been applied by Mansel in a manner very analogous to that in which Fichte applied the principles of the Critical Philosophy in his "Critique of all Revelation," though with aims and results widely different. In the interest of rationalism, it has been used by Spencer in establishing the incomprehensibility of the omnipresent Force. In fact, it is the theological bearings of the system which have so remarkably drawn to it the attention of European and American thinkers, and subjected its doctrines to so keen and searching a scrutiny. Yet that there is no little doubt as to its ultimate theological tendencies is evidenced by the conflicting appeals made to it by antagonistic schools of thought. Dogmatism is divided against itself as to the veritable drift of its tenets. One party declares that, since all speculative cognition of the Infinite and Absolute is proved impossible, man's carnal reason is humbled, deprived of all basis for heterodox conclusions, and compelled to acknowledge authority and faith as the final criteria of religious truth;* while another party avers with equal emphasis that, by teaching the utter incomprehensibility of the Infinite, systematic theology throws suspicion on the capacity of man to receive a Divine revelation, and thereby invalidates its own revealed doctrines.† Scepticism, in its turn, retorts that the entire structure of dogmatism rests on a transcendental foundation, and that religious indifferentism is the only logical consequence of the novel philosophy; nay, further, she maintains that, since it supposes truth to lie either at one or the other of two inconceivable poles of thought, while all the conceivable lies between them and coincides with neither, all human knowledge whatever, whether experience, science, philosophy, or religion, is demonstrated to be sheer illusion. Of the three, scepticism is incontrovertibly right. Admit the Law of the Conditioned, and philosophy henceforth wears the badge of Pyrrhonism. No claim can be more groundless than that this law "averts scepticism." ‡

The corollaries which Hamilton, his disciples, or his opponents have deduced from the Law of the Conditioned, have been vigorously and sufficiently assailed. But that its logical inconsistencies and their psychological causes have been sufficiently exposed, we are not aware. It is neither satisfactory nor conclusive to rest the refutation of a theory on the exhibition of its alleged consequences. The one underlying postulate of all science is the harmony of Truth with itself. If, then, a theory is true, its consequences can never be absurd or untrue, much as they may shock our prejudices or wound our sensibilities; and the only manly course is to accept theory and consequences together. But if the consequences are really absurd, and contradict necessary truths, then the theory must be false, and susceptible of refutation *per se;* and we ought never to rest till it has been refuted, irrespectively of all consequences whatever. It is the purpose of the present essay to neglect entirely the corollaries from Hamilton's law, and consider only the law itself, analyzing its main propositions, and exposing their utter untenability. By this course the corollaries are refuted *en masse* with their logical foundation; by any other, the principal work still remains undone. We shall begin by stating the law in Hamilton's own words.

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* See Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, *passim.*

† See Saisset, Essay on Religious Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 214, remarks by the Translator; Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, 2d edit., p. 286.

‡ Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 556.

> "Now, then, I lay it down as a law which, though not generalized by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phenomena, That all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must. For example, we conceive space, — we cannot but conceive space. I admit, therefore, that Space, indefinitely, is a positive and necessary form of thought. But when philosophers convert the fact, that we cannot but think space, or, to express it differently, that we are unable to imagine anything out of space, — when philosophers, I say, convert this fact with the assertion, that we have a notion, a positive notion, of absolute or infinite space, they assume not only what is not contained in the phenomenon, nay, they assume what is the very reverse of what the phenomenon manifests. It is plain that space must either be bounded or not bounded. These are contradictory alternatives; on the principle of contradiction, they cannot both be true, and, on the principle of Excluded Middle, one must be true. This cannot be denied, without denying the primary laws of intelligence. But though space must be admitted to be necessarily either finite or infinite, we are able to conceive the possibility neither of its finitude nor of its infinity.
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> "We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded, — as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no further space. Every one is conscious that this is impossible. It contradicts also the supposition of space as a necessary notion; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space; and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole. The one contradictory is thus found inconceivable; we cannot conceive space as positively limited.
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> "On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory; we cannot conceive space as infinite, as without limits. You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere in the region of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted; — with all this what have you done?

You have never gone beyond the finite, you have attained at best only to the indefinite, and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite. As Pascal energetically says, 'Inflate our conceptions as we may, with all the finite possible we cannot make one atom of the infinite.' 'The infinite is infinitely incomprehensible.' Now, then, both contradictories are equally inconceivable, and could we limit our attention to one alone, we should deem it at once impossible and absurd, and suppose its unknown opposite as necessarily true. But as we not only can, but are constrained to consider both, we find that both are equally incomprehensible; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law to admit that one, but one only, is necessary.

"That the conceivable lies always between two inconceivable extremes, is illustrated by every other relation of thought. We have found the maximum of space incomprehensible; can we comprehend its minimum? This is equally impossible. Here, likewise, we recoil from one inconceivable contradictory only to infringe upon another. Let us take a portion of space, however small, we can never conceive it as the smallest. It is necessarily extended, and may, consequently, be divided into a half or quarters, and each of these halves or quarters may again be divided into other halves or quarters, and this *ad infinitum*. But if we are unable to construe to our minds the possibility of an absolute minimum of space, we can as little represent to ourselves the possibility of an infinite divisibility of any extended entity."

After applying exactly analogous reasoning to Time, Hamilton proceeds as follows: —

"The same principle could be shown in various other relations, but what I have now said is, I presume, sufficient to make you understand its import. Now the law of mind, that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, I call the Law of the Conditioned. You will find many philosophers who hold an opinion the reverse of this, — maintaining that the absolute is a native or necessary notion of intelligence. This, I conceive, is an opinion founded on vagueness and confusion. They tell us we have a notion of absolute or infinite space, of absolute or infinite time. But they do not tell us in which of the opposite contradictories this notion is realized. Though these are exclusive of each other, and though both are only negations of the conceivable on its opposite poles, they confound together these exclusive inconceivables into a single notion; suppose it positive, and baptize it with the name of absolute. The sum, therefore, of what I have now stated is, that the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or cogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or incogitable. The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is that of Unconditional or Absolute Limitation; the other, that of Unconditional or Infinite Illimitation. The one we may, therefore, in general call the Absolutely Unconditioned; the other, the Infinitely Unconditioned; or, more simply, the Absolute and the Infinite; the term *absolute* expressing that which is finished or complete, the term *infinite*, that which cannot be terminated or concluded. These terms, which, like the Absolute and Infinite themselves, philosophers have confounded, ought not only to be distinguished, but opposed as contradictory. The notion of either unconditioned is negative; the absolute and the infinite can each only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable. In other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all." *

A paradox is always suspicious; not necessarily false, but to be tested. The Law of the Conditioned is paradoxical, because it predicates contradiction of two extremes which are each asserted to be utterly incomprehensible. The mutual relation of two objects is known, but the objects themselves are utterly unknown. No explanation is offered of this *prima facie* absurdity, which is only developed more glaringly by a deeper examination. The Unconditioned is assumed as a genus which is divided into two species, the Infinite and the Absolute; † we are entitled to expect, therefore, some essential marks or specific differences by which these co-ordinated species shall be distinguished from each other and from their proximate genus. As logical extension and intension are invariably in the inverse ratio, we are entitled to expect that, since the Unconditioned is more comprehensive than either of its species, Hamilton will indicate some positive characteristics differentiating the Infinite and the Absolute. Accordingly, the Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation, the Absolute as Unconditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we are told that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of thought. On the one hand, we are told that they differ; on the other hand, we are told that they do not differ. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he insists on the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable distinction, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insists on the inconceivability, he must abandon the definitions as sheer verbiage, devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this dilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict, for contradiction is the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials cannot conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, its contradictory, must be positive, whether conditional or unconditional. In brief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, they are not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are not wholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to us identical, and identity precludes contradiction. But if they are distinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involves positive cognition; hence one at least must be conceivable. It follows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradiction or the inconceivability must be abandoned.

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* Lectures on Metaphysics, pp. 526 – 531.

† "The Unconditioned, in our use of language, denotes the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." — Discussions on Philosophy, p. 21, note.

The Law of the Conditioned, then, in its primary enunciation, is at war with itself. Zero is maintained to be contradictory of zero; a proposition which is meaningless and absurd. This objection, however, which alone is fatal to the Law, may be altogether waived; and the flimsiness of the generalization may be exposed on broader grounds. The error has its root in a psychological confusion of the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuous reason, and a resulting co-ordination of an imaginative conception with an abstract proposition; two things which do not belong to the same category, and hence bear no mutual relation. Two imaginative conceptions may be compared, or two abstract propositions; but to oppose an imaginative conception to an abstract proposition is like opposing an inch to an ounce, or an hour to a bushel. Hamilton rests his Law of the Conditioned upon arguments drawn from the ideas of Space and Time, as appears from the foregoing citation; but we have already proved that he confounds the purely rational idea of Space with the imaginative conception of Extension.* This confusion has been shown to be prolific of absurdities in many other systems; but in no other system has it generated absurdities so superlative as in the Philosophy of the Conditioned. That these strictures are neither unwarranted nor excessive will, we believe, be abundantly evidenced by an analytical criticism of the Law itself.

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* See North American Review for July, 1864, Art. III., "The Philosophy of Space and Time," § 6.

It will be convenient to separate and condense the Law into its four component clauses, as follows: —

1. The Infinite and Absolute, as defined, are contradictory and exclusive of each other; yet one must be true.
2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.
3. Each is inconceivable, and the inconceivability of each is referable to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.
4. As opposite extremes or poles, they include everything conceivable between them.

These four propositions are the four corner-stones upon which the whole Philosophy of the Conditioned is built; and the falsity of any one of them must inevitably undermine the Law. It will be our task to prove that, except the first, which is itself a blunder, they are all absolutely and equally false.

I. The first of these four theses is indisputably true. The Absolute, defined as Unconditional Limitation, is beyond question contradictory of the Infinite, defined as Unconditional Illimitation. In admitting their contradiction, however, it is necessary to make a qualification, so obvious as to be self-evident, and yet not always borne in mind. Contradictories mutually exclude each other; to posit the one is *ipso facto* to remove the other, and reciprocally. Therefore contradiction can be subjective only, never objective; that is, it can exist solely between judgments, and never between existences. For objects in themselves, as external realities, must coexist; they cannot, therefore, mutually exclude each other, which is the condition of their being contradictories. The contradiction between the Infinite and the Absolute is, consequently, a contradiction between judgments in regard to limitation, not between two objective realities. When we admit Hamilton's contradiction, we mean that the Infinite and the Absolute, as defined, cannot coexist; that if the Infinite exists, there is no such thing as the Absolute, and if the Absolute exists, there is no such thing as the Infinite. Hamilton rejects the Hegelian principle of the Identity of Contradictories; and he is therefore bound to accept this consequence of his own theory. If we should allow the given definitions, then we must admit the contradiction between the Infinite and the Absolute.

But this hypothetical admission is no concession to the Law of the Conditioned; for the definition of the Absolute involves numerous absurdities. Our psychological analysis has shown that unity and infinity are equally necessary predicates of Space, or, in other words, that Space is an *infinite unit.** Now infinity is purely a negative predicate, and is convertible with *absolute illimitability;* it is an idea of the non-sensuous reason, not a conception of the sensuous imagination, and is simply a condensation of the proposition, "There are no limits." But unity may be construed both as positive and as negatiev, both as a conception of the sensuous imagination and as an idea of the non-sensuous reason. As the former, it is that attribute of an object which colligates its parts in a conceivable oneness, and presents them as a complete, coherent whole; it equally implies plurality of constituents and definiteness of outline; and is cognized solely through the senses and the sensuous imagination. As the latter, it is that attribute of an object which constitutes the impossibility of its partition into elements, and hence may be expressed in the proposition, "There are no parts"; it is simple indivisibility, or the negation of complexity, and is perfectly compatible with either finitude or infinitude. The one is *composite unity*, and is exemplified in the human body; the other, expressing the impossibility of resolution by analysis, is *incomposite unity*, and is exemplified in the infinite personality of God, and in the finite personality of the human soul.

Now the Law of the Conditioned grew out of Hamilton's confused recognition of the equal necessity of infinity and unity as predicates of Space. He dimly perceived the truth that Space is an infinite unit; but how was he to interpret this truth? Infinity he at once recognized as a negative notion; but, failing to perceive the radical and all-important distinction between composite and incomposite unity, he unfortunately interpreted the unity of Space as composite, thereby co-ordinating the negative, rational idea of infinity with the positive, imaginative conception of unity. Consequently he found himself compelled to regard as of equal authority both of these propositions:—

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* See article already cited, on "The Philosophy of Space and Time," §§ 15, 16.

1. Space is illimitable.
2. Space is a limited whole.*

One of these, by the first law of thought, is necessarily true, and the other false. Hamilton clearly saw the contradiction; but he also saw that to accept both propositions as necessary and dogmatic affirmations of reason would convict human intelligence of utter worthlessness, and demonstrate scepticism beyond the possibility of refutation. From this result he instinctively shrank, and sought refuge in the principle of mere weakness, of "mental imbecility," which suffered him to regard the frowning contradictories as resulting, not from a legitimate, but an illegitimate, use of reason. By thus proscribing all speculation on the Infinite and the Absolute, of which these propositions are the expression, he hoped to escape the impossible task of reconciling their contradiction, and yet save the credibility of intelligence within its proper sphere of the finite. This hope was as reasonable as that of the ostrich to escape the hunter by burying its head in the sand. But fortunately the door of escape stands wide open. The error of Hamilton lay in confounding Extension with Space, composite unity with incomposite unity, sensuous imagination with non-sensuous reason. Infinity and unity are equally absolute and unconditional predicates of Space; but the unity is incomposite.

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* "Space, it is evident, must either be limited, that is, have an end, a circumference; or unlimited, that is, have no end, no circumference. These are contradictory suppositions; both, therefore, cannot, but one must, be true. Now let us try positively to comprehend, positively to conceive, the possibility of either of these two mutually exclusive alternatives. Can we represent or realize in thought extension as absolutely limited? in other words, can we mentally hedge round the whole of Space, conceive it as absolutely bounded, that is, so that beyond its boundary there is no outlying, no surrounding space? This is impossible...... It is thus impossible for us to think Space as a totality, that is, as absolutely bounded, but all-containing. We may, therefore, lay down this first extreme as inconceivable. We cannot think Space as limited. Let us now consider its contradictory; can we comprehend the possibility of infinite or unlimited Space? To suppose this is a direct contradiction in terms; it is to comprehend the incomprehensible. We think, we conceive, we comprehend a thing, only as we think it as within or under something else; but to do this of the infinite is to think the infinite as finite, which is contradictory and absurd." (Lectures on Logic, pp. 72, 73.) Hamilton seems to suppose that to "comprehend the possibility of the infinite," and to "comprehend the infinite," are convertible expressions!

Wholeness, as we have seen, is predicable of an object either with respect to interior constitution or to exterior configuration. In the former aspect it signifies simplicity, indivisibility, or incomposite unity; in the latter aspect it signifies completeness, limitation, or composite unity. Space, therefore, being necessarily illimitable, can be a whole, a total, only in the former signification; and its unity must accordingly be interpreted as incomposite, on pain of absolute contradiction.

Instead of misinterpreting the unity of Space as composite, evolving the consequent contradiction, and most absurdly generalizing this individual antinomy into a universal law,* Hamilton ought to have interpreted it as incomposite, and thus have spared himself his gratuitously created perplexity. The two propositions would then have become as follows:—

1. Space is illimitable.
2. Space is indivisible.

The keenest analysis will fail to discover any contradiction between these judgments, two negations being incapable of contradiction. Instead, therefore, of defining the Absolute as "unconditional limitation," "a bounded whole," that is, as composite unity, we must define it, when applied to Space and Time, as "unconditional totality or indivisibility," that is, as incomposite unity. The Absolute and Infinite, therefore, far from conflicting, henceforth coincide as compatible attributes; and the unnatural antinomy is forever resolved.

II. The second of the four theses to be considered maintains that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite "can be conceived as possible." This phrase in the connection means merely "can be regarded as actual or existent"; it contains no reference to the inconceivability asserted in the third thesis, which will be criticised below. Let us once more recur to Hamilton's definitions of the Absolute and Infinite, and apply them as before to Space; we then have the contradictory propositions: —

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* "Rien n'est plus voisin de l'ignorance d'un principe que son excessive généralisation." (De Gérando, De la Génération des Connaissances Humaines, Introd., pp. xx.) — There is no wiser philosophical maxim than this.

1. Space is limited.
2. Space is unlimited.

Bearing in mind that receptivity, unity, and infinity have been shown to be the constituent elements of the idea of Space,* the two propositions may assume the following form: —

1. The-unlimited is limited.
2. The-unlimited is unlimited.

Now the first of these is the logical translation of Hamilton's Absolute Space, the second of his Infinite Space. The first is necessarily false by the Law of Contradiction, while the second is necessarily true by the Law of Identity. Yet between these two judgments, according to the Law of the Conditioned, the human mind must halt in conscious imbecility, unable to assent to either as possible, but compelled to admit one as necessary! If valid, this law would be the very *reductio ad absurdum* of intelligence. But by thus reducing the absolute and infinite, as defined, to their logical formulæ, the fallacy is laid bare; and it becomes evident that, as defined by Hamilton, the Absolute is a metaphysical absurdity or contradiction in terms, while the Infinite is a metaphysical necessity. It is but fair to point out that the validity of this proof rests on the accuracy of our analysis of Space, as necessarily illimitable; if the analysis is unsound, the proof is a *petitio principii.*

III. The third of the four theses maintains the inconceivability of the two opposites, and refers the inconceivability of each to the same cause, namely, a mental impotence. Of two contradictory propositions, Space is limited, Space is unlimited, Hamilton affirms that neither is "conceivable." Without any investigation into the nature and causes of this inconceivability, he at once assumes a mental impotence as its origin in both cases; and on this postulated mental impotence, for which no evidence is assigned beyond the simple statement and illustration of the phenomenon itself, he proceeds to build up his system. But what is the signification of this word "inconceivable"? Hamilton employs it in two entirely dissimilar senses, and by a kind of logical prestidigitation substitutes one for the other with marvellous celerity. It is sometimes convertible with the word *unimaginable*, and then denotes impossibility of representation by the sensuous imagination; sometimes it is convertible with the word *incogitable* or *unthinkable*, and then denotes impossibility of cognition by any faculty whatever. If Hamilton had only been precise and uniform in his use of this word, he could not have failed to perceive the inconsistency of his own statements. If he had rigorously adhered to the latter signification, he would certainly have refrained from maintaining the position that we can predicate contradiction as a cogitable relation between incogitable terms. Or if he had rigorously adhered to the former signification, it is scarcely possible that he could have referred the unimaginability of the Infinite and of the Absolute to the same cause. But let us interpret the present thesis according to this second meaning of the word, which we believe greatly predominates in his usage of it, and which it is certainly to his advantage that we should adopt.

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* See "The Philosophy of Space and Time," §§ 14, 15, 16.

Whatever transcends the positive data of sensuous experience is inconceivable or unimaginable, because nothing is presented, and consequently nothing can be represented. In this sense pure Space is inconceivable, whether as finite or as infinite, and by a loose use of language this inconceivability may be referred to the impotence of imagination. But we use the phrase under protest, because no faculty can be legitimately required to transcend the conditions of its exercise. The imagination deals only with sensible phenomena and their synthetical mental elaboration; it does not find pure Space, either as finite or as infinite, presented in these phenomena, and is therefore powerless to represent it. Still this is impotence in one sense of the word, and we let this objection pass. We will admit, then, that the inconceivability of Infinite Space is due to a mental impotence.

But whatever violates the law of contradiction is inconceivable or unimaginable for a totally different reason. A contradiction in terms, such as an angular sphere, a virtuous sin, or a protuberant hole, is a self-annihilating synthesis of repugnant notions, and is inconceivable, not because it *transcends*, but because it *violates*, the necessary laws of imaginative activity. Now the Absolute, being, according to Hamilton, the attribute of a "complete, bounded whole," expresses finitude, while Space has been shown to involve infinitude; the phrase Absolute Space, therefore, is as flat a contradiction in terms as a true falsehood or an hexagonal square. If, by a stretch of indulgence, we consent to refer the inconceivability of Infinite Space to a mental impotence, it would be sheer fatuity to refer the inconceivability of Absolute Space to any such cause. For to predicate either necessity or absurdity of a relation is the intensest possible act of intellectual potency. Obedience to a law of thought is not mental powerlessness; reason will not tolerate a repugnant synthesis, but by a spontaneous, involuntary, and irresistible energy annihilates it. If, therefore, the inconceivability of the infinite be referred to the impotence of imagination to transcend the conditions of its own activity, the inconceivability of the Absolute (as defined) must be referred to the highest possible potency of reason. Thus the third thesis is disproved; for such a partial and unreal impotence is altogether insufficient as a basis for Hamilton's rash generalization.

IV. The last of the four theses will best be re-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. "The conditioned is the mean between two extremes, two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which *can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one *must be admitted as necessary*." *

This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two contradictories with a mean between them, requires a hardihood unparalleled in the history of philosophy except by Hegel. If the two contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a cogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if a mean exists, that may be true, and both contradictories together false. But if a mean between contradictories be both impossible and absurd, (and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,) Hamilton's "conditioned" entirely vanishes. Even if the contradiction between the Infinite and the Absolute were developed from valid definitions, there would be no room whatever for the "conditioned" between them. Whether Space as unconditioned is bounded or not, is a question which does not concern Extension as conditioned. Still less does it concern the conditioned in general, or afford any basis for so sweeping a generalization. In fact, the very enormity of the paralogism embodied in this fourth thesis has been its chief protection. The only imaginable genesis of such an oversight as that of postulating a mean between contradictories seems to be this; the metaphor of "two opposite poles of thought" may have suggested the intermediate space between the two extremities of a straight line. But such a metaphor would be singularly infelicitous; for instead of imagining the contradictories at the ends of the line, with an intermediate space between them, the line should be bisected, each contradictory monopolizing an entire half, and thereby leaving no medium. The division A and not-A exhausts the universe. Whatever may be thought of this supposititious origin of the error, the fact of its existence is indisputable. What has a conceivable cubic yard to do with either of the inconceivables, Infinite Space or Absolute Space? How is it a mean between the contradictories? The conclusion which Hamilton ought to have educed from his own premises may be easily illustrated by the following simple diagram:

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* Discussions on Philosophy, p. 22.



Taking Space as our illustration, every conceivable extension is included between the opposite poles of *all* Space or Infinity and *no* Space or Nihility; or else between the absolute maximum of space and the absolute minimum of space. That is to say, if of Hamilton's two contradictories the Infinite should be objectively real, then the conditioned would lie between C and C′; if the Absolute, then it would lie between B and B′. But in neither case would it lie, as he maintains, between B and C on the one hand, and B′ and C′ on the other hand. Our diagram, moreover, exposes another error; while Hamilton co-ordinates B and C as *objects*, one of which must be real, he co-ordinates B′ as an *object*, and C′ as a *process* (of division) of which zero is the limit. But to co-ordinate an object and a process as contradictories is utterly illegitimate. To dwell further, however, upon a theory so indefensible would be superfluity of criticism.

Apart from direct proof, Hamilton gives a list of "Contradictions proving the Psychological Theory of the Conditioned";* and, as some of these present plausible antinomies, they must be examined. But, both as a necessary preliminary to their solution, and as a discussion possessing intrinsic interest, we shall first offer some general considerations upon the cognition of the Infinite.

There has been much misapprehension of the doctrine that the Infinite is only negatively known. The words *infinite* and *absolute* have been wands of necromancy in the hands of philosophical sorcerers. *They denote attributes, and represent objects by metonymy alone.* Infinite expresses the attribute of illimitability; as applied to Space and Time, Absolute expresses the attribute of totality (incomposite unity or indivisibility), and as applied to God, the attribute of independent existence. Their use as ambiguous middle terms has given rise to unwarrantable conclusions; what is true only of the attributes has been transferred most illogically to the objects in which they inhere. Thus, because we have only negative knowledge of the infinite, it is inferred that we have no positive knowledge of God. We shall treat hereafter of this sophism; at present we shall consider the true interpretation of the doctrine that our cognition of infinity is purely negative.

It has been argued by Fénelon, that finitude, not infinitude, expresses the real negation; that nothing is so negative as a limit; and that to deny all limit is to make a double negation, which is tantamount to a positive affirmation.† This ingenious argument confounds Being with Knowledge. All existence, whether finite or infinite, is real; the distinction of positive and negative belongs to thought alone, and arises solely as the product of the act of comparison. In real being, the attributes of finitude and infinitude coexist in different objects; in thought, they may also coexist in different objects, but become mutually exclusive, like all contradictories, in relation to the same object. But this tentative application of predicates to objects can take place only in thought; hence the terms positive and negative express simply the results of an intellectual process. The question is not, then, which term, finite or infinite, expresses a real negation *in being;* for such a question is either meaningless, or is convertible into the self-answered question, Which term expresses a real limitation? But the true inquiry is, Which term denotes a positive attribute, and which the simple absence of this attribute, *in thought?* Now any attribute is cognized as positive in relation to an object in which it inheres; and the same attribute is cognized as negative in relation to an object in which it does not inhere. That is, all attributes which are positively cognizable at all, must be cognizable in actual presentations of experience; and, inasmuch as a comparison of these presentations shows that the same attributes do not characterize them all, the distinction of positive and negative, that is, present and absent, is developed in consciousness. With reference to any particular object, a present attribute is called positive, an absent one is called negative; but in the latter case, the positive attribute itself, as formerly cognized in other objects, must be first conceived, and constitute the basis of the negative conception. *It is the character of the predication alone, as copulative or disjunctive, which determines the positive or negative character of the attribute.* Hence the question at issue is, which of the two attributes, finite or infinite, is presentatively cognized in experience, and thus becomes the basis

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* Lectures on Metaphysics, pp. 682, 683.

† "L'idée même que j'ai de l'infini n'est ni confuse ni négative; car ce n'est point en excluant indéfinitivement toutes bornes, que je me représente l'infini. Qui

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dit borne dit une négation toute simple; au contraire, qui nie cette négation, affirme quelque chose de très positive. . . . Rien n'est si négatif qu'une borne. . . . La négation redoublée vaut une affirmation; d'où il s'ensuit que la négation absolue de toute négation est l'expression la plus positive qu'on puisse concevoir, et la suprême affirmation; donc le terme infini est infiniment affirmatif par sa signification, quoiqu'il paroisse négatif dans le tour grammatical." (Œuvres, ed. 1787, Tom. II. p. 198.)

for the conception of the other? It needs but to remember that every object whatever of presentative cognition is limited, and that the term finite expresses this universal attribute of limitation, in order to decide the question. Limitation alone is positively cognized in experience, while illimitation is a deduction of the reason. Presence of limitation constitutes the finite, absence of limitation constitutes the infinite. The former is positive, the latter is negative; *but positive limitation is the basis of both conceptions.* This is necessarily the case with human intelligences, to which the finite constitutes the primordial data of knowledge; while to the Divine Intelligence such reasoning is altogether inapplicable. Our stand-point is the finite, not the infinite; to us, therefore, the infinite is a negative idea. But this, as has just been shown, is very far from being the "negation of thought." *

The idea of infinity, thus interpreted, originates neither in the faculties of sensuous presentation and representation, nor in those which cognize relations among objects, nor yet in those which cognize relations among relations, of whatever degree of abstractness; in short, it cannot in any wise be deduced from the finite. But it is contained in those ideas of the higher reason which reveal the absolute and necessary correlates of things, and without which intelligence itself would be impossible. It was shown in our former article, for instance, that infinity is an integral element in the triple synthesis which constitutes the idea of Space, as distinguished from Extension; the antithesis of finite and infinite, therefore, is seen to be *a priori* necessary. The perfect clearness of the idea of infinity is lost only when the imagination attempts to realize it in a sensuous conception of some imaginable object, and thus creates a gratuitous and perplexing antinomy. Abandoning all attempts at sensuous representation, the mind finds no difficulty whatever in comprehending the meaning of illimitability.*

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* Discussions, p. 568. — It is argued by Ulrici, that God, being limited neither *in* nor *by* any other existence, is infinite in a positive sense, inasmuch as his will alone imposes all limitation: "Und mithin hat Gott doch *keine* Gränze *an* einem Andern, noch eine Schranke die ihm *durch* ein Andres auferlegt wäre. Er ist und bleibt vielmehr der Unendliche, unendlich im *positiven* Sinne als der alle Gränze und Schranke, Grösse und Maass selbst Setzende." (Gott und die Natur, 1862, p. 535.) Like Fénelon, Ulrici fails to distinguish between the attribute and the object in which it inheres, and evades the point by transferring the distinction of positive and negative, which pertains only to attributes as predicated in thought, to existence in itself. No one denies that all limitation of created beings originates in God's will; but the question is, *Do we conceive* his infinite attributes otherwise than as attributes devoid of limitation? If not, then, however positive our idea of God may be in some respects, our idea of his infinity is purely negative.

Passing from the nature and genesis of the idea of infinity, taken in its abstractness as a pure attribute, let us consider it in relation to the existences of which alone it can properly be predicated. The consideration of this problem involves the necessity of a philosophical classification, without which certain distinctions in the applications of the predicate cannot be made apparent. The nomenclature adopted must be, from the nature of the case, inadequate, and, though not proposed at random, may perhaps be supplanted by a better one; for while the existences of which we predicate infinity transcend all empirical cognition in and by themselves alone, the only terms by which we can express the necessary distinctions must be derived from knowledge empirically acquired. Still, by criticising our own terms, and defining them by means of the requisite qualifications, it is hoped that the danger of misapprehension will be forestalled and obviated.

Infinity, then, is of two kinds, Quantitative and Qualitative. Quantitative Infinity is so called, not because it is the attribute of a quantity (for an infinite object is raised absolutely above the category of quantity), but because it is the attribute of that which is the necessary condition and correlate of quantity. It is a primary predicate or immediate attribute, and is expressed by the adjective *infinite*. It is subdivided into Statical and Dynamical, both of which designations are unsatisfactory on account of their physical or material associations; yet they point to a profound distinction which no human language could adequately express. Statical Infinity is the attribute of Space,

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* "Obscure pour les sens, elle [i. e. l'idée de l'infini] est très-claire pour la raison; confuse pour l'imagination, elle est distincte pour l'entendement." (Bénard, Précis de Philosophie, p. 121.) So Cousin: "L'imagination ne se représente que des grandeurs et des formes, c'est-à-dire, des phénomènes finis, limités, imparfaits, contingents. Si elle veut aller au delà, elle doit être en effet saisie de vertige. Mais la raison est plus forte que l'imagination; l'invisible est son domaine; elle n'imagine point, elle conçoit." (Philosophie de Kant, p. 214.)

Dynamical Infinity is the attribute of Time. It is customary to express this distinction by the statement that Space is infinite in three dimensions, Time in only one dimension. But this statement, for the following reasons, we regard as not merely inadequate, but as incorrect. In the first place, it brings these transcendental objects under mathematical categories, namely, number and mensurability; and this is legitimate only of their concrete determinations in finite existences.* In the second place, allowing such an application of mathematical categories as legitimate, the distinction still fails to maintain itself. With regard to Space, from any assumed point as a centre countless radii may be conceived, any one of which is as much a dimension of Space as any other. What is true in the assignation of only three dimensions to Space, is simply this: from a single point but three straight lines can be drawn which shall be mutually at right angles with each other, or, only three rectangularly intersecting planes can pass through a given point. But this is no law of the absolute vacuity in which no lines or planes are conceived to exist (pure Space); it is merely a law of the lines and planes themselves, cognate with the law that two straight lines can only intersect in one point, and, like all mathematical law, belongs to that unconditioned Nature of Things which, admitting of no explanation, is the ultimate terminus of all research. Geometric mensuration implies several fixed points, and fixed relations between at least two extensions, magnitudes, or forms. You cannot, therefore, predicate dimensions of Space, except in virtue of what you in imagination arbitrarily put into it; but into pure Space you have no right to put anything. Neither is it more allowable to predicate dimension of Time. The popular image of Time as a line or a stream is purely sensuous and philosophically false; for it reduces the present to a mere point, whereas the present is infinite in the sense of existing throughout the infinity of Space. All symbolism of Space and Time, regarded as existences apart from the emblems which symbolism must necessarily employ, leads inevitably to confusion and contradiction. It is sufficient to say simply that Time can be measured only by means of fixed dates, determined by relations of duration and succession among existences and events. Space and Time have no dimensions *per se*, but are the *sine qua non* of all dimension. In the third and last place, it is unscientific to distinguish Space from Time in terms of itself. If we contrast the infinity of Space and of Time as Tridimensional and Unidimensional, we distinguish them in terms of Space; for dimension presupposes Extension, and Extension presupposes Space. If such a procedure were admissible, it would be better to distinguish the infinity of one from that of the other as respectively Synchronous and Diachronous, which would state the distinction in terms of Time; for, merely positing the infinity of Space as actual at each moment of Time, and the infinity of Time as actual only in its own totality, this distinction does not involve any allusion to mathematical categories. But we regard either distinction as unphilosophical. Following strictly the same conception which justifies the term Quantitative as applicable, not merely to quantity itself, but also to the conditions of quantity, we have preferred to designate the infinity of Space as Statical, as the condition of statical quantity (extension, magnitude, &c.), and the infinity of Time as Dynamical, as the condition of dynamical quantity (force, motion, protension, &c.). No definition could be more suggestive than that of Schelling, — Space, "Pure being with the negation of all activity"; Time, "Pure activity with the negation of all being." Perhaps another definition might be equally suggestive, — Space is Infinity at rest, Time is Infinity in motion. Such definitions, however, though forcible from their very self-contradiction, are mere paradoxes unsusceptible of analysis.

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* See article on "The Philosophy of Space and Time," § 9. By a curious perversion of ingenuity, Baggesen treats the past, present, and future as the three dimensions of Time, and evolves an amusing puzzle out of the want of parallelism (*Missverhältniss*) between these and the three dimensions of Space. (Philosophischer Nachlass, Vol. II. pp. 141 – 144.)

Qualitative infinity is a secondary predicate, that is, the attribute of an attribute, and is expressed by the adverb *infinitely* rather than by the adjective *infinite*. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say that Space is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say that God is infinite. Precision of speech would require us to say, God is infinitely good, wise, or great; or, God is good, and his goodness is infinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based on an important difference between the infinity of Space and Time on the one hand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor theology can afford to disregard this difference. Quantitative Infinity is illimitation by *quantity*, Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by *degree*. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories of the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of infinity to the latter cannot be overstated; God alone possesses Qualitative Infinity which is strictly synonymous with *absolute perfection*, and the neglect of the distinction between this and Quantitative Infinity leads irresistibly to pantheistic and materialistic notions.* Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of "infinite extension" to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel Clarke's identification of God's "immensity" with Space has been shown by Martin to ultimate in pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning the incomprehensibility of infinite Space and Time, Hamilton and Mansel pass at once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. The inconsequence, however, of all such arguments is absolute; and if Philosophy tolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to the nature of God, she must reconcile herself to the negation of his personality and spirituality. Such putative analogies have no theological application whatever. We have no room to dilate on this topic, but will simply point out a double neglect which has generated paralogisms by myriads in speculations concerning "the Infinite": 1. neglect of the distinction between the *attributive* and the *metonymical* use of the term Infinite; 2. neglect of the distinction between Quantitative and Qualitative Infinity.

The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God are veiled in impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God.† Such timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join in the search for truth who trembles at the sight of it when found. But a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite, Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinities coexist. Limitation is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space and Time will limit the infinite God. *But not before.* Time exists ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is irreverent.

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* See some acute remarks in Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite, 2d ed., p. 183 et seq.

† "Hæcque indefinita dicemus potius quam infinita; tum ut nomen infiniti soli Deo reservemus, quia in eo solo omni ex parte, non modo nullos limites agnoscimus,

To recapitulate our distinctions, and present them at a glance, we exhibit the following synopsis:—

INFINITY	QUANTITATIVE	Statical	SPACE.
		Dynamical	TIME.
	QUALITATIVE		GOD.

It will doubtless be noticed that in this scheme no place is left for the mathematical Infinite; and the reasons for this omission we shall proceed now to state.

Mathematics is conversant with quantities and quantitative relations. The conception of quantity, therefore, if rigorously analyzed, will indicate *a priori* the natural and impassable

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sed etiam positive nullos esse intelligimus; tum etiam," etc. (Descartes, Princip. Philos., Pars Prima, § XXVI.) Compare Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 334; also, Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph., pp. 684–688, and Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I. p. 168.

boundaries of the science; while a subsequent examination of the quantities called infinite in the mathematical sense, and of the algebraic symbol of infinity, will be seen to verify the results of this *a priori* analysis.

Quantity is that attribute of things in virtue of which they are susceptible of exact mensuration. The question *how much* or *how many* (*quantus*) implies the answer *so much* or *so many* (*tantus*); but the answer is possible only through reference to some standard of magnitude or multitude arbitrarily assumed. Every object, therefore, of which quantity in the mathematical sense is predicable, must be by its essential nature *mensurable*. It is true, from the limitation of human powers, the mathematician may be unable actually to apply his mensurating processes; and hence the strict propriety of the phrase, immeasurable or inconceivable quantities. But the disability is purely subjective, and cannot originate from the nature of the quantities *as such;* for it is the very nature of quantity to be exactly mensurable. Now mensurability implies the existence of actual, definite limits, since without them there could be no fixed relation between the given object and the standard of measurement, and consequently no possibility of exact mensuration. In fact, since quantification is the object of all mathematical operations, mathematics might be not inaptly defined as the *science of the determination of limits*. It is evident, therefore, that the terms *quantity* and *finitude* express different phases of precisely the same attribute, namely, *limitation*, — the former relatively, and the latter absolutely; for quantity is limitation considered with relation to a standard of measurement, and finitude is limitation considered simply in itself. The sphere of quantity, therefore, is absolutely identical with the sphere of the finite; and the phrase *infinite quantity*, if strictly construed, is a contradiction in terms.

The result thus attained by considering abstract quantity is corroborated by considering concrete and discrete quantities. Such expressions as *infinite sphere*, *radius*, *parallelogram*, *line*, and so forth, are self-contradictory. A sphere is limited by its own periphery, and a radius by the centre and circumference of its circle. A parallelogram of infinite altitude is impossible, because the limit of its altitude is assigned in the side which must be parallel to its base in order to constitute it a parallelogram. In brief, all figuration is limitation. The contradiction in the term *infinite line* is not quite so obvious, but can readily be made apparent. Objectively, a line is only the termination of a surface, and a surface the termination of a solid; hence a line cannot exist apart from extended quantity,* nor an infinite line apart from an infinite quantity. But as this term has just been shown to be self-contradictory, an infinite line cannot exist objectively at all. Again, every line is extension in one dimension, hence a mathematical quantity, hence mensurable, hence finite; you must therefore deny that a line is a quantity, or else affirm that it is finite. Let us now consider the so-called infinite line as existing subjectively in imagination. Regarding the line as in process of generation by a moving point, we admit that no external limit would prevent its being endlessly produced. But at every instant it would still be terminated by the moving point, and cannot be regarded as extending beyond it; hence it can never be infinite, for it is forever bounded by its generating point, and forever capable of still farther production. Moreover, the subjective line exists so long only as the act of imagination gives it existence, and as this act is necessarily finite and comes to an end, the line must also be finite and come to an end. On regarding the line as already generated, it cannot be supposed infinite without supposing it to have already exhausted the possibility of farther extension, which is contradictory of the infinity of Space; and if it be said that it is no more contradictory to suppose the line infinite than it is to suppose Space infinite, the reply is ready and decisive, that the line is a quantity, whereas Space is not a quantity, and that the quantitative nature of the line precludes its infinity.

The same conclusions are forced upon us, if from geometry we turn to arithmetic. The phrases *infinite number*, *infinite series*, *infinite process*, and so forth, are all contradictory when literally construed. Number is a relation among separable units or integers, which, considered objectively as independent of our cognitive powers, must constitute an exact sum; and this exactitude or synthetic totality is limitation.[*] If considered subjectively in the mode of its cognition, a number is infinite only in the sense that it is beyond our power of imagination or conception, which is an abuse of the term. In either case, the totality is fixed, that is, finite. So, too, of *series* and *process*. Since every series involves a succession of terms or members, and every process a succession of stages or steps, the notions of series and process plainly involve that of number, and must be rigorously dissociated from the idea of infinity. At any one step, as at any one term, the number attained is determinate, hence finite. The fact that, by the law of the series or of the process, *we* may continue the operation *as long as we please*, does not justify the application of the epithet infinite to the operation itself; if anything is infinite, it is the will which continues the operation, which is absurd if said of human wills. Consequently, the attribute of infinity is not predicable either of "diminution without limit," "augmentation without limit," or "endless approximation to a fixed limit"; for these mathematical processes continue only as we continue them, consist of steps successively accomplished, and are limited by the very fact of this serial incompletion.

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* See "The Philosophy of Space and Time," § 9.

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[*] If, then, as Hug maintains, Number is the source of all mathematical science in general, it is self-evident that mathematics deals solely with the finite: "Die einfache und allgemein verständliche Verrichtung des Zählens ist die Quelle, aus der eine ganze, grosse Wissenschaft fliesst, die man Mathematik nennt." (Die Mathematik in systematischer Behandlungsweise, 1861, Vol. I. p. 1.) Pascal exhibits a singular union of penetration and blindness with regard to number: "L'unité jointe à l'infini ne l'augmente de rien, non plus qu'un pied à une mesure infinie. Le fini s'anéantit en presence de l'infini, et devient un pur néant. . . . . . Il est vrai qu'il y a un infini en nombre; mais nous ne savons ce qu'il est. Il est faux qu'il soit pair, il est faux qu'il soit impair; car, en ajoutant l'unité, il ne change point de nature; cependant c'est un nombre, et tout nombre est pair ou impair: il est vrai que cela s'entend de tous nombres finis." (Pensées, Chap. XI. § 1.) He saw, on the one hand, that every quantity, number included, is susceptible of augmentation, and, on the other, that infinity is incapable of augmentation. In order, therefore, to reconcile the notion of number, which necessarily involves addibility, with that of infinity, he was driven to the absurdity of maintaining that addition does not involve augmentation! If he had seen that addition *is* augmentation, he would have seen that infinity is as unsusceptible of one as of the other, and consequently cannot be predicated of number. He would also have seen that every number, irrespective of its greatness, must by the addition of unity be changed either from even to odd, or from odd to even; infinite number would be number still.

We cannot forbear pointing out an important application of these results to the Critical Philosophy. Kant bases each of his famous four antinomies on the demand of pure reason for unconditioned totality in a regressive series of conditions. This, he says, must be realized either in an absolute first of the series, conditioning all the other members, but itself unconditioned, or else in the absolute infinity of the series without any first; but reason is utterly unable, on account of their mutual contradiction, to decide in which of the two alternatives the Unconditioned is found. By the principles we have laid down, however, the problem is solved. The absolute infinity of a series is a contradiction *in adjecto*. As every number, although immeasurably and inconceivably great, is impossible unless *unity* is given as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a *first term* is given as its commencement. Through a first term alone is the Unconditioned possible; that is, if it does not exist in a first term, it cannot exist at all; of the two alternatives, therefore, one altogether disappears, and reason is freed from the dilemma of a compulsory yet impossible decision. Even if it should be allowed that the series has no *first term*, but has originated *ab æterno*, it must always at each instant have a *last term;* the series *as a whole* cannot be infinite, and hence cannot, as Kant claims it can, realize in its wholeness unconditioned totality. Since countless terms forever remain unreached, the series is forever limited by them. Kant himself admits that it can never be completed, and is only potentially infinite;* actually, therefore, it is by his own admission finite. But a last term implies a first, as absolutely as one end of a string implies the other; the only possibility of an Unconditioned lies in Kant's first alternative, and if, as he maintains, Reason must demand it, she cannot hesitate in her decision. That number is a limitation is no new truth, and that every series involves number is self-evident; and it is surprising that so radical a criticism on Kant's system should never have suggested itself to his opponents. Even the so-called moments of Time cannot be regarded as constituting a real series, for a series cannot be real except through its divisibility into members; whereas Time is indivisible, and its partition into moments is a conventional fiction. Exterior limitability and interior divisibility result equally from the possibility of discontinuity. Exterior illimitability and interior indivisibility are simply phases of the same attribute of *necessary continuity*, contemplated under different aspects. From these principles flows another, upon which it is impossible to lay too great stress; namely, *illimitability and indivisibility*, *infinity and unity*, *reciprocally necessitate each other*. Hence the Quantitative Infinites must be also Units; and the division of Space and Time, implying absolute contradiction, is not even cogitable as an hypothesis. The utility of this principle in the solution of Hamilton's antinomies will be conspicuous, and justify the emphasis we lay upon it.[*]

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* "Der Regressus in ihr aber [d. h. in der Reihe] ist niemals vollendet, und kann nur *potentialiter* unendlich genannt werden." (Kritik d. r. Vernunft, p. 331.)

By the *a priori* analysis of the conception of quantity, and by the *a posteriori* analysis of quantities and quantuplicities, we have attained the same conclusion, that mathematics has nothing to do with infinity. This conclusion is still further strengthened by considering the mathematical symbol of infinity, and citing the interpretations given to it by mathematicians themselves. The algebraic formula is this: $\frac{a}{0} = \infty$, $0 = \frac{a}{\infty}$, in which the values of 0 and ∞ are correlative, that of 0 determining that of ∞, while a represents any finite quantity. Now the value of 0 is not invariable, but depends on the nature of the process in which it is employed; when it is the result of subtraction, it denotes the absolute absence of all magnitude, but when it is used as a multiplier or a divisor, it signifies the limit of a series of suppositions. For instance, $a - a = 0$, in the former sense; $a \times 0 = 0$, in the sense that

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[*] In our former article (§§ 4, 7) it is maintained that matter necessarily consists of indivisible atoms or units. But since these are indubitably limited, it may appear that the principle in the text fails to substantiate itself. But it is evidently valid only of *necessary* continuity, and should be so interpreted. Space and ultimate atoms equally possess incomposite unity (indivisibility); the difference is, that the unity of Space is *necessary*, while that of atoms is simply *actual*. The Nature of Things necessitates the indivisibility of Space, but no reason can be found in the Nature of Things why atoms should not be further divisible, although the process must somewhere have found an end. These principles, it will hardly be necessary to state, apply exclusively to *continua*, and not to existences of which continuity is not an attribute.

0 is the limit which we shall approximate by continually conceiving smaller and smaller quantities.[*] In the formula $\frac{a}{0} = \infty$, the real divisor is not absolute zero, which is merely regarded as the final and unattainable limit of all diminution, but a quantity which is assumed to be infinitesimal, that is, of inconceivable smallness. Consequently the quotient ∞ is not absolute infinity, which is merely regarded as the final and unattainable limit of all augmentation, but a quantity which is assumed to be mathematically infinite, that is of inconceivable greatness.[†] The word *infinite*, therefore, in mathematical usage, as applied to *process*, and to *quantity*, has a twofold signification. An infinite process is one which we can continue *as long as we please*, but which exists solely in our continuance of it.[‡] An infinite quantity is one which exceeds our powers of mensuration or of conception, but which nevertheless has bounds or limits in itself.[§] Hence the possibility

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[*] "If from a we take a, there remains 0, and in this sense only can *nothing* be received as an absolute result of calculation. . . . . But when we consider multiplication or division by 0, we can only attach to the process a clear idea of what we are doing by considering the limit to which we shall come by continually multiplying and dividing by smaller and smaller quantities. . . . . The idea of making a difference between the 0 which results from one process and from another may be entirely new to the student; but we must endeavor to make him see that the distinction is as necessary as the introduction of 0 itself. . . . . It [i. e. the symbol 0] expresses that in some manner or other a perfect absence of all magnitude is either arrived at, or is the limit of a series of suppositions." (Prof. De Morgan, Differential and Integral Calculus, pp. 11 – 13.)

[†] "Hence $\frac{a}{x}$, when x diminishes without limit, itself increases without limit, which is the only intelligible view we can attach to the equation $\frac{a}{0} = \infty$. Similarly, when x increases without limit, $\frac{a}{x}$ diminishes without limit, which is the only meaning we can attach to $\frac{a}{\infty} = 0$." (De Morgan, Diff. and Integ. Calc., p. 12.) "The symbols by which we shall represent an infinity and an infinitesimal are ∞ and 0; the relation of which is, that if a represent a finite quantity, $\infty = \frac{a}{0}$; and $0 = \frac{a}{\infty}$. . . . . It will be observed that 0 does not represent absolute zero, and that ∞ does not express absolute infinity." (Price, Infinitesimal Calculus, Vol. I. p. 18.)

[‡] "We say that 1, $1 + \frac{1}{2}$, $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}$, $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$, &c., &c., is a series of quantities which continually approximates to the limit 2. Now the truth is, these several quantities are fixed, and do not approximate to 2. The first is 1, the second $\frac{3}{2}$, and so on; it is *we ourselves* who approximate to 2, by passing from one to another." (De Morgan, Diff. and Integ. Calc., p. 9.)

[§] "To use the words *infinitely great* in any sense, and to reject the corresponding of relations among infinite quantities, and of different orders of infinities. If the words *infinite*, *infinity*, *infinitesimal* should be banished from mathematical treatises and replaced by the words *indefinite*, *indefinity*, and *indefinitesimal*, mathematics would suffer no loss, while, by removing a perpetual source of confusion, metaphysics would get great gain.[*] It is the obstinate persistency of imagination in the effort to transform the idea of infinity into a sensuous conception, which has generated the innumerable paralogisms scattered with such profusion through the pages of philosophical works; and imagination is directly encouraged in this hopeless effort by the common notion that infinity and quantity are compatible attributes, and susceptible of a mathematical synthesis. Perhaps

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method of using the words *infinitely small*, is to accustom ourselves to false distinctions. If it be proper, in any manner whatsoever, to say that x is infinitely great, it is equally proper to say that $\frac{1}{x}$ is infinitely small. It is usual to say that, when x is infinite, $\frac{1}{x}$ is nothing; and the meaning is simply this, that there is no limit to the smallness of $\frac{1}{x}$, if there is no limit to the greatness of x, or that by making x sufficiently great, we may make $\frac{1}{x}$ as small as we please." (De Morgan, Diff. and Integ. Calc., p. 25.) "By finite we generally mean that which is within reach, or may be brought within reach, of our senses..... The powers, therefore, of our senses and mind place the limit to the finite; but those magnitudes which severally transcend these limits, by reason of their being too great or too small, we call *infinite* and *infinitesimal* (or infinitely small)..... Again, an infinite quantity may be so large as not only to surpass the compass of our senses, but also to surpass quantities which are from their magnitude beyond them; that is, there may be infinite quantities beyond infinite quantities, and others again beyond these: and thus there may be quantities infinitely greater than infinities, and there may be orders of infinities." (Price, Infinites. Calc., Vol. I. pp. 12, 13.) "J'appelle *quantité infiniment petite*, toute quantité qui est considerée comme continuellement decroissante, tellement qu'elle puisse être rendue aussi petite qu'on le veut..... L'unité divisée par une quantité infiniment petite, est ce qu'on nomme *quantité infinie* ou *infiniment grande*." (Carnot, Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du Calcul Infinitésimal, 1813, pp. 19, 20.)

[*] After quoting a passage from Pascal on the Method of Indivisibles, Carnot says: "Ce passage est remarquable, non seulement en ce qu'il prouve que les géomètres savaient très-bien apprécier le mérite de la méthode des indivisibles, mais encore en ce qu'il prouve que la notion de l'infini mathématique, dans le sens même qu'on lui attribue aujourd'hui, n'était point étrangère à ces géomètres; car il est clair par ce qu'on vient de citer de Pascal, qu'il attachait au mot *indéfini* la même signification que nous attachons au mot *infini*, qu'il appelait simplement *petit* ce que nous appelons infiniment petit, et qu'il négligeait sans scrupule ces petites quantités vis-à-vis des quantités finies." He also cites Roberval as using *infinite* and *infinitely small* in the same manner. (Réflexions, etc., pp. 145, 146.)

no more striking illustration of this can be found than in Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, where it is laid down that "our idea of infinity arises from the contemplation of quantity" (which is true only in the sense that quantity necessarily suggests its own conditions, infinite Space and Time), that "the idea of infinity consists in a supposed endless progression," and that it is number which "furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of."* But similar confusion of thought is to be found almost everywhere; and even Locke scarcely equals the inconclusiveness and speculative aberrations which are evinced in Hamilton's writings on these subjects. The genius and subtilty which have deservedly immortalized the Scotch metaphysician in his psychological researches, seem to have deserted him as he approached the transcendental regions of the Unconditioned.

We are now prepared to examine the list of "Contradictions proving the Psychological Theory of the Conditioned," with which Hamilton † attempts to buttress the law of the conditioned already criticised in the previous pages. We propose to complete our task by briefly criticising these alleged contradictions *seriatim*.

"1. Finite cannot comprehend, contain the Infinite.—Yet an inch or minute, say, are finites, and are divisible *ad infinitum*; that is, their terminated division incogitable."

That is, an inch or minute contains either an *infinite number of parts* or an *infinite process of division*. The phrases have just been shown to be contradictions, and consequently either assertion is absurd. Moreover, to say that a *quantity* could *contain* a *process* would be as absurd as to say that a mile could contain a calculation: the things are not of the same kind.

"2. Infinite cannot be terminated or begun.—Yet eternity *ab ante* ends now; and eternity *a post* begins now.—So apply to Space."

If a statement contains a contradiction, the best possible refutation is to point it out. Since infinity and unity involve each other, as has been shown, the assertions that our *now* breaks the continuity of Time, and our *here* the continuity of Space, are contradictions; and the statement is absurd. Eternity and Space are each indivisibly *one*, neither ending nor beginning.

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* Book II. Chap. XVII. §§ 7, 8, 9.

† Metaphysics, p. 682.

> "3. There cannot be two infinite maxima.—Yet eternity *ab ante* and *a post* are two infinite maxima of time."

Same as No. 2. One contradiction generates countless others. Moreover, two infinite maxima are no more absurd than one infinite maximum; for *maximum* is a relative and quantitative conception, implying other quantities of the same kind; whereas there can be but one infinite of the same kind.

> "4. Infinite maximum if cut into two, the halves cannot be each infinite, for nothing can be greater than infinite, and thus they could not be parts; nor finite, for thus two finite halves would make an infinite whole."

An infinite maximum is absurd, and a bisected infinite is absurd.

> "5. What contains infinite $\overbrace{\text{extensions, protensions, intensions}}^{\text{quantities}}$, cannot be passed through,—come to an end. An inch, a minute, a degree, contains these; *ergo*, etc. Take a minute. This contains an infinitude of protended quantities, which must follow one after another; but an infinite series of successive protensions can, *ex termino*, never be ended; *ergo*, etc."

Same as No. 1. From the single contradiction of an *infinite number* the whole cobweb is spun.

> "6. An infinite maximum cannot but be all inclusive. Time *ab ante* and *a post* infinite and exclusive of each other; *ergo*."

Same as Nos. 2 and 3.

> "7. An infinite number of quantities must make up either an infinite or a finite whole. I. The former.—But an inch, a minute, a degree, contain each an infinite number of quantities; therefore an inch, a minute, a degree, are each infinite wholes, which is absurd. II. The latter.—An infinite number of quantities would thus make up a finite quantity, which is equally absurd."

In other words, an infinite finite is either infinite or finite!

The best answer will be a "Rowland for an Oliver." A quadrangular triangle must have either three angles or four. I. The former. — But then it is not quadrangular. II. The latter. — But then it is not a triangle.

"8. If we take a finite quantity (as an inch, a minute, a degree), it would appear equally that there are, and that there are not, an equal number of quantities between these and a greatest, and between these and a least."

The conceptions of a greatest quantity and a least quantity are self-contradictions. According to the mathematical definition, quantity is "that which is susceptible of augmentation and diminution." The limitations of real objects are due, not to their nature *as quantities*, but to physical causes; hence in thought every quantity may be increased or decreased *ad libitum*.

"9. An absolutely quickest motion is that which passes from one point to another in space in a minimum of time. But a quickest motion from one point to another, say a mile distance, and from one to another, say a million million of miles, is thought the same; which is absurd."

Protension, as well as extension, is a mensurable quantity; hence a least protension, or quickest motion, taken abstractly, is a contradiction. But we must distinguish between the possibilities of thought and the actualities of real being. Thought may contemplate the quantity of an object by itself, as an abstracted attribute unrelated to physical attributes; and the nature of pure quantity forbids a greatest and a least. But in real being the attributes of an object are inseparable, and every object is limited on account of some physical reason or relation. Consequently, though there must exist in real being an actual greatest and an actual least, in mere thought a greatest and a least are necessarily impossible, from the very nature of quantity. And since Hamilton's puzzle refers solely to thought, its solution is found in its own contradiction.

"10. A wheel turned with quickest motion; if a spoke be prolonged, it will therefore be moved by a motion quicker than the quickest. The same may be shown using the rim and the nave."

Same as No. 9. The very illustration employed shows the absurdity of calling any *actual* motion the absolutely *quickest* motion, that is, the quickest motion possible in the nature of things.

"11. Contradictory are Boscovich Points, which occupy space, and are inextended. Dynamism, therefore, inconceivable. *E contra*,

"12. Atomism also inconceivable; for this supposes atoms, — minima extended but indivisible."

The same distinction as above must be again observed between being and thought, on pain of contradiction. Atoms *actually indivisible by existent physical forces* are one thing; atoms *necessarily indivisible in the nature of things* are a very different thing. If atoms were simply abstract mathematical quantities, they might be divided indefinitely; although even then their existence as extended quantities could never be destroyed by the process of division; neither could the process of division be infinite, since every process is limited to the steps already reached. But that atoms, as real components of a real mass, are not divided beyond a certain practical limit, wherever that may be, is demonstrated by the very existence of matter as an aggregation of parts. Nothing is more ridiculous than to suppose a process of division perpetually going on in matter, as an actual fact; yet the only alternative is to suppose that the parts of matter possess already a degree of minuteness practically ultimate.* Dynamism, therefore, is both inconceivable and impossible, and cannot be rendered tenable even by the genius of a Leibnitz; atomism, if sensuously unimaginable or inconceivable, still violates no law of thought, and is a necessary deduction from empirical observation.

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* Descartes and Newton furnish most cogent illustrations of the necessity of these conclusions. Descartes started with the theory that extension alone constitutes the essence of matter; he therefore could regard matter solely under its mathematical relations, and had to maintain its endless divisibility: "Nam planè profiteor, me nullam aliam rerum corporearum materiam agnoscere, quàm illam omnimode divisibilem, figurabilem et mobilem, quam Geometræ quantitatem vocant, et pro objecto suarum demonstrationum assumunt; ac nihil planè in ipsa considerare, præter istas divisiones, figuras et motus; nihilque de ipsis ut verum admittere, quod non ex communibus illis notionibus, de quarum veritate non possumus dubitare, tam evidenter deducatur, ut pro mathematica demonstratione sit habendum. Et quia sic omnia Naturæ phænomena possunt explicari, ut in sequentibus apparebit, nulla alia Physicæ principia puto esse admittenda, nec alia etiam optanda." (Princip. Philos., Pars Secunda, § LXIV., ed. 1685.) He distinctly identifies substance with quantity: "Quippe quantitas a substantia extensa in re non differt, sed tantum ex parte nostri conceptus, ut et numerus a re numerata." (Ibid., § VIII.) Newton, on the other hand, who studied Nature not merely as a mathematician, but also as a physicist, was compelled to accept the theory of atomism: see Optice, Lib. III. Quæst. 31, and Principia,

"13. A quantity, say a foot, has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quantity, say an inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another. Therefore an inch is equal to a foot."

Compare Nos. 5 and 7; the same absurdity of an infinite number reappears. But if Hamilton undertakes to deal with the mathematical "infinite," he should observe that mathematics admits among its infinites relations of unequal magnitude.

"14. If two divaricating lines are produced *ad infinitum* from a point where they form an acute angle, like a pyramid, the base will be infinite and, at the same time, not infinite: 1°, because terminated by two points; and, 2°, because shorter than the sides; 3°, Base could not be drawn, because sides infinitely long."

The impossibility of an infinite line has been shown above; and the hypothesis is therefore contradictory.

"15. An atom, as existent, must be able to be turned round. But if turned round, it must have a right and left hand, &c., and these its signs must change their place; therefore, be extended."

See Nos. 11 and 12. The only absurdity consists in maintaining that atoms are *not* extended.

We have now concluded our tedious examination of Hamilton's alleged contradictions. In every case, the contradiction has been shown to lie solely in Hamilton's own hypothesis; and it may give us increased confidence in the principles set forth in the foregoing pages, to see that they enable us so easily to untie this formidable knot of antinomies. It only

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Lib. III. Pr. 6, Cor. 3. Saisset, in his Essai de Philosophie Religieuse, p. 142, attributes to Newton a more precise ennunciation of the distinction in the text than seems to be warranted by the passages referred to: "Pour lui, si tout corps est idéalement divisible à l'infini, en tant qu'étendu, il n'en résulte pas le moins du monde qu'elle soit effectivement divisé." To distinguish between body as ideally divisible and as practically indivisible, is a very accurate statement of the truth.

remains, in order to accomplish our task, to discover the source of Hamilton's Law of the Conditioned, and form an estimate of his originality.

The Law of the Conditioned is an attempt to determine *a priori* the precise limits of human thought. The principle upon which it rests is the principle of mental impotence; its method is the development of a necessary contradiction maintained to exist between the decisions of Reason, when she exercises herself in speculations upon the Infinite and the Absolute. Now Hamilton repudiates the Kantian system in the very article in which he first propounded his own, as "leading to absolute scepticism";* and his strictures are in the main just, for such is the tendency of every philosophy which culminates in antinomy. Yet Kant employs the same principle and the same method by which Hamilton builds up his Philosophy of the Conditioned; with this difference, that the power and logical acumen which he exhibits are absent in a marked degree from these speculations of the Scotch metaphysician. The relation between the Critical Philosophy and the Philosophy of the Conditioned is genetic; in fact, so far as this system is concerned, Hamilton is only a clumsy imitator of Kant, and betrays his unskilfulness by alterations for the worse. While Kant sagaciously idealizes Time and Space, and finds his antinomies in the problems of the infinity of matter, the atomic simplicity of matter, the existence of freedom, and the existence of a necessary Being, Hamilton incalculably weakens his argument by transferring the antinomies to Space and Time, in which Kant was analyst enough to see there could be none, inasmuch as infinity is a constituent element in the idea of each.† A simple comparison will reveal the close affinity between the Kantian and the Hamiltonian doctrines, and substantiate our allegation that the latter is simply a deterioration of the former. It is the doctrine of each system, that, in seeking to attain transcendental knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, reason falls into an inevitable and hopeless antinomy. Now that the nature of this antinomy, its supposed effect upon the validity of human knowledge, and supposed tendency to promote our highest practical interests, are substantially identical in both systems, will be abundantly shown by the following passages. Treating of the search for the Unconditioned in a regressive series of conditions, Kant says: —

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* Discussions, p. 25.

† "Der Raum wird als eine unendliche gegebene Grösse vorgestellt." (Kritik d. r. Vernunft, p. 712.)

> "This Unconditioned can be thought, either as consisting simply in the entire series, all of whose terms without exception would then be conditioned, and their entirety alone unconditioned (in which case the regress is called Infinite); or else as consisting simply in one term of the series (the Absolute), to which the remaining terms are subordinated, while this is conditioned by no other." *

And again: —

> "With all possible perceptions, you remain forever hemmed in by *conditions*, whether in Space or Time, and never attain to aught Unconditioned, so as to decide whether it is to be placed in an absolute commencement of the series, or in an absolute totality of the series without any commencement." †

If these and similar passages are compared with the one already cited from Hamilton, in which he states his Law, it will be seen that both philosophers place the Infinite in an unconditioned *totality* of a series, the Absolute in an unconditioned *first* of a series; with this difference, that, while the series of Kant is cognized by the understanding, urged on by the reason to search for an *unattainable* Unconditioned, the series of Hamilton is cognized by the sensuous imagination, urged on by reason to search for an *inconceivable* Unconditioned. Kant's antinomy lies confessedly between the reason and the understanding, inasmuch as the former demands what the latter cannot attain, that is, the Unconditioned; Hamilton's antinomy lies between the reason and the imagination, but he perceives no distinction, and confounds the two faculties under the general term *think* or *conceive*. The agreement is fundamental and important; the difference is of importance only as indicating the greater profundity and subtlety of the philosopher of Königsberg.

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* "Dieses Unbedingte kann man sich nun gedenken, entweder als blos in der ganzen Reihe bestehend, in der also alle Glieder ohne Ausnahme bedingt und nur das Ganze derselben schlechthin unbedingt wäre, und dann heisst der Regressus unendlich; oder das absolut Unbedingte ist nur ein Theil der Reihe, dem die übrigen Glieder derselben untergeordnet sind, er selbst aber unter keiner anderen Bedingung steht." (Kritik d. r. Vernunft, p. 331.)

† "Ihr bleibt mit allen möglichen Wahrnehmungen immer unter *Bedingungen*, es sei im Raume, oder in der Zeit, befangen und kommt an nichts Unbedingtes, um auszumachen, ob dieses Unbedingte in einem absoluten Anfange der Synthesis, oder einer absoluten Totalität der Reihe, ohne allen Anfang, zu setzen sei." (Ibid., p. 382.)

With reference to the tendency of their doctrines towards scepticism, an accusation which both philosophers seek by anticipation to repel, their language is as follows: —

> "By the doctrine, on the contrary, which I propose, these contradictory phenomena are carried up into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties. Intelligence is shown to be feeble, but not false; our nature is, thus, not a lie, nor the Author of our nature a deceiver." *

> "The ideas of pure reason can never be in their own nature self-conflicting; but their misemployment only can cause fallacies and illusions to arise from them." †

And again: —

> "There is, therefore, no natural contradiction in the domain of pure reason." ‡

Both philosophers subvert the credibility of intelligence; but Hamilton, recognizing the dangerous character of the Kantian doctrine, gravely recommends his own as "subverting scepticism." After what has preceded, no comment on this pretension is needed. It is enough to point out that they equally failed to perceive the real drift of their own philosophies.

Lastly, with reference to the supposed influence of their doctrines on morality and religion, there is again a marked parallelism of opinion between the two thinkers. For example: —

> "I shall only add, in conclusion, that, as this is the one true, it is the

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* Metaphysics, p. 556.

† "Die Ideen der reinen Vernunft können nimmermehr an sich selbst dialektisch sein, sondern ihr blosser Missbrauch muss es allein machen, dass uns von ihnen ein trüglicher Schein entspringt." (Krit. d. r. Vern., p. 519.)

‡ "So giebt es demnach keine eigentliche Polemik im Felde der reinen Vernunft." (Ibid., p. 584.) Yet Hamilton says, Discussions, p. 25, "Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of mere illusion." This may be the result of his system, but Kant certainly does not admit it; neither does Hamilton himself.

only orthodox, inference. . . . . Faith, — Belief, — is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge." *

Again: —

"Above all, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy and those of revealed truth. . . . . Humility thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason." †

"I cannot even assume, in behalf of practical reason, the existence of God, Freedom, and Immortality, unless at the same time I deprive speculative reason of its claim to transcendental vision. . . . . I was compelled, therefore, to uproot Knowledge in order to make room for Faith. . . . . Above all [the value of the Critical Philosophy will be apparent], if we consider the inestimable advantage of silencing forever all objections against morality and religion after the Socratic fashion, namely, by demonstrating the ignorance of the objector." ‡

It would be doing injustice to the memory of great and good men to withhold our tribute of honor from the spirit which prompted such words as these. They set themselves manfully to combat the errors of their times, and stood forth as the champions of those high interests which give to human life all its dignity and significance. But while the general conclusion, the grand result which they aimed to establish, is friendly in the highest degree to a wise philosophy and a true religion, the means adopted to reach it are fraught with terrible danger to both. The "Faith" which cannot stand unless buttressed by contradictions, is built upon the sand. The profoundest possible faith is faith in the integrity of human nature and in the unity of truth. If there is found to be any want of concord in the normal interaction of human faculties, any conflict in the results of a right reason, any inevitable treachery to truth on

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* Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 531.

† Discussions, p. 588.

‡ "Ich kann also *Gott, Freiheit* und *Unsterblichkeit* zum Behuf des nothwendigen praktischen Gebrauchs meiner Vernunft nicht einmal *annehmen*, wenn ich nicht der spekulativen Vernunft zugleich ihre Anmassung überschwänglicher Einsichten *benehme*. . . . . Ich musste also *Wissen* aufheben, um zum *Glauben* Platz zu bekommen, ... — am meisten aber, wenn man den unschätzbaren Vortheil in Anschlag bringt, allen Einwürfen wider Sittlichkeit und Religion, auf *sokratische* Art, nämlich durch den klarsten Beweis der Unwissenheit der Gegner, auf alle künftige Zeit ein Ende zu machen." (Kritik d. r. Vern., p. 679.)

the part of her sole interpreter, no appeal to practical interests, or traditionary authority, or intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of scepticism. It has been well said by a critic of Hamilton in the Prospective Review, that "a philosophy which creates antinomies may have the highest merit but one; the highest of all is reserved for a philosophy that resolves them." No theory of knowledge can be a true one which fails to place in the clearest light the admirable concord of the universe, and dissipate the clouds of seeming contradiction. Faith sets herself to an ignoble task when she would force human reason to commit suicide; and it is well for faith herself that the task is as hopeless as it is ignoble.

We shall conclude by exhibiting the theological corollaries which flow from the doctrine of the preceding pages, and the relation which we conceive to exist between the infinity of God and his other attributes. The doctrine of a purely negative cognition of the Infinite, which has caused religion to fear and scepticism to exult on equally fallacious grounds, is rendered not only innocuous, but salutary, by distinctly bearing in mind what is meant by "the Infinite." "If the Infinite is utterly incomprehensible in any positive sense," exclaim doctors of divinity in alarm, "what foundation is left for Christianity? What becomes of its sweet supports and consolations, if God is absolutely beyond our positive knowledge? But we are conscious that we *do* know God — partially, it is true, yet really — in our own experience; therefore the Infinite can be, at least to a certain extent, positively known." It is amazing how almost universally such shallow sophisms pass current among men; they meet us on every hand. This common argument illustrates the danger of not observing the distinction between the attributive and the metonymical use of the term Infinite. The Infinite is not God. It is not even an immediate attribute of God, but denotes merely the illimitation of his attributes; and this illimitation is negatively cognized. The distinction of Coleridge, that we may *apprehend*, but not *comprehend*, the Infinite, is superficial; we comprehend nothing more completely than the Infinite. For the idea of illimitability is as clear, precise, and intelligible as the idea of limitability which is its basis. The propositions "A is X," "A is not-X," are equally comprehensible; the conceptions A and X are in both cases positive data of experience, while the affirmation and negation consist solely in the copulative or disjunctive nature of the predication. Consequently, if X is comprehensible, so is not-X; if the finite is comprehensible, so also is the Infinite. Since no sane man claims to comprehend either Space, Time, or God, the distinction of Coleridge is either a mere truism or a fallacy.

The idea of God originates, not in the suggestions of outward nature, but in the depths of humanity itself. The soul cannot infer God from nature, except in virtue of what it first projects into nature. Hence the radical defect in the argument from design; for the affirmation of an intelligent World-cause is the objective transference of a subjective consciousness. Although it may be mutilated and perhaps annihilated by the pitiless manipulations of a sceptical and aberrant logic, the idea of an All-pervading Personality is the formative nucleus of the idea of God; and this idea of personality, which finds no analogue in the world of matter, can only be generated through the soul's consciousness of selfhood. Not until this is objectified and matured into the idea of an omnipresent Self, can the argument from design become pertinent or forceful. But once posit this unconditioned existence, and nature, becoming its manifestation or visible word, pours a flood of light upon its attributes. Selfhood, therefore, or personality, is the primordial germ of the idea of God; and in the development of this idea from void personality into determinate character, the soul must still repeat its former procedure and reiterate human analogies. Human nature, therefore, is the point of departure in the search for God. The four grand elements of personality or conscious being — intelligence, will, affection, and conscience — are elevated to absolute perfection, and become the august attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, all-lovingness, and all-holiness. But conjoined with these four elements, positive in their nature though negative in their infinity, must coexist attributes purely negative, disallowing the four grand limitations of human existence, — cause, dependence, space, and time, — and thus constituting the awful mysteries of self-existence, absoluteness, omnipresence, and eternity. It is thus evident that, while the idea of God contains positive elements, it is more largely constituted by elements purely negative; and even these positive elements are associated with the negative idea of infinity, which, without destroying their essential nature, carries them immeasurably beyond the vastest reach of thought. To accuse such an idea, so overwhelming in its sublimity, of a degrading anthropopathism, is simply to misapprehend the meaning of degradation. A community of nature between God and man is the absolute condition of religion; and, though matched with the stellar hosts which fill with resplendent beauty the bosom of infinite Time and Space, a moral nature, finite though it be, is the very culmination of the sublime. In vain would Philosophy divest her idea of God of all human attributes. Every such attempt degrades the Being she would exalt; and she must at last confess that a certain reverent outshadowing of the human upon the background of infinity yields equally the most majestic and the least inadequate idea of the Divine. When, however, it is said that human nature, in its positive aspect and freed from its restrictions, is an epitome, a copy in miniature, of the Divine, this is true only of ideal humanity, not of humanity as it exists in the distorted images we see around us. We predicate of God no positive attribute which is not essential to a perfect humanity, and no attribute which is essential to a perfect humanity can we omit in our idea of God. If, therefore, the ideal human has ever become historically real, that realization is the profoundest utterance of God; and it is the conscious or unconscious longing for such a realization which has riveted the eyes of all the ages upon the Man of Palestine. The positive attributes of God are shared by him in a measure with all his children; his negative attributes, and whatever other perfections are veiled in the blinding lustre of his incommunicable essence, are his own alone. And while these inscrutable mysteries shroud the Divine radiance from human eyes, no earnest thinker need fear that the Deity vanishes in a "God understood."

But, in thus assuming a community of nature between God and man, we are at once confronted with the assertion that personality is by necessity a limitation or restriction, and that an infinite or absolute Personality is a contradiction in terms. This objection admits of a duality of form, according as the limitation is maintained to be intrinsic or extrinsic; and we cite two representative arguments, taken respectively from Fichte and from Strauss.

> "This Being must be differentiated from you and the universe, and must act in the latter according to conceptions; it must therefore form conceptions, and possess personality and consciousness. But what do you mean by personality and consciousness? do you mean that which you have found in yourself, learned to know in yourself, and have designated by this name? But that you neither do nor can think this except as limited and finite, the most cursory attention to your own formation of this conception will prove to you. You therefore create this Being by the attribution of personality to a being limited, and like yourself; and you have not, as you wished to do, thought God, but only reduplicated in thought your finite self." *

This argument is condensed into four words by Spinoza,—"*Omnis determinatio est negatio.*" But all real being must be determined; only pure Nothing can be undetermined. Even Space and Time, though cognized solely by negative characteristics, are determined in so far as differentiated from the existences they contain; but this differentiation involves no limitation of their infinity. All differentiation or distinction is determination; and, if all determination is negation, that is (as here used), limitation, then the Infinite, being determinately distinguished from the finite, loses its own infinity, and is either absorbed in the finite or else vanishes into pure Nothing or Non-Being. Spinoza, therefore, by the principle that all determination is limitation, reduces his own philosophy to a system of Absolute Nihilism, which is by no means his purpose. A pure Ego, therefore, by determination to thought, volition, affection, is not limited; its limitation or illimitation depends simply upon the *character* of this thought, volition, or affection, as perfect or imperfect. As the attribute of continuity has been shown to exist equally in infinite Space and in finite Extension, without involving *per se* quantitative finitude or infinitude, so pure personality is absolutely neutral with respect to qualitative finitude or infinitude, that is, imperfection or perfection. Imperfection admits of different degrees; absolute perfection (which is synonymous with qualitative infinity) is above the category of degree. Until, therefore, the simple and unanalyzable idea of selfhood or personality can be demonstrated to necessitate a certain *degree* in its determinations of intelligence, will, affection, and conscience, the assertion that personality *per se* involves intrinsic limitation remains an utterly unsubstantiated assumption. The further paralogism, that personality, implying unity, thereby implies intrinsic limitation, is completely exposed by a simple reference to the distinction previously established between composite and incomposite unity. It is manifestly impossible to form a positive, imaginative conception of pure spirit, except under modifications of form and color, as Mr. Sears, in his "Athanasia," admits; but nothing is more evident than the materialistic nature of such conceptions. To conceive the Absolute Spirit, especially, with attributes of form or color, is to be guilty of the very grossest anthropomorphism. The unity of personality is purely incomposite, being equivalent to indivisibility or simplicity; nothing is implied by it concerning limitation. If we repress over-curious imagination, and are content with the sublime deliverance of reason, that God is one God, without partition of essence, the unity of personality is no more a limitation to him, than the unity of continuity is a limitation to infinite Space and Time.

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* "Dieses Wesen soll von euch und der Welt unterschieden seyn, es soll in der letzeren nach Begriffen wirken, es soll sonach der Begriffe fähig seyn, Persönlichkeit haben und Bewusstseyn. Was nennt ihr denn nun Persönlichkeit und Bewusstseyn? doch wohl dasjenige, was ihr in euch selbst gefunden, an euch selbst kennen gelernt, und mit diesem Namen bezeichnet habt? Dass ihr aber dieses ohne Beschränkung und Endlichkeit schlechterdings nicht denkt, noch denken könnt, kann euch die geringste Aufmerksamkeit auf eure Construction dieses Begriffs lehren. Ihr macht sonach dieses Wesen durch die Beilegung jenes Prädicats zu einem endlichen, zu einem Wesen eures Gleichen, und ihr habt nicht, wie ihr wolltet, Gott gedacht, sondern nur euch selbst im Denken vervielfältigt." (Fichte, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung. Werke, Vol. V. p. 187.)

The argument of Strauss varies from the foregoing argument of Fichte.

> "We know and feel ourselves to be persons only in contradistinction from other persons, like ourselves and external to us; we distinguish ourselves from them, and are thus conscious of our own finitude. Con-

sequently the conception of personality, formed in and for the province of the finite, appears to lose all meaning when extended beyond it, and a being which finds no external analogue of itself appears also not to be a person. To speak of a personal God, or Divine personality, is seen, from this stand-point, to be a synthesis of conceptions, one of which absolutely excludes and abolishes the other. Personality is Selfhood limiting itself to a definite compass in antithesis to another, which it thereby separates from itself; Absoluteness, on the contrary, is the Encompassing, the Unlimited, which excludes nothing from itself so much as the exclusiveness latent in the conception of personality; absolute personality, consequently, is a nonentity about which nothing can be thought." *

This argument strikingly illustrates the danger and the inconsequence of arguing from quantitative to qualitative infinity. On examining it, the prominence of spatial conceptions is very marked. The mutual exclusion which results from the plurality of objects and the impossibility of their occupying the same space, is the covert drift of the argument. Coexistence of objects in space undoubtedly implies the finitude of the coexistents, but coexistence of personalities implies nothing as to their finitude. There is no analogy, except in a loose metaphorical sense, between things material and things spiritual. Even admitting the validity of the analogy, Strauss illegitimately uses his data, which can be so employed as to construct a plausible argument *a priori* for the existence of a personal God. The existence of material objects being given as an immediately cognized fact, the existence of Space, its *conditio sine qua non*, is absolutely necessitated. But since material objects are finite, and Space is infinite, the existence of the finite is demonstrative of the existence of the infinite. Now infinite Space includes finite objects, without being either limited by them or merging them in itself. Consequently, if the analogy holds good, the existence of finite personalities necessitates, as their *conditio sine qua non*, or ground of reality, the existence of an infinite Personality, which includes them and renders them possible, without either being limited by them or merging them in itself. But because we disallow the legitimacy of arguing from quantitative to qualitative infinity, we reject this plausible and seductive proof. The relation of inclusion, which is intelligible as existent between Matter and Space, is altogether meaningless when predicated of personalities; it is a mystical conception, which finds expression in the often-misinterpreted words of Paul, — "in him we live and move and have our being," — but which philosophy can recognize solely as a figure of speech. Persons may be distinct without mutual limitation. The only attribute which can create mutual limitation between two persons, is that of power or will; but while finite powers may limit each other, the statement that a limited power can limit an illimitable power is absurd on the very face of it. Hence the alleged limitation implied in the coexistence of persons is purely fictitious.

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* "Als Personen fühlen und wissen wir uns nur im Unterschiede von andern gleichartigen Personen ausser uns, von denen wir uns unterscheiden, mithin als endliche; in diesem Gebiete der Endlichkeit und für dasselble gebildet, scheint folglich der Begriff der Persönlichkeit ausserhalb desselben jeden Sinn zu verlieren, und ein Wesen, welches kein anderes seinesgleichen ausser sich hat, auch keine Person sein zu können. Von einem persönlichen Gott, oder göttlicher Persönlichkeit zu sprechen, erscheint auf diesem Standpunkt als eine Verbindung von Begriffen, deren einer den andern schlechthin ausschliesst und aufhebt. Persönlichkeit ist sich zusammenfassende Selbstheit gegen Anderes, welches sie damit von sich abtrennt; Absolutheit dagegen ist das Umfassende, Unbeschränkte, das nichts als eben nur jene im Begriff der Persönlichkeit liegende Ausschliesslichkeit von sich ausschliesst: absolute Persönlichkeit mithin ein *non ens*, bei welchem sich nichts denken lässt." (Glaubenslehre, Vol. I. pp. 504, 505.)

But the root of the sophism lies deeper than this. The idea of personality, according to Strauss, is a relative one, and consciousness implies a relation between at least two persons. Now it is indisputable that the Ego comes to consciousness only as opposed to a Non-Ego; but it is equally indisputable that this Non-Ego cannot be a person. We come into immediate contact with nothing but matter, which is the sole object of the senses, and through which alone other human personalities can act upon us; and matter, therefore, is the real Non-Ego which conditions consciousness. But while *consciousness* is conditioned on a Non-Ego, it is untrue to say that *personality* is conditioned on a Non-Ego; for consciousness is the reflex activity of the personality, not the personality itself. The personality remains indestructible, although consciousness may lapse into utter unconsciousness, as in a swoon. Moreover, because a consciousness which comes into existence in

Time is conditioned on a Non-Ego, it is unwarrantable to say that a Consciousness which never came into existence at all, but has existed *ab æterno*, is likewise so conditioned. All that we know is, that personality is a simple, ultimate, absolute idea, not analyzable into constituent elements, nor implying *per se* any relation whatever to any other existence. Consequently, to attribute personality to God, is to predicate nothing which limits in any way his absolute perfection or infinity, strictly and rationally construed.

Such are the true consequences of the doctrine that we cannot positively know infinity; — consequences which few would controvert, and which are wholly at variance with the Philosophy of the Conditioned. If Hamilton had been content to teach such a doctrine as this, by wise and self-consistent methods, thoughtful minds would have been spared the disappointment which is the sole fruit of his constructive labors. Alas for the love of paradox! Harmony is the grand secret of universal Being; there are no jarring chords in the music of the spheres. The laws of Truth are severely simple, and refuse to assume the theatrical attitudes by which men would enhance their naked sublimity. The needle of human reason trembles violently on its centre at the deflections of error, prejudice, and passion; but its vibrations move through ever-lessening arcs, and perpetually approximate to a final equilibrium. Philosophy has not yet achieved a fixed point of departure, and a faultless method of advance; but when these shall have been attained, she will vindicate her own transcendent nobility, and assume her rightful rank as the Science of Sciences.

Art. IV. — 1. *Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs.* Washington. 1863.

2. *History of the Sioux War.* By I. V. D. Heard. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1863.

It was our privilege to visit Western Minnesota a few weeks before the Indian massacre of 1862. The journey was made at leisure, so that we had ample opportunity to note the wild beauty of this Western border. It had lost none of the poetry of the wilderness, although the log-cabins of the frontiersmen marked the tidal line of American civilization. The few scattered fields of golden grain which bent low for the reaper were like so many gems set in the flowery prairie. There was a generous freshness in the rude hospitality of these pioneers which won our hearts, and made us rejoice that their lines had fallen in such pleasant places. A few weeks later we heard on this border such a wail of agony as we pray God that we may never hear again. Many scores of our friends who fell victims of savage hatred are sleeping in nameless graves. Minnesota was for two hundred miles one track of blood. Husbands and fathers were murdered in the harvest-fields, and mothers and children massacred in their homes. Eight hundred of the most generous people on the earth perished by savage violence. Every village in Minnesota became the refuge of the homeless. It was a tale of horror to curdle one's blood, and if the world had not been watching with breathless anxiety the greatest rebellion of history, it would have moved all hearts to pity.

Sufficient time has elapsed to calm the outburst of passion, and enable men to examine dispassionately the causes which have brought such anguish and desolation to our new homes. A great crime has been committed, and for that crime some one is responsible to God and to man. We believe that this massacre was the legitimate fruit of our Indian system, which is conceived in folly and carried out by fraud. Two facts in this regard stand out unmistakably in American history; — first, that all our treaty relations with the Indians, however friendly in the commencement, end in serious difficulty, and often lead to murders and Indian wars; second, that every Indian tribe which has entered into treaty relations with the American government has either perished or sunk into a state of brutishness unknown to their heathen fathers. It is because we believe that these fearful results are due to blunders and crimes, that we propose to examine our Indian system. We have witnessed one massacre, and would spare others this sad fate. We confess that, as believers in Christianity, we are unable to look upon the degradation and destruction of a heathen race without emotions of pity. We shall write plainly, for these are not the days when men can afford to cover up iniquity. A nation trembling on the brink of anarchy and ruin should not trifle with God.

The first inquiry which we propose is this,—Is our Indian system calculated to secure peace and safety to the pioneers on the border? This is simply a question of self-preservation. Whether the Indians are to be regarded as men or wild beasts, self-interest demands that our policy shall secure peace and restrain all savage violence.

Our first dealing with these savages is one of those blunders which is worse than a crime. We recognize a wandering tribe as an independent and sovereign nation. We send ambassadors to make a treaty as with our equals, knowing that every provision of that treaty will be our own, that those with whom we make it cannot compel us to observe it, that they are to live within our territory, yet not subject to our laws, that they have no government of their own, and are to receive none from us; in a word, we treat as an independent nation a people whom we will not permit to exercise one single element of that sovereign power which is necessary to a nation's existence.

The treaty is usually conceived and executed in fraud. The ostensible parties to the treaty are the government of the United States and the Indians; the *real* parties are the Indian agents, traders, and politicians. The avowed purpose of the treaty is for a Christian nation to acquire certain lands at a fair price, and make provision that the purchase-money shall be wisely expended, so as to secure the civilization of the Indians. The real design is to pay certain worthless debts of the Indian traders, to satisfy such claims, good or bad, against the Indians, as have been or may be made, and to create places where political favorites may receive their reward for political service. The hereditary chiefs are men who feel jealous of our encroachments upon their territory. They often demand an exorbitant price for their lands, in order to prevent the sale. Those chiefs who cannot be bribed or deceived by false interpretations have in some instances been deposed, and more pliable tools appointed in their place. The interpreters who carry the heads of the commissioners and the chiefs on their shoulders are frequently men who can be bribed, and thus the two parties to the treaty are ignorant of each other's views. An officer of the United States army described to us one of these treaties. The Indians said to the commissioners that "they desired to sell their land to their Great Father, but that, if they did sell it, they wished to receive the money themselves, and would not pay the bad debts of the traders, which they did not owe." This was interpreted: "The Indians say that many years ago good white men visited our people and sold them goods which they were too poor to pay for; these debts are honest, and have long laid heavy on our hearts: we will sell the land, if the first money can go to pay our honest debts." We ourselves have known a treaty made with the Indians, and ratified by the United States Senate, which one half of the chiefs denied having signed, and a majority of them were ignorant of its provisions. There is always a large amount of fair speech and smooth words, for the Indians are told of the love of their Great Father, of his desire to see them like their white brothers, of their need of schools and implements of husbandry, and of the bright future which is sure to await them if they will listen to their Great Father's words.

They feel their helpless condition, for their traditions tell them how other Indian tribes have perished. The offer of help from a superior race seems to give them a pledge of safety, the sums of money offered are to them almost fabulous, and they hope still to hunt the game over the unoccupied lands: they believe the lying words of the white man, and the treaty is ratified. The Indians now find that large claims have absorbed the first payment. Indian chiefs have told us that, having made a treaty to sell their lands, they were asked to sign a supplementary one in order to make its provisions plain. A few of the chiefs did sign this supposed supplementary treaty. They were told by a friend that they had been deceived, and that this paper provided that all of their first payment should be paid to the Indian traders. Some of the chiefs refused to sign it; then certain white men bribed these chiefs to sign the amended treaty, paying them large sums of money. After they had signed it, they were made drunk, and while drunk the same white men who had bribed them stole from their blankets the very money which had been paid them as a bribe. In Mr. Heard's book, pages 35 to 41, there is an account of the Sioux treaty of 1851 and 1852, which lifts the curtain a little to reveal the iniquity practised in Indian treaties. On page 42 of Mr. Heard's book, and page 280 of the Report of the Commissioner, are descriptions of a similar treaty. In 1858, the Sioux sold the government about eight hundred thousand acres of their reservation, for which the Upper Sioux were to receive two hundred and forty thousand dollars, and the Lower Sioux ninety-six thousand dollars. Up to the time of the massacre the Indians had not received one single cent, except fifteen thousand dollars in goods, many of which were almost useless, the invoice containing such items as dozens of Canadian belts. At the time of our visit to the Sioux country, immediately before the massacre, we heard many bitter complaints of the shameless dishonesty of both of these treaties.

After the completion of the treaty, the Indians are placed under our Indian Bureau. The agents who are selected to guide a savage heathen people, and the employees who are to act under their direction, receive their places as a reward for political services. These places are eagerly sought after, because there is a tradition on the border that by some Aladdin's lamp the pittance of salary will be multiplied into a fortune by the end of four years.

If the agent is an honest man, whose sole desire is to elevate a degraded people, he will be powerless; most of his employees will be forced upon him by the Superintendent, by some member of Congress, or the influence of party. He has no authority to make laws, and no power to enforce them. The traders may be banded against him, his interpreter may be the secret hireling of some Indian claimants; he cannot explain or redress the past robberies of his wards, nor prevent them in the future. The claims secretly deducted from Indian annuities, and the dishonesties in lessening the Indian goods purchased by the Department in Washington, are things for which he cannot apologize. At every step his wisest plans will be thwarted, and, knowing that at the end of four years he must give place to a successor, he has little inducement to learn the language of the Indians, study their character, or inaugurate any plans for their improvement, so that even at best the Indians are three years out of every four under incompetent agents. If the agent is a mere political place-hunter, he enters upon his duties with only one thought, and that is plunder. Under his administration dead men's names are placed upon the pay-rolls, and it is certified upon oath that they have received the annuity. The school is a miserable sham, the agricultural funds are wasted by improvidence, the annuity goods are lessened by fraud in the purchase or by theft after they are received, and the implements of husbandry are worthless. We have seen cast-iron side-hill ploughs sent to the Indians to plough prairie-land, so that even these savages asked with astonishment if their Great Father thought that all Indians were born left-handed. The employees of the Superintendent will be men who wink at crime, and who by their evil lives teach the Indians that blasphemy, adultery, drunkenness, and theft are not sins. We must add to this catalogue of evils, that on the border outside of the reservation there are a multitude of harpies worse than devils, who furnish the Indians with the most deleterious and deadly whiskey. These men ply their trade on the ceded lands, and as the reservation is under United States laws, and the ceded lands under State law, they have always managed to escape the penalty due to their crimes, on account of the conflict of jurisdiction.

The Indians' hunting-grounds are now gone, their annuities wasted, their people left subject to every evil influence, without law or government to encourage the good or punish the bad. Disease will soon rest in every village, and the poor and wretched people sink into a state of brutishness unknown to their fathers.

The most fatal mistake in this chapter of evils is the lack of government. The Indians have been placed under conditions where their rude patriarchal government is destroyed or cannot be exercised. We have recognized them as an independent nation, and then left them without a vestige of government or law. The chief has no power to make or to execute laws. In their wild state the office of a chief is only advisory, for he cannot protect the innocent or punish the guilty: the Indians' law of redress is savage vengeance. The only human being in the United States who has none of the restraints or protection of law is the treaty Indian. He has no protection in person, property, or life. Every motive which could influence him to become civilized is taken away. His crops may be destroyed, his house burned, his wife or child killed, his only redress is private revenge. If he turns thief, and steals from his white neighbors, the Department, with its usual wisdom, deducts the value of the theft from the annuity of the tribe, so that by this means the guilty party makes a profit out of his crime. Those who embrace Christianity, or who desire to follow the pursuits of civilized life, are left, by the government's neglect, to suffer from the bitter hostility of their heathen neighbors.

There is a deeply rooted antipathy between the habits, religion, and customs of a savage race, and the pursuits and teachings of civilization. The first step in the change from barbarism to civilization must be so distinct and marked that it will admit of no return. The civilized Indian consents to have his hair cut after the fashion of the white man. He knows that in the estimation of his people the loss of the scalp-lock is the public and open renunciation of the war-path and the chase. It is a step which is taken with fear and trembling, because he knows that henceforth he cannot wear the warrior's feather, which is the highest mark of savage ambition, and that he will meet at every step the insults and reproaches of his people. These civilized Indians have had their crops destroyed, their fences torn down, and even their lives have fallen a sacrifice, and yet the government has never given them protection. In many of the treaties provision is made that these men shall have a patent for their land, and that it shall no longer be the property of the tribe; but no patent has been issued, for, while it might give manliness to one who had something that he called his own, it would stand in the way of the removal of the Indians whenever the greed of white men clamored for their land, or the Department-agents and traders wished to make another attack on the public treasury.

Wabashaw, an aged chief, at whose request we had written a letter to the President to ask for reform in these particulars, said to us: "Your words have made my heart glad. You have spoken for me as a father speaks for the child whom he loves well. You have often come to see us, and you know that the Indians are not like their white brothers. They have not your ways, nor have you our ways. Our Great Father at Washington bought our hunting-grounds, and promised to help us to become like our white brothers. He said to me, Go home, and try to live like a white man, and I will help you more than I have ever done. Four winters have passed since he said these words, and the fifth is nigh at hand; we think our Great Father has forgotten his red children, and our hearts are very heavy. The agents he has sent us seem to forget his words before they get here, for we think they disobey what he told them. You said you were sorry to see so many of our young men engage in foolish dances. I am sorry. I wish they would be like white men. Sometimes I think these old customs hang around them like a garment of their wild life, because their hearts are sick. They do not know whether these lands are to be their home. They have seen the red man's face turned towards the setting sun, and are afraid there are many long journeys for themselves and their children. This makes them uneasy, and they do not try to be different. If the great Council at Washington would do as they promised, then my people would see they meant as they said. The good Indian would be like the white man, and the bad Indian would seek another home. I have heard of your wise words to our Great Father, and you tell me that to those who live like the white men he will give, as he promised, deeds for our land. My heart is glad. You have none of my blood in your veins, but you have been a true friend of the Dacotah. I will repeat your wise words to my people, and often when I sit in my tepee they will come back to me, and be like music to my heart." The poor chief never realized his dream. Although innocent of any connection with the massacre, he was removed to the Missouri to die of a broken heart.

A chief of another tribe once said to us: "I opposed this treaty, because, if I am an Indian, I am not a fool. When I sell to the white man my father's hunting-grounds, if I remain a wild man I have dug my grave. This treaty has no oxen, no houses, no seed, no clothing, no schools; it does not help us to become like our white brothers. It has some money for the traders, and takes away my hunting-grounds and leaves me by a grave." He then said, "My father, have you children?" The reply was, "Yes." "How would you feel if they were going to die?" "Very sorrowful," was the answer. Said he, "My people are all going to die; will you help me save them?" This artless eloquence of a poor and wretched people must move every heart with indignation against the Indian system.

In this history of mistakes and robbery we must not overlook the fact, that no mark of disapprobation is placed upon the savage and pagan customs of the Indians. We have known the Governor of the State, on an official visit, to hire Indians to engage in a savage dance for the amusement of a gaping crowd. They have without let or hinderance followed the war-path upon our own territory, they have fought and murdered each other beside our villages, and when they returned, glutted with savage vengeance, our citizens have watched the brutal scalp-dance as a holiday pastime, not knowing that underneath there were dark brooding passions which some day would bring desolation to our own firesides and homes. These savage customs are calculated to keep alive every feeling of resentment for real or fancied wrongs. The dishonesties of the treaties, the thefts of the agents, the claims of traders, the corruption of the Indian women sometimes accompanied by violence, are sure to be spoken of in the council and soldier's lodge, to be repeated from wigwam to wigwam, until they become the great tradition of wrong and hatred which on the first opportunity will break out in murder and massacre.

The trade in Indian claims has become one great means of dishonesty, and is the real reason for the frequent removal of the

Indians. So long as the government has no relations with the Indians, the trader is their friend. The Indians dare not refuse payment for the goods, lest the trader should refuse to give them an outfit for their hunt, and the traders dare not oppress the Indians, lest they should lose their debts. Under the treaty, the government offers a bounty for dishonest claims. The trader is permitted to add up all his bad debts and those of his fathers, and these individual debts are recognized by the government as a claim against the patrimony of the tribe. This system is perpetuated, because the owners of these claims can afford to pay large premiums and percentage to have them allowed. We have been informed by persons in whose word we have confidence, that on one occasion a person who found that his claims were unpaid was told that, if he would hand ten thousand dollars to a person designated, all these claims would be settled. The sum was larger than he could afford, but he did place five thousand dollars in an envelope and handed it as he was directed, and soon after received the money for every claim.

If the Indian reservation is anywhere in the path of civilization, no plea of mercy, justice, or humanity can save this hapless people for an hour. Either the fears of the white settlers will be aroused, or their cupidity excited, until the removal is effected. Often the vagabond habits which the Indians have learned under government tutelage make it a necessity. When the removal takes place, humanity and fear of God are forgotten; for the Indians are often removed at the point of the bayonet, to be placed under such circumstances that it is only a question of time when they shall perish. The Winnebagoes and friendly Sioux were thus removed in 1863, and we learn, in the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the character of the country to which they were taken.

In a letter of General Sully, written from motives of humanity to the Department, he says: "I find both tribes very discontented, and if troops are not constantly kept here, I think there will be trouble. The Winnebagoes I find hard at work making canoes, with the intention of quitting the agency and going to join the Omahas, or some other tribe down the river. I held a council with them yesterday, in which they said they had been promised, when they left their last reservation, to be settled on the Big Sioux. They also stated that nothing will grow here. They dare not go out to hunt, for fear of other tribes, and they said they would [should] all starve to death. *This I believe to be true*, without the government intends to ration them all the time." Subsequently he addressed another letter to the Department, describing in the strongest terms the miserable character of the country, and said that his opinion was not formed from its present appearance, but from his former knowledge of it.*

Under date of August 12, 1863,† the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs writes to the agent of the Winnebagoes, that representations had been received at the Indian office that the site of the new reservation was an unsuitable one, and requests him to assure the Indians that they should be removed. Since that time we know that the Department has been informed that nearly one thousand of these Indians have died during the past year from disease and hunger, and the officer who made the reconnoissance of the country, one of the most honored generals in our army, has certified that it was incapable of successful cultivation; but no change has been made. And yet the government is expending money by thousands in this worthless country, and we wonder why we have Indian wars. This constant removal of the Indians, without any due provision for their wants, leaves upon their minds, and the minds of all Indians near them, a deep feeling of resentment, sure to end in blood. A young warrior of the Chippewas once startled us as he said: "I hear the white man will remove us from our country. Tell your great Father I have one hundred warriors, and their shadows are falling on their graves."

We have thus briefly described some of the features of our Indian policy, and to our mind they give the secret history of the terrible Minnesota massacre so vividly described in Mr. Heard's book.

Their agent, Mr. Galbraith, whom we believe to be an honest man, says, in his report of 1863, speaking of the treaties: "It was a perpetual source of wrangling, dissatisfaction, and bitter, even threatening complaints on the part of the Upper and Lower Sioux."

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* Commissioner's Report, pp. 322, 323.

† Ibid., p. 324.

Mr. Heard tells us (p. 44): "This dissatisfaction was fearfully augmented by the failure of the government to make their annual payment, which had heretofore taken place in June, and by the traders refusing their credit when they needed it most. When an Indian would ask for credit, they would retort, 'Go to the soldiers' lodge and get credit,' and the Indian would angrily reply, 'Yes, if I kept your squaw I could get all the credit I wanted.' On one occasion a large number appeared before a trader's store, saying, 'You have told us that you will give us no more credit, that we might starve this winter, or eat hay or dirt; now, since you will not give us credit, when you want wood or water, do not get it on our reservation.' To this the trader replied, 'Ho! all right! when you are cold this winter, and want to warm yourself by our stove, I will put you out of doors.'" Agent Galbraith was aware of this dissatisfaction, but could give no reason for the delay in the payment. The true reason has never been given by the Department. The delay was caused by the fact that the Commissioner had paid a number of claims out of their annuities. The Superintendent and Agent were not willing to make a part payment, knowing it would precipitate an Indian war. At the last moment this deficiency was made up out of other funds, as the warrant on the treasury will show. Two months of precious time had elapsed, the money reached Fort Ridgely at 12 M. the 18th day of August. The massacre had already commenced: it was too late!

The next question that we shall ask is, "Are the Indian races of North America capable of receiving a Christian civilization?" We answer, unhesitatingly, Yes. It would impugn the goodness of God and the power of the Christian religion to say that Christianity was not adapted to the wants and woes of all the children of sin, shame, and sorrow.

The North American Indian is a heathen, and yet, heathen though he is, he will compare favorably with any race in the same condition. He is one of the very few heathen men who is not openly an idolater. He recognizes a Great Spirit, and although he speaks of the spirit in the woods, the brooks, and the storm, he is not a pantheist. He has, for a heathen, a warm attachment to his family, kindred, tribe, and country. In his wild state, before coming in contact with the white man, he is more truthful, virtuous, and honest than most uncivilized races. His religion is the grand medicine which recognizes a Great Spirit, and existence after death. In his early youth he is taught to fast until in his sleep he sees the figure of some animal. He is then to hunt for that animal, fasting until he kills it. The skin is carefully prepared and ornamented by the squaws, and given to him as a medicine-bag, to be his charm through life. He is then initiated into the mysteries of the grand medicine by its priests. Of these there are four degrees, each professing to teach some hidden knowledge of medicine, charms, or poisons, whereby he may gain the love of his friends and punish his enemies. Of worship, strictly speaking, there is none; the feasts connected with the grand medicine are mere occasions of sensual enjoyment. The few customs of purification which still remain have survived all the teaching which at one time was probably connected with them. In sickness, or times of great danger, the conjurers of the grand medicine are consulted, and they resort to their rattles, drums, and dances to drive away the evil spirits who threaten their peace and safety.

The Indians possess warm affection for their children. Upon the death of a child, the mother takes everything which belonged to the child, and often everything she had which would please the child, and makes a little bundle of the size of an infant, which she carefully ornaments with bead-work or porcupine quills, and carries this memento of her dead child for a year. During the time of mourning, all gay clothing and ornaments are laid aside, and the hair is left uncombed, so that everything in the outward appearance shall show the sorrow for the dead.

The penalty among the Chippewas for adultery was to have the nose bitten off. The Sioux held an annual maidens' or virgins' feast. On one occasion we witnessed this feast among the Lower Sioux. Nearly one thousand Indians, in every variety of holiday costume, were assembled on the prairie. An old medicine-man went to and fro in the camp, announcing that the virgins and braves were now called to the virgins' feast. A sacred stone, painted with bright colors, and gayly ornamented with feathers, was placed in the centre of the circle formed by the Indians. The old crier stood beside it, and called all the virgins to the feast. A mother led her daughter, a girl of perhaps fifteen, and neatly dressed, up to the stone, and deposited beside it her offering for the feast. The daughter touched the sacred stone, and looked up to the sky, which was regarded by all present as a solemn oath that she was a virtuous maiden. When all the girls who desired had taken the oath, the old crier announced that any brave who had taken a scalp before he had made love to a woman was entitled to eat with the virgins. One by one the young braves, with their war-paint and feathers, entered the circle, and, having touched the stone, related the history of their following their enemy on the war-path, and where it was that they had overtaken and slain him. When this part of the festival had ended, the old crier called upon the people to come forth and challenge any one who had made a false statement, or was unworthy of these honors. A young man, amid breathless silence, entered the circle and laid his hands on one of these girls, and accused her of being unworthy. The accusation and defence were very brief, and then there rose from a thousand voices a cry of indignation which henceforth branded her as a child of shame.

We have been permitted to examine many letters of the agents of the Northwest Fur Company, and have made inquiries of old men who have spent their whole lives in the Indian country; and we are satisfied that a very great deterioration has come to this people since their treaty relations with the government. Governor Sibley and Senator Rice, both of whom spent many years in the employ of the Fur Company, testify to the honor, honesty, and fidelity of the Indians.

The best evidence of the mistakes of our policy is found in the fact that the English government in Canada has never had an Indian war, and no lives have been lost by Indian massacre. Their Indians live in peaceful relations with their white neighbors and friends, and wherever there was an Indian tribe there is now a Christian Indian village. They have not expended one dollar where we have spent thousands. The whole secret is, that England carries her government and laws wherever she extends her civilization. Our nation is almost the only one in history that has extended its conquests without extending its government, or that permits human beings to live within its territory without being subject to its laws.

We have known among this people too many instances of the power of Christian faith, to doubt their ability to accept the Christian religion and embrace its civilization. All that sheds light on the horrible scenes of this bloody massacre is due to the Christian faith. The only men who dared to stand up against it were men who had been under missionary influence. Paul Ma-za-ku-tu-ma-ne, Taopi, Wakeau-was-té, Other Day, Wabashaw, and others no less our friends, proved that friendship at the risk of their lives. Other Day rescued sixty persons and led them to Henderson. Taopi and others delivered two hundred captives to General Sibley, at Camp Release. Paul made a speech in the Indian council which exhibits the truest bravery. "I want to know if you lower Indians are crazy; you might as well fight the thunder and lightning as to fight the whites. You might as well bail out the Mississippi as to hope to destroy them. You say you will make a treaty with the English. It is impossible. They are white men. They are ruled by a petticoat, and she has the tender heart of a squaw. . . . . I am going to shake hands with the whites. I hear some of you boast, 'I have killed so many women and children'; that is not brave, it is cowardly." Amid cries of "Kill him! kill him!" he said: "Bluster away. I am not afraid. I am not a woman. I shall not die alone; there are others who will die with me."

Even the farmer Indians who were heathen were throughout opposed to the war, and the few who for self-preservation joined the tribal Indians in their raids are believed to have taken no active part in the warfare. Major Joseph R. Brown, who has lived for forty years in Minnesota, and during this time sustained intimate relations with the Indians as trader and agent, was present at the battles of Fort Ridgely and Birch Cooley, two of the most severe battles of the war. He says in a published letter, speaking of the farmer Indians: "During the attack upon Fort Ridgely many balls were fired into the roofs of the houses, and during the battle of Birch Cooley the tops of the Sibley tents were riddled with balls. I am too well aware of the precision with which an Indian uses his gun to believe they would have shot so wildly at short range if it was not done intentionally."

These men, who were the deliverers of our captive friends, and others who were acquitted by the military court, are the Sioux who were sent to the Missouri to starve.

We admit cheerfully that very little has been done to civilize or Christianize the Indian race; but we are not willing to see this poor people dragged down to death, and then hear men with their mock piety plead God's decrees as an excuse for their own guilt. We have heard a high Indian official declare, as if he approved of the atrocious sentiment, that "there were many wise men who thought the best policy was to exterminate the Indians," and we ventured to tell him plainly, that "no one but Almighty God could exterminate, and that, if he would remember that within three years more white men of our own citizens than all the Indians on the continent had been exterminated, he might perhaps learn that the American people had to do with a God who was not blind."

It would extend this article beyond its proper limits to do more than point out a remedy for these evils, and to give the details of a more perfect Indian system. The only remedy is to give the Indians the protection of law, to treat them as our wards for whom we are responsible, to give them individual rights in the soil and the means to cultivate it, to guard them from the low vagabonds who would sell an Indian's soul for a pittance of coin, and secure to them agents to guide them out of their heathen darkness who *are* men, who believe in God, and who are ashamed to lie and steal. The agents and employees of the Indian Department should be placed beyond the reach of political removals. They should be men of the highest character, receiving good salaries, and holding their office during good behavior. It is now many years since we looked into the iniquity of this atrocious system; many a time, as we have heard the pitiful plea of the helpless, we have wept in very bitterness. But that which has been the most terrible to bear was to witness day after day the gathering of a storm-cloud of savage hate and ferocity; to hear its low mutterings; to plead with a woman's love and a man's earnestness for help only to be refused, and then with a bruised heart to watch the anguish and desolation which guilty apathy had permitted to settle over border homes. This year the people will again express their voices at the ballot-box, and instruct their agents as to their duty. Would God that they might demand, in a voice which should be heard, that these evils shall be redressed. Ours is a generous people; there is a great, manly heart in American breasts, which is always ready to help the wretched. The government has never been parsimonious, it has always had the kindest intentions, and poured out its money like water to help its Indian wards. It will cost time, it will cost money, it will cost abuse and hatred to any man who attempts to reform this Indian system; but it will cost more to cover up iniquity and anger God. The war in Minnesota has kept seven thousand brave soldiers out of the field, it has cost fifteen millions of dollars a year. The two waves of population between the Atlantic and the Pacific are soon to meet, and we must right these wrongs, or enter upon an Indian war which will cost a hundred millions of dollars and the sacrifice of thousands of precious lives. We dare not be silent. Our beloved country is filled with anguish and woe, and we look with awe and fear to the future, because we know that God is just.

ART. V.—*Life of William Blake, "Pictor Ignotus," with Selections from his Poems and other Writings.* By the late ALEXANDER GILCHRIST. Illustrated from Blake's own Works, in Fac-simile by W. J. LINTON, and in Photolithography; with a few of Blake's original Plates. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1863. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xiv., 389; viii., 268.

THE readers of the two volumes which contain the Life of William Blake, selections from his writings, and illustrations of his art, have reason to thank the biographer and his editors, the brothers Rossetti, for the faithfulness with which they have collected and arranged such material as exists for representing a man who has long waited, and must still perhaps long wait, for due recognition by the world. Blake died in 1827; the thirty years and more which have passed since then furnish sufficient perspective for a correct delineation of his life, and while some details which it would have been interesting to know have doubtless been lost, the most valuable authentication of personal knowledge remains. There are still living those who as young men talked with him, looked on his face, watched him at work, and finally followed him with reverence to his grave. The reminiscences of these men, now occupying honorable places in English art, are among the most interesting memorabilia of Blake, and are especially valuable as certifying by their harmony of feeling to the truth of the account which Mr. Gilchrist has given of the life which Blake led.

This account has been drawn up after a painstaking examination of all the sources of information: it is thorough as respects the external features of Blake's life, and does not offend by an officious analytic exhibition of that which lay behind; while the biographer has furnished to the critical reader most excellent material for discovering the more remote current of the artist's life. We can easily forgive certain affectations of style, bungling English, and what we think an occasional ill-mannered air, for the affectionate interest which the biographer feels in his subject, and for the confident belief in Blake's genius and sanity which makes him willing to tell all that he can learn about the man: a more timid biographer might have hesitated about making so open an exhibition of his hero's singularities. Nor can we refrain from sincere praise of the manner in which the editors have performed their part; the comprehensive catalogue of the artist's works, and the discriminating remarks upon those works, add much to the value of this biography. However the credit is to be apportioned between the biographer and his editors, we are indebted to both for the conception that we are enabled to form of what Blake was as an artist and as a man of genius.

His name has for two generations stood for one who for some reason was unrecognized by the world, consigned by it, in default of a more exact classification, to the order of "men of insane genius," whose works should interest rather the psychologist than one who wished simply to gratify his love for the beautiful. Among students of art, indeed, he has had a distinct place, by virtue chiefly of his two best-known works, the illustrations to Blair's Grave and Inventions to the Book of Job; but even such students have rarely been able to study any other of his works, and doubtless many have accepted the name which the world had given him — the mad Blake — as correct in its application to his life and to the great mass of his productions, which never had found their way to the public eye. These volumes will, we are sure, once and for all establish Blake in the position to which his powers entitle him, and set him by himself as a man of genius, whose designs, whose writings, and whose life have a wonderful harmony, and who, if he represents any school of art, represents one which has numbered few others among its members.

It is, however, not easy to treat Blake otherwise than as an individual, and it is easier so to regard him, since the world rejected him as having too little in common with it, and the men with whom properly he may be compared are themselves individual men: there is, indeed, no comparison, in the case of Blake, so effective as that which measures him in one form of expression by himself in another form. There is no poet with whom Blake the artist can be compared so fit to the purpose as Blake the poet, and the man Blake finds his best explanation and illustration in a comparison with the poet and the painter Blake. If genius eludes our comprehension by its intangibility, we have at least the advantage here of grasping at it in diverse forms. Perhaps, by pursuing this man through the various shapes which his nature assumed, we may be able to reach an apprehension of one who, while exhibiting himself in a complex manner to the world outside, holding some converse with it through his pen and pencil, was all the while living a life which was more wonderful and more lovely than all the creations to which it gave birth.

Born in 1757, Blake lived to near the close of his seventy-first year. In his forty-third year he took residence near Chichester for three years, to fulfil an engagement with Hayley, Cowper's biographer; but excepting that short period, he lived uninterruptedly in London. He was the son of a tradesman, who favored his decided inclination for art by putting him first to a drawing-school, and four years afterward apprenticing him to an engraver, under whose instruction Blake acquired the art which was to be his chief support in life. His apprenticeship closed when he was twenty-one, but he remained under his father's roof, pursuing his studies in the Royal Academy, until in his twenty-fifth year he married and removed to apartments of his own, thereafter living as well as he could upon the work of his graver and his pencil. For forty-five years he worked with constant industry, engraving when he must, designing and composing when he could. The incomplete list of works engraved by him contains about eighty titles, many of which represent a large number of plates; the list of his original works exceeds four hundred, some of which were often repeated; and he asserted that he had written more than Shakespeare and Homer together. Yet with all his industry he never more than kept want at arm's length. If it had been Blake's object to gain a fortune by his labor, he must be set down as having wofully failed, after such an expense of energy.

During this long life of patient labor, Blake took no pains to conceal himself from the world. He had no wish, for he had no need, to lead a hermit life; it is only natures weak in confidence that have to fortify their spiritual life by withdrawing from the world. Blake liked society, and enjoyed what he could get; and that was of an excellent sort, for while his humble origin would have excluded him from good society, his profession as an artist introduced him not only to the company of fellow-artists, but to that of the patrons and lovers of art. He never wanted for friends who could recognize power in him, though practical assistance was mainly from one or two generous men like Mr. Butts and Mr. Linnell, who enjoyed the rare privilege of enabling the artist to produce everlasting works. When he grew old, he could find among the young men an enthusiastic acknowledgment of his power, such as he had ceased to look for among his contemporaries. And yet, always frank, always ready to be approached, and fulfilling with fidelity the orders given him, Blake failed to win in his day a reputation at all commensurate with his genius. While Stothard was winning fame and easy popularity, and Lawrence was at the top of notoriety, Blake was living obscurely; and even near the close of his life we find him engraving designs of his more fortunate friend Flaxman, designs which he knew to be inferior to his own conceptions. If, then, it had been Blake's object to gain reputation by his labor, we must confess that here also he met with failure.

He did desire recognition, and his ill-success in obtaining it, set in stronger shade by the contrasted light of the reputation of those whom he justly regarded as less worthy, made him feel that he had suffered injustice, and wrung from him many bitter words and pungent criticisms. This very sensitiveness to neglect bears witness to his strong human sympathy. He wanted others to think and feel as he did. If he had been by nature so independent of human sympathy as to design and compose simply for the gratification of exerting special power, he would not have excited such profoundly tender emotions as some of his words inspire, nor have flashed such light upon the mysteries of life and immortality as his pencil sheds, nor indeed would he in his old age have attracted about him a band of youthful disciples. Blake did desire recognition; he desired it for his own sake, and for the sake of others. When he was struggling with the world, he thought to find satisfaction in a wide fame; but when fame and fortune were offered to him if he would give up his chosen manner of life, he chose to live in poverty and obscurity. "They pity me," he would say of Lawrence and other prosperous artists, who condescended to visit him; "but 't is they are the just objects of pity. I possess my visions and peace. They have bartered their birthright for a mess of pottage."

What, then, was the birthright which Blake valued above gold and fame? To retain what did he hold all else as cheap? It was an endowment of nature which falls sometimes to misers, sometimes to spendthrifts, sometimes also to wise men. Blake accepted the trust reposed in him, and the aim of his life, consciously or unconsciously, was to multiply this endowment, and to use it, neither hoarding it like a selfish egotist, nor wasting the fountains of his wealth like a fool. He once wrote, in his usual positive fashion: "Knowledge of ideal beauty is not to be acquired. It is born with us. Innate ideas are in every man, born with him; they are truly himself. The man who says that we have no innate ideas must be a fool and knave; having no *con*-science, or *innate* science." Whatever may be the value of this statement as a general truth, it was impossible for Blake to believe otherwise, for the testimony of his own mental experience confirmed the doctrine. The ideas which he held were the objects of an instinctive perception, and the resultant truths, whether in art or in philosophy, were not so much generated from these ideas in the direct line of logical deduction, as radiated from them in separate clusters. His mind was of the order of instinctive natures; his perceptions were instinctive, his judgment based upon those perceptions equally instinctive, and by a natural relation of ideas he was possessed of an unbounded faith in his own nature, a faith which no hard shocks of worldly experience, no demonstration of absurd conclusions, ever shattered, or even weakened.

With this instinctive perception of ideal beauty, and an unbounded faith in the infallibility of his mental vision, Blake might have been wholly, what he was in part, a seer, discerning what was hidden to the dull eye of sense, penetrating the secrets of life and the outward creation, and delivering himself in oracular sentences that should half reveal, half conceal truth, revealing so far as a kindred power of sight could appreciatingly follow, concealing and misguiding when sense offered a distorted medium. But there was added, in Blake's case, the constructive power of a glorious imagination, and the seer became a poet, using both pen and pencil, but requiring still a responsive nature in any one who should, we will not say receive, but in many cases even perceive, what he had to deliver. His imagination, with its wonderful facility of creation, was constantly vitiating his worth as a seer, by enclosing his spiritual discoveries in such forms as bore no semblance of human realities, thus taking away from those who would understand him the common symbol which should serve as the key to his meaning. What grand philosophic truths may be imbedded in the "Jerusalem" we know not, nor is it worth while to attempt to discover; they are there, if there at all, in images which may be hieroglyphs, but their author has supplied no key to them.

No doubt, also, the extravagance of some of Blake's words and pictures was heightened by the separation which had taken place between himself and the world. He had at first been affected by a sense of the deficiency of imagination in others, and had suited his creations somewhat to the average capacity of men; but when the world refused to listen to his more open declarations and rejected him, he quietly rejected the world, and thenceforth wrote for the countless multitude of unseen spirits whom he felt to be about him. They needed no sense aids to the understanding, and he poured his conceptions forth, wholly careless of the indefiniteness of form which they might assume. So completely did he live in the world which he had cast about himself, — so constantly did he look through it to the outer, busy world of other men, — that we find him in a public address saying of some calumniators who attacked him in the columns of the Examiner: "The manner in which I have rooted out the nest of villains will be seen in a poem concerning my three years' Herculean labors at Felpham, which I shall soon publish. Secret calumny and open professions of friendship are common enough all the world over, but have never been so good an occasion of poetic imagery." This poem was "Jerusalem," and it makes us smile to see the innocent man answering the Examiner in the mysteries of Jerusalem!

It is manifest that imagination was the chief endowment of his nature; in this faculty lay his power, and the exercise of it was from first to last attended by a childlike faith in its creations. In childhood he saw trees filled with angels, bright, angelic wings bespangling every bough like stars, and when he saw hay-makers at work, he saw also what those honest men may safely be said not to have seen, angels walking in the midst of them. One day a traveller was telling bright wonders of some foreign city. "Do you call *that* splendid?" broke in young Blake; "I should call a city splendid in which the houses were of gold, the pavement of silver, the gates ornamented with precious stones." These were childish, unreasoning notions; when he came to be a man of fifty, he wrote: "Imagination [is] the real and eternal world, of which this vegetable universe is but a faint shadow; and in which we shall live, in our eternal or imaginative bodies, when these vegetable, mortal bodies are no more." And again: "All things exist in the human imagination."

The practical and unquestioning use of an extraordinary power of imagination finds a legitimate issue in this doctrine, and hence, as his biographer justly remarks, "this last line contains what deserves to be called the corner-stone of Blake's philosophy. . . . . Amid all contradictions, incoherences, wild assertions, this principle — that the conceptions of the mind are the realities of realities, that the human imagination is an eternal world, 'ever expanding in the bosom of God' — shines steadily forth; and to readers of a speculative turn, who will be at the pains to examine by its light these erratic writings, the chaos will resolve itself into *substance*, though not into form and order. It is needless to tell such thinkers that Bishop Berkeley was one on the list of Blake's favorite authors. But, with his fervid, dauntless imagination, the artist seized hold of the metaphysician's theory of Idealism, and quickened it into a grand poetic reality."

If Blake had been merely a philosopher, speculating about the material and spiritual, we should doubtless have found in him the usual practical infidelity that characterizes philosophers of this school; like them he would have confessed with his mouth to the truth of a dogma, from which he would have withheld the practical allegiance that leads one to base his daily conduct upon a faith in the principles avowed. But Blake was not a speculative philosopher. He seemed to have theories in common with such philosophers, but it was because the terms of language adopted by them expressed nearly enough his ideas, so far as they were capable of exact expression. When Blake said, 'All things exist in the human imagination,' he used a phrase which Berkeley might have assented to, but Blake meant a great deal more than Berkeley would have done by the words. His was not merely a speculative, it was a practical belief, having all its value in the meaning which it gave to his art and life, while with men merely philosophic the belief is valued solely for the gratification it affords the intellect in solving problems and performing mental gymnastics.

It is important to understand this characteristic of Blake's mind, since it enables us to credit him with the utmost good faith in his wildest vagaries, and to comprehend that what perhaps amuses us as a fancy was to this singular man a reality of the most solid sort. If we would apprehend him, it is not so necessary that we should comprehend his visions, as that we should bear in mind the fact that these visions were not the plays of his fancy, from which he could withdraw to more rational and appreciable occupations, but that they were the most complete and the highest expressions of his soul, believed such by himself, and accepted by him with full assurance that in following the lead of his imagination he was obeying the voice of God.

This twofold belief of Blake's — the practical faith in his visions, and the speculative belief in their existence through the agency of his own imagination — served to confuse men in regard to the reality of his visions. They were entangled in the effort to separate an objective from the subjective reality; and the attempt to do more than accept the subjective reality of the visions rested solely upon the ground of their confidence in Blake's veracity. Thus he would say, "I saw Socrates to-day: he said to me thus and thus." If his hearer were content to believe in Blake's sincerity of imagination, it was the utmost that he could reasonably do, and so far could rest and make what was possible out of Socrates's observation, regarded as a morsel of wisdom, wholly impersonal. But if he questioned as to the actual appearance of Socrates to Blake, and accepted Socrates's observation, not as a bit of wisdom to be judged absolutely, but as a sort of Socratic deliverance, Blaked off upon him, he was likely to end in believing Blake insane, lest his own sanity should be imperilled.

The visionary heads which Blake drew in the company of John Varley furnish an example to the point. These remarkable productions were professedly copies of what Blake at the moment saw. He would see King Edward I., and looking up now and then, with most perfect composure, at his imaginary sitter, would draw his portrait. Varley, who had faith in Blake's power of vision and also in Blake's doctrine that it was a universal gift, sat beside him, and, since he made some profession to a spiritual sight, being an astrologer in his way, looked wistfully in the direction to which Blake's eyes pointed, in earnest hope of seeing the same sight. He was honest and looked as hard as he could, but his honesty compelled him to confess that he saw no king before his eyes. He tried, in fact, after letting his mind go its proper length of believing in Blake's sincerity, to make it go further, and believe, not only that the king really appeared to Blake through Blake's first creating the king that should appear, but also that the king was objectively present and ought to show himself to him also.

A more rational believer was Mrs. Blake. The picture of her life with Blake has been most tenderly touched by the biographer. She was as unquestioning a believer in Blake as Blake was in himself. He exercised, by virtue of his will, a strong influence over her mind. Husband and wife, if mated and not merely married, come by long intercourse, even when surrounded by constant attendants, to have a likeness of face, indicative of an equilibrium of character. Blake and his wife, living almost by themselves, attained a twinship of nature. She had originally his simple faith, by education something of his imagination, and after a while she also began to have visions. She had undoubting confidence in her husband's sincerity. She believed that he really saw what he saw, but she instinctively avoided the irrational step of trying to believe that she also saw identically with him. Her visions were all her own, of the same general nature as Blake's, but of a humbler sort.

If Blake's faculty of seeing and his faculty of constructing are constantly betraying each other, leading him to veil his really profound spiritual discoveries in forms that refuse to symbolize anything for ordinary minds, it is yet easy to understand that, when he does succeed in bounding by intelligible words and lines the realities which his soul dwells among, we are likely to come upon marvellously noble results, and also to be constantly disappointed by the flitting of some delicate creation, which we thought we had seized, out of the light into chaotic darkness. Hence in Blake's poetry the finest expression of his genius is its power to open for the soul sudden vistas of immortality, to conduct it by means of a half-recognized emotion into fair fields whither it would lack the power to go of itself. We are not sure but the finest power of genius in poetry is always thus. Let the reader feel at one with Wordsworth's "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality," and see if its profound beauty is not owing to its sudden opening of gates at which the speculative soul might knock forever in vain. Just so is it with certain poems of Blake's, especially those in the "Songs of Innocence." One cannot analyze them, but, if there be any sympathy of feeling, they will sound to the soul like heavenly voices, opening the gates of a Paradise, once lost but never forgotten. Truly did Blake say, in his quaint fashion:

"I give you the end of a golden string:
Only wind it into a ball,
It will lead you in at Heaven's gate,
Built in Jerusalem wall."

There is a subtile element in Blake's poetry, disengaging one from objects of sense and leading the enchanted spirit on a far journey. A similar power in different form appears in certain poems of Coleridge, which was heightened, if we are to believe his contemporaries, by the recital of the poet. The entranced listeners might float with Coleridge to Xanadu, to get back as they could at the unfortunate end of the poet's vocal journey, while he travelled on by himself, whither no one but himself could tell, and whither, alas! he has failed to tell us. It is related by his biographer, that Blake used to sing his songs to music which he had composed, but which never was written down. What angelic melody it ought to have been!

This peculiar power in Blake's poetry is deepened by the extreme simplicity of language and symbols. It is because the lamb meant so much to him, because mere childhood was the symbol of so glorious a reality that he never thought to waste language on the accidents of such symbols. One of the most familiar of his poems is the Introduction to his "Songs of Innocence"; it has been placed most fittingly at the entrance of Coventry Patmore's "Children's Garland." How utterly devoid of meaning this must be to a large number of worthy people, who would be quite gracious over the matter-of-fact, but by no means common-place, little poem of "Blind Man's Buff" in Blake's "Poetical Sketches"! and of those who acknowledge instinctively its poetic merit, how many are charmed simply with the exquisite melody and the childlike spirit that pervade it! But one who catches at its ethereal beauty reads it again and again, unable to tell himself what is its precise charm, and yet moved even to tears by the distant tones which are sung behind those spoken words.

But the very indefiniteness of this revelation borders on the total eclipse which Blake's visionary sun so frequently suffered, and, half perceiving his meaning, one is too often led on to the regions of darkness and left hopelessly bewildered. Such a poem as "The Crystal Cabinet" deceives one with its easy flow and difficult interpretation. Blake understood it, or he could not have written such a lovely lyric; but the reader is baffled by its coquetry with his understanding.

If this element in Blake's poetry is the finest, it is by its very nature limited. It is too fine to be grand, and if it were the only power of which we could lay hold, we should be disappointed, feeling that his poetry was but a partial disclosure of Blake's genius. There is a grander power united with it, which raises some of the poems to loftier heights. Who is he that wrote these lines, which he calls "Holy Thursday"? he is the same that designed "When the morning stars sang together,"—"a design," says Dante Rossetti, "which never has been surpassed in the whole range of Christian art."

"'Twas on a Holy Thursday, their innocent faces clean,
Came children walking two and two, in red, and blue, and green:
Grey-headed beadles walk'd before, with wands as white as snow,
Till into the high dome of Paul's, they like Thames' waters flow.

"O what a multitude they seem'd, these flowers of London town,
Seated in companies they were, with radiance all their own:
The hum of multitudes was there, but multitudes of lambs,
Thousands of little boys and girls raising their innocent hands.

"Now like a mighty wind they raise to heaven the voice of song,
Or like harmonious thunderings the seats of heaven among:
Beneath them sit the aged men, wise guardians of the poor.
Then cherish pity, lest you drive an angel from your door."

What if Blake wrote uncounted reams of unintelligible, bottomless prose and verse. Throw into the scales the whole rubbish, if you choose to call it so, of Jerusalem, Europe, Milton, Urizen, Song of Los, Book of Ahania, and all the rest of the named and nameless productions of Blake's untiring pen, they never will avail a feather's weight to depress the value of the few heavenly poems that we can read.

Blake has fitly named two books of his poems "Songs of Innocence" and "Songs of Experience." Experience never shook his faith in heaven, but it did disturb his confidence in men, and the latter collection is interesting as disclosing the new aspect of the world to him, when the rude shock which the French Revolution in its development gave to dreams of innocence passed over his mind. Many of the poems in this book are antithetical to the sweeter, more trustful lyrics of the former, and while they possess frequently a strength and even a wild, stormy character, they lapse also into the commonplaces to which the mind resorts, weary and disgusted with the revelations forced upon it. From the further selections presented in the volume of Blake's writings, one poem may be cited for its dramatic power, its sternness, and searching truth. It is named

"THE TWO SONGS.

"I heard an Angel singing
When the day was springing:
'Mercy, Pity, and Peace
Are the world's release.'

"So he sang all day
Over the new-mown hay,
Till the sun went down,
And haycocks looked brown.

"I heard a Devil curse
Over the heath and the fúrze:
'Mercy could be no more
If there were nobody poor,
And Pity no more could be
If all were happy as ye:
And mutual fear brings Peace.
Misery's increase
Are Mercy, Pity, Peace.'

"At his curse the sun went down,
And the heavens gave a frown."

It is easy to see that poetry is wholly incompetent to contain some of the most characteristic of Blake's inventions and discoveries. The failure of "Jerusalem," and similar writings, to convey any notion of Blake's meaning, seems due in large part to his mistake in trying to employ a medium wholly inadequate, while there was in his reach another much more perfect. Thus, while the lovely designs that border the "Songs of Innocence" are truly illustrative, they do not of themselves convey so perfectly Blake's meaning as do the songs. On the other hand, in the prophetic books the illustrative borders are frequently much more capable of *some* interpretation than the verses which they are supposed to embellish. Indeed, throughout these enigmatical books there must be, from the examples furnished in the biography, many noble designs. Trying to worry some meaning out of the "Jerusalem," the reader comes upon the design of the crucifixion, and turns with relief to that, — a wonderful picture, even in the fac-simile, — as containing a world of meaning.

If Blake's imagination in its bold flights thus hindered the clear statement of what he saw, by constructing symbols unintelligible to men, in the case of his designs the reverse aid rendered by his faculty of instinctive perception to that of imagination is equally remarkable. Lines can be drawn in any direction, and an *insane* imagination, that is, one wholly disjoined from the order of which it is one component, can be conceived as making monstrous designs, and claiming truth and beauty for them. But Blake could see as well as make, and he perceived the truth of form and color with marvellous quickness and accuracy. His writings abound with such expressions as these, indicating the principles which controlled his pencil: —

"Invention depends altogether upon execution or *organization.* As that is right or wrong, so is the invention perfect or imperfect. Michael Angelo's art depends on Michael Angelo's execution altogether."

"Execution is the chariot of Genius."

"The character and expression in this picture [The Canterbury Pilgrims] could never have been produced with Rubens's light and shadow, or with Rembrandt's, or anything Venetian or Flemish. The Venetian and Flemish practice is broken lines, broken masses, and broken colors; Mr. B.'s practice is unbroken lines, unbroken masses, and unbroken colors. Their art is to lose form; his is to find form and to keep it. His arts are opposite to theirs in all things."

"General knowledge is remote knowledge; it is in particulars that wisdom consists, and happiness too. Both in art and in life general masses are as much art as a pasteboard man is human. Every man has eyes, nose, and mouth; this every idiot knows; but he who enters into and discriminates most minutely the manners and intentions, the characters in all their branches, is the alone wise or sensible man; and on this discrimination all art is founded. I entreat, then, that the spectator will attend to the hands and feet; to the lineaments of the countenance; they are all descriptive of character, and not a line is drawn without intention, and that most discriminate and particular. As poetry admits not a letter that is insignificant, so painting admits not a grain of sand or a blade of grass insignificant, — much less an insignificant blur or mark."

Admirable doctrine! but what was Blake's practice? In poetry he failed oftener than he succeeded, but the language of poetry is ductile; it can be led to great lengths before it breaks, and Blake's imagination did thus manipulate it. Not so with the language of art; lines are more inflexible, and there, moreover, are always present the great patterns of nature by which to judge them. Hence, armed with this truth which he so clearly apprehended, Blake did in design succeed far oftener than he failed. Everywhere we find firm outline enclosing his conception,—no vagueness of idea hiding behind indistinctness of drawing, concealing itself in shades. Blake held that he drew what he saw, and inasmuch as he saw angels more distinctly than some artists seem to see men, he drew them boldly, gave them something to exist in, instead of adopting a common trick, and trying to conceal a fearful absence of body by an unmistakable presence of clothing.

As an artist, Blake will be judged chiefly by his two best known works, the Inventions to the Book of Job, and the Illustrations of Blair's Grave. The former of these is exclusively Blake's, since he engraved his own designs; the latter, fine as it is, does not exhibit Blake so truly, since his designs were engraved by another. It is in fact Blake translated, and many, no doubt, would prefer this translation to the original, because it is in the vernacular. The translation, excellent indeed, proves the real greatness of the original, for genius is in it. It is no purpose of ours to dwell upon the technic excellences of Blake's art, but we cannot help calling attention to the admirable illustration which this work offers of Blake's application of the doctrine contained in the paragraph last quoted. Let the spectator of these designs "attend to the hands and the feet"; he will see that "not a line is drawn without intention," but that, on the contrary, powerful meaning has been expressed through these members.

The Job, however, it is that enshrines Blake's genius, and as a whole it is doubtless the most perfect work of art which came from his pencil; perfect in the sense of completeness of the idea all of Blake's designs may be declared to be, but whereas many are but outlines, this is filled up in detail. The series of twenty-one designs are by no means chance illustrations of the most striking points in the Book of Job; there is an epic unity, independent of the book illustrated. One is startled to see how Blake has seized upon a *middle* to the series, not expressed in Job and yet epically essential; for in the sixteenth plate, following the Almighty's declaration of his sovereignty and preceding his acceptance of Job, he has introduced a scene of Satan falling as lightning from heaven. The photolithograph from this series, contained in the second volume, taken with the excellent description of the plates in the thirty-second chapter of the Life, will make many sigh for a sight of the original designs.

One has a sense of awe in looking at these designs, arising not wholly from the open presence of God and the powers of heaven and hell ranged about a type of human life, but from the exhibition of daring upon the part of the designer. Who is this man who thus stands, as it were, between heaven and earth, drawing aside the clouds and discovering to us the secrets of God? Is it some Titan, mocking at heaven? Or is it some angel, with the voice of a trumpet, saying, "Come up hither, and I will show thee things which must be hereafter"? We cannot mistake his attitude, for however we may start back timidly from the representation of eternity, we feel that the interpreter himself has neither shrunk from the presence of these scenes, nor rushed in upon them with unholy audacity. To have conceived these designs, the designer must have been, not inspired as with a flash from heaven enkindling his imagination, nor once and once only admitted to a near view of eternal mysteries, but a constant dweller amid such scenes, familiar with most awful presences,—so familiar indeed as to reproduce them in firm outline and with unfaltering touch.

In comparing Blake with his fellows, or in seeking his place in the history of art, we must take his most comprehensive attribute as the foundation for any classification or comparison. In his generation he was almost alone, perhaps he would have been alone in almost any generation, perhaps to-day such a one appearing amongst us would fare as hardly, for Blake was one of those who are not so much in advance of any age or school of art, as they are outside of it. Still, in certain aspects, we might class Blake among the mystics, or again, with larger reason, among the Gothic artists, with the men who built the cathedrals, toward whom, in fact, he always felt drawn in strong sympathy. But we choose rather to class Blake in the small number of distinctively Christian men of genius. When Blake said that art was Christianity and Christianity was art, he said what was true of his own art, which was the expression of a life with Christ personally in it, in distinction from one in which Christ's gifts through Christianity may be, but in which the personal Christ is not. If genius in art is known by its expression of universal truth, then is that the genius of Christian art which sees the component parts in the light of Christ's revelation. Christ brought life and immortality to light: pagan art had expressed the search for life and immortality in the darkness of nature: Christian art concerns itself about the same realities, but works by the light of the world. The mythology of the ancients was beautiful, it embodied their spiritual life; but the distance between the fable of Psyche and the truth which that fable faintly shadowed, as revealed by Christ, is the distance in light between a statue of Psyche and the statuesque forms in the illustrations of Blair's Grave. Here do we place Blake among those who, throwing a bridge over the river of death and bringing into one field this world and the next, do it not with the wild guess of a human soul trying to follow the leadings of its own mysterious nature, but with the sure faith in a divine revelation.

We pore over the fruits of Blake's genius, wondering, perplexed, delighted, awed, and ask ourselves, Who is this man, and what did he have to do with earth? The Songs of Innocence are marvellously beautiful; who is this that sings them? The Inventions to the Book of Job are grand revelations; who is the man that has witnessed and can describe such scenes? The answer will be made by every one for himself according as he looks behind the outward life, faithfully portrayed in the biography, reads the opinions which Blake put forth, the poems which he wrote, and examines the designs which he executed. But all alike will not fail to perceive that the purest song which he sang was the life which he led, the noblest design which he executed was the manifestation of eternal beauty and majesty through the limitations of that nature by which he was constrained.

We should not be so touched by the loveliness of Blake's life, if it were set in the harmonious surrounding of green fields and country purity, and graced by the gentle independence of a plain dweller in his own cottage; but we see him maintaining quietly his even spirituality amidst the roar of London streets and in the poverty of an artisan's room. "I live in a hole here," he would say, "but God has a beautiful mansion for me elsewhere." It was this unswerving faith in God, making the realities of eternity more vivid than the mere tangibilities of space, that was the prevailing temper of Blake's mind. Again and again he put aside opportunities of temporal advantage that he might have his "visions and peace."

> "For that I cannot live," he writes to Mr. Butts, "without doing my duty to lay up treasures in heaven is certain and determined, and to this I have long made up my mind. And why this should be made an objection to me, while drunkenness, lewdness, gluttony, and even idleness itself, does not hurt other men, let Satan himself explain. The thing I have most at heart — more than life, or all that seems to make life comfortable without — is the interest of true religion and science. And whenever anything appears to affect that interest, (especially if I omit any duty to my station as a soldier of Christ,) it gives me the greatest of torments. I am not ashamed, afraid, or averse to tell you, — what ought to be told, — that I am under the direction of messengers from heaven, daily and nightly. But the nature of such things is not, as some suppose, without trouble or care. Temptations are on the right hand and on the left. Behind, the sea of time and space roars and follows swiftly. He who keeps not right onward is lost; and if our footsteps slide in clay, how can we do otherwise than fear and tremble!.... If we fear to do the dictates of our angels, and tremble at the tasks set before us; if we refuse to do spiritual acts because of natural fears or natural desires; who can describe the dismal torments of such a state! I too well remember the threats I heard! 'If you, who are organized by Divine Providence for spiritual communion, refuse, and bury your talent in the earth, even though you should want natural bread, — sorrow and desperation pursue you through life, and after death shame and confusion of face to eternity. Every one in eternity will leave you, aghast at the man who was crowned with glory and honor by his brethren and betrayed their cause to their enemies. You will be called the base Judas who betrayed his friend!' Such words would make any stout man tremble, and how then could I be at ease? But I am now no longer in that state, and now go on again with my task, fearless, though my path is difficult. I have no fear of stumbling while I keep it."

This is the culmination of Blake's work, that in humble, childlike reverence he not merely recorded for men the spiritual discoveries which he made, but strove to order his life after the pattern of those things which he saw on the mount of God.

ART. VI.—1. *The Naval and Mail Steamers of the United States.* By CHARLES B. STUART, Engineer-in-Chief of the United States Navy. New York. 1855. 4to.

2. *Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post.* By THOMAS RAINEY. New York. 1858. 8vo.

3. *Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York on Ocean Steam Navigation.* Prepared by JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, JR., Secretary. New York. 1864. 8vo.

4. *Memorial of the Boston Board of Trade in behalf of the American Steamship Company.* 1864.

5. *Ocean Steam Navigation. A Speech on the Bill providing a Subsidy for a Line of Steamers to Brazil, delivered in the House of Representatives*, April 15, 1864, by the HON. JOHN B. ALLEY.

6. *The Past, Present, and Future of Atlantic Ocean Steam Navigation.* By T. T. VERNON SMITH, C. E. Fredericton, N. B. 1857.

IN the Memorial of the Boston Board of Trade, addressed to Congress, in behalf of the American Steamship Company, a comprehensive statement of facts is given, which will suitably introduce what we desire to say upon the general subject of ocean steam navigation.

"The undersigned respectfully submit for your consideration,—

"That, prior to the application of STEAM to ocean navigation, the trade of the Atlantic was very largely, if not almost exclusively, in the hands of the citizens of the United States, to whom it yielded valuable returns; while the vessels employed in it were the admiration of all at the various ports to which they went, and everywhere reflected credit upon the national flag;

"That within the last twenty years a change has been steadily progressing, which has at length resulted in the transfer from sailing vessels to steamships of the entire passenger traffic and nearly all the freight between the United States and Europe;

"That during this period several steamship lines have been established by citizens of the United States; but, for reasons which the undersigned will not now detail, all these have, after longer or shorter continuance, been abandoned, *until now there is not one American steamship in the merchant service crossing the Atlantic Ocean;*

"That the change already referred to, of the commerce of the Atlantic from sailing ships to steamers, has thus issued in the complete diversion of this commerce from American to European bottoms; that we are at the present time totally dependent upon foreign flags for the transportation of our citizens, our correspondence, and our merchandise to and from every foreign country (excepting Cuba and Panama) upon the globe; and that consequently all moneys earned by the conveyance of such passengers, mails, and freight are remitted or are retained abroad; thus diminishing our national importance with the people of other nations, and draining our resources at home;

"That foreign, and especially British, steamship companies, with the assistance of government grants, and also aided by local facilities for the economical construction of the requisite hulls and machinery, have rendered it difficult, by the occupation of our routes, and by their connections at our principal cities, to re-establish American steam communication with Europe; and that, by their accumulation of profits in the trade now monopolized by them, the difficulty of attempting competition with these companies is increasing daily."

This twofold change which has taken place in the trade of the North Atlantic since the application of steam, namely, the transfer of both freight and passengers from sailing ships to steamers, and from American to European bottoms, is to be traced also upon the other oceans of the globe; but nowhere as upon this has the development of steamship navigation been so entirely at the expense of the American mercantile marine. And yet the United States started side by side with Great Britain in the knowledge and in the use of this new and mighty agency; and indeed, as we shall see, was in the advance in its employment for practical purposes with remunerative success.

England, Scotland, and the United States claim respectively for Bell, Symington, and Fulton the merit of first applying steam to the propulsion of vessels. We do not propose to reopen this question, which each nation has long since resolutely decided in favor of its own candidate; but whatever may be the difference of opinion upon the general question, it is conceded by all the British authorities that Fulton constructed the first steamboat which made regular trips for the accommodation of passengers, and the first which compensated her owners. In 1807, the Clermont made her appearance on the Hudson, and in the following year began to ply regularly between New York and Albany. When, in 1813, the Comet started on the Clyde, there were six steamers on the Hudson and one on the St. Lawrence. It is admitted also that the pioneer steam-vessel to venture out upon the open ocean was under American guidance. Fulton having secured to himself the exclusive privilege of navigating by steam in the waters of the State of New York, Stevens of Hoboken, who had brought his experiments to a successful issue almost as soon, took his vessel round by sea to the Delaware, in 1808.

British North America is a competitor with the United States for the honor of the first passage by steam across the Atlantic. In the year 1818, the Savannah, of 350 tons and 90 horse-power, built in New York, proceeded to Savannah, where she was owned; she next went to Charleston, and thence, on the 25th of May, 1819, sailed for Liverpool, where she arrived in safety after a passage of twenty-two days. In reference to this voyage the Canadians urge that the Savannah could hardly be called a steamship, because her paddle-wheels were so arranged that they could be removed and present no impediment to her sailing powers; that, after steaming a few days, her paddle-wheels were unshipped and taken on deck, the remainder of the distance being performed under canvas; and that the voyage back was never attempted. But while we concede that these considerations are not without weight, it seems to us that the Savannah must still be regarded as having in an important sense solved the problem of ocean steam navigation, and sufficiently demonstrated its practicability. In 1833, the Royal William, of 1000 tons burden and 180 horse-power, built at Three Rivers in Lower Canada, made the voyage from Pictou, Nova Scotia, to Cowes, in the Isle of Wight; it is for her that our Provincial neighbors claim the credit of the first ocean transit by steam. She was employed for three or four years between England and Ireland, and afterwards made several passages across the Atlantic.

But the true pioneers in ocean steam navigation were the Sirius and the Great Western, which, in 1838, ran that exciting race, once and again, to New York and back to England, which initiated and gave the moving impulse to all subsequent enterprises of the kind. We well remember seeing the Sirius at her moorings in the Thames after her first return from the New World; among the various craft lying around her, she looked like a giant among pygmies, or, as Sir Francis Head has since expressed it in the title of his interesting description of the Great Eastern, like "a Triton among the minnows." She had made the passage from London to New York in seventeen days, and the return trip in sixteen. Of course the full significance of her achievement was not then understood; but she was for the time one of the prominent wonders of the metropolis. She was of 700 tons, 320 horse-power, and comely in her proportions. Little did those imagine who then looked upon her with so much admiration, that just opposite to where she then lay at anchor, at Millwall, the keel of a steamship would within twenty years be laid, more than three times the length of the Sirius, and nine times her indicated horse-power.

The Sirius had been built to run between London and Cork, but the British and American Steam Navigation Company, resolving not to be left astern by the company in Bristol which was getting the Great Western ready for sea, chartered her to run against this vessel on the ocean, and she made two voyages in their employ. The result of the experiment was so satisfactory, that the London Company placed the British Queen and the President upon the route. The Great Western was a fine vessel of 1340 tons and 440 horse-power. Her first passage to the westward was accomplished in fifteen days, and the return in thirteen and a half; on her second trip from New York she reached Bristol in twelve and a half days, which would be considered fair time even now. She continued to sail from the Severn, and subsequently from the Mersey, and made seventy-four Transatlantic passages before passing into the hands of the West India Company. In the mean time the Royal William, already referred to, and the Liverpool, had been despatched by different parties from Liverpool to New York; so that four independent companies had now entered upon this new arena of commercial enterprise. As is too often the case, however, with those who are the first to undertake new movements of magnitude and risk, no one of these companies succeeded in permanently maintaining itself.

In the same eventful year, the British government advertised for tenders to carry the mails between Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston. Only two bids were made; and the contract was awarded to Mr. Samuel Cunard, who had for many years been interested in a line of fast-sailing brigs carrying the mails between Falmouth (England), Halifax, and we believe Boston. Mr. Cunard associated with himself Messrs. George and James Burns of Glasgow, and Messrs. David and Charles McIver of Liverpool, merchants of recognized ability and of large experience. Thus came into existence the British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, the history of which we shall presently have occasion to refer to somewhat in detail. The Unicorn was despatched from Liverpool on the 15th of May, 1840, to be placed on the branch route to Newfoundland, and made the passage to Boston in nineteen days. She was followed on the 4th of July by the Britannia, the first regular vessel of the Cunard line, under command of Lieut. Woodruff of the Royal Navy, which arrived at Boston in fourteen days eight hours, bringing "one month's later news from Europe." In the same year a contract was made by the Admiralty with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, for the conveyance of the mails between Southampton, the West Indies, and the ports of Mexico on the Gulf, and the first vessel in this service (which happened to be named the Forth) took her departure on the 7th of December, 1841. The contract originally included some of the Southern ports in the United States, but these after a few years were abandoned. In 1845 a contract was concluded with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (incorporated in 1840), for the employment of steamers from Southampton via Gibraltar and Malta to Alexandria in Egypt, thence for the transmission of the mails overland to Suez, and thence again by steamers to Aden, Point de Galle, and Calcutta, with branch lines to Bombay, and to Singapore and Hong Kong. When these three great lines were organized, Great Britain had, though unconsciously, more nearly than ever before attained to the sovereignty of the seas; for the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the old Erythræan, and the waters of the East had then been taken possession of for the transmission of her mails and for the accommodation of her commerce, as though they had all been included within her rightful domain.

While the British government was thus seconding and supporting British enterprise on the sea, the subject of ocean steam navigation awakened but little interest in the United States. The requirements of our lakes and rivers for suitable steam tonnage, and the vast extent of the railway system to be developed on the continent, interfered with the due consideration of the claims of the ocean.* Mr. Thomas Butler King of Georgia, who was for many years Chairman of the Committee of the House of Representatives on Naval Affairs, was one of the few statesmen in our country who comprehended the policy of Great Britain in this respect, and who appreciated the importance of similar activity on our part. As early as 1841, he introduced a resolution directing the Secretary of the Navy to advertise for proposals for mail steamships to run to some of the European ports, and also for a coastwise line between the North and the South. Mr. King persevered in his endeavors from session to session, and in 1845 a bill was passed placing the arrangements for the transportation of the mails to foreign countries under the direction of the Postmaster-General, and authorizing him to solicit proposals for several routes. This led to the formation of the Ocean Steam Navigation Company of New York, which in 1847 built the Washington of 1,700 tons, and the Hermann of 1,800 tons, and placed them on the route to Southampton and Bremen. These vessels received a moderate subsidy from the government, and proved themselves safe and reliable; their average passages to and from Cowes were about fourteen days. Mr. Stuart says of them: "They were at the time of their construction the best specimens of sea steamers our constructors and engineers had produced, but they proved entirely unequal to the early vessels of the English lines, and far behind, in point of speed, the later Cunarders." In 1848, Fox and Livingston established a line to Havre, with the Franklin of 2,400 tons, which was followed by the Humboldt of 2,850 tons; these steamers made the passage to and from Havre, on the average, in thirteen days. In this year also, the lines between New York and San Francisco via the isthmus of Panama were organized; and, as it proved, most opportunely, for the discovery of gold in California led to an emigration which at once made them a public necessity, and gave them a strong position apart from the assistance of the government, which of itself would have been altogether inadequate for their support. The California, the Panama, and the Sonora, of the Aspinwall line, and the Illinois and the Empire City, of the Law line, were fine vessels in their day; they have been succeeded by a fleet of powerful steamers, which have yielded large profits to their owners, although the public has had much cause for complaint in the manner of their management.

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* On the 30th of June, 1861, the steam tonnage of the United States was 877,203 tons, of which 774,595 was inland and coastwise. At the close of the same year, the steam tonnage of Great Britain was 561,023. On the 1st of January, 1864, the total length of the railways of the United States was 33,830 miles; that of the United Kingdom, 11,904.

We come now, in the order of events, to the Collins line, which went into full operation in the summer of 1850. At that time the British steamship companies were those already named, with the addition of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, on the route between Panama and Valparaiso, the contract with which was made in 1845, and in which, we ought to add, Mr. Wheelwright, an American merchant, was one of the prime movers. Cunard's was, in 1850, the only British line coming to the United States; but it had enlarged its vessels from the Britannia of 1,200 tons, to the Asia of 2,100 tons, and it had doubled the service, by making the same number of trips, since 1848, to New York as to Boston. Our coastwise lines, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific, comprising all our principal ports, were now placed upon a permanent footing, and with the Collins vessels the number of trips across the Atlantic, under the American flag, was to be fully equal to those under the cross of St. George. Notwithstanding the partial apathy of the past, it seemed as though we had almost overtaken our rival upon the seas, and might soon outstrip her. Mr. Senator Gwin spoke with a natural enthusiasm, but prematurely, when he said of the new steamers, just after they had entered upon their career: "Their success has elevated the American name and character; it has wrested from Great Britain the palm of the maritime dominion, and merits such a substantial recognition by the American government as will indicate that the contest is a national one upon both sides, and not a strife between an association of American citizens and the greatest governmental power of the world."

Mr. Collins's first proposition to the government of the United States was made in 1845, but no contract was concluded until 1847. There was a good deal of delay in getting the vessels ready for sea, owing to various changes in the machinery which from time to time were determined upon, and to other causes. The Atlantic first took her departure for Europe in April, 1850; the Pacific followed in a few weeks, and the Arctic and the Baltic soon after. These vessels were almost alike in model and in dimensions. The following figures give the size of the Arctic: —

Length of main deck, ...	282 feet.
Breadth of beam, ...	45 "
Depth under main deck, . . .	24 "
Depth under spar deck, . . .	32 "
Tonnage, ...	2856 tons.
Cylinder, ...	95 inches.
Stroke, ...	10 feet.

These magnificent vessels at once took the first position upon the ocean; their models were superior in grace and proportion to anything that had been seen; they combined the sharpness and symmetry of our swift river steamers with the beauty and buoyancy of our world-renowned sailing-packets. The London Times spoke with admiration of the appearance of the Arctic as she steamed up the Mersey, opening the water before her so smoothly that there was hardly a ripple under her bows. Their speed brought Europe and America more than a day nearer together; and the comfort and elegance of their accommodations were unequalled. It is not strange that much pride in them was manifested throughout the country, for the future which awaited them was full of brilliant promise; and although this promise was unfulfilled, it cannot be doubted that they introduced a new era in the navigation of the ocean. In anticipation of their appearance, the Cunard Company had built the Asia and the Africa; these vessels being unequal to the competition, the Arabia was brought out, but the Arctic was more than a match for her. For what first-class ocean steamships are to-day, the public is largely indebted to the genius and enterprise of Mr. Collins and his associates. The testimony of an officer of the British navy, who made a passage in the Baltic in 1852, will be valuable in this connection.*

> "I am only doing justice to these magnificent vessels in stating that they are, beyond any competition, the finest, the fastest, and the best sea-boats in the world. I am sorry to be obliged to say this, but as a naval officer I feel bound in candor to admit their great superiority. Their extraordinary easiness in a sea cannot fail to excite the admiration of a sailor, and I never beheld anything like it. There was none of that violent plunging, that sudden check, usually attending a large ship in a heavy head-sea. The elongated bow dipped gently in when a vast wall-sided and threatening swell appeared overwhelmingly to rush upon her. The whole fore-length of the vessel appeared to sink gently down until almost level with the water, and as gradually to rise again after passing. Most wondrous of all, no sea ever came on board, and the foaming and angry waters appeared to glide harmlessly past her peak and narrow bows. The extraordinary difference in this respect to the America was most marked, as a very ordinary head-sea would dash angrily and with huge volumes over her bows."

He goes on to attribute this superiority of the Baltic to her long and gently graduated bow, and to the lightness and buoyancy of the fore part of the vessel when relieved from the bowsprit. He adds: —

> "From a considerable experience in all classes of steam-vessels besides the Cunard America, I advisedly assert that the Baltic is out and out, by long odds, the very best and easiest steamship I ever sailed in."

These steamers were very successful in drawing passengers, and yet it is doubtful if they ever secured the full confidence of the public to the same extent as the Cunard ships. While they bore away the palm for excellence of model, for speed and for convenience of passenger accommodations, there was something wanting in their machinery which gave an important advantage to their less showy but eminently stanch and steady rivals. We were told by experienced English commanders who saw them on the stocks, that nothing could be better than the material of their hulls or the manner of their construction. The Atlantic and the Baltic, now owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, have been almost constantly in the employ of our government for three years past, and are in as good condition as ever. But the engines, although beautiful in their finish, were not altogether reliable at first; probably there was no such deficiency in them as endangered the vessels, but frequent mishaps, many of them slight in themselves, tended to impair confidence, and added seriously to current expenses.

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* The Resources and Settlement of America, by Captain McKinnon, R. N. London. 1853.

It is important to inquire carefully into the causes of the failure and abandonment of the Collins enterprise. No one can now be injured, while great public advantage may accrue from telling the plain truth on this subject. If we would not fail in new attempts to promote ocean-steamship interests under our flag, we must distinctly comprehend the reasons why the efforts of the past have been so unfortunate. The first of these causes was fundamental. From the start, the Company appears to have suffered for the want of the requisite capital. It was stated during the debates in Congress in 1855, and the statement was not controverted, that up to that time, although the four vessels of the Company had cost $ 2,944,142, its capital paid in amounted only to $1,200,000. It began, therefore, with a cumbrous debt of $1,744,142, which was secured by mortgages, and which made a continual drain for interest and commissions. But with careful management this difficulty might have been overcome, for its receipts from the government for the transportation of the mails during the first five years amounted to $ 3,413,966, or considerably more than the cost of its vessels.* Its receipts also from other sources were

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* Mr. Collins submitted the following curious statement to Congress, dated February 17th, 1855:—

Total receipts for passengers and freight, . . .	$ 4,460,867
" " " mail service, ...	3,418,966
	$ 7,874,833
Total disbursements, ...	7,207,291
	$ 667,542

This nominal surplus he more than disposed of as follows:—

large, and when the Arctic and the Pacific were lost, they were insured for their value at the time.

The inadequacy of capital at the outset was aggravated by the extravagant cost of the vessels, and the lavish expenditure continually made upon them. From figures given above, the average cost of construction appears to have been $736,035; which exceeded by $150,000 the cost of the Asia and the Africa, the most expensive ships with which they then had to compete. The luxurious elegance of the saloons and cabins, which were compared by a Senator to Cleopatra's barge, was altogether unnecessary. The passenger accommodations of the English line might have been improved upon without going to such an extreme in style and show. Comfort, not elegance, is what is required at sea; neatness and solidity are much more appropriate than elaborate decoration. The machinery also, deficient as it was to a certain extent, cost more than enough to be equal to the best. Expensive alterations were made after the specifications were drawn up, and, indeed, after the engines were partially constructed; and novelties, which were supposed to be improvements, were introduced, which after trial had to be given up. These vessels, thus expensively built, were still more expensively sailed. According to sworn statements laid before Congress, the average outlay for twenty-eight voyages was $65,215; the average receipts for the same were $48,286; which would leave a deficit at the end of the year of $440,154, or more than half the cost of one of the vessels. This sum included repairs and insurance; but did not allow for depreciation from wear and tear, or for interest on the investment.

To offset this deficit, however, the company received a subsidy from the government, which, according to the service performed, was much more than was ever paid to the Cunard Company. But this subsidy helped to provoke its ruin. The managing owners seem to have acted upon the presumption that they had the national treasury to fall back upon, and that

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Loss of the Arctic, ...	$255,000
Depreciation of investment, . .	258,000
7 per ct. interest on capital, . .	408,000
	$921,000

therefore prudence and economy were unnecessary. Mr. John Austin Stevens, Jr., in the able Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York prepared by him, is obliged to say: "Nor is it to be concealed, that in the management of this line there was wanting that regard to economy which is essential to success in enterprises of this nature." It must be admitted that the desire to surpass rivals, and to achieve distinction for this great representative line, proceeded largely from national and patriotic motives; but while acquitting those concerned of unworthy or dishonorable motives, we consider the principle on which they acted to be unsound and dangerous. Whenever a corporation or an individual engages in business for the sake of notoriety rather than for substantial success, the result will almost always be disastrous. Reputation, if deserved, will come in good time, but it should not be sought for as a direct object. Had the ships of which we are speaking been managed on strict commercial principles, the issue would perhaps have been altogether different.

But a recklessness in another particular also characterized the management of the Collins line. The all-controlling desire for pre-eminence, which seemed to outweigh every consideration of prudence, manifested itself principally in reference to speed. The avowed object of Mr. Collins, from the first, was to outsail the British steamers, if it were necessary to put all the capital at risk in order to do it. The speeches in Congress by the advocates of the line were full of the same spirit. We think the people of the United States, if not the government also, were greatly to blame on this point, and the responsibility for the result must rest in part with them. The Hon. Mr. Olds of Ohio, in a speech in the House of Representatives, expressed the feeling of multitudes in the country, when he said: "We have the fastest horses, the prettiest women, and the best shooting guns in the world, and we must also have the fastest steamers. The Collins steamers must beat the British steamers. Our people expected this of Mr. Collins, and he has not disappointed them." Government had not stipulated in the contract for a given rate of speed, only that the vessels were to be "of great speed"; but Mr. Collins was urged on by the newspapers and by stump orators until he probably felt that the honor of the country depended upon his beating his competitors on every trip. One gentleman, in the Senate, intimated that the friends of free government throughout the world were watching the contest between Collins and Cunard with the intensest interest. The vast importance which is made to attach to fast passages in Mr. Stuart's "Naval and Mail Steamers," and by Mr. Stevens in his "Memorial," indicates what this question of speed was in the public estimation; and we fear it is still thought of too much. There is little doubt that the Collins vessels could have kept in advance of all others, without the extreme effort which they put forth from the beginning; they had every advantage in their model, and their power might have been cautiously and gradually increased, under favorable circumstances, so as to secure the shortest time practicable between the Old World and the New.

Mr. Collins estimated that the small difference of about one day which he gained over the Cunard Company cost him $16,800 additional for every voyage,* and in this way:—

400 tons of coal @ $7, ...	$2,800
200 " freight from Liverpool @ $30, . . .	6,000
200 " " to " @ $15, . . .	3,000
Additional repairs to engines, not estimating the wear and tear of ship and machinery, . . .	5,000
	$16,800

These figures seem to us excessive, except the cost of the coal; but Mr. Collins was ready to come before the country and declare that he was sacrificing $436,800 annually for the sake of saving a few hours in the transit across the Atlantic, and the country encouraged him in his course. Had the emulation been in respect of economy in sailing, perfection of discipline, solid comfort in cabin arrangements, or anything but speed, the rivalry might have been advantageous. As it was, the struggle involved the company in constantly increasing financial embarrassment, and cost two splendid steamships, with hundreds of lives.

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* By the word *voyage* in this article we mean the two passages, outward homeward.

This expensive and reckless navigation was performed on an ocean perhaps the most dangerous on the globe, taking into account fog and ice, and the severity and frequency of its gales. Time and experience might possibly have led to the correction of the other evils to which we have referred, although we confess the indications were unfavorable; but this infatuation on the subject of speed was to lead to disasters to this favorite and boasted line from which it could not recover. On the 20th of September, 1854, the Arctic, the pride of the nation, the clipper of the seas, with everything auspicious about her, sailed from Liverpool on what promised to be a mere pleasure-trip across a summer sea. She was thronged with passengers, and the interests of many a home circle on both sides of the Atlantic were involved in the issue of that passage. She was making unwonted progress day after day, and, ensnaring hope, she was to reach New York in the shortest time on record from Liverpool. With such eagerness in the race, would that there had been a corresponding use of precaution in that swift advance through the dense and blinding fog, — that the watch had been doubled on the forecastle and the foretop, and that sufficient apprehension of danger had been felt to induce preparation for its appearance; but all thought themselves secure. At noon on Wednesday, the 27th, the Captain had announced the splendid run of the twenty-four hours previous, and the passengers were seating themselves at lunch, making bets upon the number of hours which it would take to reach New York, and talking in terms of praise and pride of the noble vessel, matchless in elegance, in speed, yes, in all but in safety. For at that very moment there was a crash, and an alarm, and a stoppage of the engines; the only vessel within perhaps a hundred miles at the time had suddenly emerged from the fog, and plunged her sharp stem into the Arctic's bows, as a swordfish might wound a whale; it was the French steamer Vesta, a tiny craft compared with the Arctic, but able to inflict a mortal blow. In the mysterious ordering of Divine Providence, the Vesta had struck the blow at the instant when the Arctic, just rising on the swell, exposed herself to peril where she was most vulnerable. Even then, however, there was no thought of danger, except for the Vesta, which had left her prow fastened between the timbers of the Arctic's frame, and offers of assistance were made to her which she declined. Three cheers were given from the deck of the ill-fated steamship when assurances were received that the Vesta was not seriously disabled, and the vessels parted, each to pursue her way. In the mean time the sea was pouring into the Arctic below the water-line, and it soon became apparent that she was settling at the bows. Brave efforts were now made for safety, but the delay had been too great, and there was no hope except in leaving the vessel. The order was soon given to man and lower the boats; this was the signal for general confusion, and for the extinction of all authority on board. We do not wish to criticise the well-intended, if not well-directed, movements of the Captain, who worked gallantly for the salvation of the precious lives depending upon him, and who took no thought for himself; but there was an utter absence of discipline in this awful emergency, and some of the officers and most of the crew, throwing off all restraint, sought only to save themselves. Then was beheld the shameful sight of boats half filled with strong men pushing away from the vessel on whose deck a hundred women and children were standing helpless and doomed. We need not dwell on the sickening details; three hundred and twenty-two lives were lost, and not a woman or child escaped, although some of them had friends who would have given a boat-load of treasure to secure for them places which were vacant, and which they might and should have had freely. We shall never forget how, a few days afterwards, it was shouted in our hearing, as we approached the wharf at Halifax in the Europa, which had brought us almost over the very scene of the catastrophe, — "The Arctic is lost." Some of the survivors had just arrived there, and the electric wires were even then trembling with the sad intelligence which on that morning was to thrill numberless hearts with anguish. From that collision shock of the Vesta, the Collins Company never recovered.

The contract with the government contemplated the construction of five vessels, and before the loss of the Arctic the Adriatic had been commenced. This steamship surpassed in size and in power, not only the other ships of the Collins line, but every vessel then afloat. She was of 4,144 tons, and no pains had been spared to make her all that a first-class mail steamship ought to be. But unfortunately there was, in reference to her, the same looseness of calculation that was exhibited in the other vessels. It was inexcusable to undertake the construction of a vessel, expecting to spend $ 900,000 upon her, and find when she was completed that her cost had reached nearly $1,200,000. Nor was it prudent for a company with its position only partially established, with its pecuniary success still problematical, and with no certainty of permanent support from the government, to embark so large a sum in the construction of a single vessel. The Scotia, since built by the Cunard Company, cost about $ 900,000; but she was the fifteenth paddle-wheel steamship which they had brought upon the route, and when they had gained the experience of more than twenty years. Mr. Collins and his associates were too impatient and too fast; they sought to accomplish, almost at the very outset, what it had required long years of patient, plodding perseverance for the Cunard Company to perform. To be sure, it was not needful for them to go over the entire ground traversed by their predecessors; but practical experience in ocean steam navigation, not less certainly than in other departments of industry, both individuals and companies must gain for themselves; and they must allow time for its growth, for it is not "the hasty product of a day." That the Adriatic, when completed, was peerless in her proportions and in her performances, and that now, under another flag, she is recognized as one of the finest steamships in the world, but poorly compensates for the national mortification involved in the failure of the great American company to which she belonged; or, what is of far more importance, for the discouraging effect this failure has had upon subsequent projects in the same direction.

Before the Adriatic was ready for sea, the Company was overtaken by another disaster, in some respects more appalling than the wreck of the Arctic, although attended with less loss of life. The winter of 1855–56 had been unusually severe both on the land and on the sea, and one effect of the gales had been to break up the great ice-fields of the frozen North, and to fill the Atlantic with ice at a season when it is rarely met with in these latitudes. On the 23d of January, 1856, the Pacific, not fully advised, perhaps, of this state of things, left the Mersey for New York, and was never heard of afterwards. There is every reason to believe that she perished in the ice which then barricaded the passage between the two hemispheres, and that the calamity was sudden and brief. That she too, like the Arctic, was endangered by ambition for speed, if not lost absolutely in consequence, is to be feared from the circumstance that the new steamship Persia was to follow three days later on her first voyage; the comparative merits of the rival vessels had been freely canvassed on 'Change and at the hotels in Liverpool, and the Pacific started with the determination not to be beaten. This dangerous spirit of emulation was not confined, however, to her. Mr. Vernon Smith admits this in his interesting allusion to the occurrence, and we shall venture to quote his remarks in full.

> "Three days after her [the Pacific], the Persia, new from her builders' hands, rushed after her in a race second to none that had yet made the Atlantic their pacing ground. America had for some time beaten us in the contest for speed; our vessels, built for strength, and for the possible emergency of war, had been sacrificed in their construction to a fancied security against attack, to a possible chance of other service than the requirements of commerce, and their details had been dictated and superintended by the naval authorities of the day.* In 1854, the Arabia, the last of the Cunard vessels built of wood, had separately beaten each of the Collins steamers in succession, but the average speed for the year was in favor of the Collins line. In 1855, the requirements of the Crimean war had withdrawn the Arabia from the station, had disarranged the mail service, and left the Collins line without any competitors on the New York route. The commencement of the next year set all the old boats at liberty, the line to New York was resumed, and in addition to the Arabia, the Persia was making ready for the start. For the first time, a steamer combining unusual power and size with a symmetry of proportion and beauty of model unequalled by

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* Mr. Smith overlooks the fact that the Collins steamers also were built under naval supervision, and with a view to the possibilities of government service. Commodore Perry, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 18, 1852, gave it as his opinion, "that $ 20,000 expended on each would convert them into war-steamers at any of our navy-yards." Except for the transport service, however, the vessels of both lines would as war-steamers disappoint the expectations of their projectors.

anything afloat had been permitted to take her place in the mail service untrammelled by naval inspection, and *built of a material* against which the Admiralty had passed a final and decisive verdict.

"Under these circumstances Captain Eldredge succeeded Nye in the command of the Pacific, and, with the avowed intention of challenging her rival before mooring at New York, the Persia sped after her on her first Atlantic journey. Five days out from Liverpool, the Persia, running eleven knots an hour, struck heavily on a field of ice. For the first time that such an accident, though often threatened, had actually occurred to a Cunard steamer, the Persia was the only one of the number that could have survived the shock. The collision broke a large hole through the plates of her iron bow, tore the rivets asunder for sixteen feet on her starboard side, and bent and twisted the rims of her paddle-wheels as if they had been made of lead. No wooden vessel could have lived an hour after receiving that terrible blow. The first compartment instantly filled, but the water-tight bulkhead saved her, and though laden down with the weight of water in her bows, and sailing heavily by the head, she was enabled slowly to keep on her course, and reached New York in safety, though much behind the anticipated time. And where was the Pacific? Seven days after the accident to the Persia, and near the same place, the Edinburgh, on her passage from Glasgow to New York, picked up some cabin furniture, a lady's work-box, and a few trivial articles, in the position that ten days before had probably been occupied by the missing vessel. Subsequent reports left no doubt as to the fate of the unfortunate liner. Independently of the accident to the Persia and the report of the Edinburgh, the Atlantic on the 19th of February, the Arago on the 22d, and the Africa on the 2d of March, were all in imminent danger from the same cause, and near the same place, and on their homeward trip the Baltic and the Arabia both encountered the opposite shore of the same floating island whose eastern edge had proved so fatal to the Pacific, and so dangerous to the others."

It was long before the public could bring itself to believe that the Pacific was lost. Week after week the suspense became more painful, but the Atlantic had been missing in the winter of 1851, and after a long agony the joyful news had reached us that she was safe in Liverpool, having put back in a disabled condition after making half the distance to New York. "Why may it not be the same with the Pacific? It cannot be that two out of the four ships of the Collins line have been lost within a period of eighteen months." Thus men talked, "hoping against hope," but the steamers sent in search of the overdue vessel returned without tidings; successive arrivals from Europe failed to bring the hoped-for intelligence; and at length the Pacific was placed on that dreary list of "missing vessels" of which nothing more will ever be known until the sea gives up its dead and reveals all the awful mysteries buried with them.

Until the completion of the Adriatic, the company chartered the Ericsson and the Quaker City to make out the required service; but the trips were irregular and unsatisfactory, the confidence of the community was almost destroyed, and the successful passages of the Adriatic, when at length she made her appearance, were not sufficient to dissipate the general distrust, or to remove the pressure under which the company labored. In this state of things Congress discontinued the extra compensation voted in 1852; and, as the company was hopelessly insolvent before, this hastened its inevitable suspension. It is common to blame Congress for this, and to charge it with breach of faith, as well as with a disregard to the national interests. This is most unjust, and evinces a want of discrimination which can only injure the steamship cause with our public men. A careful reference to the action of Congress on this subject, will show that the Collins Company had no reason whatever to complain of the treatment it received at the hands of the government. In 1847, Mr. Collins, in behalf of himself and others, entered into a contract for the conveyance of the mails between New York and Liverpool, agreeing to make twenty voyages each year, and to employ five vessels "of great speed, and sufficiently strong for war-vessels," which were to be ready for sea in eighteen or twenty months. Mr. Collins named his own terms, and they were acceded to, $19,250 a voyage. As the stipulated time drew near, Congress was memorialized to extend the limit for the completion of the vessels, and it consented. It was then asked to authorize an advance of $25,000 a month on each vessel, from the date of launching until the sum should reach $385,000, equal to one years' conpensation under the contract; this was in effect asking it to supply so much capital; but the money was voted. Mr. Collins now desired to be relieved from his obligation to employ four midshipmen of the United States navy on each of his vessels; this also was conceded. His next request was that the construction of the fifth vessel might be postponed; and this was granted. In 1852, the Post-Office Department having expressed a wish to increase the number of voyages per annum from twenty to twenty-six; the opportunity was taken to ask that the compensation for each voyage might be advanced from $ 19,250 to $ 33,000. So that, instead of an annual subsidy of $ 385,000 for twenty voyages, the amount should be $ 858,000 for twenty-six voyages. Congress thus far had been very patient, but this demand was almost too much for its liberality, seeing that Mr. Collins had made the original contract upon his own terms, and that he was already receiving a higher rate of compensation than the Cunard Company. But it was urged in his behalf, that, during the two years which had transpired, he had been gaining experience at a heavy cost in a new field of enterprise; and that the disaster to the Atlantic, when she broke her shaft and returned to Liverpool, cost him $ 100,000. The expense involved in maintaining the reputation of the vessels for speed was insisted upon, and the figures were presented which we have already given. It was more than intimated that this heavy additional compensation would in all probability be only needed for a short time; and after much discussion the measure was carried, with a proviso that six months' notice of discontinuance of the extra grant ($13,750 a voyage) might be given by Congress after the close of 1854. In 1855, a persistent endeavor was made to secure the repeal of this proviso, and to make an unconditional contract at $ 858,000 annually for five years; Congress, however, refused to make the entire grant absolute. It began now to appear that Mr. Collins and his friends were pushing matters too far for their own interest; each new demand was more excessive than the last, and yet the affairs of the company were becoming more involved than before. It is no wonder that, after their second great disaster, when they had only two vessels for a service which they had contracted to perform with five, and when of necessity they were irregular in their trips and behindhand in time, Congress should vote to discontinue the concession of 1852, which was granted with the understanding that it was to be temporary, and should restrict the company to $19,250 a voyage, as originally agreed upon. It should be mentioned, also, that in 1855, when the Cunard vessels were withdrawn from the New York route, Mr. Vanderbilt had proposed to supply their place with a semi-monthly line, to alternate with the Collins ships, and had asked $15,000 if he might confine himself to the average speed of the Cunard line, or $19,250 if he were expected to make as good time as the Collins vessels had done. After the suspension of the company, its friends came to Washington once more, and asked for permission, on resuming the service, to go to Southampton instead of to Liverpool; but Congress had grown weary of so much importunity. One speaker expressed the feeling of a majority of the members when he said: —

> "After having suspended the trips for more than a year, after breaking up the contract and denying his indebtedness to the government, and being at this very day indebted to the government in large sums of money for the very building of his ships, he [Mr. Collins] comes here and asks you to give him additional legislative favors."

Mr. Vanderbilt had placed one or more steamers on the route to Southampton and Havre, and had again proposed to make a mail contract with the government, his terms being $16,680 a voyage, the compensation paid by Great Britain to the Cunard line. We believe also that the Bremen steamers were still running, and to have acceded to Mr. Collins's request that he might go to Southampton would have been to give him a monopoly of which he had shown himself to be unworthy, and to enable him to run both these lines off the routes which they had occupied with credit to themselves and with security to the community. The Collins Company did not resume its service, and soon ceased to exist; its early history had been promising; it had been generously sustained by the government; a nation's pride had become identified with its prosperity; it had attracted the attention of the world by the brilliancy of its performances, and not less by the tragic terrors of its misfortunes; — but errors, fundamental and fatal, had entered into the scheme for its establishment and into the method of its administration, — errors which time did not modify, or experience counteract, — and the final disaster could not be averted.

The Cunard Company deserves more particular notice than we have yet given to it. The steamships with which the line was started were of 1200 tons* and 440 horse power, — the Britannia, the Acadia, the Caledonia, and the Columbia. They were an enlargement of, and in some respects an improvement upon, the vessels which Messrs. Burns and McIver had employed for many years between Glasgow and Liverpool. These had been sea-going steamers in all essential points, adapted for the rough passage of the Irish Sea, and tested by a coastwise service as stormy as is to be found anywhere. The experience gained in this trade was of the greatest importance when deep-sea navigation by steam was to be attempted, and contributed not a little to the subsequent success of the new company. The sphere on which they were entering was not altogether new to them; rather, it was the expansion of one which they had already shown themselves competent to occupy. The Hibernia, which came out in 1842, although not much larger than her predecessors, was considered an improvement upon them, and the Cambria, of 1400 tons, built in 1846, was regarded yet more favorably. In 1848 the company, still cautiously feeling its way, added to its fleet four fine vessels of 1800 or 1900 tons, — the America, the Niagara, the Europa, and the Canada. On the 1st of January in the same year, the Hibernia sailed from New York, opening the service on that route. In 1850 the Asia and the Africa, again somewhat larger, came into the line. All this time the passages had been gradually shortening, and the Asia, when new, repeatedly reached Boston on the tenth day from Liverpool. Early in 1853 the Arabia made her first trip; she was of 2400 tons, and attracted much attention. The Persia made her appearance in 1856, a splendid vessel of 3600 tons, with ample and commodious saloon and state-room accommodations. The model and the general effect of the Collins steamers had evidently been carefully studied and profited by. In one instance the Persia landed her passengers at Liverpool on the ninth day from New York. She, however, has had to give place to a newer rival; the Scotia, of 4100 tons, entered the service in 1862; she may be considered as the original fleet of 1840 compressed into one vessel, with every well-tried improvement in addition. She made the run to Liverpool last December in 8 days 21 hours, including the detention off Cork Harbor. All these ships of which we have spoken are paddle-wheel steamers. The company own also two powerful screw-steamships, which take their turn in the mail line,—the Australasian, of 1800 tons, built in 1857, and the China, of 2500 tons, in 1862; these are constructed of iron, as are also the Persia and the Scotia.

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* It should be remembered that the tonnage of British vessels appears smaller than it really is in proportion to American vessels, because of the different modes of measurement prevailing in the two countries.

In this slow and steady progress we discover an important element contributing to the success of the Cunard Company. Never in advance of the times, but never far behind them; never experimenting, but always ready to adopt any improvement thoroughly tested by others; avoiding equally extravagance and parsimony; carefully studying the nature of the service in which it is engaged, and so far as possible guarding against every contingency,—the success of this Company, taking all things into the account, has never been equalled. These vessels are plying constantly between Great Britain and the United States; no gale sweeps the North Atlantic that does not toss at least one of them; no fog rests on its bosom that does not obscure their path; no floating berg or ice-field drifts to the southward that does not pass almost immediately athwart their bows. And yet they steam to and fro, during all seasons, amidst all dangers, in spite of all contingencies, with as much regularity as the ferry-boats which cross our harbors; they come and go, bringing and taking their precious lading, and we have come to consider it all as a matter of course. "Yes," we have heard it said, "they are certainly very fortunate vessels." Fortunate! That is not the word to apply to them; it is not to good fortune, but to wise forethought, patient care, and good management that they owe their success. "Providence helps those who help themselves." These vessels are not exempt from exposure to casualty, or from extreme peril. They have more than once gone ashore; they have been on fire; they have come into collision with ice, with other vessels, and in a single instance with each other; their canvas has been torn to shreds; their decks have been swept; almost everything has happened to them as to other ships, except that, so far as we remember, not one of them has ever sprung a leak. But these perils have made their excellence the more apparent. When the Europa cut the Charles Bartlett down to the water's edge, in 1849; when the Persia struck the ice in 1856; when the Arabia and the Europa came in collision off Cape Race in 1858; when the Africa went ashore in the same vicinity in 1863, — the strength of the vessels, the discipline of the crews, and the seamanship of the commanders were made available promptly at the moment when everything was depending upon them. Then it was seen that the ships were not built for pleasure excursions, and that their officers were not dressed for holiday show. Such occurrences have secured a confidence for them which could not otherwise have been gained; since it must now be admitted that they have not been especially favored of fortune, but that they have subjected fortune to themselves; they have not only commanded success, "they have done more, they have deserved it;" their construction has been proved to be most stanch and thorough; and all will allow that they have been navigated with a skill equal to any exigency which has yet arisen, and with a watchful care ceaseless and untiring as the revolutions of their own paddle-wheels.

The Cunard Company has lost one vessel, the Columbia, which drifted ashore on Sable Island in a fog in 1842, and could not be got off. Everything pertaining to the passengers and crew was saved, and whatever was thought worth removal from the vessel itself was taken away; nothing but the hull was finally lost, and many a storm swept on and over this before it broke up and went to pieces. During these four-and-twenty years more than 150,000 passengers have embarked by this line; occasionally an invalid has died on board, but, so far as the company has been concerned, it has never failed in a single instance to fulfil its agreement with those who have intrusted themselves to its care. When we consider the fatality which has attended other lines, such a record is wonderful.

Of the roughness and danger of Atlantic navigation we have already spoken. But in the teeth of the most violent weather, these stout ships, month in and month out, year in and year out, for more than twenty years, have perseveringly, persistently, triumphantly, pressed against and through all opposition, and attained the determined goal. We can recall but one instance in which the contest had to be abandoned for a time. In the autumn of 1856, in the storm which Sir John Herschel informs us is beginning to be recognized as one of the features of the European weather-table under the name of "the November atmospheric wave," the America, her decks swept, and the houses and bulwarks forward on one side carried away, was obliged to return to Liverpool for repairs. But the good ship sustained no substantial injury, and was soon ready to resume the voyage.

The first impression one receives on going on board these ships is of their massive solidity and strength, and the impression is not a deceptive one. In the machinery especially, the best material, the most skilful mechanism, and the most approved designs are made use of; the engines are always put together and thoroughly tested in motion before going into the vessel. Everything also is kept in the best repair. After a certain number of voyages, the vessels are hauled up, whether they appear to require attention or not. A visitor at one of the company's works near Glasgow saw several boilers lying about which had been condemned simply because of their age, and not because they were not to all appearance sound and good. He was told that, after a boiler has been in use for a specified time, the rule is invariably to remove it. The company do not wait until a boiler explodes before deciding whether it is defective; nor do they give it the benefit of a doubt.

The ships thus sent to sea in the best condition are navigated under strict and thorough discipline, and competent and experienced seamanship. Every captain must have served as first officer in the employ of the company, and every first officer must have been a captain in some other service. The supervision of the Admiralty, and the liability to a searching examination before the Board of Trade in the event of accident, doubtless exert a wholesome influence upon all who are in authority.

The pecuniary success of this line has been fully commensurate with its prosperity otherwise. From four small steamships it has grown to a fleet of nearly forty vessels, including all its branches. During the Crimean war it was able to supply to the government over 14,000 tons of steam-shipping, without interrupting its service to Halifax and Boston. The British government has always been liberal to it, and without such liberality it could hardly have sustained itself in its earlier years; for the passengers who then gave the preference to steamers were comparatively few, and to suggest the shipment on them of any description of freight excepting the most valuable and of the least bulk, would have been thought absurd. The subsidy has been increased from time to time, but in all instances in consideration of an extension of the service, and of an addition to the size or the number of the vessels employed. There is no question that with the government this is the favorite company of the whole packet service, doubtless because of its long-proved reliability and safety. While the West India Company is compensated at the rate of $2.46 a mile, and the Peninsular and Oriental Company at the rate of $1.53, the Cunard Company receives $2.83.* This cannot be because the North Atlantic route is less remunerative from its ordinary receipts, or more costly to maintain than the others; but, as we judge, the payment is in part an acknowledgment of the admirable management of the line during all its history; which influences favorably other and similar lines, and which reflects no little credit upon the British marine. It stands ready to furnish to the government, at short notice, well-ordered and well-equipped steamers, in any exigency; and its managing owners are constantly called on by the authorities for information and advice on the subjects with which they are known to be familiar. In 1859, Mr. Cunard, who is conservative in his politics, was made a Baronet by Lord Derby, in recognition of what he had accomplished for ocean steam navigation. The present contract will expire on the 1st of January, 1867, with twelve months' notice thereafter; and notwithstanding the good disposition towards the line of both government and people, there will be a strong opposition brought to bear against the renewal of the subsidy, by the Montreal Company, by the company which Mr. Inman represents, and perhaps by others.

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* The compensation of the Collins Company was $3.10 a mile.

While the contest for supremacy on the Atlantic between the Collins and the Cunard lines was in progress, and just when the spirit of rivalry had reached its height, the shipbuilders of Great Britain were bringing to perfection a new class of steamers, which were destined to interfere more seriously with the carrying trade of the United States upon this ocean than any that had previously been introduced. We refer to the iron screw steamships, for which the yards and shops on the Clyde especially have become so famous; and our long neglect of which in this country has been far more fatal to our commercial interests than the hesitation of the Federal government to grant subsidies, of which our citizens so often complain. For, as these vessels have shown themselves able to compete with the British paddle-wheel steamers with their heavy subsidies, they can of course compete with American vessels of the same build, not subsidized at all. They cost less to construct and less to sail than a paddle-wheel steamer, while their capacity for freight and passengers is much greater. The Cunard steamer Arabia, of 2,400 tons, can carry only 400 or 500 tons of freight, while a screw steamer of the same tonnage, sailing at half the expense, will carry 1,800 tons. These screw steamers have also entered into successful competition with sailing ships, which the other steamers never could do to any serious extent; and they have come to control the freighting business between this country and Europe. They have solved the long-perplexing problem of self-sustaining ocean steam navigation, having indicated that the degree of speed really demanded by the public necessity can be attained at an outlay which the ordinary rates of freight and passenger traffic will justify. As now constructed, some of them are able to make passages on the average almost, if not quite, as fast as the best paddle-wheel steamers; and as their model and machinery are improved upon, their speed increases and their running expenses diminish; so that it is believed, at no distant day, for voyages of moderate length, they will entirely supersede sailing ships for every description of cargo. The freighting history of railroads illustrates the manner in which, as the means of transportation become developed, traffic of every kind avails itself of steam. A few years ago, no one would have supposed that the New York Central Railroad could transport freight to advantage by the side of the Erie Canal; or that the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada would be able to take away nearly all the business of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario steamers. But it has been seen that screw propellers only can maintain themselves on parallel routes against railroad competition. The prices at which railroad companies now contract for freight would formerly have been pronounced ruinous; yet these prices are known to be remunerative. And as steam transportation on the land has shown itself thus to be more than a match for water-carriage, ocean steamers are now discovered to be formidable rivals to sailing ships for ordinary merchandise and for every class of passengers. The coal trade between Newcastle and London furnishes a double illustration on this subject. Formerly the colliers, so called, engaged in this trade, were the poorest, cheapest, and the least seaworthy vessels to be found in any waters. Anything that could float and move was considered good enough for the transportation of coal. But the Great Northern Railway put on coal trains, and, to the surprise of everybody, was able to take away the business from the colliers. And now, in recent years, iron propellers have entered into competition with the railway, and some of the largest proprietors make use of them altogether for the shipment of their coal to the metropolis. In a single year, 18,000 tons of iron screw colliers were built on the Tyne alone. Some of them are of 1,500 tons burden. It is estimated that in one year a screw collier will convey as many coals as ten of the ordinary vessels could do in the same time.

In 1852–53 the Cunard Company began to use iron propellers as auxiliary to their mail steamers; the Alps, the Etna, the Jura,* and others, were despatched from Liverpool or Havre to Boston or New York, as occasion required, and this led to the establishment of a regular line. The company has become convinced, also, that the screw can be employed in the mail service as successfully as in freighting. The China alternates with the Persia and the Scotia, and her speed is nearly equal to theirs. She is said to be the least expensive and the most useful vessel belonging to the company. Her daily consumption of coal is about seventy tons, against one hundred and twenty tons consumed by the Scotia. In 1854 another line was started, under the direction and agency of Mr. William Inman; the vessels were called after various cities, and Philadelphia was made their destination in the United States. The first year witnessed the loss of the City of Glasgow and the City of Philadelphia; but the proprietors persevered in their efforts, managing the ships with economy, adapting them to the trade, and carefully increasing their power and capacity. In 1857 they changed from Philadelphia to New York. Notwithstanding its loss of three ships, the line has been a decided success, and has a hold upon the confidence of the public second only to the Cunard line. It began with a monthly service, but now makes weekly trips, and frequently in busy times two vessels a week are sent to sea. Mr. Inman testified before the Select Committee on Ocean Steamships of the House of Commons, that, up to the advent of the Scotia, the vessels of his line had beaten on the average all the Cunard vessels, and had beaten every vessel separately except the Persia. It is now claimed that the City of New York (since wrecked in Queenstown Harbor) made the fastest passage to Liverpool ever accomplished, beating the Scotia by a few hours. What is no less noteworthy, this line, unassisted by the British government, has been able to sustain itself against the subsidized companies. It should be said, however, that the abandonment of the Liverpool route by Mr. Collins gave an impulse to its operations, to which its success since that time is to be more or less attributed. It adopted the Collins sailing days, and, by an arrangement with the government of the United States, took charge of the mails which had previously been conveyed by the American ships, for the consideration of the ocean postage accruing upon them. The compensation for this service amounts to about $200,000 per annum. This line, therefore, like all the British lines on the Atlantic, has been built up largely at our expense.

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* The Etna was afterwards sold to the Inman line, and the Jura to the Montreal Company.

The trade of the Canadas, which formerly depended upon the St. Lawrence, and which was limited each year to the period of open navigation, now gives employment to several steamship lines, which make Portland their winter harbor. The Canadians have manifested an energy and a forecast in establishing them, which merchants and others on this side of the frontier may imitate advantageously. They have not been blind to the advantages of iron propellers, nor have disasters, constantly recurring and of the most disheartening nature, shaken them from their purpose. The Montreal Ocean Steam Navigation Company has had an experience much more trying than any of our own companies have known; for during the eight years of its existence, it has lost eight of its vessels. The usual hazards of Atlantic navigation are augmented by the perils it has to encounter in the Lower St. Lawrence, and the officers of the company have not shown themselves competent to cope with them. The Provincial government pays it $400,000 a year for the conveyance of the mails weekly, and this subsidy, with a continually increasing business, has enabled it to bear up under its unprecedented misfortunes. There are two other lines in operation from Montreal, to Liverpool and Glasgow, and a line to London has recently been initiated; none of these receive government assistance.

The North German Lloyds Company of Bremen and the Hamburgh American Packet Company have opened regular communication with New York, by means of the same class of vessels of which we have been speaking. We have said that in 1850 all the steamships engaged in the transit between Europe and the United States, excepting only Cunard's, were American. In 1864 there are twelve lines, and not one of them belongs to us. Of these, all except the Cunard mail-packets and the new French vessels are screw steamers. The Galway line we do not include among existing companies. It is to be observed, also, that the German and the French vessels are all built in Great Britain, and it is a question well worthy of the consideration of our rulers, whether such a temporary relaxation of the navigation laws of the United States as would, for a year or two to come, allow foreign-built steamers of large tonnage and of the first class to be placed under our flag, would not be of the greatest service to us in many ways. By this means we should be able at once to obtain vessels for our projected steam lines, which our own ship-yards cannot supply for several years. We think, also, it would be beneficial to our mechanics, to bring to their more particular notice the mode of construction and the propelling power which already control ocean navigation, and are destined to do so still more completely, and in which, it must be admitted, we as yet do not excel. The style of ship-building in England was much improved by the presence of the magnificent clippers which were purchased in Boston and New York for Liverpool account; and although there certainly are builders in this country of approved skill, a moderate infusion of foreign ideas in our machine-shops would tend to give a higher character to our machinery. The frequent accidents which occur to the engines of our gunboats, and other naval vessels, demonstrate that we have still very much to learn in this respect.

To complete the account of this class of steamships, we may state that the Peninsular and Oriental Company was the first to adopt screw steamers for its regular service; in 1852 the Chusan, of 765 tons, and the Formosa, of 675 tons, were placed upon the route between Hong Kong and Shanghae. These were succeeded by the Bengal, of 2185 tons, and the Candia, of 1982 tons, between Suez and Calcutta. Of 73,285 tons owned by this company, 59,677 tons are in screw steamers, and these are mostly of iron. The West India Company has never built any except paddle-wheel steamers.

It would be a reflection on the intelligence of our readers, to offer statistics for the purpose of showing that a nation is sure to reap direct and immediate benefit when it places itself in the closest possible communication with other lands. But it may be well to observe how the profits of commerce inevitably transfer themselves, from a nation which does not pursue such a policy, to its more enterprising rival. Our exports and imports are not affected, as relates to countries which are connected with us by steamship lines, by the question whether these lines are owned by our citizens or by foreigners; but we are placed at a most serious disadvantage in trading to a country which is not connected with us in this way, but which is reached by the steamships of other nations. The Hon. Mr. Alley, in his speech on the Brazil Steamship Subsidy, shows how we have been losing ground in our intercourse with the countries of Central and of South America, while England has been continually gaining. He says: —

> "Our commerce with these countries, previous to the rebellion, either decreased or remained during this same period — the last decade — almost stationary, while that of England flourished and increased, in many instances fourfold, under the fostering care of her subsidy system. In 1859 our trade with Mexico was in exports to that country about three and a half millions of dollars, and our imports from there about five and a half millions, upwards of four millions of which was specie. England exported and imported about four times as much during the same year. It should have been reversed. We should have had four times as much commerce with Mexico as England."

The following are the results of the steamship line between Great Britain and the Brazils, established in 1851: —

> "The first year British exports were increased five millions of dollars, and the imports and exports of England with Brazil the first six years were doubled, while the six years immediately preceding the year 1851, without steam communication, the trade remained stationary.
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> "Our exports to Brazil in the year 1858 were about five millions; in 1859, about six millions; in 1860, nearly the same; and in 1861, within ten thousand dollars of amounting to five millions.
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> "Our importations from Brazil during the same period — four years — were seventeen millions in 1858, twenty-two millions in 1859, twenty-one millions in 1860, and something less than fifteen millions in 1861. This enormous balance against us — an average annual amount of about thirteen millions — had to be wiped out, of course, in coin. Contrast this with the trade of Great Britain in 1861. Her exports to Brazil amounted in that year to over twenty-eight millions of dollars, and her imports of Brazilian products (other than specie) less than half that sum, — making a balance in her favor of about the same number of millions as we show of balance against us, — a trade which greatly increases the wealth of England, and to no small extent impoverishes us."

It is not to be supposed that the people of the United States will quietly withdraw from the maritime struggle in which we have been engaged almost ever since we became a nation, and permit the commerce of the world, our own included, to be carried on under foreign flags. Nor do we believe that the energy and skill of our merchants have been exhausted by the efforts hitherto made to establish American steamship lines on the ocean. Our business men are not easily discouraged or daunted, and the time is not distant when this whole subject will receive the attention which its importance deserves. It is to be hoped, however, that we shall profit by experience, that we shall undertake the work before us calmly, considerately, and prudently, and that we shall start on sound principles. The mortifying failures to which we have been subjected in the past indicate the dangers to which we shall be exposed, and which are to be avoided by us, in the future. One of these dangers, and not the least, is *a spirit of rivalry and of national pride.* Mr. Rainey, in his book on the Ocean Post, which contains much valuable information, but is strangely incorrect in its assertions about screw steamships, and, in our view, is altogether unsound in its advocacy of expensive mail lines, speaks of the Collins steamers thus: —

> "They have literally been engaged in a continual race across the ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far excel those of the Cunard line."

No manufacturer, importer, or artisan could long maintain himself, who should adopt such a policy as this implies, and should estimate a nominal advantage gained over a rival above his own security and emolument. And yet the New York Memorialists ask of Congress

> "that subsidies shall be offered to a first-class line, to make weekly trips from New York to Liverpool and return; and they ask this, not alone in the interest of the general trade of the country, for it can hardly be asserted that such a line is imperatively demanded, but because the pride of the country, as well as its position as a first-class maritime power, is involved in the maintenance of the best and fastest line which shall connect the capitals of the two hemispheres."

Does the New York Chamber of Commerce want another Collins line? In any such desire as this neither Congress nor the country can join with it. If there be no commercial necessity for an American line to Liverpool from New York, the same may not be, and probably is not, true of Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and "the pride of the country, as well as its position as a first-class maritime power," would be sustained more creditably by a solvent and mainly self-supporting line from any one of those cities, than by a company at New York maintained by the public purse. But whether from New York or elsewhere, there are other attainments to desire than speed, and if American ocean steam navigation shall ever become successful, it will be when we have accepted some ideas in reference to it beyond and above those suggested by a regatta.

Nor does it follow because Great Britain or any other power employs steamers on a given route, that, apart from all other considerations, the United States should place a line there also. The situation and circumstances of each nation must determine the routes which it can properly and profitably occupy. The English ocean post is not an artificial system; but is the natural result of the situation of the British Islands, and of the extent and importance of the British colonies. Mr. Emerson in his "English Traits" says: "England resembles a ship in its shape, and, if it were one, its best admiral could not have worked it, or anchored it in a more judicious or effective position. The shop-keeping nation, to use a shop word, has a good stand. England is anchored at the side of Europe, and right in the heart of the modern world." There are routes in the waters surrounding her, and along the coasts adjacent to her, where it would be folly for us to attempt competition. Her steamers trading to the various ports on the North Sea and the Baltic are engaged in a commerce which legitimately belongs to her and to the other nations bordering on those seas. The service to Oporto, Lisbon, Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria, if not exactly belonging to her by geographical right, comes more naturally within her domain than ours. It must be remembered, also, that her colonial possessions in every quarter of the world make it imperative on her to keep up constant and reliable communication with them. She must knit firmly together her widely scattered provinces, or she cannot retain her hold upon them. The security of these dependencies had more to do with the development of her ocean postal system, than any determination to build up a world-wide commerce. British statesmen are not wanting in forethought or breadth of vision, in their care for the promotion of the national prosperity; but we do not believe the wisest of them foresaw how wonderfully expansive and how richly remunerative the ocean mail service was to prove. They were shrewd enough, however, soon to discover the advantage which was to be derived from it, and promptly to seize the opportunity. The first Cunard contract was made principally in the interest of British North America; and Halifax and Boston were therefore selected as the Cunard ports on this continent. The service to New York was an afterthought, and grew out of this. In the same way, the service to the Brazils was the natural expansion of the contract for the West India mails. We all know the value which Great Britain places upon her Indian empire and upon her influence in the East. The political reasons for connecting herself with Asia by the shortest and quickest route are of the greatest weight; and these explain the existence of the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

On the other hand, we regard the ocean postal system of France as somewhat artificial. That she should navigate the Mediterranean by steam, is natural enough; but there is no commercial necessity for her establishing independent lines on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, nor any political necessity, except that which grows out of jealousy of her neighbor. The establishment of an expensive mail line between Havre and New York, we look upon as of questionable policy. It is in accordance with the spirit of the French government to expend large sums of money to keep up a good appearance, and so long as these ships can be thus supported, they will probably continue to run.

How then shall we define the appropriate sphere for ocean steam navigation under the American flag? In a word, it is that which belongs to us by geographical propriety. If the time shall come when this is fully occupied, the circumstances of the case will have changed, and we shall be warranted in passing beyond its limits. These limits, however, are neither narrow nor confined. On our own shores we can develop a steamship system equal to that of all Europe in extent and in commercial value. The distance from Portland to the Gulf of Mexico is nearly as great as from Southampton by way of Gibraltar to Alexandria. These coastwise lines must be brought up to the highest point of efficiency and safety. Boston has recently organized a line to Liverpool on a sound and conservative basis, which promises well. If there be no inducement at the present time to start a similar line from New York, the shrewd merchants of that city will watch the opportunities, and will be prompt to act when such a movement shall become a necessity. Instead of laying out parallel routes to Liverpool, Havre, Bremen, or Hamburg, as their Memorial contemplates, would it not be wiser to turn their attention to points with which we have no direct steam connection whatever? We question the expediency, also, of organizing a new and intricate mail service among the various islands of the West Indies. Let us rather avail ourselves of the expensive and convenient service supported by Great Britain, and this we can do by means of our Havana and our St. Thomas steamers.

Communication by steam with the Brazils, too long delayed, is likely soon to be established. By the authority of Congress, the Postmaster-General has advertised for tenders for a monthly service between "some port north of the Potomac" and Rio de Janeiro, touching at St. Thomas, Pernambuco, and Bahia. It is understood that the Brazilian government will unite with our own in subsidizing the proposed line, and we may confidently hope that the increased intercourse which it will facilitate will prove highly beneficial to both nations. Another route, which by every right belongs to us, is between San Francisco and China. Our interest in the commerce of the East is second only to that of Great Britain, and we ought to secure ourselves in it by means of adequate steamship connections. But we cannot sustain an East India line by way of Alexandria and Aden; even with the completion of the Suez canal, we could not compete with the English and the French. On the Pacific we have a route peculiarly our own; and if we are true to ourselves, no foreign companies can interfere with us in its possession.* The first responsibility for making it available rests with the merchants of San Francisco, as being immediately and primarily interested in the result. They should organize a company, subscribe liberally to the capital stock, and then come to New York and Boston to invite the co-operation of enterprising men in the Eastern States. Through their Chamber of Commerce, they have already memorialized Congress for its aid; but in our opinion, every preliminary step should be taken before making application at Washington. When those who are most deeply concerned have pledged themselves that the work shall be accomplished, it will be comparatively easy to secure a postal contract.

This suggests another error to be avoided in future efforts in behalf of American ocean steam navigation, namely, *undue reliance upon the government.* The Grand Duke of Baden, the Viceroy of Egypt, and other potentates in the Old World, are the proprietors of the railways which traverse their dominions, and of other public works. In the United States we have been accustomed to depend upon ourselves in the development of great improvements. Our material prosperity is the result of private industry and energy, rather than of legislative expenditure. Some deviation from this policy may be necessary in maturing our ocean postal system; but even in this, the intervention of the government should be incidental and subordinate; it should tend to stimulate, not to stifle, individual enterprise and prudence; and it should be designed, not to give existence to steamship companies, but to impart to them increased efficiency. Grants of public money will not communicate soundness to an unsound project, although they may essentially assist one that has the elements of success within itself. For political reasons, and contrary to its usual course, the British Parliament awarded to the Galway Company a large subsidy, equal for the service performed to the compensation of the Cunard Company; but it was not large enough to give life to a concern which was destitute of all inherent vitality. The Collins contract was the most ample and generous ever enjoyed by any company; what the result of it was, we now know. Twenty-five years ago private capital could not cope with the pecuniary difficulties which then embarrassed ocean steamers; but ingenuity and experience have wrought great changes, and now even in Great Britain, where the postal subventions have been so liberal, new lines are constantly going into operation without reference to or dependence upon aid from the government.

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* An attempt was made a year or two since to establish an English line on this route, but it was soon given up.

The keen and philosophical observer from whom we have already quoted unfolds the secret of the success of the English steamers in a few words which deserve to be carefully pondered. He says: "Solvency is in the ideas and mechanism of an Englishman. The Crystal Palace is not considered honest until it pays; — no matter how much convenience, beauty, or *éclat*, it must be self-supporting. They are contented with slower steamers, as long as they know that swifter boats lose money. They proceed logically by the double method of labor and thrift."

Our government unquestionably has a duty to perform in this matter. It owes a fostering care to every national enterprise, both on the land and on the sea; and it has a direct interest in the fullest possible development of the national resources. That it has been more or less delinquent in regard to the ocean mail service, cannot be denied. In its relations with the Collins Company it was too easy, too lax, and too lavish; and its legislation was too exclusively for the benefit of that one company. When the company failed, steps should have been taken immediately to supply its place with a sounder, more efficient, and more trustworthy line. It was hardly statesmanlike to throw up the whole question in despair, and to abandon everything to foreigners, because in one instance a costly experiment had been unsuccessful. A special committee should have been appointed by Congress to make a thorough investigation into the causes of this failure, and to propose a plan for the future. Judicious intervention at that time on the part of the government would have encouraged new attempts, notwithstanding the disheartening effect of the misfortunes we have described. But this was wanting; and our ocean commerce was permitted steadily to decline, until, as has already been said, we are now dependent upon rival powers for the conveyance of our mails, government despatches, and passengers, both private and official, to every quarter of the globe. In making a new beginning, as we must now do, it is to be expected that the government will manifest a due regard for the great interests involved, and will carefully consider both the manner and the measure of the co-operation which it ought to render. As other governments evince a strong and energetic purpose to promote their own ends and to assist their own subjects on the ocean, it is not reasonable to ask our citizens to engage by themselves and unassisted in a struggle so unequal and so costly.

The aid thus on good grounds to be anticipated should be given in the form of postal compensation, and in view of a full consideration to be returned. The public money ought to be appropriated for public, and not for private objects; to promote the good of the community at large, and not to enhance the profits of proprietors or stockholders. If an American company undertake an important service with limited means, so that it cannot employ as large a class of vessels, or make as many voyages, as the interests of the nation seem to demand, a subsidy should be granted which will enable it to make its plan more comprehensive and more generally beneficial. The British government, in renewing a contract or increasing a subsidy, invariably requires an extension of the service, or such improvements as will render a fair equivalent for the privileges conferred. It is to be expected and to be desired that the enterprise of those who thus essentially advance the welfare of the community while seeking to use their money advantageously, should be amply rewarded; and to this, as an indirect consequence of the discriminating action of the government, no one can object.

We think it better for Congress to authorize a call for tenders, as it did at the last session, for the new Brazilian service, than to pass a bill in favor of a particular company. But it does not follow that the department should be restricted to the acceptance of the lowest bid. It should be left quite free to use its best judgment. Judge Collamer, whose familiarity with every postal question is well known, expressed his views during a debate on this subject in the Senate, a few years ago, a follows: —

> "I think these ocean contracts should be made just as mail contracts are on the land. When you have fixed the route, and declared that there shall be a mail line by steamship between a point on the American and on the European coast, or anywhere else, let the Postmaster-General advertise for and receive proposals. I do not say that the Department should be compelled to make a contract with the lowest bidder. I think he ought to have a discretion to ascertain whether the lowest bidder is a man of straw, a man to go into the market and fix up a joint-stock company, sell shares, and let the government whistle for service. I think the Postmaster-General should have a discretion to see that the men who offer to make contracts are responsible, that they will carry out their contracts, and he should stipulate for the size, proportion, and rate of the vessels."

To give only the accruing postages for the conveyance of the mails is not sufficient, and in the Transatlantic service would do injustice to a new American line. The various foreign steamers have adopted the best sailing days, and as the usage is to make up mails for them all, the letters which a new line would be likely to secure would be a small proportion of the whole, and would probably yield a less compensation than that received by the steamers sailing in competition with them. There are many reasons also why the present rates should be reduced, and this cannot be accomplished if the cost of conveying the mails by sea is to be permanently provided for out of the postal earnings of mail steamers. It should not be expected that our ocean mail-service will be self-supporting; it may be very profitable, and yet not in any direct manner pay its own expenses. The commercial advantages which will follow an enlightened and liberal policy will vastly preponderate over any deficiency that may appear on the balance-sheet of the Department.

ART. VII. — 1. *Lectures on Modern History, delivered in Oxford*, 1859-61. By GOLDWIN SMITH, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. Oxford and London: J. H. and Jas. Parker. 1861. 8vo.

2. *Rational Religion, and the Rationalistic Objections of the Bampton Lectures for* 1858. By GOLDWIN SMITH. Oxford: J. L. Wheeler. 1861. 8vo.
3. *Irish History and Irish Character.* By GOLDWIN SMITH. Oxford and London: J. H. and Jas. Parker. 1861. Post 8vo.
4. *The Empire. A Series of Letters published in "The Daily News,"* 1862, 1863. By GOLDWIN SMITH. Oxford and London: John Henry and James Parker. 1863. Post 8vo.
5. *Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?* By GOLDWIN SMITH. Oxford and London: John Henry and James Parker. 1863. Post 8vo. [Reprinted, Cambridge, Mass.: Sever and Francis. 1863.]
6. *A Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association.* By GOLDWIN SMITH. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. [Author's edition.] 12mo.
7. *A Plea for the Abolition of Tests in the University of Oxford.* By GOLDWIN SMITH. Oxford: Wheeler and Day. 1864. Post 8vo.

OUR existing civil war is separating us as a nation, not only from our own past, but also from the Old World. The Revolution, the war of 1812, though dividing us politically from England, left us still provincials. And this was natural, for nationality is not the growth of a night; it is not to be created by a declaration of independence; it is not of regular procedure, or the product of calculable forces. Even to define it precisely is difficult. It may be said, in general, to be the sum of the differences, geographical, historical, political, and moral, which separate a people as a community from every other, — of those differences which modify the character of each individual, and the results of which are combined in the traits of national character. The consciousness of its existence is develop slowly, and it is long before the sentiment of nationality — the true foundation of patriotism — gains force over the hearts and convictions of a people. But this sentiment, when it has once taken root, is one of the most powerful of those by which human conduct is affected. It is a sentiment of the highest order, lifting men out of narrow and selfish individualism into a region where they behold their duties as members one of another, and as partakers of the general life of humanity, — the inheritors of the past, the trustees of the future. It is capable, indeed, of being perverted to low ends; its force may be reduced to the mean uses of mere vulgar politics; it may be narrowed into a bigoted and insolent pride, or degraded to the level of partisanship; but in its noblest exercise it is brought into close connection with religion, inspiring men to behold in the nation, not a mere conglomeration of individuals, with separate and clashing interests, but a marvellous, intricate organization, testifying to the wisdom and providence of Him who maketh and who ruleth the people.

Nothing shows more clearly how favorable were the elements of our social and political condition, how fortunate have been our circumstances, and how vigorous has been our growth, than that in less than a century we have become from colonies a nation, and have changed from Englishmen to Americans. And though the rebellion of the slaveholders might at first sight seem an indication to the contrary, it has really furnished the most substantial proof, not only of the existence of a true nationality in the people of the United States, but — and this has been one of the most important results of the war — of the existence among them of a sentiment of nationality capable of supplying a permanent motive for the performance of the most wearisome and difficult patriotic duties. The attack upon the life of the nation has been the means of exhibiting its indestructible vitality and astonishing vigor.

The chief external form in which nationality embodies itself is that of institutions; and the fact is not to be denied, that our political and social institutions proving themselves capable of bearing this enormous strain of rebellion, will have proved themselves the strongest the world has known, as they long since proved themselves the best fitted to secure and to promote independence, justice, prosperity, and happiness.

Founded as they are on the principle of respect for the rights of man, however much that principle may have been violated in practice, they are the only institutions of government under which, theoretically at least, every individual in the community is assured of the possession and enjoyment of all natural rights, of all the dignities and privileges of manhood; while, as a consequence of this, the community and the government are assured of the support and respect of every individual. There is under them no division of interest between classes, between those that make and administer and those that obey the laws. There are, it is true, difficulties and dangers inherent to our system as to every other. Its success thus far has been marvellous, but the continuance of its success depends on continually new conditions. Were our system to fail to-morrow, it would be from no inherent fault, but from some external and remediable cause. The final problem of popular government, in other words, of popular sovereignty, is constantly presenting itself under new forms for solution. It is a double problem, — to make law stronger than the passionate will of the multitude, and to secure to the permanent and intelligent will of the people its due expression in law, — to guard against the despotism of the many, of the few, or of one, — and it is this double problem which we are continually working out, and which generations to come will not cease to be required to work out for themselves. But we have already proved that the problem is capable of satisfactory solution by each generation, and that our system is essentially one of stability and regularity.

The contrast between such a system of politics and government as this, and those which exist as inheritances from the past in Europe, is almost complete. The political institutions of Europe are founded not on the broad, general principles of right, rest finally on no moral basis, but are established on the notion of privilege ; in other words, on the fallacy that a man or a class may justly, whether by right of birth or of force, possess political rights in which other men have no share. These institutions consequently do not protect and promote the interests of all alike, but only of a comparatively few individuals at the expense of the great multitude of the people.

No nation in Europe presents the aspect of a true community. One form or another of government and of institutions may be fitted for one or another nation, but no form of government and no institutions can be regarded as good or as permanent which establish unjust distinctions among men in those matters in which by nature they have equal rights.

There is then an irrepressible conflict between the Old World and the New. Europe is still feudal. America is democratic. The war is emphasizing this distinction. In maintaining the Union, or, in other words, in contending for the integrity of the institutions in which the distinctive principles of our nationality have taken form, we are destroying slavery, an institution contradictory to them in its nature, which, having been engrafted on our political system, was becoming irreconcilable with its permanence and was threatening its ruin. And in destroying slavery we are destroying the worst form of class-privilege, and a base and spurious counterfeit of aristocracy. In this contest we cannot fail to have our principles confirmed, and our confidence in our free democratic system quickened and made stronger. A man feels the worth of that for which he voluntarily suffers, and learns the real meaning of that to protect or maintain which he is forced to expose himself to death. We shall come out of this war with faith justly deepened in the principles of justice and liberty on which our institutions rest. We shall have new reason for trust in the political instincts and intentions of an instructed and intelligent people. We shall have given proof of the possession by a free popular government of those very qualities which it has been commonly though erroneously supposed such a government was incapable of exhibiting.

Ours is indeed no ideally perfect frame of government or of society. But it is founded on ideal principles, capable of practical application, and thus it affords opportunities of improvement according to the progress and elevation of the thoughts and desires of men. The moral nature of its fundamental ideas justifies us in believing it capable of indefinite development. Not yet are our people educated up to the great argument of their own principles; never will humanity, however educated, reach the fulness of justice, of liberty, of love. But as our people become more enlightened and more virtuous, they will find their institutions capable of adaptation to the new demands of their improved moral sense. Politics will be brought naturally into closer dependence upon morals, and the identity of the principles of American democracy with the abstract, eternal principles of right will be more clearly recognized and completely established.

On the other hand, the principles of the English political system not being those of abstract justice, the arrangements of society resulting from the practical application of these principles are not just. In striking opposition to our American theory, and to the tendency of our political action, the result of the unequal distribution of political power in England is to promote social justice and to increase popular liberty only so far as is consistent with the preservation of the privileges of the governing classes.

Such a difference necessarily separates the two countries widely; but it is obvious that the separation is increasing, not only by the widening divergence of political and social theory and practice, but also by a growing difference in the modes of thought and forms of opinion. The mental temper, the spiritual condition, of the two peoples are becoming more and more distinct. This difference is radical. It is evident in the insatiable curiosity with which the two nations regard each other, and in the increasing difficulty which each finds in comprehending the other. We seem no longer to be brothers,— hardly of the same stock. We are strangely near, still more strangely apart.

This separation, so far as it is the result of absolute difference of national character and of institutions resulting from it, is not matter of regret. Nations are the complements of each other. Their diversities secure the full development of humanity. Civilization, in its present stage at least, depends greatly for its progress on the combined results of these differences. "Nations redeem each other. They do for each other nationally very much what men of different characters do for each other morally in the intercourse of life." But if the separation be produced or aggravated by other circumstances than the real differences of national character,—if it be widened by unfair dealing, by jealousy, by selfish diplomacy, by force, — then indeed it becomes lamentable, for then the sympathy which should bind the nations together, in spite of differences, is weakened, and it may be destroyed. Underneath national diversity lies human similarity, — and it is the human element in life that is the constant quantity, outvaluing all the rest.

And though we have no reason for regret that our present war, by developing our national character, has widened the separation between us and England, there is reason for the deepest regret that circumstances arising out of the war have greatly diminished the sympathy between the two countries, have put them in almost a hostile attitude to each other, and have rendered doubtful what ought never to be called in doubt, — the continuance of peace between them. This condition of feeling is a misfortune not alone to England and America, but to the world. It has sprung mainly from the inevitable jealousy with which a declining aristocracy must regard a democratic community like ours, exhibiting for the first time its tremendous strength. This jealousy of the governing class has been heightened by the misconceptions of an astonishing ignorance, by the perversions of malice, and by the fact that the only class in England which has felt and exhibited sympathy with us in our present trials is that of the intelligent workingmen, upon whose democratic sentiments the oligarchy looks with not unnatural suspicion and alarm. The indigent and unenfranchised masses in England regard the constitution of their country with apathy, and the more active-minded of them with sullen disaffection. Our failure would be cited as the failure of the democratic system. Our success will be shared by the people all the world over. And thus the great body of the aristocracy, the wealthy, and those who live on the established order of things, true to the instinct of self-interest, have proved untrue to the cause of liberty to which England in better days was pledged, and have given the benefit of subterfuge, evasion, and sympathy to those rebels who would destroy, not only our nationality and freedom, but the best hopes of the oppressed and the poor in the Old World. It is the course of England as directed, not by her people, but by her oligarchy, that has parted us from her, that has widened the ocean between us, that has cut away one after another of those tenderest ties which no force and no conscious effort can bind again.

But in effecting this the ruling classes in England have done greater harm to themselves than to us. For, so far as their interests are those of the whole people of England, we are the only nation on the face of the globe which can be their real support and hearty ally. So far as the English rulers mean liberty, justice, law, and equal rights, so far they are our friends and we theirs by nature.

But though the aristocracy in England, the clergy of the Established Church, the men of letters, and the wealthy middle class generally, have been against us during this war, yet a few men have been found in each class to recognize that we are fighting the battles of the English people, and that patriotism, no less than reverence for liberty and for law, respect for the right, and faith in progress, called upon them to take part with us, and to give us not merely their sympathy, but their most strenuous efforts and most faithful service. They have had a hard duty to perform. They have shown, in a period of selfish and cynical reaction, that the qualities which have made England great are not wholly extinct, and, however large may be the debt of gratitude which America owes to them, England owes to them still more, for striving, and not unsuccessfully, to save her from the degradation and the danger to which her evil counsellors and our ill-wishers would have brought her.

Among the supporters of the cause of the Free States in England, those who understand the historical and moral elements of the rebellion and the true nature of our government are very few. The most ardent sympathy is frequently united with great misconceptions of facts, or with great ignorance of them. Lord Russell's epigram about "independence" and "empire" was the clever false statement of ignorance, far more than the invention of wilful malice. How, indeed, should truth be reached concerning matters so intricate, especially when it is the object of many individuals both at the North and in England to obscure the truth both of history and of the present time? A wrong cause must be supported by false arguments, and the false argument may persuade even good men that the wrong cause is right. Old lies have helped the new. It has been said in England, and the saying has been believed, that the newspaper press was independent. But the truth is, that the Times, the influence of which upon public impressions is hardly to be exaggerated, is as devoid of real independence as the Paris Moniteur or the New York Herald. It is not dependent in the same way, but it is not the less the organ of prepossession and of prejudice. At the very head-quarters of intelligence facts have been perverted, news has been garbled, fables have been invented, true statements have been denied and false ones affirmed, till it is more strange that there should be any among the English who take part with us than that there should be so few. If the estrangement between the two nations should widen until war shall ensue, the historian will trace one of its most important and most embittering sources in the daily repeated malignant falsehoods of that great newspaper which had established a firm despotism over the minds of the vast unthinking mass of the upper classes of English society.

Among the men in England who have most thoroughly studied and most clearly understand the real nature of the rebellion is Mr. Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford. And no man has shown a keener appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of our institutions, or a more genuine and hearty sympathy in our endeavors to protect and maintain those institutions, as the means and instrument by which freedom and justice may be secured, perpetuated, and extended. Writing with great vigor of style, which corresponds well to the vigor of his thought, and sure to be listened to not merely on account of the authority of his position, but also on account of the pith and force of his arguments, he has been one of the most constant and effective defenders of the Northern cause and of the course of the administration. In frequent letters to the press, especially to the Daily News, he has exposed the blunders or the falsehoods of the Times, and enlightened the public as to the causes and conditions of the war. With a talent for controversy perhaps unrivalled by any living writer in England, he has with sharp irony, or with still sharper moral indignation, cut through the masks of the Confederate slave-dealers and their friends, and torn off the infamous disguises with which they endeavored to make the worse appear the better cause. He has made clear the fact that the rebellion is one, not against the American government alone, and against the unity and life of one nation, but that it is an attack upon the very foundations of all government, a rebellion against law itself, and that its success would be the success of false opinions, subversive of the principles mainly characteristic of modern civilization. He has never ceased to urge upon England the adoption of a policy not only worthy of her honor and dignity, but also in accordance with her most inspiring traditions and her hereditary claims as the guardian of the oppressed, the foster-mother of liberty, and the fearless defender of the right.

Watching with the deep interest of a liberal political student the course of affairs and the current of public opinion in both countries, Mr. Smith has brought all the resources of his learning, as well as all the powers of his mind, to his great task. If the highest duty of a Professor of History be to apply the lessons of the past to the understanding of the present time, and in the conflict and confusion of contending forces and opinions to discover and set forth the truth, he has well performed it. His well-known essay on the relation of the Bible to Slavery affords an excellent instance of the wise use of historical studies. But the very question of the title, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery ?" is in itself a curious evidence of the extraordinary corruption of opinion wrought by slavery during the last few years. That an eminent Professor of History at Oxford should find it needful, for the sake of enlightening public opinion, to prove by elaborate historic and moral argument that the existence of slavery among the Jews in the time of Moses affords no ground of defence for slavery in the nineteenth century, and that the Christian religion is the natural enemy of slavery, — that such a man should publish such a treatise affords striking evidence of the low condition of moral feeling and of intelligence among the most enlightened and civilized people of the present time.

In this excellent essay, Mr. Smith has vindicated Christianity against that misinterpretation of its teachings, and that perversion of its spirit, by which the apologists of slavery have obscured the truth and corrupted religion. He has also found occasion to present a strong argument in favor of that community which, founded upon free labor, is inspired with the Christian idea that "the state is a brotherhood, of which all are equally recognized as members."

Mr. Smith's more recent "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Association" is a more popular, and, as covering the whole ground of the war, a more important production. No abler statement of our cause has appeared on either side of the Atlantic. It is written with such strength of feeling, with such sympathetic intelligence, with such accuracy and abundance of knowledge, and with such clear historic insight, as to excite just surprise as the production of a foreigner, viewing our institutions and conditions from across the ocean. Such a judgment upon our affairs is an indication of what the judgment of posterity upon this great epoch in our history is likely to be.

Had Mr. Goldwin Smith, however, never engaged in the discussion of American questions, his works in other fields of inquiry have given him so high a place among the younger generation of English men of letters, and he has displayed in them abilities of so rare and high an order, that American readers and thinkers could not long have remained ignorant of his reputation or indifferent to his writings.

It is now about four years since he published, one after another separately, and then collected in a small volume, a brief series of Lectures on Modern History, which established his position as one of the most liberal and soundest historical students in England. Perhaps no more valuable contribution to thought in this department of knowledge, and no more important discussion of the theory and philosophy of history, have appeared in England during the present period of renewed interest in the topic and controversy concerning it. The two Lectures "On the Study of History," and the one "On some Supposed Consequences of the Doctrine of Historical Progress," exhibit the leading historical views of Professor Smith, and display the most marked qualities of his intellect and character. It is one of the peculiarities of Mr. Goldwin Smith's writing, that it shows the qualities of his moral character with no less distinctness than those of his intellect, and while it excites the respect of the reader, it at the same time wins his sympathy and regard.

The first of the Lectures on the Study of History is, in the main, an examination of the claims of history to be regarded as an exact science, and a refutation of the hypothesis of the positive school, or, in other words, of those who assert that history is governed by necessary laws. The course of history, according to Professor Smith, does not allow us to infer from it a law of development, by which it may be ranked and studied among the inductive sciences, but, on the contrary, the true induction from the phenomena of history is the doctrine of the progress of mankind through the efforts of individuals. History is made up of the actions of men, and, as every man knows from his own consciousness, the actions of men are free. "Human actions, in history as in individual life and society, may and do present moral connections of the most intimate and momentous kind, but not that necessary sequence of causation on which alone science can be based." "Humanity advances by free effort, but is not developed by invariable laws, such as, when discovered, give birth to a new science."

This view of history, confirmed as it is not only by what we know of the external world, but also by its accordance with the nature, of man, not only as a physical, but as a spiritual being, and its harmony with our highest conceptions of the Divine nature and the purposes of God in the creation of the world, commends itself alike to common sense and to religious sentiment. It gives us a philosophy of history, though it deprives us of a science. It accounts for and leaves room for the influence of the moral nature, and it gives meaning to the two grand facts in the life of the world, — the division of nations and the succession of ages. This religious theory of history covers all the facts, the physical view of the world covers the physical facts alone.

In the second Lecture Mr. Goldwin Smith develops this philosophy of history with great breadth of view, fertility of illustration, clearness of statement, and moral earnestness. The conclusion of this Lecture is in a noble strain of eloquence; we can quote but the last admirable words.

> "That the human race is in a real sense one; that its efforts are common, and tend in some measure to a joint result; that its several members may stand in the eye of their Maker, not only as individual agents, but as contributors to this joint result, — is a doctrine which our reason, perhaps, finds something to support, and which our hearts readily accept. It unites us not only in sympathy, but in real interest, with the generations that are to come after us, as well as with those that have gone before us; it makes each generation, each man, a partaker in the wealth of all; it encourages us to sow a harvest which we shall reap, not with our own hands, indeed, but by the hands of those that come after us; it at once represses selfish ambition and stimulates the desire of earning the gratitude of our kind; it strengthens all social and regulates all personal desires; it limits, and by limiting sustains effort, and calms the passionate craving to grasp political perfection or final truth; it fills up the fragment, gives fruitfulness to effort apparently wasted, and covers present failure with ultimate success; it turns the deaths of states, as of men, into incidents in one vast life; and quenches the melancholy which flows from the ruins of the past, — that past into which we too are sinking, just when great things seem about to come."

The solidity of the foundation upon which the philosophy of history maintained by Mr. Goldwin Smith is constructed, and the truth of its main elements, are confirmed by the fact that it rests in great part upon "the doctrine that the Human Morality is identical with the Divine, and that the moral nature of man points truly, though remotely, to that of God," — a doctrine which forms the basis not only of the philosophy of history, but also of rational religion itself. Mr. Smith was led to emphasize and insist the more strongly upon this doctrine, because it had recently been ably though indirectly controverted by Mr. Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures for 1858, on the Limits of Religious Thought. In publishing his two Lectures on the Study of History, Mr. Smith appended a postscript defending the doctrine of the identity of the Divine and Human Morality against the arguments of the Bampton Lecturer, by showing that the opposite doctrines would, if logically carried out, lead to the absurdity of atheism. To this postscript Mr.

Mansel published a reply, vindicating his doctrine against the conclusions which had been drawn from it. To this reply Mr. Smith answered in the volume entitled "Rational Religion," which drew from Mr. Mansel a second letter, and with this the controversy ended. The discussion was conducted upon both sides with ability. It was not a dispute in regard to individual opinions, but it regarded the very foundations of religion and morality, and presented the last phase of the old controversy between the advocates of reason and those of authority in matters of religion,—between those who have faith in the free thought of man as the means by which he can attain to intelligible and consistent, however incomplete, notions of the nature and attributes of the Divine Being, and those who, denying to him this power, found upon a negative philosophy the doctrine of an incomprehensible God. The opposite tendencies of thought in England at the present time, and the divergence between the two schools of religious philosophy, were distinctly marked by this controversy between men alike eminent in their respective spheres. Mr. Mansel met Mr. Smith's objections to his views with an appeal to the consent of ecclesiastical authorities; an appeal to which there could be but one answer. As the champion of the liberal cause, Professor Smith showed that he had cut himself loose from the bonds of ancient error and traditional creeds, while he struck blows of telling effect against those who fight intrenched behind the figments of metaphysics and scholasticism, armed with the weapons furnished from the full armory of human creeds. But the very freedom and vigor with which he contended,—his confidence in the power of reason, his eager impatience of the mere subtleties of metaphysical disputation,—occasionally exposed him to the keen thrusts of so accomplished a dialectician, so acute and learned a disputant, as Mr. Mansel. But the opponents were not unequally matched, for if superior skill in the use of metaphysical argument was on the one side, the force of rational conviction was upon the other.

In the Lecture on "Some supposed Consequences of the Doctrine of Historical Progress," Mr. Smith shows the harmony of this doctrine with the truths of Christianity, and the support it derives, not only from the teachings, but also from the character of Christ, and exposes some of the crudities and errors of the theories of Comte, and of the other Positivists. The portion of this Lecture devoted to the development of the author's view of the character, teaching, and life of Christ in their relation to the progress of mankind, is a remarkable expression of its author's character as indicated in its manly freedom of thought, its eloquent dignity of tone, its spiritual insight, and comprehensive wisdom.

The concluding Lecture in the volume is a very admirable one on "The Foundation of the American Colonies." The volume is out of print in England, but we trust that it may be reprinted in this country, where it would find a large circle of readers.

In 1861 Professor Smith published his essay on Irish History and Irish Character. It is a brief sketch of the history of Ireland, and of the relation between the history and the character of the Irish people, from the earliest period to the present time. This difficult and thorny subject is treated with a fairness of judgment, an historic learning, a sound common sense, and a right feeling, that are not surpassed in the works of any English historian. The essay is a model of condensation and clearness of statement. It is written in a style exceedingly attractive from its simplicity and animation, illumined by the flashes of moral indignation and the pure light of Christian liberality and charity. It is a book for the statesman as well as for the student of history, in the New World as well as in the Old; for in America half the Irish people have at last found the just laws, the equal rights, the religious and political freedom, which have been denied them in their own land. Calamity after calamity has driven them into happy exile, and here at length the wrongs of centuries are redressed. The effect of the sudden influx of a people so long misgoverned, and whose progress was arrested at an almost primitive stage, the effect, moreover, of the mingling of so large an element of a race foreign to our own, upon our habits and our institutions, deserve more careful study and consideration than they have received, and this treatise of Professor Smith's affords means for forming correct opinions of the character of a people that already takes so large a part in the conduct of our political affairs, and in our industrial, social, and domestic life.

The volume called "The Empire" contains a series of letters published in "The Daily News" in 1862 and 1863, treating of the relations between England and her various colonies and dependencies. The first letter was occasioned by the affair of the Trent, which revealed the precariousness of the existing connection between Canada and England, — and the main argument of the volume is that of Colonial Emancipation. In Professor Smith's view, the colonies and dependencies of England, with very small exception, are sources, not of strength, but of weakness; and the present system is maintained, not for the advantage of England, but to the real diminution of her power, for the benefit of a class, and for the gratification of a false pride of empire. The question is one of the most important to England in the whole range of those which relate to her honor, her glory, her prestige, and her prosperity; and it is not strange that the opinions of Mr. Goldwin Smith are not regarded with favor by the large class who hold the false notion that the glory and power and prosperity of a nation are dependent upon, and synonymous with, the extent of territory over which she holds direct dominion. But to those of juster and more enlightened thought, who apprehend the true sources of national greatness, Mr. Smith will not seem unpatriotic or extravagant in arguing that England would be vastly stronger, both in material power and in moral influence, as the mother of free, self-governing nations in Canada, in Australia, in New Zealand, or elsewhere, than as the mistress of colonies which she can neither govern well nor sufficiently protect, of colonies which are an annual charge upon her own resources, and whose independence and political and material progress are all alike impeded by their unnecessary connection with her.

The prevailing characteristic of this, as of Mr. Smith's other works, is its philosophic breadth of view and good common sense; all his books illustrate his own maxim, that "History is a mere string of facts without moral philosophy, and without history philosophy is apt to become a dream." He stands in the very front ranks of the intelligent, enlightened liberals of England, and his views are indications of the course which public opinion is likely to take, rather than an exposition of its present condition. He writes as one of the small class of the leaders of thought, and in the definiteness of his opinions on many of the most important subjects of thought it is probable that he stands nearly alone among his own class. He is a liberal by nature and by conviction, in religion and in politics, and has fairly thought his way out of social and political feudalism, and out of that state Church which is its religious complement. Such a man is naturally in sympathy with the principles and objects of American institutions, with the better hopes, purposes, and aspirations of the American people. He has studied history too deeply and with too clear a mind not to recognize that the American state represents, better than any other, a true community; that it represents, imperfectly it may be, but still in increasing measure, the highest ideal of a state to which human conceptions have attained, — the ideal of a people enjoying freedom under self-imposed law, seeking justice in political and social arrangements, and sharing alike the benefits and the burdens of the social union. The American commonwealth has, in part at least, to use his own words, "solved a great problem for humanity; — the full rights of citizenship have been conferred on a whole people; a real community has been called into being, ... and American institutions have received that which is the best practical stamp of excellence, — the loyal attachment of a perfectly free people." Not yet are the results of this great novelty in history fully developed, not yet is the fulfilment of hope; but even now, in spite of all the calamities which beset and all which still await our state, the hearts of the lovers of mankind cannot fail to be with that nation which more than any other bears in the bark of its fortunes the political and the religious hopes of man.

And it is because Mr. Goldwin Smith is not merely a wise political student, but a true lover of mankind, that he has stood firmly by us in our great contest, and fought manfully for us against the bigotry, the falsehood, the malignity with which our cause has been assailed in England. Therefore it is that with full confidence he has given us his sympathy and his strength; and while other men, professed lovers of liberty and of justice, have failed us, he has striven with unwavering fidelity to rouse the better mind of England, to quicken her nobler instincts, and to waken her to a sense of the wrongs she was inflicting on us, and the injury she was inflicting on herself, in recklessly loosing the bonds by which the two nations should be indissolubly connected in interest, in respect, and in affection.

America is not ungrateful to him who thus serves her, and in serving her promotes the universal cause of liberty and justice. She pays to him the tribute of heartiest gratitude. She welcomes him, not as a stranger, but as a son.

In that long distant future when, in the grand federation of the world, the day of lasting peace shall dawn, the name of Goldwin Smith shall be remembered as of one who labored to speed the coming of that better time.

ART. VIII.—*The Works of* NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 16 vols. 12mo.

THE traveller by the Eastern Railroad, from Boston, reaches in less than an hour the old town of Salem, Massachusetts. It is chiefly composed of plain wooden houses, but it has a quaint air of past provincial grandeur, and has indeed been an important commercial town. The first American ship for Calcutta and China sailed from this port; and Salem ships opened our trade with New Holland and the South Seas. But its glory has long since departed, with that of its stately and respectable neighbors, Newburyport and Portsmouth. There is still, however, a custom-house in Salem, there are wharves, and chandlers' shops, and a faint show of shipping, and an air of marine capacity which no apparent result justifies. It sits upon the shore like an antiquated sea-captain, grave and silent, in tarpaulin and duck trousers, idly watching the ocean upon which he will never sail again.

But this touching aspect of age and lost prosperity merely serves to deepen the peculiar impression of the old city, which is not derived from its former commercial importance, but from other associations. Salem village was a famous place in the Puritan annals. The tragedy of the witchcraft tortures and murders has cast upon it a ghostly spell, from which it seems never to have escaped; and even the sojourner of to-day, as he loiters along the shore in the sunniest morning of June, will sometimes feel an icy breath in the air, chilling the very marrow of his bones. Nor is he consoled by being told that it is only the east wind; for he cannot help believing that an invisible host of Puritan spectres have breathed upon him, revengeful, as he poached upon their ancient haunts.

The Puritan spirit was neither gracious nor lovely, but nothing softer than its iron hand could have done its necessary work. The Puritan character was narrow, intolerant, and exasperating. The forefathers were very "sour" in the estimation of Morton and his merry company at Mount Wollaston. But for all that, Bradstreet and Carver and Winthrop were better forefathers than the gay Morton, and the Puritan spirit is doubtless the moral influence of modern civilization, both in Old and New England. By the fruit let the seed be judged. The State to whose rough coast the Mayflower came, and in which the Pilgrim spirit has been most active, is to-day the chief of all human societies, politically, morally, and socially. It is the community in which the average of well-being is higher than in any state we know in history. Puritan though it be, it is more truly liberal and free than any large community in the world. But it had bleak beginnings. The icy shore, the sombre pines, the stealthy savages, the hard soil, the unbending religious austerity, the Scriptural severity, the arrogant virtues, the angry intolerance of contradiction, — they all made a narrow strip of sad civilization between the pitiless sea and the remorseless forests. The moral and physical tenacity which is wrestling with the Rebellion was toughened among these flinty and forbidding rocks. The fig, the pomegranate, and the almond would not grow there, nor the nightingale sing; but nobler men than its children the sun never shone upon, nor has the heart of man heard sweeter music than the voices of James Otis and Samuel Adams. Think of Plymouth in 1620, and of Massachusetts to-day! Out of strength came forth sweetness.

With some of the darkest passages in Puritan history this old town of Salem, which dozes apparently with the most peaceful conscience in the world, is identified, and while its Fourth of July bells were joyfully ringing sixty years ago Nathaniel Hathorne was born. He subsequently chose to write the name Hawthorne, because he thought he had discovered that it was the original spelling. In the Introduction to "The Scarlet Letter," Hawthorne speaks of his ancestors as coming from Europe in the seventeenth century, and establishing themselves in Salem, where they served the state and propitiated Heaven by joining in the persecution of Quakers and witches. The house known as the Witch House is still standing on the corner of Summer and Essex Streets. It was built in 1642 by Captain George Corwin, and here in 1692 many of the unfortunates who were palpably guilty of age and ugliness were examined by the Honorable Jonathan Curwin, Major Gedney, Captain John Higginson, and John Hathorn, Esquire.

The name of this last worthy occurs in one of the first and most famous of the witch trials,— that of "Goodwife Cory," in March, 1692, only a month after the beginning of the delusion at the house of the minister Parris. Goodwife Cory was accused by ten children, of whom Elizabeth Parris was one; they declared that they were pinched by her, and strangled, and that she brought them a book to sign. "Mr. Hathorn, a magistrate of Salem," says Robert Calef, in "More Wonders of the Invisible World," "asked her why she afflicted these children. She said she did not afflict them. He asked her who did then. She said, I do not know; how should I know? She said they were poor, distracted creatures, and no heed ought to be given to what they said. Mr. Hathorn and Mr. Noyes replied, that it was the judgment of all that were there present that they were bewitched, and only she (the accused) said they were distracted. She was accused by them that the *black man* whispered to her in her ear now (while she was upon examination), and that she had a yellow bird that did use to suck between her fingers, and that the said bird did suck now in the assembly." John Hathorn and Jonathan Curwin were "the Assistants" of Salem village, and held most of the examinations and issued the warrants. Justice Hathorn was very swift in judgment, holding every accused person guilty in every particular. When poor Jonathan Cary of Charlestown attended his wife charged with witchcraft before Justice Hathorn, he requested that he might hold one of her hands, "but it was denied me. Then she desired me to wipe the tears from her eyes and the sweat from her face, which I did; then she desired that she might lean herself on me, saying she should faint. Justice Hathorn replied, she had strength enough to torment these persons, and she should have strength enough to stand. I speaking something against their cruel proceedings, they commanded me to be silent, or else I should be turned out of the room." What a piteous picture of the awful Colonial Inquisition and the village Torquemada! What a grim portrait of an ancestor to hang in your memory, and to trace your kindred to!

Hawthorne's description of his ancestors in the Introduction to "The Scarlet Letter" is very delightful. As their representative, he declares that he takes shame to himself for their sake, on account of these relentless persecutions; but he thinks them earnest and energetic. "From father to son, for above a hundred years, they followed the sea; a gray-headed shipmaster, in each generation, retiring from the quarter-deck to the homestead, while a boy of fourteen took the hereditary place before the mast, confronting the salt spray and the gale, which had blustered against his sire and grandsire. The boy also, in due time, passed from the forecastle to the cabin, spent a tempestuous manhood, and returned from his world-wanderings, to grow old, and die, and mingle his dust with the natal earth." Not all, however, for the last of the line of sailors, Captain Nathaniel Hathorne, who married Elizabeth Clarke Manning, died at Calcutta after the birth of three children, a boy and two girls. The house in which the boy was born is still standing upon Union Street, which leads to the Long Wharf, the chief seat of the old foreign trade of Salem. The next house, with a back entrance on Union Street, is the Manning house, where many years of the young Hawthorne's life were spent in the care of his Uncle Robert Manning. He lived often upon an estate belonging to his mother's family, in the town of Raymond, near Sebago Lake, in Maine. The huge house there was called Manning's Folly, and is now said to be used as a meeting-house. His uncle sent Hawthorne to Bowdoin College, where he graduated in 1825. A correspondent of the Boston Daily Advertiser, writing from Bowdoin at the late Commencement, says that he had recently found "in an old drawer" some papers which proved to be the manuscript "parts" of the students at the Junior exhibition of 1824; among them was Hawthorne's "De Patribus Conscriptis Romanorum." "It is quite brief," writes the correspondent, "but is really curious as perhaps the only college exercise in existence of the great tragic writer of our day (has there been a greater since Shakespeare ?). The last sentence is as follows; note the words which I put in italics: 'Augustus equidem antiquam magnificentiam patribus reddidit, *sed fulgor tantum fuit sine fervore.* Nunquam in republica senatoribus potestas recuperata, postremum species etiam amissa est.' On the same occasion Longfellow had the salutatory oration in Latin, — 'Oratio Latina; — Anglici Poetæ.'"

Hawthorne has given us a charming glimpse of himself as a college boy in the letter to his fellow-student, Horatio Bridge of the Navy, whose "Journal of an African Cruiser" he afterward edited. "I know not whence your faith came; but while we were lads together at a country college, — gathering blueberries, in study-hours, under those tall academic pines; or watching the great logs, as they tumbled along the current of the Androscoggin; or shooting pigeons and gray-squirrels in the woods; or bat-fowling in the summer twilight; or catching trouts in that shadowy little stream which, I suppose, is still wandering riverward through the forest — though you and I will never cast a line in it again, — two idle lads, in short (as we need not fear to acknowledge now), doing a hundred things that the Faculty never heard of, or else it had been the worse for us, — still it was your prognostic of your friend's destiny, that he was to be a writer of fiction." From this sylvan university Hawthorne came home to Salem; "as if," he wrote later, "Salem were for me the inevitable centre of the universe."

The old witch-hanging city had no weirder product than this dark-haired son. He has certainly given it an interest which it must otherwise have lacked; but he speaks of it with small affection, considering that his family had lived there for centuries. "An unjoyous attachment," he calls it. And, to tell the truth, there was evidently little love lost between the little city and its most famous citizen. Stories still float in the social gossip of the town, which represent the shy author as inaccessible to all invitations to dinner and tea; and while the pleasant circle awaited his coming in the drawing-room, the impracticable man was — at least so runs the tale — quietly hobnobbing with companions to whom his fame was unknown. Those who coveted him as a phœnix could never get him, while he gave himself freely to those who saw in him only a placid barn-door fowl. The sensitive youth was a recluse, upon whose imagination had fallen the gloomy mystery of Puritan life and character. Salem was the inevitable centre of his universe more truly than he thought. The mind of Justice Hathorn's descendant was bewitched by the fascination of a certain devilish subtlety working under the comeliest aspects in human affairs. It overcame him with strange sympathy. It colored and controlled his intellectual life.

Devoted all day to lonely reverie and musing upon the obscurer spiritual passages of the life whose monuments he constantly encountered, that musing became inevitably morbid. With the creative instinct of the artist, he wrote the wild fancies into form as stories, many of which, when written, he threw into the fire. Then, after nightfall, stealing out from his room into the silent streets of Salem, and shadowy as the ghosts with which to his susceptible imagination the dusky town was thronged, he glided beneath the house in which the witch-trials were held, or across the moonlight hill upon which the witches were hung, until the spell was complete. Nor can we help fancying that, after the murder of old Mr. White in Salem, which happened within a few years after his return from college, which drew from Mr. Webster his most famous criminal plea, and filled a shadowy corner of every museum in New England, as every shivering little man of that time remembers, with an awful reproduction of the scene in wax-figures, with real sheets on the bed, and the murderer in a glazed cap stooping over to deal the fatal blow, — we cannot help fancying that the young recluse who walked by night, the wizard whom as yet none knew, hovered about the house, gazing at the windows of the fatal chamber, and listening in horror for the faint whistle of the confederate in another street.

Three years after he graduated, in 1828, he published anonymously a slight romance with the motto from Southey, "Wilt thou go with me?" Hawthorne never acknowledged the book, and it is now seldom found; but it shows plainly the natural bent of his mind. It is a dim, dreamy tale, such as a Byron-struck youth of the time might have written, except for that startling self-possession of style and cold analysis of passion, rather than sympathy with it, which showed no imitation, but remarkable original power. The same lurid gloom overhangs it that shadows all his works. It is uncanny; the figures of the romance are not persons, they are passions, emotions, spiritual speculations. So the "Twice-told Tales," that seem at first but the pleasant fancies of a mild recluse, gradually hold the mind with a Lamia-like fascination; and the author says truly of them, in the Preface of 1851, "Even in what purport to be pictures of actual life, we have allegory not always so warmly dressed in its habiliments of flesh and blood as to be taken into the reader's mind without a shiver." There are sunny gleams upon the pages, but a strange, melancholy chill pervades the book. In "The Wedding Knell," "The Minister's Black Veil," "The Gentle Boy," "Wakefield," "The Prophetic Pictures," "The Hollow of the Three Hills," "Dr. Heidegger's Experiment," "The Ambitious Guest," "The White Old Maid," "Edward Fane's Rose-bud," "The Lily's Quest," — or in the "Legends of the Province House," where the courtly provincial state of governors and ladies glitters across the small, sad New England world, whose very baldness jeers it to scorn, — there is the same fateful atmosphere in which Goody Cloyse might at any moment whisk by upon her broomstick, and in which the startled heart stands still with unspeakable terror.

The spell of mysterious horror which kindled Hawthorne's imagination was a test of the character of his genius. The mind of this child of witch-haunted Salem loved to hover between the natural and the supernatural, and sought to tread the almost imperceptible and doubtful line of contact. He instinctively sketched the phantoms that have the figures of men, but are not human; the elusive, shadowy scenery which, like that of Gustave Doré's pictures, is Nature sympathizing in her forms and aspects with the emotions of terror or awe which the tale excites. His genius broods entranced over the evanescent phantasmagoria of the vague debatable land in which the realities of experience blend with ghostly doubts and wonders.

But from its poisonous flowers what a wondrous perfume he distilled! Through his magic reed, into what penetrating melody he blew that deathly air! His relentless fancy seemed to seek a sin that was hopeless, a cruel despair that no faith could throw off. Yet his naive and well-poised genius hung over the gulf of blackness, and peered into the pit with the steady nerve and simple face of a boy. The mind of the reader follows him with an aching wonder and admiration, as the bewildered old mother forester watched Undine's gambols. As Hawthorne describes Miriam in "The Marble Faun," so may the character of his genius be most truly indicated. Miriam, the reader will remember, turns to Hilda and Kenyon for sympathy. "Yet it was to little purpose that she approached the edge of the voiceless gulf between herself and them. Standing on the utmost verge of that dark chasm, she might stretch out her hand and never clasp a hand of theirs; she might strive to call out, 'Help, friends! help!' but, as with dreamers when they shout, her voice would perish inaudibly in the remoteness that seemed such a little way. This perception of an infinite, shivering solitude, amid which we cannot come close enough to human beings to be warmed by them, and where they turn to cold, chilly shapes of mist, is one of the most forlorn results of any accident, misfortune, crime, or peculiarity of character, that puts an individual ajar with the world."

Thus it was because the early New England life made so much larger account of the supernatural element than any other modern civilized society, that the man whose blood had run in its veins instinctively turned to it. But beyond this alluring spell of its darker and obscurer individual experience, it seems neither to have touched his imagination nor even to have aroused his interest. To Walter Scott the romance of feudalism was precious, for the sake of feudalism itself, in which he believed with all his soul, and for that of the heroic old feudal figures which he honored. He was a Tory in every particle of his frame, and his genius made him the poet of Toryism. But Hawthorne had apparently no especial political, religious, or patriotic affinity with the spirit which inspired him. It was solely a fascination of the intellect. And although he is distinctively the poet of the Puritans, although it is to his genius that we shall always owe that image of them which the power of "The Scarlet Letter" has imprinted upon literature, and doubtless henceforth upon historical interpretation, yet what an imperfect picture of that life it is! All its stern and melancholy romance is there, — its picturesque gloom and intense passion; but upon those quivering pages, as in every passage of his stories drawn from that spirit, there seems to be wanting a deep, complete, sympathetic appreciation of the fine moral heroism, the spiritual grandeur, which overhung that gloomy life, as a delicate purple mist suffuses in summer twilights the bald crags of the crystal hills. It is the glare of the Scarlet Letter itself, and all that it luridly reveals and weirdly implies, which produced the tale. It was not beauty in itself, nor deformity, not virtue nor vice, which engaged the author's deepest sympathy. It was the occult relation between the two. Thus while the Puritans were of all men pious, it was the instinct of Hawthorne's genius to search out and trace with terrible tenacity the dark and devious thread of sin in their lives.

Human life and character, whether in New England two hundred years ago or in Italy to-day, interested him only as they were touched by this glamour of sombre spiritual mystery; and the attraction pursued him in every form in which it appeared. It is as apparent in the most perfect of his smaller tales, "Rappaccini's Daughter," as in "The Scarlet Letter," "The Blithedale Romance," "The House of the Seven Gables," and "The Marble Faun." You may open almost at random, and you are as sure to find it, as to hear the ripple in Mozart's music, or the pathetic minor in a Neapolitan melody. Take, for instance, "The Birth-Mark," which we might call the best of the smaller stories, if we had not just said the same thing of "Rappaccini's Daughter," — for so even and complete is

Hawthorne's power, that, with few exceptions, each work of his, like Benvenuto's, seems the most characteristic and felicitous. In this story, a scholar marries a beautiful woman, upon whose face is a mark which has hitherto seemed to be only a greater charm. Yet in one so lovely the husband declares that, although it is the slightest possible defect, it is yet the mark of earthly imperfection, and he proceeds to lavish all the resources of science to procure its removal. But it will not disappear; and at last he tells her that the crimson hand "has clutched its grasp" into her very being, and that there is mortal danger in trying the only means of removal that remains. She insists that it shall be tried. It succeeds; but it removes the stain and her life together. So in "Rappaccini's Daughter." The old philosopher nourishes his beautiful child upon the poisonous breath of a flower. She loves, and her lover is likewise bewitched. In trying to break the spell, she drinks an antidote which kills her. The point of interest in both stories is the subtile connection, in the first, between the beauty of Georgiana and the taint of the birth-mark; and, in the second, the loveliness of Beatrice and the poison of the blossom.

This, also, is the key of his last romance, "The Marble Faun," one of the most perfect works of art in literature, whose marvellous spell begins with the very opening words: "Four individuals, in whose fortunes we should be glad to interest the reader, happened to be standing in one of the saloons of the sculpture-gallery in the Capitol at Rome." When these words are read, the mind familiar with Hawthorne is already enthralled. What a journey is beginning, not a step of which is trodden, and yet the heart palpitates with apprehension! Through what delicate, rosy lights of love, and soft, shimmering humor, and hopes and doubts and vanishing delights, that journey will proceed, on and on into utter gloom. And it does so, although "Hilda had a hopeful soul, and saw sunlight on the mountain-tops." It does so, because Miriam and Donatello are the figures which interest us most profoundly, and they are both lost in the shadow. Donatello, indeed, is the true centre of interest, as he is one of the most striking creations of genius. But the perplexing charm of Donatello, what is it but the doubt that does not dare to breathe itself, the appalled wonder whether, if the breeze should lift those clustering locks a little higher, he would prove to be faun or man? It never does lift them; the doubt is never solved, but it is always suggested. The mystery of a partial humanity, morally irresponsible but humanly conscious, haunts the entrancing page. It draws us irresistibly on. But as the cloud closes around the lithe figure of Donatello, we hear again from its hidden folds the words of "The Birth-Mark": "Thus ever does the gross fatality of earth exult in its invariable triumph over the immortal essence, which, in this dim sphere of half-development, demands the completeness of a higher state." Or still more sadly, the mysterious youth, half vanishing from our sympathy, seems to murmur, with Beatrice Rappaccini, "And still as she spoke, she kept her hand upon her heart,—'Wherefore didst thou inflict this miserable doom upon thy child?'"

We have left the story of Hawthorne's life sadly behind. But his life had no more remarkable events than holding office in the Boston Custom-House under Mr. Bancroft as Collector; working for some time with the Brook Farmers, from whom he soon separated, not altogether amicably; marrying and living in the old manse at Concord; returning to the Custom-House in Salem as Surveyor; then going to Lenox, in Berkshire, where he lived in what he called "the ugliest little old red farm-house that you ever saw," and where the story is told of his shyness, that, if he saw anybody coming along the road whom he must probably pass, he would jump over the wall into the pasture, and so give the stranger a wide berth; back again to Concord; then to Liverpool as Consul; travelling in Europe afterward, and home at last and forever, to "The Wayside" under the Concord hill. "The hillside," he wrote to a friend in 1852, "is covered chiefly with locust-trees, which come into luxuriant blossom in the month of June, and look and smell very sweetly, intermixed with a few young elms and some white-pines and infant oaks, the whole forming rather a thicket than a wood. Nevertheless, there is some very good shade to be found there; I spend delectable hours there in the hottest part of the day, stretched out at my lazy length with a book in my hand or an unwritten book in my thoughts. There is almost always a breeze stirring along the side or brow of the hill."

It is not strange, certainly, that a man such as has been described, of a morbid shyness, the path of whose genius diverged always out of the sun into the darkest shade, and to whom human beings were merely psychological phenomena, should have been accounted ungenial, and sometimes even hard, cold, and perverse. From the bent of his intellectual temperament it happens that in his simplest and sweetest passages he still seems to be studying and curiously observing, rather than sympathizing. You cannot help feeling constantly that the author is looking askance both at his characters and you, the reader; and many a young and fresh mind is troubled strangely by his books, as if it were aware of a half-Mephistophelean smile upon the page. Nor is this impression altogether removed by the remarkable familiarity of his personal disclosures. There was never a man more shrinkingly retiring, yet surely never was an author more naively frank. He is willing that you should know all that a man may fairly reveal of himself. The great interior story he does not tell, of course, but the introduction to "The Mosses from an Old Manse," the opening chapter of "The Scarlet Letter," and the "Consular Experiences," with much of the rest of "Our Old Home," are as intimate and explicit chapters of autobiography as can be found. Nor would it be easy to find anywhere a more perfect idyl than that introductory chapter of the Mosses. Its charm is perennial and indescribable; and why should it not be, since it was written at a time in which, as he says, "I was happy"? It is, perhaps, the most softly-hued and exquisite work of his pen. So the sketch of "The Custom-House," although prefatory to that most tragically powerful of romances, "The Scarlet Letter," is an incessant play of the shyest and most airy humor. It is like the warbling of bobolinks before a thunder-burst. How many other men, however unreserved with the pen, would be likely to dare to paint, with the fidelity of Teniers and the simplicity of Fra Angelico, a picture of the office and the companions in which and with whom they did their daily work? The Surveyor of Customs in the port of Salem treated the town of Salem, in which he lived and discharged his daily task, as if it had been, with all its people, as vague and remote a spot as the town of which he was about to treat in the story. He commented upon the place and the people as modern travellers in Pompeii discuss the ancient town. It made a great scandal. He was accused of depicting with unpardonable severity worthy folks, whose friends were sorely pained and indignant. But he wrote such sketches as he wrote his stories. He treated his companions as he treated himself and all the personages in history or experience with which he dealt, merely as phenomena to be analyzed and described, with no more private malice or personal emotion than the sun, which would have photographed them, warts and all.

Thus it was that the great currents of human sympathy never swept him away. The character of his genius isolated him, and he stood aloof from the common interests. Intent upon studying men in certain aspects, he cared little for man; and the high tides of collective emotion among his fellows left him dry and untouched. So he beholds and describes the generous impulse of humanity with sceptical courtesy rather than with hopeful cordiality.

He does not chide you if you spend effort and life itself in the ardent van of progress, but he asks simply, "Is six so much better than half a dozen?" He will not quarrel with you if you expect the millennium to-morrow. He only says, with that glimmering smile, "So soon?" Yet in all this there was no shadow of spiritual pride. Nay, so far from this, that the tranquil and pervasive sadness of all Hawthorne's writings, the kind of heart-ache that they leave behind, seem to spring from the fact that his nature was related to the moral world, as his own Donatello was to the human. "So alert, so alluring, so noble," muses the heart as we climb the Apennines toward the tower of Monte Beni; — "alas! is he human?" it whispers, with a pang of doubt.

How this directed his choice of subjects, and affected his treatment of them, when drawn from early history, we have already seen. It is not, therefore, surprising, that the history into which he was born interested him only in the same way.

When he went to Europe as Consul, "Uncle Tom's Cabin" was already published, and the country shook with the fierce debate which involved its life. Yet eight years later Hawthorne wrote with calm ennui, "No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty of writing a romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity, in broad and simple daylight, as is happily the case with my dear native land." Is crime never romantic, then, until distance ennobles it? Or were the tragedies of Puritan life so terrible that the imagination could not help kindling, while the pangs of the plantation are superficial and commonplace? Charlotte Brontë, Dickens, and Thackeray were able to find a shadow even in "merrie England." But our great romancer looked at the American life of his time with these marvellous eyes, and could see only monotonous sunshine. That the Devil, in the form of an elderly man clad in grave and decent attire, should lead astray the saints of Salem village, two centuries ago, and confuse right and wrong in the mind of Goodman Brown, was something that excited his imagination, and produced one of his weirdest stories. But that the same Devil, clad in a sombre sophism, was confusing the sentiment of right and wrong in the mind of his own countrymen he did not even guess. The monotonous sunshine disappeared in the blackest storm. The commonplace prosperity ended in tremendous war. What other man of equal power, who was not intellectually constituted precisely as Hawthorne was, could have stood merely perplexed and bewildered, harassed by the inability of positive sympathy, in the vast conflict which tosses us all in its terrible vortex?

In political theories and in an abstract view of war men may differ. But this war is not to be dismissed as a political difference. Here is an attempt to destroy the government of a country, not because it oppressed any man, but because its evident tendency was to secure universal justice under law. It is therefore a conspiracy against human nature. Civilization itself is at stake; and the warm blood of the noblest youth is everywhere flowing in as sacred a cause as history records, — flowing not merely to maintain a certain form of government, but to vindicate the rights of human nature. Shall there not be sorrow and pain, if a friend is merely impatient or confounded by it, — if he sees in it only danger or doubt, and not hope for the right, — or if he seem to insinuate that it would have been better if the war had been avoided, even at that countless cost to human welfare by which alone the avoidance was possible?

Yet, if the view of Hawthorne's mental constitution which has been suggested be correct, this attitude of his, however deeply it may be regretted, can hardly deserve moral condemnation. He knew perfectly well that, if a man has no ear for music, he had better not try to sing. But the danger with such men is, that they are apt to doubt if music itself be not a vain delusion. This danger Hawthorne escaped. There is none of the shallow persiflage of the sceptic in his tone, nor any affectation of cosmopolitan superiority. Mr. Edward Dicey, in his interesting reminiscences of Hawthorne, published in Macmillan's Magazine, illustrates this very happily.

> "To make his position intelligible, let me repeat an anecdote which was told me by a very near friend of his and mine, who had heard it from President Pierce himself. Frank Pierce had been, and was to the day of Hawthorne's death, one of the oldest of his friends. At the time of the Presidential election of 1856, Hawthorne, for once, took part in politics, wrote a pamphlet in favor of his friend, and took a most unusual interest in his success. When the result of the nomination was known, and Pierce was President-elect, Hawthorne was among the first to come and wish him joy. He sat down in the room moodily and silently, as he was wont when anything troubled him; then, without speaking a word, he shook Pierce warmly by the hand, and at last remarked, 'Ah, Frank, what a pity!' The moment the victory was won, that timid, hesitating mind saw the evils of the successful course, — the advantages of the one which had not been followed. So it was always. Of two lines of action, he was perpetually in doubt which was the best; and so, between the two, he always inclined to letting things remain as they are.
>
> "Nobody disliked slavery more cordially than he did; and yet the difficulty of what was to be done with the slaves weighed constantly upon his mind. He told me once, that, while he had been Consul at Liverpool, a vessel arrived there with a number of negro sailors, who had been brought from Slave States, and would, of course, be enslaved again on their return. He fancied that he ought to inform the men of the fact, but then he was stopped by the reflection, — who was to provide for them if they became free? and, as he said, with a sigh, 'while

I was thinking, the vessel sailed.' So, I recollect, on the old battle-field of Manassas, in which I strolled in company with Hawthorne, meeting a batch of runaway slaves, — weary, foot-sore, wretched, and helpless beyond conception; we gave them food and wine, some small sums of money, and got them a lift upon a train going northwards; but not long afterwards Hawthorne turned to me with the remark, 'I am not sure we were doing right after all. How can those poor beings find food and shelter away from home?' Thus this ingrained and inherent doubt incapacitated him from following any course vigorously. He thought, on the whole, that Wendell Phillips and Lloyd Garrison and the Abolitionists were in the right, but then he was never quite certain that they were not in the wrong after all; so that his advocacy of their cause was of a very uncertain character. He saw the best, to alter slightly the famous Horatian line, but he never could quite make up his mind whether he altogether approved of its wisdom, and therefore followed it but falteringly.

> 'Better to bear those ills we have,
> Than fly to others that we know not of,'

expressed the philosophy to which Hawthorne was thus borne imperceptibly. Unjustly, but yet not unreasonably, he was looked upon as a pro-slavery man, and suspected of Southern sympathies. In politics he was always halting between two opinions; or, rather, holding one opinion, he could never summon up his courage to adhere to it and it only."

The truth is, that his own times and their people and their affairs were just as shadowy to him as those of any of his stories, and his mind held the same curious, half-wistful poise among all the conflicts of principle and passion around him, as among those of which he read and mused. If you ask why this was so, — how it was that the tragedy of an old Italian garden, or the sin of a lonely Puritan parish, or the crime of a provincial judge, should so stimulate his imagination with romantic appeals and harrowing allegories, while either it did not see a Carolina slave-pen, or found in it only a tame prosperity, — you must take your answer in the other question, why he did not weave into any of his stories the black and bloody thread of the Inquisition. His genius obeyed its law. When he wrote like a disembodied intelligence of events with which his neighbors' hearts were quivering, — when the same half-smile flutters upon his lips in the essay "About War

Matters," sketched as it were upon the battle-field, as in that upon "Fire Worship," written in the rural seclusion of the mossy Manse, — ah me! it is Donatello, in his tower of Monte Beni, contemplating with doubtful interest the field upon which the flower of men are dying for an idea. Do you wonder, as you see him and hear him, that your heart, bewildered, asks and asks again, "Is he human? Is he a man?"

Now that Hawthorne sleeps by the tranquil Concord, upon whose shores the old Manse was his bridal bower, those who knew him chiefly there revert beyond the angry hour to those peaceful days. How dear the old Manse was to him, he has himself recorded; and in the opening of the "Tanglewood Tales" he pays his tribute to that placid landscape, which will always be recalled with pensive tenderness by those who, like him, became familiar with it in happy hours. "To me," he writes, "there is a peculiar, quiet charm in these broad meadows and gentle eminences. They are better than mountains, because they do not stamp and stereotype themselves into the brain, and thus grow wearisome with the same strong impression, repeated day after day. A few summer weeks among mountains, a lifetime among green meadows and placid slopes, with outlines forever new, because continually fading out of the memory, — such would be my sober choice." He used to say, in those days, — when, as he was fond of insisting, he was the obscurest author in the world, because, although he had told his tales twice, nobody cared to listen, — that he never knew exactly how he contrived to live. But he was then married, and the dullest eye could not fail to detect the feminine grace and taste that ordered the dwelling, and perceive the tender sagacity that made all things possible.

Such was his simplicity and frugality, that, when he was left alone for a little time in his Arcadia, he would dismiss "the help," and, with some friend of other days who came to share his loneliness, he cooked the easy meal, and washed up the dishes. No picture is clearer in the memory of a certain writer than that of the magician, in whose presence he almost lost his breath, looking at him over a dinner-plate which he was gravely wiping in the kitchen, while the handy friend, who had been a Western settler, scoured the kettle at the door. Blithedale, where their acquaintance had begun, had not allowed either of them to forget how to help himself. It was amusing to one who knew this native independence of Hawthorne,.to hear, some years afterward, that he wrote the "campaign" Life of Franklin Pierce for the sake of getting an office. That such a man should do such a work was possibly incomprehensible, to those who did not know him, upon any other supposition, until the fact was known that Mr. Pierce was an old and constant friend. Then it was explained. Hawthorne asked simply how he could help his friend; and he did the only thing he could do for that purpose. But although he passed some years in public office, he had neither taste nor talent for political life. He owed his offices to works quite other than political. His first and second appointments were virtually made by his friend Mr. Bancroft, and the third by his friend Mr. Pierce. His claims were perceptible enough to friendship, but would hardly have been so to a caucus.

In this brief essay we have aimed only to indicate the general character of the genius of Hawthorne, and to suggest a key to his peculiar relation to his time. The reader will at once see that it is rather the man than the author who has been described; but this has been designedly done, for we confess a personal solicitude, shared, we are very sure, by many friends of Nathaniel Hawthorne, that there shall not be wanting to the future student of his works such light as acquaintance with the man may throw upon them, as well as some picture of the impression his personality made upon his contemporaries.

Strongly formed, of dark, poetic gravity of aspect, lighted by the deep, gleaming eye that recoiled with girlish coyness from contact with your gaze; of rare courtesy and kindliness in personal intercourse, yet so sensitive that his look and manner can be suggested by the word glimmering; giving you a sense of restrained impatience to be away; mostly silent in society, and speaking always with an appearance of effort, but with a lambent light of delicate humor playing over all he said in the confidence of familiarity, and firm self-possession under all, as if the glimmering manner were only the tremulous surface of the sea, — Hawthorne was personally known to few, and intimately to very few. But no one knew him without loving him, or saw him without remembering him; and the name Nathaniel Hawthorne, which, when it was first written, was supposed to be fictitious, is now one of the most enduring facts of English literature.

ART. IX. — 1. *Platform of the Chicago Convention.* Public Journals, 30th August.

2. *Letter of General McClellan.* Ibid., 9th September.

THE spectacle of an opposition waiting patiently during several months for its principles to turn up, would be amusing in times less critical than these. Nor was this the worst. If there might be persons malicious enough to think that the Democratic party could get along very well without principles, all would admit that a candidate was among the necessaries of life. Now, where not only immediate policy, but the very creed which that policy is to embody, is dependent on circumstances, and on circumstances so shifting and doubtful as those of a campaign, it is hard to find a representative man whose name may, in some possible contingency, mean enough, without, in some other equally possible contingency, meaning too much. The problem was to hunt up somebody who, without being anything in particular, might be anything in general, as occasion demanded. Of course, the professed object of the party was to save their country, but which *was* their country, and which it would be most profitable to save, whether America or Secessia, was a question that Grant or Sherman might answer one way or the other in a single battle. If only somebody or something would tell them whether they were for war or peace! The oracles were dumb, and all summer long they looked anxiously out, like Sister Anne from her tower, for the hero who should rescue unhappy Columbia from the Republican Bluebeard. Did they see a cloud of dust in the direction of Richmond or Atlanta? Perhaps Grant might be the man, after all, or even Sherman would answer at a pinch. When at last no great man *would* come along, it was debated whether it would not be better to nominate some one without a record, as it is called, since a nobody was clearly the best exponent of a party that was under the unhappy necessity of being still uncertain whether it had any recognizable soul or not. Meanwhile the time was getting short and the public impatience peremptory.

> "Under *which* king, bezonian? Speak, or die!"

The party found it alike inconvenient to do the one or the other, and ended by a compromise which might serve to keep them alive till after election, but which was as far from any distinct utterance as if their mouths were already full of that official pudding which they hope for as the reward of their amphibological patriotism. Since it was not safe to be either for peace or war, they resolved to satisfy every reasonable expectation by being at the same time both and neither. If you are warlike, there is General McClellan; if pacific, surely you must be suited with Mr. Pendleton; if neither, the combination of the two makes a *tertium quid* that is neither one thing nor another. As the politic Frenchman, kissing the foot of St. Peter's statue (recast out of a Jupiter), while he thus did homage to existing prejudices, hoped that the Thunderer would remember him if he ever came into power again, so the Chicago Convention compliments the prevailing warlike sentiment of the country with a soldier, but holds the civilian quietly in reserve for the future contingencies of submission. The nomination is a kind of political *What-is-it?* and voters are expected, without asking impertinent questions, to pay their money and make their own choice as to the natural history of the animal. Looked at from the Northern side, it is a raven, the bird of carnage, to be sure, but whitewashed and looking as decorously dove-like as it can; from the Southern, it is a dove, blackened over for the nonce, but letting the olive-branch peep from under its wing.

A more delicate matter for a convention, however, even than the selection of candidates, is the framing of a platform for them to stand upon. It was especially delicate for a gathering which represented so many heterogeneous and almost hostile elements. So incongruous an assemblage has not been seen since the host of Peter the Hermit, unanimous in nothing but the hope of plunder and of reconquering the Holy Land of office. There were War Democrats ready to unite in peace resolutions, and Peace Democrats eager to move the unanimous nomination of a war candidate. To make the confusion complete, Mr. Franklin Pierce, the dragooner of Kansas, writes a letter in favor of free elections, and the maligners of New England propose a Connecticut Yankee as their favorite nominee. The Convention was a rag-bag of dissent, made up of bits so various in hue and texture that the managers must have been as much puzzled to arrange them in any kind of harmonious pattern, as the thrifty housewife in planning her coverlet out of the parings of twenty years' dressmaking. All the odds and ends of personal discontent, every shred of private grudge, every resentful rag snipped off by official shears, scraps of Rebel gray and leavings of Union blue, — all had been gathered, as if for the tailoring of Joseph's coat. That a Hebrew should be chosen to call this motley collection to order was a matter of instinct; and as a Chatham Street broker first carefully removes all marks of previous ownership from the handkerchiefs which find their way to his counter, so the temporary chairman advised his hearers, as a preliminary caution, to surrender their convictions. This, perhaps, was superfluous, for it may be doubted whether anybody present, except Mr. Fernando Wood, ever legally had one, though Captain Rynders must have brought many in his following who richly deserved it. Mr. Belmont, being chosen to represent the Democracy of Mammon, did little more than paraphrase in prose the speech of that fallen financier in another rebellious conclave, as reported by Milton: —

> "How in safety best we may
> Compose our present evils, with regard
> Of what we are and were, dismissing quite
> All thoughts of war."

But we turn from the momentary elevation of the banker, to follow the arduous labors of the Committee on Resolutions. The single end to be served by the platform they were to construct was that of a bridge over which their candidate might make his way into the White House. But it must be so built as to satisfy the somewhat exacting theory of construction held by the Rebel emissaries at Niagara, while at the same time no apprehensions as to its soundness must be awakened in the loyal voters of the party. The war plank would offend the one, the State-rights plank excite the suspicion of the other. The poor fellow in Æsop, with his two wives, one pulling out the black hairs and the other the white, was not in a more desperate situation than the Committee, — MacHeath between his two doxies, not more embarrassed. The result of their labors was, accordingly, as narrow as the pathway of the faithful into the Mahometan paradise, — so slender, indeed, that Blondin should have been selected as the only candidate who could hope to keep his balance on it, with the torrent of events rushing ever swifter and louder below. It might sustain the somewhat light Unionism and lighter reputation of Mr. Pendleton, but would General McClellan dare to trust its fragile footing, with his Report and his West Point oration, with his record, in short, under his arm? Without these documents, General McClellan is a nobody; with them, before he can step on a peace platform, he must eat an amount of leek that would have turned the stomach of Ancient Pistol himself. It remained to be seen whether he was more in favor of being President than of his own honor and that of the country.

The Resolutions of the Chicago Convention, though they denounce various wrongs and evils, some of them merely imaginary, and all the necessary results of civil war, propose only one thing, — surrender. Disguise it as you will, flavor it as you will, call it what you will, umble-pie is umble-pie, and nothing else. The people instinctively so understood it. They rejected with disgust a plan whose mere proposal took their pusillanimity for granted, and whose acceptance assured their self-contempt. At a moment when the Rebels would be checkmated in another move, we are advised to give them a knight and begin the game over again. If they are not desperate, what chance of their accepting offers which they rejected with scorn before the war began? If they are not desperate, why is their interest more intense in the result of our next Presidential election, than even in the campaign at their very doors? If they were not desperate, would two respectable men like

Messrs. Clay and Holcomb endure the society of George Saunders? General McClellan himself admitted the righteousness of the war by volunteering in it, and, the war once begun, the only real question has been whether the principle of legitimate authority or the wanton insurrection against it should prevail, — whether we should have for the future a government of opinion or of brute force. When the rebellion began, its leaders had no intention to dissolve the Union, but to reconstruct it, to make the Montgomery Constitution and Jefferson Davis supreme over the whole country, and not over a feeble fragment of it. They knew, as we knew, the weakness of a divided country, and our experience of foreign governments during the last four years has not been such as to lessen the apprehension on that score, or to make the consciousness of it less pungent in either of the contending sections. Even now, Jefferson Davis is said to be in favor of a confederation between the Free and the Slave States. But what confederation could give us back the power and prestige of the old Union? The experience of Germany surely does not tempt to imitation. And in making overtures for peace, with whom are we to treat? Talking vaguely about "the South," "the Confederate States," or "the Southern people," does not help the matter; for the cat under all this meal is always the *government* at Richmond, men with everything to expect from independence, with much to hope from reconstruction, and sure of nothing but ruin from reunion. And these men, who were arrogant as equals and partners, are to be moderate in dictating terms as conquerors! If the people understood less clearly the vital principle which is at hazard in this contest, if they were not fully persuaded that Slavery and State Rights are merely the counters, and that free institutions are the real stake, they might be deluded with the hope of compromise. But there are things that are not subjects of compromise. The honor, the conscience, the very soul of a nation, cannot be compromised without ceasing to exist. When you propose to yield a part of them, there is already nothing left to yield.

And yet this is all that the party calling itself Democratic, after months of deliberation, after four years in which to study the popular mind, have to offer in the way of policy. It is neither more nor less than to confess that they have no real faith in popular self-government, for it is to assume that the people have neither common nor moral sense. General McClellan is to be put in command of the national citadel, on condition that he immediately offers to capitulate. To accept the nomination on these terms was to lose, not only his election, but his self-respect. Accordingly, no sooner was the damaging effect of the platform evident, than it was rumored that he would consent to the candidacy, but reject the conditions on which alone it was offered. The singular uniform, half Union-blue and half Confederate-gray, in which it was proposed by the managers at Chicago to array the Democratic party, while it might be no novelty to some camp-followers of the New York delegation familiar with the rules of certain of our public institutions, could hardly be agreeable to one who had worn the livery of his country with distinction. It was the scene of Petruchio and the tailor over again: —

Gen. McC. "Why, what, i' th' Devil's name, tailor, call'st thou this?"
Committee. "You bid me make it orderly and well,
According to the fashion and the time."
Gen. McC. "Marry, I did; but, if you be remembered,
I did not bid you mar it to the time."

Between the nomination and the acceptance came the taking of Atlanta, marring the coat to the time with a vengeance, and suggesting the necessity of turning it, — a sudden cure which should rank among the first in future testimonials to the efficacy of Sherman's lozenges. Had General McClellan thrust the resolutions away from him with an honest scorn, we should have nothing to say save in commendation. But to accept them with his own interpretation, to put upon them a meaning utterly averse from their plain intention, and from that understanding of them which the journals of his own faction clearly indicated by their exultation or their silence, according as they favored Confederacy or Union, is to prepare a deception for one of the parties to the bargain. In such cases, which is commonly cheated, the candidate, or the people who vote for him? If the solemn and deliberate language of resolutions is to be interpreted by contraries, what rule of hermeneutics shall we apply to the letter of a candidate? If the

Convention meant precisely what they did not say, have we any assurance that the aspirant has not said precisely what he did not mean ? Two negatives may constitute an affirmative, but surely the affirmation of two contradictory propositions by parties to the same bargain assures nothing but misunderstanding.

The resolutions were adopted with but four dissenting votes; their meaning was obvious, and the whole country understood it to be peace on any conditions that would be condescended to at Richmond. If a nation were only a contrivance to protect men in gathering gear, if territory mean only so many acres for the raising of crops, if power be of worth only as a police to prevent or punish crimes against person and property, then peace for the mere sake of peace were the one desirable thing for a people whose only history would be written in its cash-book. But if a nation be a living unity, leaning on the past by tradition, and reaching toward the future by continued aspiration and achievement, — if territory be of value for the raising of men formed to high aims and inspired to noble deeds by that common impulse which, springing from a national ideal, gradually takes authentic shape in a national character, — if power be but a gross and earthy bulk till it be ensouled with thought and purpose, and of worth only as the guardian and promoter of truth and justice among men, — then there are misfortunes worse than war and blessings greater than peace. At this moment, not the Democratic party only, but the whole country, longs for peace, and the difference is merely as to the price that shall be paid for it. Shall we pay in degradation, and sue for a cessation of hostilities which would make chaos the rule and order the exception, which would not be peace, but toleration, not the repose of manly security, but the helpless quiet of political death ? Or shall we pay in a little more present suffering, self-sacrifice, and earnestness of purpose for a peace that shall be as lasting as honorable, won as it will be by the victory of right over wrong, and resting on the promise of God and the hope of man ? We believe the country has already made up its mind as to the answer, and will prove that a democracy may have as clear a conception of its interests and duties, as fixed a purpose in defending the one and fulfilling the other, a will as united and prompt, as have hitherto been supposed to characterize forms of government where the interests were more personal and the power less diffused.

Fortunately, though some of General McClellan's indiscreet friends would make the coming election to turn upon his personal quarrel with the Administration, the question at issue between the two parties which seek to shape the policy of the country is one which manifestly transcends all lesser considerations, and must be discussed in the higher atmosphere of principle, by appeals to the reason, and not the passions, of the people. However incongruous with each other in opinion the candidates of the Democratic party may be, in point of respectability they are unexceptionable. It is true, as one of the candidates represents war and the other peace, and "when two men ride on one horse, one must ride behind," that it is of some consequence to know which is to be in the saddle and which on the croup; but we will take it for granted that General McClellan will have no more delicacy about the opinions of Mr. Pendleton, than he has shown for those of the Convention. Still, we should remember that the General may be imprudent enough to die, as General Harrison and General Taylor did before him, and that Providence may again make "of our pleasant Vices whips to scourge us." We shall say nothing of the *sectional* aspect of the nomination, for we do not believe that what we deemed a pitiful electioneering clamor, when raised against our own candidates four years ago, becomes reasonable argument in opposing those of our adversaries now. The point of interest, then, is simply this: What can General McClellan accomplish for the country which Mr. Lincoln has failed to accomplish? In what respect would their policies differ? and, supposing them to differ, which would be most consistent with the honor and permanent well-being of the nation?

General McClellan, in his letter of acceptance, assumes that, in nominating him, "the record of his public life was kept in view" by the Convention. This will enable us to define with some certainty the points on which his policy would be likely to differ from that of Mr. Lincoln. He agrees with him, that the war was a matter of necessity, not of choice. He agrees with him in assuming a right to emancipate slaves as a matter of military expediency, differing only as to the method and extent of its application, — a mere question of judgment. He agrees with him as to the propriety of drafting men for the public service, having, indeed, been the first to recommend a draft of men whom he was to command himself. He agrees with him, that it is not only lawful, but politic, to make arrests without the ordinary forms of law where the public safety requires it, and himself both advised and accomplished the seizure of an entire Legislature. So far there is no essential difference, and beyond this we find very little, except that Mr. Lincoln was in a position where he was called on to act with a view to the public welfare, and General McClellan in one where he could express abstract opinions, without the responsibility of trial, to be used hereafter as a part of his "record" for partisan purposes. For example, just after his failure to coerce the State of Virginia, he took occasion to instruct his superiors in their duty, and, among other things, stated his opinion that the war "should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State," but "should be against armed forces and political organizations." The whole question of the right to "coerce a sovereign State" appears to have arisen from a confusion of the relations of a State to its own internal policy and to the general government. But a State is certainly a "political organization," and, if we understand General McClellan rightly, he would coerce a State, but not the people of it, — a distinction which we hope he appreciates better than its victims would be likely to do. We find here also no diversity in principle between the two men, only that Mr. Lincoln has been compelled to *do*, while General McClellan has had the easier task of telling us what he *would* do. After the Peninsular campaign, we cannot but think that even the latter would have been inclined to say, with the wisest man that ever spoke in our tongue, "If to do were as easy as to know what 't were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces."

The single question of policy on which General McClellan differs from Mr. Lincoln, stripped of the conventional phrases in which he drapes it, is Slavery. He can mean nothing else when he talks of "conciliation and compromise," of receiving back any State that may choose to return "with a full guaranty of all its constitutional rights." If it be true that a rose by any other name will smell as sweet, it is equally true that there is a certain species of toadstool that would be none the less disgusting under whatever *alias*. Compromise and conciliation are both excellent things in their own way, and in the fitting time and place, but right cannot be compromised without surrendering it, and to attempt conciliation by showing the white feather ends, not in reconcilement, but subjection. The combined ignorance of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus as to what had been going on while they were in their cavern would hardly equal that of General McClellan alone as to the political history of the country. In the few months between Mr. Lincoln's election and the attack on Fort Sumter we tried conciliation in every form, carrying it almost to the verge of ignominy. The Southern leaders would have none of it. They saw in it only a confession of weakness, and were but the more arrogant in their demand of all or nothing. Compromise we tried for three quarters of a century, and it brought us to where we are, for it was only a fine name for cowardice, and invited aggression. And now that the patient is dying of this drench of lukewarm water, Doctor Sangrado McClellan gravely prescribes another gallon. If that fail to finish him, why, give him a gallon more.

We wish it were as easy to restore General McClellan's army to what it was before the Peninsular campaign, as he seems to think it is to put the country back where it was at the beginning of the war. The war, it is true, was undertaken to assert the sovereignty of the Constitution, but the true cause of quarrel was, not that the South denied the supremacy of that instrument, but that they claimed the sole right to interpret it, and to interpret it in a sense hostile to the true ideal of the country, and the clear interests of the people. But circumstances have changed, and what was at first a struggle to maintain the outward form of our government, has become a contest to preserve the life and assert the supreme will of the nation. Even in April, 1861, underneath that desire for legal sanction common to our race, which expressed itself in loyalty to the Constitution, there was an instinctive feeling that the very germinating principle of our nationality was at stake, and that unity of territory was but another name for unity of idea, nay, was impossible without it, and undesirable if it were possible. It was not against the Constitution that the Rebels declared war, but against free institutions; and if they are beaten, they must submit to the triumph of those institutions. Their only chance of constitutional victory was at the polls. They rejected it, though it was in their grasp, and now it is for us, and not them, to dictate terms. After all the priceless blood they have shed, General McClellan would say to them, "Come back and rule us." Mr. Lincoln says, "Come back as equals, with every avenue of power open to you that is open to us; but the advantage which the slaveholding interest wrung from the weakness of the fathers, your own madness has forfeited to the sons."

General McClellan tells us that, if the war had been conducted "in accordance with those principles which he took occasion to declare when in active service, reconciliation would have been easy." We suppose he refers to his despatch of July 7th, 1862, when, having just demonstrated his incapacity in the profession for which he had been educated, he kindly offered to take the civil policy of the country under his direction, expecting, perhaps, to be more successful in a task for which he was fitted neither by training nor experience. It is true he had already been spoken of as a possible candidate for the Presidency, and that despatch was probably written to be referred to afterwards as part of the "record" to which he alludes in his recent letter. Indeed, he could have had no other conceivable object in so impertinent a proceeding, for, up to that time, the war had been conducted on the very principles he recommended, nay, was so conducted for six months longer, till it was demonstrated that reconciliation was not to be had on those terms, and that victory was incompatible with them. Mr. Lincoln was forced into what General McClellan calls a radical policy by the necessity of the case. The Rebels themselves insisted on convincing him that his choice was between that and failure. They boasted that slavery was their bulwark and arsenal, that, while every Northern soldier withdrew so much from the productive industry of the Union, every fighting-man at the South could be brought into the field, so long as the negroes were left to do the work that was to feed and clothe him. Were these negroes property? The laws of war justified us in appropriating them to our own use. Were they population? The laws of war equally justified us in appealing to them for aid in a cause which was their own more than it was ours. It was so much the worse for the South that its property was of a kind that could be converted from chattels into men, and from men into soldiers, by the scratch of a pen. The dragon's teeth were not of our sowing, but, so far from our being under any obligation not to take into our service the army that sprang from them, it would have been the extreme of weakness and folly not to do it. If there be no provision in the Constitution for emancipating the negroes, neither is there any for taking Richmond; and we give General McClellan too much credit for intelligence and patriotism to suppose that, if, when he asked for a hundred thousand more men at Harrison's Bar, he had been told that he could have black ones, he would have refused them.

But supposing the very improbable chance of General McClellan's election to the Presidency, how would he set about his policy of conciliation? Would he disarm the colored troops? In favor of prosecuting the war, as he declares himself to be, this would only necessitate the draft of just so many white ones in their stead. Would he recall the proclamation of freedom? This would only be to incite a servile insurrection. The people have already suffered too much by General McClellan's genius for retreat, to follow him in another even more disastrous. But it is idle to suppose that the Rebels are to be appeased by any exhibition of weakness. Like other men, they would take fresh courage from it. Force is the only argument to which they are in a condition to listen, and, like other men, they will yield to it at last, if it prove irresistible. We cannot think that General McClellan would wish to go down to posterity as the President who tried to restore the Union by the reenslaving of men who had fought in its defence, and had failed in the attempt. We doubt if he had any very clear conception of what he meant by conciliation and compromise, except as a gloss to make the unconditional surrender doctrine of the Chicago Convention a little less odious. If he meant more, if he hoped to gain political strength by an appeal to the old proslavery prejudices of the country, he merely shows the same unfortunate unconsciousness of the passage of time, and the changes it brings with it, that kept him in the trenches at Yorktown till his own defeat became inevitable. Perhaps he believes that the Rebels would accept from him what they rejected with contempt when offered by Mr. Lincoln, — that they would do in compliment to him what they refused to do from the interest of self-preservation. If they did, it would simply prove that they were in a condition to submit to terms, and not to dictate them. If they listened to his advances, their cause must be so hopeless that it would be a betrayal of his trust to make them. If they were obstinate, he would be left with the same war on his hands which has forced Mr. Lincoln into all his measures, and which would not be less exacting on himself. As a peace candidate he might solicit votes with some show of reason, but on a war platform we see no good reason for displacing Mr. Lincoln in his favor except on personal grounds; and we fear that our campaigns would hardly be conducted with vigor under a President whom the people should have invested with the office by way of poultice for his bruised sensibilities as a defeated commander. Once in the Presidential chair, with a country behind him insisting on a re-establishment of the Union, and a rebellion before him deaf to all offers from a government that faltered in its purposes, we do not see what form of conciliation he would hit upon by which to persuade a refractory "political organization," except that practised by Hood's butcher when he was advised to try it on a drove of sheep.

"He seized upon the foremost wether,
And hugged and lugged and tugged him neck and crop,
Just *nolens volens* through the open shop
(If tails came off he did not care a feather);
Then, walking to the door and smiling grim,
He rubbed his forehead and his sleeve together, —
'There! I 've *con*ciliated him!'"

It is idle, however, to think of allaying angry feeling or appeasing resentment while the war lasts, and idler to hope for any permanent settlement, except in the complete subjugation of the rebellion. There are persons who profess to be so much shocked at the *word* subjugation, as to be willing that we should have immediate experience of the *thing*, by receiving back the Rebels on their own conditions. Mr. Lincoln has already proclaimed an amnesty wide enough to satisfy the demands of the most exacting humanity, and they must reckon on a singular stupidity in their hearers who impute ferocious designs to a man who cannot nerve his mind to the shooting of a deserter or the hanging of a spy. Mr. Lincoln, in our judgment, has shown from the first the considerate wisdom of a practical statesman. If he has been sometimes slow in making up his mind, it has saved him the necessity of being hasty to change it when once made up, and he has waited till the gradual movement of the popular sentiment should help him to his conclusions and sustain him in them. To be moderate and unimpassioned in revolutionary times that kindle natures of more flimsy texture to a blaze, may not be a romantic quality, but it is a rare one, and goes with those massive understandings on which a solid structure of achievement may be reared. Mr. Lincoln is a long-headed and long-purposed man, who knows when he is ready, — a secret General McClellan never learned. That he should be accused of playing Cromwell by the Opposition, and reproached with not being Cromwellian enough by the more ardent of his own supporters, is proof enough that his action has been of that firm but deliberate temper best suited to troublous times and to constitutional precedents. One of these accusations is the unworthy fetch of a party at a loss for argument, and the other springs from that exaggerated notion of the power of some exceptional characters upon events which Carlyle has made fashionable, but which was never even approximately true except in times when there was no such thing as public opinion, and of which there is no record personal enough to assure us what we are to believe. A more sincere man than Cromwell never lived, yet they know little of his history who do not know that his policy was forced to trim between Independents and Presbyterians, and that he so far healed the wounds of civil war as to make England dreaded without satisfying either. We have seen no reason to change our opinion of Mr. Lincoln since his wary scrupulousness won him the applause of one party, or his decided action, when he was at last convinced of its necessity, made him the momentary idol of the other. We will not call him a great man, for over-hasty praise is too apt to sour at last into satire, and greatness may be trusted safely to history and the future; but an honest one we believe him to be, and with no aim save to repair the glory and greatness of his country.

But fortunately it is no trial of the personal merits of opposing candidates on which the next election is to pronounce a verdict. The men set up by the two parties represent principles utterly antagonistic and so far-reaching in their consequences that all personal considerations and contemporary squabbles become as contemptible in appearance as they always are in reality. However General McClellan may equivocate and strive to hide himself in a cloud of ink, the man who represents the party that deliberately and unanimously adopted the Chicago Platform is the practical embodiment of the principles contained in it. By ignoring the platform, he seems, it is true, to nominate himself; but this, though it may be good evidence of his own presumption, affords no tittle of proof that he could have been successful at Chicago without some distinct previous pledges of what his policy would be. If no such pledges were given, then the Convention nominated him with a clear persuasion that he was the sort of timber out of which tools are made. If they were not given, does not the acceptance of the nomination under false pretences imply a certain sacrifice of personal honor? And will the honor of the country be safe in the hands of a man who is careless of his own? General McClellan's election will be understood by the South and by the whole country as an acknowledgment of the right of secession, — an acknowledgment which will resolve the United States into an association for insurance against any risk of national strength and greatness by land or sea. Mr. Lincoln, on the other hand, is the exponent of principles vital to our peace, dignity, and renown, — of all that can save America from becoming Mexico, and insure popular freedom for centuries to come.

It is the merest electioneering trick to say that the war has been turned from its original intention, as if this implied that a cheat had thereby been put upon the country. The truth is, that the popular understanding has been gradually enlightened as to the real causes of the war, and, in consequence of that enlightenment, a purpose has grown up, defining itself slowly into clearer consciousness, to finish the war in the only way that will *keep* it finished, by rooting out the evil principle from which it sprang. The country has been convinced that a settlement which should stop short of this would be nothing more than a truce favorable only to the weaker party in the struggle, to the very criminals who forced it upon us. The single question is, Shall we have peace by submission or by victory? General McClellan's election insures the one, Mr. Lincoln's gives us our only chance of the other. It is Slavery, and not the Southern people, that is our enemy; we must conquer this to be at peace with them. With the relations of the several States of the Rebel Confederacy to the Richmond government, we have nothing to do; but to say, that, after being beaten as foreign enemies, they are to resume their previous relations to our own government as if nothing had happened, seems to us a manifest absurdity. From whom would General McClellan, if elected under his plan of conciliation, exact the penalties of rebellion? The States cannot be punished, and the only merciful way in which we can reach the real criminals is by that very policy of emancipation whose efficacy is proved by the bitter opposition of all the allies of the Rebellion in the North. This is a punishment which will not affect the independence of individual States, which will improve the condition of the mass of the Southern population, and which alone will remove the rock of offence from the pathway of democratic institutions. So long as slavery is left, there is antipathy between the two halves of the country, and the recurrence of actual war will be only a question of time. It is the nature of evil to be aggressive. Without moral force in itself, it is driven, by the necessity of things, to seek material props. It cannot make peace with truth, if it would. Good, on the other hand, is by its very nature peaceful. Strong in itself, strong in the will of God and the sympathy of man, its conquests are silent and beneficent as those of summer, warming into life, and bringing to blossom and fruitage, whatever is wholesome in men and the institutions of men.

ART. X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*Life of Napoleon.* By BARON JOMINI, General-in-Chief and Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia. Translated from the French, with Notes, by H. W. HALLECK, LL.D., Major-General United States Army; Author of "Elements of Military Art and Science"; "International Law, and the Laws of War," &c., &c. With an Atlas. New York: D. Van Nostrand. London: Trübner & Co. 1864. 4 vols. 8vo.

THE merit and importance of this work in its original language are well known to the students of military history and of the art of war. It is the history of the wars of the greatest commander of modern times, if not of all time, written by a man whose fitness for the task, by the qualities of his mind, his acquirements, and his position, was unequalled. It must continue to possess a high value so long as the career of the great soldier, statesman, legislator, and emperor shall continue to be an object of interest to mankind. Hitherto the work has not received in England and America that study and attention it deserves, from the fact, it may be, that, until the translation by Major-General Halleck, which has just appeared in four handsome volumes, there had been no English version of the work.

General Halleck introduces his translation with a sketch of the life and writings of Jomini. He was born in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland, in 1779. His education was partly military and partly commercial. At the age of nineteen, he received an appointment to the staff of Keller. For many years he served Napoleon, and for many subsequent years the Emperor of Russia, in the most confidential and important staff positions. He never had an assignment of troops, but his advice was most valuable to the powerful monarchs to whom he was successively attached. He has been a laborious student and a prolific author, and he occupies a distinguished position in the front rank of military historians. It is probably not going too far to say, that, in that small class of writers, he is not only unsurpassed, but that he has no equal.

General Jomini's Prologue represents a scene of commotion in the Elysian Fields in the month of May, 1821. The shades see their clear sky darkened, and hear the tumultuous noise of greedy Acheron. The unwonted sights and sounds convince them that some great shade is coming, and presently Napoleon appears. He is surrounded and greeted by the thronging multitudes, and then is questioned upon the great problems of his career by Alexander, Cæsar, and Frederick.

Napoleon's reply makes up the book before us. And in accordance with this clumsy fiction, the narrative is conducted throughout in the first person. Jomini's style is characterized by clearness, precision, and accuracy, but the interest which inseparably attaches to the treatment of such a subject by such an author is diminished by the great compression which the magnitude of his undertaking compelled him to practise.

In General Halleck's translation the sentences are well framed and well balanced, and the language is usually well chosen; but it has not the clear conciseness of the original. Though the translation wants the last finish, it is respectably well done, and the defects of style are not numerous enough to interrupt disagreeably the attention of the reader. General Halleck informs us that his manuscript was prepared for and carried through the press by a friend, whom he does not name. It is evident that this friend is wanting in experience as a proof-reader, not to say in education. He has left the punctuation in a condition which is very frequently susceptible of improvement, and he has allowed some glaring errors to pass uncorrected. *Debauch* is an awkward mistake for *debouch*, and *enceinte* is constantly printed *enciente*. *Stragetic* for *strategic* is an error especially unworthy of a general's translation of a military work. Sometimes a word is permitted to retain its French form, as *combattants*, and sometimes the English form is allowed in a French phrase, as *Chef-de-Battalion*. The Italian name *Ventimiglia*, in French *Vintimille*, appears once as *Vintimilla* and once as *Vertemilla*. Such misprints as *Messena*, *Groza* for *Grossa*, *Carthagenians*, *maneuvers*, *assunder*, *were* for *where*, *division* for *divisions*, *defeats* for *defeat*, *striped* for *stripped*, are not uncommon. *Compromitted* is used repeatedly for *compromised*, and troops in action are said to be *sustained* by others, when *supported* is the appropriate word. Napoleon is represented as declaring that the French troops "lively pursued the retreating enemy." This peculiar phrase occurs more than once. Alvinzi advances "to raise the siege of Wurmser," as if Wurmser were a place, and not a general. Napoleon speaks of invading "the Carinthia." *La Carinthie* is good French, but it is not common to prefix the definite article in English to the name of a province. Other errors, which more gravely affect the sense, may also be owing to the carelessness of the translator's friend, but they will be noted in our remarks upon the merit of the translation.

Our long war is leading many Americans to read military books, and some to make a study of military matters. General Halleck's translation, therefore, appears at a good time. For the true soldier, and for the faithful student of the art and history of war, Jomini's work is a book of very great value. But, even for this small class, it is not a book to begin with. To profit by it to any considerable degree, one should have a general knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon, and a good acquaintance with the topography and geography of the countries in which he waged his wars. With such knowledge, and attentive study, the most important lessons may be learned from this book about the combinations and movements, the strategy and tactics, of the great master of the art of war. Without such knowledge, the mind of most readers will be confused by the incessant appearance of new names, both of places and of men, and the great compression which the author was obliged to practise will destroy all sense of the proportionate magnitude of the events which crowd his pages.

These general characteristics of the book almost deprive it of attraction for the general reader. The majority of that class of general readers who read for information will find that, owing to their own want of knowledge, they carry away so little from it that they will soon be ready to close it, and employ their time elsewhere to more immediate advantage. The men who read for pleasure may seize the book with avidity. There is no name more potent than that of Napoleon, and a certain vague interest has long been attached, in this country, to the name of the almost unknown Jomini. It has been rumored that he not only understood and wrote about such abstruse matters as strategy, grand tactics, and logistics, but that he had taken all military knowledge to be his province, and that in mastery of the theory of war he was not inferior to the great conqueror whom he served. It is natural for men to open his book as if they were entering a gallery hung with pictures of Arcola and Rivoli, of Marengo and Austerlitz, of Jena and Waterloo. There is some hope of hearing the guns of Nelson at Aboukir, of visiting the trenches of St. Jean d'Acre, of seeing the Pyramids from which the centuries looked down on the legions of France, or of bearing some of the hardships and exposures of the passage of the Alps. Alison, in his descriptions of battles, has taught us to taste the delights of picturesque and dramatic error, and Kinglake, in his "Invasion of the Crimea," has photographed for us the banks of the Alma, and led us on the field and through the ranks and among the guns and the horses, and found time, in the very crisis of the battle, to introduce us to generals and colonels, and even enlisted men, and has seen to it that the acquaintance should not stop with the introduction, but should by degrees ripen into intimacy. It is far different in this book. The drums and trumpets do not sound. The eagles do not glisten. The greatest battles are described in a few lines, or, at most, in a few paragraphs. It is very seldom that there is more than the briefest description of the positions and movements of great bodies of troops. No pictures are presented to our eyes, and the story of Austerlitz is told wellnigh as dryly as if the author were developing a mathematical problem. But those who, desirous to understand the art of war, really study the book as it deserves, will be well repaid for their toil; and for them we have a few remarks to make on the character of General Halleck's translation.

The translation is generally faithful in substance, and successful in giving the spirit of the original, but it is not free from discreditable, and sometimes serious errors. This is a strong statement, and we therefore shall support it by numerous instances. It is true that some of the errors we shall note may be owing to the fault of the translator's friend, and not of the translator, but it is the merit of the book, and not of its makers, that is under consideration. These errors seem to be generally owing rather to carelessness than to ignorance, but they often affect the meaning.

In Vol. I. p. 99, we find Napoleon saying: "I marched .... with my grenadiers *on* the divisions of Massena and Augereau." For *on* we should read *and*.

P. 103: "Before beginning new exploits I promised my soldiers to regulate the interior administration of Lombardy." This seems a very singular promise for an invading general to make to his victorious army. A reference to the original shows that these words are a mistranslation. There we find: *Avant de courir aux nouveaux exploits que je promettais à mes soldats, je donnai des soins à l'administration*, &c.

P. 111: "But, fortunately for us, Naples now produces no Hannibals." With this compare the original: *Heureusement ce n'était pas à Naples qu'il fallait, de nos jours, chercher un Annibal.*

P. 166: "such a clause is always eventual." These words mean little or nothing. The French is, *une pareille clause est toujours éventuelle. Éventuelle* means *contingent*, while *eventual* means *consequential, ultimate, final.*

P. 169: *Pour tourner de plus près la droite de l'archiduc*, is translated, "so as to turn nearer the right of the Archduke." Many readers would fail to understand that *turn* was the word governing *the right.*

P. 207: "Finally, we know that the English," &c. The use of the present tense here, where the original has *savions*, quite ruins the sense.

P. 234, Napoleon is made to say: "If my reputation had suffered any by the affair," &c.; a very inelegant and imperfect rendering of *Si ma réputation avait pu être faiblement obscurcie par*, &c.

P. 267: "The Cabinet of Vienna, more intent upon consolidating its power in Italy than in destroying the organized corps which had compromitted us in the Grisons, had directed," &c. This is utterly unintelligible, not to say nonsensical. Jomini wrote: *Le Cabinet de Vienne, plus jaloux de se consolider en Italie que de détruire les corps organisés que nous avions compromis dans les Grisons, avait prescrit*, &c.

In the same paragraph, the march assigned to Bellegarde is made to appear as a duty left by him to the division of Haddick.

P. 268: "thinking to prevent." In French, *sentant qu'il devait empêcher*. Expectation is made to take the place of consciousness of necessity.

P. 272: "Merlin and Treilhard .... completely contracted the feeble Laréveillère." These words have no meaning. The French verb is *entraînaient*, which means *controlled* or even *constrained.*

P. 321: "situated on an impregnable rock." Original: *situé dans une position inexpugnable.*

P. 328: "a rear-guard left by Ott at Marenga was routed." This is stronger than the French *en fut débusquée*, which means only *was dislodged* or *driven out.*

P. 329: "seemed not to wish a battle." Original: *semblait indiquer qu'il n'était point décidé à livrer bataille.* Here again the English expression is stronger than the original warrants.

P. 330: "Ott, having returned from Castel-Ceriolo, ... threatens to take our right in reserve." There can be nothing in the way of mistranslation much worse than this. Jomini's language, in describing a critical moment in the battle of Marengo, is as follows: *Ott, ayant dépassé Castel-Ceriolo, menaçait de prendre à revers notre droite;* that is, Ott, having *passed*, or *advanced beyond*, Castel-Ceriolo (a place beyond the right of the French position), threatened to take our right *in reverse.*

P. 331: "But on the other wing we are less fortunate." *Mais, en revanche, sur ma gauche elles* (i. e. *mes affaires*) *vout au plus mal.* This means "as badly as possible."

P. 331: "his centre is pierced, and his entire corps is driven back on San Giuliano." This is to the French something as the Southern to the Northern account of a Federal success: *son centre est enfoncé, et tout son corps, mis en désordre, se trouve vivement poussé sur San Giuliano.*

P. 331: "to prolonging the movement of retreat on the left." The word "prolonging" is ill chosen; the French word is *ralentir*, which means to *slacken*, to *abate the speed.* The whole sentence beginning "The enemy, after a short halt," is weakly and imperfectly translated.

P. 333: "The column is broken, the head, cut off and surrounded, surrenders." The French reads thus: *La colonne ébranlée se pelotonne, la tête, entourée et enfoncée, finit par mettre bas les armes;* that is to say, The shaken column breaks, and its head, surrounded and overwhelmed, finally lays down its arms.

P. 335: "a brilliant and timely charge of the cavalry." The French for this is feebly translated. It is, *une charge de cavalerie faite à propos et à l'improviste.*

P. 335. On this short page of only three lines is found another mistake, unworthy of a scholar. "The Austrians .... fight in retreat." The French is, *Les Autrichiens .... battent en retraite,* that is, *fall back,* or *retreat.* The translator seems to have mistaken the phrase for *se battent en retraite.*

P. 337: "reaches." French, *se replie à,* i. e. "falls back to."

P. 339: "The Cabinet of Vienna sent to me M. St. Julien." This should be "sent back." The French is *renvoya.* The use of the word *sent* puzzles the reader of the preceding paragraph.

P. 360: "Nelson replied by the signal for deadly combat." A very weak translation of *répondit par le signal de combat à mort.*

P. 363: "this recession of two thirds of the debt." The original of this ill-chosen word is *annulation,* which means *abatement,* or *cancellation.*

Vol. II. p. 132: "anticipate the enemy's project." The original has *déjouer,* which means to *baffle* or *thwart.*

P. 134: "the emperor's and the general head-quarters." French, *les empereurs et le quartier-général.* The careless admission of the apostrophe quite changes the sense, and drives the Emperor of Austria or of Russia from the mind of the reader.

P. 134: "The reports of my guards." French, *Les rapports des grands-gardes.* Napoleon's guards and his grand-guards occupied very different positions.

Pp. 135, 136: "But to give it success required something more than the action of this isolated left." These words do not correspond to the original: *Mais, pour qu'il réussît, il ne fallait pas isoler cette gauche agissante.*

P. 137: "Lannes moves with equal rapidity." Original, *Lannes marche à la même hauteur;* i. e. "on the same line."

P. 137: "to march and dispute";—a careless mistake, of some importance. The French reads, *pour masquer et disputer.*

P. 138: "disposed *en croisement.*" This is a very curious and puzzling error. The original is, *disposées en croissant*, i. e. "in the form of a crescent." The translator seems to have coined a new French phrase to interpret an old and familiar one to American readers.

P. 139: "the Russian generals." French, *gardes russes*. Another grave error, from mere carelessness.

P. 140: "at Austerlitz." French, *d'Austerlitz*, i. e. *from* Austerlitz. The reader will see that the difference is important.

P. 140: "to cope with the enemy." French, *pour achever l'ennemi*, i. e. to *despatch, dispose of*.

P. 142: "roads which .... the frost rendered almost impassable." French, *le dégel*, i. e. *thaw*.

P. 142. The paragraph beginning, "The position of the enemy," is unlike the original, from omissions and errors too numerous for mention, except the serious error of speaking of Davoust as able to "advance to Goeding," where the French means "get to Goeding before the enemy."

P. 143: "negotiations were to be resumed"; *des négociateurs (durent) se réunir*, i. e. "commissioners were to meet."

The Translator's Preface describes the translation as "almost literal, only a few paragraphs being slightly condensed. These relate to subjects which at the present time are of very little interest." We must therefore attribute in part to carelessness the not infrequent omissions, of which we shall offer a few specimens.

Vol. I. p. 317: "The Austrian general, who had an army three times as numerous as that of the French," &c. In the original, the words *dans l'état de Gênes* follow the words thus translated, and are omitted from the translation.

Vol. II. p. 133. The words *cette tournée donna lieu à un des événements les plus touchants de ma vie*, after "he would not have put any faith in it," are not translated at all, perhaps because General Halleck thought them not in keeping with the general dryness of the book; and perhaps we may trace to the same feeling the numerous changes in the striking description of Napoleon's ride through his lines, on the night before Austerlitz, by which the picturesqueness of one of the few picturesque passages in the book is toned down.

P. 138: "Kamenski's brigade, ... assailed on its right flank, succeeds in re-establishing their affairs for a moment." It seems strange that a single brigade, assailed on its flank, should do this, but, turning to the original, we find words omitted. Jomini wrote, *La brigade Kamenski, ... assaillée ainsi, &c., vient réunir ses efforts à ceux de Kutusoff, et rétablir un moment les affaires.*

P. 141. The words *où il se trouvait engagé* are omitted in the translation, after the words "escape from the trap."

The fact stated in the Preface, that "it is very difficult to procure a copy [of Jomini's Life of Napoleon] in French," gives this translation a certain value. But a pretty careful examination of more than half the four volumes, and a comparison of much of their contents with the original, has detected so many inaccuracies, errors, and omissions, as to leave us with the impression that every one who has access to a library which contains the original will do better to consult or read that than to use the translation.

The volume of maps which accompanies the translation is composed of A. K. Johnston's reduction from the originals of Jomini, and seems to be admirable in every particular.

2.—*Essays on Fiction.* By NASSAU W. SENIOR. London. 1864.

WE opened this work with the hope of finding a general survey of the nature and principles of the subject of which it professes to treat. Its title had led us to anticipate some attempt to codify the vague and desultory canons, which cannot, indeed, be said to govern, but which in some measure define, this department of literature. We had long regretted the absence of any critical treatise upon fiction. But our regret was destined to be embittered by disappointment.

The title of the volume before us is a misnomer. The late Mr. Senior would have done better to call his book Essays on Fictions. Essays on the Novelists, even, would have been too pretentious a name. For in the first place, Mr. Senior's novelists are but five in number; and in the second, we are treated, not to an examination of their general merits, but to an exposition of the plots of their different works. These Essays, we are told, appeared in four of the leading English Reviews at intervals from the year 1821 to the year 1857. On the whole, we do not think they were worth this present resuscitation. Individually respectable enough in their time and place, they yet make a very worthless book. It is not necessarily very severe censure of a magazine article to say that it contains nothing. Sandwiched between two disquisitions of real merit, it may subsist for a couple of weeks upon the accidental glory of its position. But when half a dozen empty articles are bound together, they are not calculated to form a very substantial volume. Mr. Senior's papers may incur the fate to which we are told that inanimate bodies, after long burial, are liable on exposure to the air,—they crumble into nothing. Much better things have been said on these same authors than anything Mr. Senior has given us. Much wiser *dicta* than his lie buried in the dusty files of the minor periodicals. His remarks are but a dull restatement of the current literary criticism. He is superficial without being lively; he is indeed so heavy, that we are induced to wonder why his own weight does not force him below the surface.

But he brings one important quality to his task. He is evidently a very good novel-reader. For this alone we are grateful. By profession not a critic nor a maker of light books, he yet read novels thoughtfully. In his eyes, we fancy, the half-hour "wasted" over a work of fiction was recovered in the ensuing half-hour's meditation upon it. That Mr. Senior was indeed what is called a "confirmed" novel-reader, his accurate memory for details, his patient research into inconsistencies, — dramatic, historic, geographic, — abundantly demonstrate. The literary judgments of persons not exclusively literary are often very pleasant. There are some busy men who have read more romances and verses than twenty idle women. They have devoured all James and Dumas at odd hours. They have become thoroughly acquainted with Bulwer, Coventry Patmore, and the morning paper, in their daily transit to their place of business. They have taken advantage of a day in bed to review all Richardson. It is only because they are hard-working men that they can do these things. They do them to the great surprise of their daughters and sisters, who stay at home all day to practise listless sonatas and read the magazines. If these ladies had spent the day in teaching school, in driving bargains, or in writing sermons, they would readily do as much. For our own part, we should like nothing better than to write stories for weary lawyers and schoolmasters. Idle people are satisfied with the great romance of doing nothing. But busy people come fresh to their idleness. The imaginative faculty, which has been gasping for breath all day under the great pressure of reason, bursts forth when its possessor is once ensconced under the evening lamp, and draws a long breath in the fields of fiction. It fills its lungs for the morrow. Sometimes, we regret to say, it fills them in rather a fetid atmosphere; but for the most part it inhales the wholesome air of Anglo-Saxon good sense. Certain young persons are often deeply concerned at their elders' interest in a book which they themselves have voted either very dull or very silly. The truth is, that their elders are more credulous than they. Young persons, however they may outgrow the tendency in later life, are often more or less romancers on their own account. While the tendency lasts, they are very critical in the matter of fictions. It is often enough to damn a well-intentioned story, that the heroine should be called Kate rather than Katherine; the hero Anthony rather than Ernest. These same youthful critics will be much more impartial at middle age. Many a matron of forty will manage to squeeze out a tear over the recital of a form of courtship which at eighteen she thought absurdly improbable. She will be plunged in household cares; her life will have grown prosaic; her thoughts will have overcome their bad habits. It would seem, therefore, that as her knowledge of life has increased, her judgment of fiction, which is but a reflection of life, should have become more unerring. But it is a singular fact, that as even the most photographically disposed novels address pre-eminently the imagination, her judgment, if it be of the average weight, will remain in abeyance, while her rejuvenated imagination takes a holiday. The friends of a prolific novelist must be frequently tempted to wonder at the great man's fertility of invention, and to deprecate its moral effects. An author's wife, sitting by his study-table, and reading page after page of manuscript as he dashes it off, will not be unlikely to question him thus: "Do you never weary of this constant grinding out of false persons and events? To tell the truth, I do. I would rather not read any more, if you please. It 's very pretty, but there 's too much of it. It 's all so untrue. I believe I will go up to the nursery. Do you never grow sick of this atmosphere of lies?" To which the prolific novelist will probably reply: "Sometimes; but not by any means so often as you might suppose. Just as the habitually busy man is the best novel-reader, so he is the best novel-writer; so the best novelist is the busiest man. It is, as you say, because I 'grind out' my men and women that I endure them. It is because I create them by the sweat of my brow that I venture to look them in the face. My *work* is my salvation. If this great army of puppets came forth at my simple bidding, then indeed I should die of their senseless clamor. But as the matter stands, they are my very good friends. The pains of labor regulate and consecrate my progeny. If it were as easy to write novels as to read them, then, too, my stomach might rebel against the phantom-peopled atmosphere which I have given myself to breathe. If the novelist endowed with the greatest 'facility' ever known wrote with a tenth part of the ease attributed to him, then again his self-sufficiency might be a seventh wonder. But he only half suffices to himself, and it is the constant endeavor to supply the missing half, to make both ends meet, that reconciles him to his occupation."

But we have wandered from our original proposition; which was, that the judgments of intelligent half-critics, like Mr. Senior, are very pleasant to serious critics. That is, they would be very pleasant in conversation; but they are hardly worth the trouble of reading. A person who during a long life has kept up with the light literature of his day, if he have as good a memory as Mr. Senior, will be an interesting half-hour's companion. He will remind you of a great deal that you have forgotten. This will be his principal merit. This is Mr. Senior's chief merit in the present volume.

His five authors are Scott, Bulwer, Thackeray, Mrs. Stowe, and — Colonel Senior. We are at loss to understand this latter gentleman's presence in so august a company. He wrote, indeed, a tale called "Charles Vernon," and we believe him to be a relative of the author. His presence was doubtless very good fun to the Messrs. Senior, but it is rather poor fun to the public. It must be confessed, however, that Mr. Senior has restrained the partiality of blood to decent limits. He uses his kinsman chiefly as a motive for an æsthetic dissertation of questionable soundness; and he praises his story no more than, to judge from two or three extracts, it deserves.

He begins with Sir Walter Scott. The articles of which the paper on Scott is composed were written while the Waverley Novels were in their first editions. In our opinion this fact is their chief recommendation. It is interesting to learn the original effect of these remarkable books. It is pleasant to see their classical and time-honored figures dealt with as the latest sensations of the year. In the year 1821, the authorship of the novels was still unavowed. But we may gather from several of Mr. Senior's remarks the general tendency of the public faith. The reviewer has several sly hits at the author of "Marmion." He points out a dozen coincidences in the talent and treatment of the poet and the romancer. And he leaves the intelligent reader to draw his own conclusions. After a short preface he proceeds to the dismemberment of each of the novels, from "Rob Roy" downward. In retracing one by one these long-forgotten plots and counter-plots, we yield once more to something of the great master's charm. We are inclined to believe that this charm is proof against time. The popularity which Mr. Senior celebrated forty years ago has in no measure subsided. The only perceptible change in Sir Walter's reputation is indeed the inevitable lot of great writers. He has submitted to the somewhat attenuating ordeal of classification; he has become a standard author. He has been provided with a seat in our literature; and if his visible stature has been by just so much curtailed, we must remember that it is only the passing guests who remain standing. Mr. Senior is a great admirer of Sir Walter, as may be gathered from the fact that he devotes two hundred pages to him. And yet he has a keen eye for his defects; and these he correctly holds to be very numerous. Yet he still loves him in spite of his defects; which we think will be the permanent attitude of posterity.

Thirty years have elapsed since the publication of the last of the Waverley series. During thirty years it has been exposed to the public view. And meanwhile an immense deal has been accomplished in the department of fiction. A vast army has sprung up, both of producers and consumers. To the latter class a novel is no longer the imposing phenomenon it was in Sir Walter's time. It implies no very great talent; ingenuity is held to be the chief requisite for success. And indeed to write a readable novel is actually a task of so little apparent difficulty, that with many popular writers the matter is a constant trial of speed with the reading public. This was very much the case with Sir Walter. His facility in composition was almost as great as that of Mrs. Henry Wood, of modern repute. But it was the fashion among his critics to attribute this remarkable fact rather to his transcendent strength than to the vulgarity of his task. This was a wise conviction. Mrs. Wood writes three volumes in three months, to last three months. Sir Walter performed the same feat, and here, after the lapse of forty years, we still linger over those hasty pages. And we do it in the full cognizance of faults which even Mrs. Wood has avoided, of foibles for which she would blush. The public taste has been educated to a spirit of the finest discernment, the sternest exaction. No publisher would venture to offer "Ivanhoe" in the year 1864 as a novelty. The secrets of the novelist's craft have been laid bare; new contrivances have been invented; and as fast as the old machinery wears out, it is repaired by the clever artisans of the day. Our modern ingenuity works prodigies of which the great Wizard never dreamed. And besides ingenuity we have had plenty of genius. We have had Dickens and Thackeray. Twenty other famous writers are working in the midst of us. The authors of "Amyas Leigh," of "The Cloister and the Hearth," of "Romola," have all overtaken the author of "Waverley" in his own walk. Sir Edward Bulwer has produced several historical tales, which, to use an expressive vulgarism, have "gone down" very extensively. And yet old-fashioned, ponderous Sir Walter holds his own.

He was the inventor of a new style. We all know the immense advantage a craftsman derives from this fact. He was the first to sport a fashion which was eventually taken up. For many years he enjoyed the good fortune of a patentee. It is difficult for the present generation to appreciate the blessings of this fashion. But when we review the modes prevailing for twenty years before, we see almost as great a difference as a sudden transition from the Spenserian ruff to the Byronic collar. We may best express Scott's character by saying that, with one or two exceptions, he was the first English prose story-teller. He was the first fictitious writer who addressed the public from its own level, without any preoccupation of place. Richardson is classified simply by the matter of length. He is neither a romancer nor a story-teller: he is simply Richardson. The works of Fielding and Smollett are less monumental, yet we cannot help feeling that they too are writing for an age in which a single novel is meant to go a great way. And then these three writers are emphatically preachers and moralists. In the heart of their productions lurks a didactic *raison d'être*. Even Smollett — who at first sight appears to recount his heroes' adventures very much as Leporello in the opera rehearses the exploits of Don Juan — aims to instruct and to edify. To posterity one of the chief attractions of "Tom Jones" is the fact that its author was one of the masses, that he wrote from the midst of the working, suffering mortal throng. But we feel guilty in reading the book in any such disposition of mind. We feel guilty, indeed, in admitting the question of art or science into our considerations. The story is like a vast episode in a sermon preached by a grandly humorous divine; and however we may be entertained by the way, we must not forget that our ultimate duty is to be instructed. With the minister's week-day life we have no concern: for the present he is awful, impersonal Morality; and we shall incur his severest displeasure if we view him as Henry Fielding, Esq., as a rakish man of letters, or even as a figure in English literature. "Waverley" was the first novel which was self-forgetful. It proposed simply to amuse the reader, as an old English ballad amused him. It undertook to prove nothing but facts. It was the novel irresponsible.

We do not mean to say that Scott's great success was owing solely to this, the freshness of his method. This was, indeed, of great account, but it was as nothing compared with his own intellectual wealth. Before him no prose-writer had exhibited so vast and rich an imagination: it had not, indeed, been supposed that in prose the imaginative faculty was capable of such extended use. Since Shakespeare, no writer had created so immense a gallery of portraits, nor, on the whole, had any portraits been so lifelike. Men and women, for almost the first time out of poetry, were presented in their habits as they lived. The Waverley characters were all instinct with something of the poetic fire. To our present taste many of them may seem little better than lay-figures. But there are many kinds of lay-figures. A person who goes from the workshop of a carver of figure-heads for ships to an exhibition of wax-work, will find in the latter the very reflection of nature. And even when occasionally the waxen visages are somewhat inexpressive, he can console himself with the sight of unmistakable velvet and brocade and tartan. Scott went to his prose task with essentially the same spirit which he had brought to the composition of his poems. Between these two departments of his work the difference is very small.

Portions of "Marmion" are very good prose; portions of "Old Mortality" are tolerable poetry. Scott was never a very deep, intense, poetic poet: his verse alone was unflagging. So when he attacked his prose characters with his habitual poetic inspiration, the harmony of style was hardly violated. It is a great peculiarity, and perhaps it is one of the charms of his historical tales, that history is dealt with in all poetic reverence. He is tender of the past: he knows that she is frail. He certainly knows it. Sir Walter could not have read so widely or so curiously as he did, without discovering a vast deal that was gross and ignoble in bygone times. But he excludes these elements as if he feared they would clash with his numbers. He has the same indifference to historic truth as an epic poet, without, in the novels, having the same excuse. We write historical tales differently now. We acknowledge the beauty and propriety of a certain poetic reticence. But we confine it to poetry. The task of the historical story-teller is, not to invest, but to divest the past. Tennyson's "Idyls of the King" are far more one-sided, if we may so express it, than anything of Scott's. But imagine what disclosures we should have if Mr. Charles Reade were to take it into his head to write a novel about King Arthur and his times.

Having come thus far, we are arrested by the sudden conviction that it is useless to dogmatize upon Scott; that it is almost ungrateful to criticise him. He, least of all, would have invited or sanctioned any curious investigation of his works. They were written without pretence: all that has been claimed for them has been claimed by others than their author. They are emphatically works of entertainment. As such let us cherish and preserve them. Say what we will, we should be very sorry to lose, and equally sorry to mend them. There are few of us but can become sentimental over the uncounted hours they have cost us. There are moments of high-strung sympathy with the spirit which is abroad when we might find them rather dull — in parts; but they are capital books to have read. Who would forego the companionship of all those shadowy figures which stand side by side in their morocco niches in yonder mahogany cathedral? What youth would willingly close his eyes upon that dazzling array of female forms, — so serried that he can hardly see where to choose, — Rebecca of York, Edith Plantagenet, Mary of Scotland, sweet Lucy Ashton? What maiden would consent to drop the dear acquaintance of Halbert Glendinning, of Wilfred of Ivanhoe, of Roland Græme and Henry Morton? Scott was a born story-teller: we can give him no higher praise. Surveying his works, his character, his method, as a whole, we can liken him to nothing better than to a strong and kindly elder brother, who gathers his juvenile public about him at eventide, and pours out a stream of wondrous improvisation. Who cannot remember an experience like this? On no occasion are the delights of fiction so intense. Fiction? These are the triumphs of fact. In the richness of his invention and memory, in the infinitude of his knowledge, in his improvidence for the future, in the skill with which he answers, or rather parries, sudden questions, in his low-voiced pathos and his resounding merriment, he is identical with the ideal fireside chronicler. And thoroughly to enjoy him, we must again become as credulous as children at twilight.

The only other name of equal greatness with Scott's handled by Mr. Senior is Thackeray's. His remarks upon Thackeray are singularly pointless. He tells us that "Vanity Fair" is a remarkable book; but a person whose knowledge of Thackeray was derived from Mr. Senior's article would be surely at a loss to know wherein it is remarkable. To him it seems to have been above all amusing. We confess that this was not our impression of the book on our last reading. We remember once witnessing a harrowing melodrama in a country playhouse, where we happened to be seated behind a rustic young couple who labored under an almost brutal incapacity to take the play as it was meant. They were like bloodhounds on the wrong track. They laughed uproariously, whereas the great point of the piece was that they should weep. They found the horrors capital sport, and when the central horror reached its climax, their merriment had assumed such violence that the prompter, at the cost of all dramatic *vraisemblance*, had to advance to the footlights and inform them that he should be obliged to suspend the performance until betwixt them they could compose a decent visage. We can imagine some such stern inclination on the part of the author of "Vanity Fair," on learning that there were those in the audience who mistook his performance for a comedy.

We have no space to advert to Mr. Senior's observations upon Bulwer. They are at least more lenient than any we ourselves should be tempted to make. As for the article on Mrs. Stowe, it is quite out of place. It is in no sense of the word a literary criticism. It is a disquisition on the prospects of slavery in the United States.

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3. — *The Campaner Thal, and Other Writings.* From the German of JEAN PAUL FRIEDRICH RICHTER. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. 16mo. pp. 383.

GRATEFUL as we are to the publishers of this volume for the generous faith in Jean Paul and their public which inspires them to bring out in so excellent a form everything of his which they can get in

English, — nevertheless, ungracious as it may seem, we cannot refrain from expressing our regret that, in this instance, they did not wait long enough to add to the leading piece in this collection the affecting *torso* which belongs with it, letting these, with certain fragments and sentences (unfinished piers of the great bridge over its vast subject), occupy the present volume, and reserving the rest of the miscellaneous material for another.

It is known to all readers of Jean Paul's life, that he was engaged on a work, resuming the subject of the Campaner Thal, when death arrested the busy hand and brain, and took that great heart home to the perfection for which it yearned and labored. It was this unfinished work, the "Selina," and not the Campaner Thal, which was laid upon his coffin, and went down with all that was mortal of Jean Paul into his grave.

The German editor of the Selina prefixes to the book some "Prefatory Fragments" extracted from the author's commonplace-books of preparation for the work, concluding with the droll sentence, "No reviewer will, I trust, act against me the part of Cain, who slew Abel, because he asserted immortality," and containing the following affecting passage: "Why no fun in Selina? not because the subject forbade it, — for see my Campaner Thal; not because I was too old, — for see my next book; but because I felt no inclination for it." The *fun in the Campaner Thal* refers to the grotesque and satirical series of wood-cuts and commentaries on the ten commandments which, in the German, form part of that book, and his "next book," which was to contain fun, had already for many years had its plan sketched under the title of "The Kite, or my last Comic Work."

This Preface is dated "Baireuth, November 14, 1825."

It seems that, soon after the publication of the Campaner Thal, Jean Paul formed the plan of a second work on Immortality, and for that purpose prepared a blank-book, to contain hints for future development, which he entitled, "Campaner Thal. September, 1816."

After some years he made a second book, on which he inscribed "Selina I.; or Continuation of the Campaner Thal. June 23, 1823"; — shortly after, another, "Selina II. November, 1823"; — then "Selina III. 14 September, 1824; 8 April, 1825"; — and finally a fourth, which he entitled "History" (a green-bound quarto, relic and remembrancer of his dear son Max, who died in 1821); this last ending with the paper called "Proof from Memory," and bringing all of the work that could be published to a close.

The fragment, as it now stands printed, is in nine chapters, named after the planets, beginning with Mercury and ending with Jupiter.

The Preface says: "If Herodotus divided his History, and Goethe his poem of 'Hermann and Dorothea,' not into chapters, but among the nine Muses, I thought I might be allowed to choose, considering the greater number and lesser worth of my divisions, instead of the nine Muses, merely the eleven chief Planets with their ministry of moons as the doorkeepers and ancestral statues of the several rooms. One resemblance at least the planetary company need not be ashamed of in my chapters, that these, like them, have chosen a sun as the centre of their orbit, and the title might be a double one: Immortality or God."

The author had revised the first five Planets a few months before his death, and declared that these chapters (in the red-bound volume, afterward buried with him) were ready for the press; the Juno, Ceres, and Pallas chapters were complete, but had not been revised; the Jupiter chapter was yet unfinished; two more, Saturn and Uranus, and perhaps a closing chapter, which (in the words of the editor) "was to collect the whole circle of Planets around the Sun of Immortality," were only indicated, but not written out, — when this extraordinary spirit "passed the flaming bounds of space and time."

"Thus far, and no farther," the editor's loving and reverent hand places, instead of *Finis*, at the end of this incomplete work, and makes these words the text for his touching reminiscences of Jean Paul's last days and studies, and of the beautiful simplicity with which, amidst his growing blindness and his sorrow for the loss of his only son, he resigned himself to the will of Providence. On his last day he let himself be taken to his chamber at three in the afternoon, and lay there with the serene and submissive composure of a child, in peaceful waiting for the great summons.

Such is the merest superficial account of the origin of Jean Paul's last work, which we hope the publishers of the Campaner Thal will some day present to his admirers.

But now, having spoken of what they have *not* given us, it is time we said something of what they have given us. Of the translation of the Campaner Thal we are sorry not to be able to speak in high praise. To be sure, it would have to be a very poor translation which should wholly conceal Jean Paul's beauties, which should not in fact reveal much of his charm. And certainly this version does, on the whole, give a vast deal, perhaps we should say almost the whole of Jean Paul's *meaning*, and a good deal of that rhythm which is the hardest thing to carry over from one language to another. Still, having carefully compared a considerable portion of it — the first and last Stations closely — with the original, we are bound to say that we find a number of blemishes or defects, arising, we are persuaded, more from inattention than from incompetency. Jean Paul is a writer whom it will not do to think of rendering at a flying glance, or by substituting *transfusion* for *translation.* He demands a close, conscientious eye and hand.

The faults of translation generally may be divided into three classes, — understatement, overstatement, misstatement, of an author's thought. With Jean Paul one is hardly liable to sin much in the second of these respects; in the first and last, Miss Bauer is too often found tripping. Perhaps her chief fault is what many translators of Jean Paul are chargeable with, namely, that of little weakenings and tamings of his expression, which, when looked at in single cases, may not seem much, but in the long run seriously impair the power of the writing and blur the manifestations of the author's genius. Thus it might seem hypercritical to remark on "*minutely condensed* world" (in the Introduction) as a translation of "kleine *zusammengeschmolzene*"; on the rendering of *Isles of the Blest* by "the Holy"; Daphne's *grove* by "*grotto*"; *verschmerzen* (p. 8) by "withstand," instead of *worry down* or the like, "all sorrows"; making the lover *drag,* instead of *snatch,* the hands of the dead maiden to his burning lips; or (p. 14) letting the flowers only *breathe,* when Richter says they *steamed* (expressive of the intense sultriness) from their chalices; it may not seem much matter if, on page 13, the pine torch carried into the grotto is made to draw a *flying smoke-picture* (when Richter says a flying *vergoldung*) along the tree-tops; or if it is said of Nadine, "she received him with an assemblage of wit, or was it grace?" when the original is "an embassy of wits, or were they graces?" — but every one can see that many such slight robberies must seriously impoverish us at last in the matter of getting Jean Paul's wealth. Sometimes a nice allusion is sacrificed strangely, as, for instance, where, on page 4, we have "golden *sheep,*" for "golden *calves* and *fleeces.*" In fact, the sins of this version are more those of omission than of commission.

But there are several cases of actual mistranslation. Thus, why should Richter be made to say, on page 8, that Dante paints hell better than *purgatory,* when he does say "than *heaven*"? On page 10, Karlson the materialist is said to be "too much accustomed to *analyzed ideas and opinions,*" when the original has it "physical views and prospects." In the next sentence it is said, "he had never broken the ambrosia, *whose delights a trust in immortality affords*"; the German being, "whose enjoyment imparts immortality." On page 12, the translator speaks of Karlson's "muse- and goddess-warmed heart"; Richter says, "*more* warmed by muses than by goddesses" (having just stated that the adored one was about to be torn from that heart by marriage).

After the first chapter the rendering seems to grow more accurate, expressive, and true. (We interrupt ourselves to point out to the printer, on page 37, "astronomy, this *saw*ing-machine of suns," a mistake, taken from the English copy, for *sow*ing-machine.) Still, even in the last we find (p. 60) *schöpfrad* (water-wheel) rendered "*creative* wheel," and on page 61, the question, "O can death, that haven of refuge, be but the last engulfing whirlpool?" is thus emasculated: "O, can death be but the last destroying whirlwind?"

But why dwell longer on these faults, which, after all, only show the reader what he might have had, when he has enough, — at all events, has Jean Paul in one of his most beautiful prose poems, full of his good heart, his childlike prudence, his manly sense, his holy faith? It is pleasanter to thank again the publishers for giving us this charming work in an English dress, on the whole so tasteful and fitting.

As to the work itself, we shall not forestall the pleasure of the reader by describing how happily a story of thwarted love and despairing sorrow, conquered by noble friendship, the scene of which is laid in a mountain valley, shut in, with its murmuring river and sweet meadows, from the world of men, like a little heaven on earth, is made the vehicle of disquisitions on Immortality, which develop with such ease and beauty Jean Paul's cherished doctrine, that the great proof of future immortality is the present world of immortality revealed by Truth, Beauty, and Virtue, as lying without that of sense.

We have already intimated that the Campaner Thal, in the original, consists of two parts, just as (Jean Paul says in his Preface) man does, who "resembles the two-headed eagle of the fable, which with the one head bends down to eat, while with the other he looks round and keeps watch"; the second part being an "Exposition of the Wood-cuts under the Ten Commandments of the Catechism," in which Jean Paul quizzes the old Lutheran pedantries and impositions, — and he begs the critics to judge leniently "the comic arabesques and moresques of the commentary in an age wherein upon the one shore so many bleed, and on the other so many weep, and wherein, therefore, more than ever, we have to rescue, not our hopes only (by faith in immortality), but our cheerfulness also (by diversions)."

This comic portion of the Campaner Thal (containing, however, — need we say? — a great deal of wisdom as well as wit) we trust the publishers will give us in a future edition or volume. But at all events we hope they will not fail to bring out the Selina, which seems to us one of the most delightful of Jean Paul's books, full of a sweetness, simplicity, and serenity indicative of a pure life's calm evening, — a rich harvest-field made beautiful by the setting sun. So confident are we that our readers must one day see this remarkable work, that we have some misgivings about marring their future pleasure of discovery by telling those of them who have read the Campaner Thal, that Selina is the name of the only daughter and child of Gione, who has died since the events of the former book; that Karlson has married a certain Josepha, a true, good German wife and mother; that one of his sons, Alex, has taken up the scepticism and materialism which his father renounced; the other, Henrion, a soldier and scholar, now fighting for the Greeks, being a warm believer in immortality, and an eloquent preacher of it in his letters to Selina, whose lover he is; and these, with Nantilde, Karlson's daughter, and (of course) Jean Paul himself. form the excursion and conversation parties, whose adventures are the silken thread on which are strung the pearls of the author's quaint humor, pathos, and poetry. In this company, as our steps wander through pleasant scenes of earth, our thoughts "wander through eternity."

This fragment ends just in the midst of Jean Paul's reply to Alex's objections to recognition in a future world.

The editor of the Selina appends to it a considerable collection of "Precursive Thoughts," extracted, under several heads, from Jean Paul's commonplace books, among which is the following affecting allusion to his son: "This is the only book of mine which he will not have occasion to read, since he has immortality as its own proof. His burial-day I consecrate to myself by the determination to write on Immortality, — be his ashes to me Phœnix-ashes. — Dedication to him!"

But enough of this prospective reviewing. We return, in conclusion, to the volume before us, simply to say that the translations by Carlyle, which form a large part of it, need no praise from us, and that those by DeQuincey will probably be new to many of our readers, as they were to us, and as welcome; for surely if any genius could, his was the genius to reproduce Jean Paul.

4.—*A Treatise on Logic, or the Laws of Pure Thought; comprising both the Aristotelic and Hamiltonian Analyses of Logical Forms, and some Chapters of Applied Logic.* By FRANCIS BOWEN, Alford Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1864. pp. xv., 450.

THE publication, a few years ago, of Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, with an Appendix containing various papers, in which his new views on logical forms were developed, placed before the students of this science the best materials, new and old, which the genius and scholarship of the author had collected during twenty years of study and reflection, and as the fruits of a discussion which has associated his name as closely with the science of Logic as that of its great founder, Aristotle. Though we had already a foretaste of these novelties of the science in Mr. Baynes's New Analytic of Logical Forms, and in Dr. Thomson's excellent little treatise on the Laws of Thought, yet the great superiority of these Lectures over any work on pure Logic which had appeared in the English language gave them at once a prominent place among books of instruction, in spite of the great defects incident to a posthumous publication of writings not intended for such use, nor especially adapted to the purposes of a text-book in the instruction of classes.

To secure the excellences of these Lectures, as well as of other modern treatises, and at the same time to present their materials in a more systematic form, and within a compass convenient for a text-book, appears to have been the aim of Professor Bowen in the preparation of his treatise. In performing this important service to the study of Logic, Professor Bowen has gone over the ground of the science as it now exists in the best modern treatises. In what is by far the most important and original feature of his book, the parallel presentations of the old and new analyses of the logical elements and forms, under each of the several divisions of the subject, our author exhibits the fruits of a diligent and careful study, and we owe him much for the lucid expositions he has given of this part of the science. That skill in clear and forcible exposition which his previous writings evince is in this book turned to the best account, on subjects in which it is especially serviceable.

When we consider the unsettled state in which modern discussions of the principles and forms of Logic have left the science, and the interest which has thus been created in controverted points, at the expense of the integrity of the science, we cannot too much admire the judiciousness of the plan the author has pursued, by which he has been enabled to include so many interesting topics under a regular and systematic development of the subject. He has, of course, assumed the position of a liberal conservatism, assenting to what the friends of the scholastic system still agree upon, and presenting in a fair and impartial manner their different views, but dissenting from views which are hostile to the science in its essential features.

The introduction of cognate terms from different authors is happily done in several instances; thus, in the use of the terms "connote" and "denote," which Mr. Mill revived from the usages of the schoolmen to designate the two functions of names, and in the use of the derivative terms "connotation" and "denotation" as synonymes of the "intension" or "comprehension" and the "extension" of concepts, — terms in more general use, — he has added clearness by regarding the same distinction under slightly different points of view. His treatment of the important distinction of the two quantities of concepts is, in all its applications, especially happy.

As an illustration of the unsettled state in which the science of Logic remains, we will instance the great diversity of opinion which still obtains among writers on Logic in regard to so fundamental a matter as the proper meaning of the word "inference." While such writers as Mr. Mill would include in the meaning of the word "inference" the *real* force of an argument, or that which really determines belief in its conclusion, writers who follow more closely the scholastic system of Logic would confine this meaning to what they term the *formal* validity of an argument, or that which constitutes a truly logical procedure. But on this point there is still a want of harmony, for the advocates of the scholastic system do not agree among themselves as to what constitutes the proper distinction between a logical and a grammatical transformation of a proposition, or as to what kinds of verbal changes in a proposition should be regarded as changing its logical import or meaning. This dissension exists in respect to those inferences which are called "immediate," in which a single proposition is supposed to be the proof of another with a different formal or logical import. The various kinds of immediate inference are all rejected by the modern or inductive school of Logic, on the ground that what, even in thought, can really determine belief in the derived proposition must be identical with what can render the original proposition credible, so that the two propositions should be regarded as identical in relation to proof. But such inferences, or some of them, are still regarded by the school logicians as having some logical value. They all agree that an interchange of subject and predicate, or a conversion, and a change of "quantity" in the terms of a proposition, are changes of meaning sufficiently important to be regarded as logical transformations, while some are disposed to regard a change of "quality" in a proposition effected by infinitating its terms, or by the double negative, as only a verbal or grammatical change. The latter appears to be the opinion of Hamilton, though not of our author. A form of immediate inference, called inference by æquipollence or infinitation, which, according to Hamilton, is of mere grammatical relevancy, is introduced with a development due to Mr. De Morgan. We cannot but regard one phase of this development as at least a redundancy in the enumeration of simple forms of inference; for whatever may be thought of the logical value of the double negative, a union of it with inference by simple conversion ought not to be regarded as a simple inference, even supposing it to be more than a mixture of a logical with a grammatical transformation of a proposition. Thus, to infer from "All metals are fusible," that "All infusible substances are unmetallic," is equivalent to "No metals are infusible" by the double negative, and hence, by simple conversion, "No infusible substances are metallic," and lastly, by the double negative again, "All infusible substances are unmetallic." This process may be summed up, it is true, in a single rule, which may be derived directly from logical axioms; but since it is resolvable into elementary steps, which are also given, it should not be regarded as an elementary form of inference. And we may repeat, that it should not be regarded as a proper form of inference at all, if we define logical inference, according to the inductive school, to be a relation between real grounds of belief and the proposition to be proved, formally exhibited or explicated in a reasoning. According to this definition, a reasoning *indicates*, but does not contain, proof, — just as a name, or its mental counterpart, a concept, indicates, but does not contain, the evidence of the coexistence of the attributes connoted by it, or of the resemblance of the things which it denotes; and just as a proposition indicates, but does not contain, the ampliative experience by which significance is added to what is already collected in the mind through the instrumentality of language.

This leads us at once to the consideration of the criticism on the mediate or syllogistic inference of the logic-books, by which modern writers have brought in question the very foundations of the science, — namely, the criticism that all syllogisms involve a *petitio principii*, since the truth of the premises presupposes the truth of the conclusion, and that nothing can be proved by referring a case to a rule (as is done in the syllogism), since the rule is not true unless what is supposed to follow from it is also true. Our author follows Sir William Hamilton in thinking that the analytic arrangement of the syllogism, in which, instead of the premises followed by the conclusion, the more natural order is observed, — the *quæsitum* or proposition in question being propounded, and the reasons made to follow, — "effectually relieves the syllogism of the imputation which has been thrown upon it for more than three centuries of being founded upon a mere *petitio principii*, or a begging of the question"; and this, forsooth, because "we appeal to the admitted universal truth only *after* we have established, what is the main point of the argument, the applicability of the truth" to the case in question. As, for example, when we argue, "Socrates is mortal, because he is a man, and all men are mortal." But we conceive that the more natural order of the syllogism is relieved of this imputation only in so far as it exhibits better than the synthetic order the true function of formal inference, — namely, its indication of the ground of real inference. It amounts to the same whether we virtually assume in a premise, or virtually reaffirm in a reason, the proposition we wish to prove. If the illative value of the syllogism resides in itself, then truth is nothing but verbal consistency, whatever be the order of the consistent parts. Nor does the relative importance of the premises or reasons in an argument affect this point. It is doubtless true that in most arguments the minor premise, by which a question is referred to a rule, is the one requiring emphasis, and, indeed, is the only one for which, in general, there is any need of explicit statement; nevertheless, its true function is to indicate the existence of a general rule, and, through this general rule, to indicate the existence of cases parallel to the case in question, — cases from which the rule may be justly inferred, along with the case in question. And this is the whole argument in a syllogism. It is not merely an explication of propositions, but is much more nearly what Mr. Mill describes as an *interpretation* of a rule to meet a case in question, though we think this description to be defective on several accounts. In the first place, it gives too great prominence, in the formal process, to the major premise, which, as our author justly thinks, is not the most emphatic part of the syllogism. In the second place, the inquiry, or the search, which leads to the discovery of an argument in answer to the question, "Why or for what reason is a given proposition true?" refers as much to the discovery of a rule through which it may be verified as to the interpretation of the rule when found, so that an argument answers, — to use Mr. Mill's illustration, — not simply how the short-hand record of experience, the general rule, applies to the case in question, but what particular record is applicable to the case. In other words, the formal process conducts us at the same time to the discovery and the interpretation of the major premise through the minor. But the gist of the objection to the syllogism, which Mr. Mill has discussed with the greatest fairness, is, that what is expressed in the syllogism is not the whole of the process of real inference; what justifies the rule or major premise being an integrant part of the whole inference, and, indeed, the most essential part. So far from having "laboriously attempted to restrict the range, and depreciate the utility, of the syllogistic process," as our author accuses Mr. Mill, among others, with having done, he has done much, we think, to determine its true range, and to appreciate its real utility.

It is obvious, from what has been said, that the two propositions of a so-called immediate inference should not be regarded as constituting an argument or proof proper, since neither serves to indicate more distinctly than the other the real ground on which both must be received or rejected together. It may be questioned, however, whether there are not some cases where an immediate inference will have a real validity; as when in inferring a particular proposition from a universal one in the same terms, we argue, "This cloud is composed of vapor, because all clouds are composed of vapor." For we exclude the possible supposition that some clouds are composed of smoke or some other substance, and base the particular proposition on evidence which might not be essential to it. There is an apparent inference sometimes in these transformations, since the simpler grammatical structure indicates more clearly than the more complex one the real meaning of both, and through this the real grounds of both, so far as the meaning of a proposition can reveal the grounds of its truth or falsity. But in all true arguments a case is brought under a rule, and through the rule is brought under the evidence or authority which the rule represents; and this is oftenest effected without an explicit announcement, or even an explicit thought of the rule itself.

What words are to our first apprehensions of things, such are general propositions to that ampliative experience by which our knowledge of things is perfected, and as a word is assumed to stand equally for everything denoted by it, so a general proposition, framed of words, is assumed to hold equally for every case included under its signification, whether in actual or in possible experience. These assumptions give to words and propositions their formal value. The appeal that is made through them is not to the sum of actual experiences merely, but to the assumed universal validity of these experiences. Independently of these assumptions the knowledge we embody in language is ideal only, and truth is only consistency in thought and language. And this leads us to the consideration of the much-mooted questions, the grounds of induction and analogy and the origin of necessary truths. These questions are regarded by the followers of scholastic logic as extra-logical, and are treated in a supplement to the formal science under what is improperly called Applied Logic. As affecting real inference, they are properly regarded by the modern inductive school of logic as integrant parts of the science itself. "Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a very little way towards establishing an universal proposition?" asks Mr. Mill; and he adds, that "Whoever can answer this question knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the great problem of induction." Overlooking this important question, or rather answering it after the manner of metaphysicians, by stating the facts to be explained in language which implies that they are ultimate and inexplicable, the school logicians, and among them our author, content themselves with dividing all universal propositions into two classes, — the so-called necessary truths, and the contingent or empirical truths. The former are those which require but one observation for their induction, and no experience at all, according to these writers, for their verification. With the latter or contingent truths logic proper, they say, is not concerned. These belong to the matter, and not to the form of thought; and this is also true, they admit, of the greater number of necessary truths; yet, as these are referred, not to vulgar experience, but to a special power of the mind, assumed for the purpose, — namely, the reason, *nous*, or *locus principiorum*, — they are of sufficient dignity to claim attention from philosophers. Such philosophers lump together all the degrees of certainty in experimental science, and patronizingly lend an *a priori* principle to eke out any deficiency in that demonstrative certainty on which they take their stand. To the vulgar empiricist there is no greater certainty than what the sum total of experience, inductive and ratiocinative, can afford; but as there are some truths in science so elementary and so incessantly presented that their contradictories cannot be represented in imagination or conceived in the understanding as possibly true, the empiricist is constrained to rise occasionally to the heights of certainty, whence, according to the logicians, all truth is derived.

Instead of dividing universal truths into the two great classes we have mentioned, a more fundamental analysis would, we conceive, establish many grades of certainty, according to the character of the evidence and the range of our experience. The determination of what we may call the inductive *weights* of experiments and observations — to borrow a technical term from the mathematical theory of probabilities — depends on a preliminary induction which in fact has already been performed, perhaps involuntarily and unconsciously, by every experienced mind. These inductive weights have in common the one universal presumption, that the course of nature is uniform, which is more formally explicated in what we may call, by way of distinction, the phenomenal Law of Causation, in order to discriminate it from the ontological Principle of Causality, which is quite a different matter. The presumption expressed in the Law of Causation, that all precisely similar antecedents must be followed by precisely similar consequents, should not be confounded with the Principle that nothing can be conceived to begin to exist, or as having a really new and independent existence. The Principle of Causality is probably nothing else than a succinct but indirect statement of the history and character of all knowledge, or of the fact that everything is known along with, or as proceeding out of, something else, which in a vague and general sense is called its cause; so that we have no experience of, and no ground for representing, anything without a cause. But the character of this cause need not necessarily be that defined in the Law of Causation. And indeed this law does not possess the universal credibility or the character of necessity in thought, which belongs to the Principle of Causality. Whatever certainty the law does possess is regarded by our author as derived from this principle. The law doubtless implies the principle, but its characteristic significance, the uniformity of nature and experience, can hardly be regarded as certified by a necessary principle, unless we are prepared to admit that the law itself is also a necessary truth. The author says, "It is only necessary to show that the Law [Principle] of Causality is readily and naturally explicated into the maxim that nature's course is uniform, so that the absolute and imperative conviction which belongs to the former as an *a priori* cognition of the human mind is transferred, by an easy association of ideas, to the latter, though not logically belonging to it." The author is here obviously steering between Scylla and Charybdis. In shunning empiricism he fears to fall into fatalism. It is a new logic to us, which can explicate a maxim out of a necessary principle to which it does not logically belong; or can retain an imperative conviction in the reason and withhold it from the consequent, or transfer it only "by an easy association of ideas." If the author is attempting to *explain* rather than justify the belief in the uniformity of nature, we have no grave objections, except to the phraseology of his argument, though we see no necessity for appealing to an *a priori* principle to account for belief in an empirical fact. Either the Principle of Causality does, or does not, prove the Law of Causation. If it does, our author is swallowed up in the yawning gulf of fatalism, and he has proved the "astounding theory," which he quotes, in his chapter of Fallacies, from Mr. Mill, the confutation of which, he says, "is the business of the metaphysician or the theologian."* But if the Principle of Causality does not prove the Law of Causation, then the uniformity of nature must be regarded as a generalization from experience, and our author is lost in the equally obnoxious doctrine of empiricism. Independently of inductive evidence, however, this law has a formal or regulative value like that of words and general propositions. If not a universal fact, it is at least true of all we can properly learn about facts. All else is chaos. It is true as far as we know. All the evidence is for it, and of the evidence against it we are ignorant. The empiricist acknowledges his helplessness against arbitrary doubt, except in those inveterate cases where habit or primitive association in ideas is too strong to allow it. In these cases he is as resolute as the dogmatist, but his strength is the force of inertia.

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* The following is the conclusion of the obnoxious passage from Mill: "The state of the whole universe at any instant we believe to be the consequent of its state at the previous instant; insomuch, that one who knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space, and their properties, — in other words, the laws of their agency, — could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe, at least unless some new volition of a power capable of controlling the universe should supervene."

Too little regard is paid, in treating of Induction and Analogy in logic-books, to what we have denominated the inductive weight of an experiment or observation. This constitutes a limitation to the general presumption of uniformity in Nature, and is of an *a priori* character relatively to the particular matter under investigation, but is derivable by induction and ratiocination from our experience of our liabilities to error in the given kind of matter. A single determination of the sum of two numbers by counting them together, will be regarded by any person experienced in numbers as a sufficient induction of the universality of the fact which such an experiment discloses; especially if the result be verified by any one of the many deductive processes by which the same result might be inferred. Such is the inductive weight of experiments in numbers. A physical or chemical experiment, performed with the precautions which experience has discovered, has nearly as great an inductive weight. The inductive weight in other branches of science, and in common observation, is rarely defined or definable, except in a rough way; but it is estimated and applied by all experienced observers with the same kind of subtle, unconscious sagacity which determines the bestowal of names in the formation of language.

One turns naturally to the chapter on Fallacies in the logic-books for the raciest portions of their rational festivities. Here the author descends from the lofty pure forms of thought and the contemplation of second intentions, to deal with embodied materialized forms of thought, the time-honored tricks of the dialectic art, or with the novelties of recent heresies. What the opinions of the Calvinist ministers were to the Port-Royalist logicians, such appear to be the heresies of modern theories of Natural History to our author, who essays to entrap his antagonists within the lines of pure thought, and in the very citadel of demonstration. He has managed somehow (we do not clearly understand how) to bring Mr. Darwin's theory of "The Origin of

Species by Natural Selection" under "the Fallacy of the Composite and Divisive Sense," but in the process a singular definition occurs: "We are often misled by the use of the word *tendency*. We rightly say that a given result *tends* to happen only when there is more than an even chance of its occurrence; if there is less than an even chance, it *tends not* to happen." The application of this definition to the doctrine of the derivationists, that there is a tendency to variation in the specific characters of organic races, is obvious and fatal, because the cases of variation are greatly in the minority. But the destructive power of the definition does not stop here. The conviction we have entertained from our youth, that stones tend to roll down hill, and that the loose materials of the earth's surface tend by every practicable route to approach nearer to the centre of the earth, must be materially modified if the definition we have quoted always holds. For the occasions of stones rolling down hill, or the occurrence of land-slides, are rather infrequent and exceptional phenomena, and cannot, therefore, according to our author, tend to happen. The existence of permanent conditions, which, if not contravened by other causes, will be constantly followed by a given result, constitutes what, in accordance with scientific usage, we should denominate a tendency,* and as the causes which may hinder a tendency from showing itself except in rare and occasional instances do not thereby destroy the tendency, so, on the other hand, the hypothesis of a tendency from the occasional occurrence of a phenomenon is not invalidated by the mere infrequency of the phenomenon. The real ground of induction in such cases is too subtle to be discussed under the coarse criteria of scholastic logic. And this is also true of another doctrine in natural science, which our author also burdens with a fallacy; namely, the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*, or "answering to the wrong point." The uniformitarian school of geologists are guilty of this fallacy, the author thinks, when "they argue that the geological phenomena now visible, many of which are of stupendous magnitude, *can be* accounted for by the ordinary working of physical causes now in operation, if we only assign a sufficient lapse of time for the cumulation of their results," etc. "Their *ignoratio elenchi* consists," he adds, "in multiplying proofs that slow-working causes *might have* effected all these stupendous results, and then jumping at the conclusion that these causes *did* so produce them. They propound this dilemma: Accept this solution of the problem or propose a better one. We may logically decline to do either." "An Elenchus" the author defines as "a syllogism which will confute the argument of your opponent, and *ignoratio elenchi* is ignorance of what will confute him, — ignorance of the fact that your conclusion, even if it were established, would not contradict his conclusion," — and if the uniformitarians were really bent on confuting our author's assumed logical indifference to geological theories, they might be found guilty of the fallacy. But in this the author himself ignores the point in question. The uniformitarians really adduce their arguments in confutation of the counter-arguments of those who believe that geological phenomena *might have* been produced by the purely hypothetical causes called Cataclysms, and then jump at the conclusion that such causes *did* produce them. Accept the cataclysm or propose a better solution, say the orthodox geologists, and the uniformitarians, instead of declining to do either, propose an hypothesis which more nearly accords with all that is really known of natural forces, but which demands an immense quantity of that very abundant element, Time, and as Red-Jacket said of those who complain that they have n't time enough, "they have all there is."

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* Archbishop Whately says, in treating of Ambiguous Terms, "By a tendency towards a certain result is sometimes meant, the existence of a cause which, if *operating unimpeded*, would produce that result." The tendency, for example, of individual characters in animals and plants to become specific characters by inheritance. "But sometimes, again, a tendency towards a certain result is understood to mean, the existence of such a state of things that the result *may be expected to take place*." The tendency, for example, in the opponents of the theory of derivation to misunderstand it.

Mathematicians will be somewhat surprised to learn from the author's chapter on the sources of evidence, etc., that "what is called 'the Method of Least Squares' has been adopted as a mode of finding the most probable result, since it was ascertained that the arithmetical mean is not the best mean of a number of observed quantities [!]. This Method proceeds upon the assumption that all errors are *not* equally probable, but that small errors are more probable than large ones." Now in all the treatises on this Method, it is shown to involve the principle of the rule of the arithmetical mean. Indeed, this Method is only an analytical device for computing the most probable values of such unknown quantities as are indirectly determined through the observation of other quantities on which they depend, and the most probable values in such cases — as in the cases to which the rule of the arithmetical mean is more directly applicable — are those which render the sum of the estimated errors of the observed quantities (the algebraic sum, of course) equal to zero. Or, what comes to the same, the sum of the squares of the estimated errors is required to be a *minimum*. This Method also gives certain conventional rules for estimating the degrees of probable accuracy in results so obtained. Our author has doubtless confounded the rule of the arithmetical mean with the method of the least *absolute* sum of the errors, which was used by Laplace, and which the Method of Least Squares has superseded, with the greatest advantage to Practical Astronomy and Geodesy. But it is not easy to see why Applied Logic should take more notice of Least Squares than of the Logarithm or the Arabic system of numerals. We may add, that the rule of the arithmetical mean does not presuppose that the errors in observed quantities are all equally probable, but that any two of these quantities, considered by themselves, have an equal *a priori* probability of error. Considered in conjunction with the others, this probability is modified, and those observed quantities which differ least from the arithmetical mean of the whole set are regarded as the most correct, or as having probably the least error.

Among the many matters of thought through which our author has added an individual interest to his work is a doctrine almost exclusively his own, and already promulgated in his previously published writings, — namely, his doctrine of the mental constitution of the higher brute animals. Its logical interest is brought out in the Psychological Introduction of this work to illustrate the fundamental characteristics of Thought proper, the elementary operations of the Understanding, and the value of Language to that kind of knowledge it enables men to attain through its instrumentality. And the illustration is very clear and apt, provided the doctrine be admitted. Brutes not only have nothing equivalent to language proper, but they do not, according to our author, have even the elements of understanding; not a ray of true intelligence visits their darkened minds, — if mind that be which can perceive without abstracting, know without comparing, and effect what is tantamount to inference without generalizing. This theory, admitting many of the effects of abstract knowledge, denies all their known causes, and does so, we suppose, on the ground that brutes have a very imperfect comprehension of signs *as such*, and no proper command of them at all, and perhaps, also, because it is commendable to establish as broad a line of demarcation as possible between our intelligence and theirs. On the little logical capacity of these poor creatures our author says: "As they have only Intuitions, the only names which they can apply or understand are Proper Names, — the appellations of this or that particular thing. These they *can* understand. A dog can easily be taught to know the name of his master, even when pronounced by another person. They can even be taught to know the names of particular places and buildings, so that they can understand and obey when they are told to go to *the barn*, *the river*, or *the house*. But it is always *the particular barn*, or other object, with which they have been taught to associate this sound or significant gesture as its proper name." It would be interesting to inquire, in this connection, what happens when one says "rat" to a terrier, or addresses the various words of command, "out," "down," "whoa," and the like, to dogs and horses. Does the terrier think of the last particular victim of his sport, or the horse of his last particular act of stopping? And if so, why is the dog's fancy apparently so filled with visions of the chase, and why does the horse stop again? That words and other signs have a generic *power* in all intelligences, though not always, in strict propriety, a generic significance, is a conclusion, we think, warranted by all the facts and analogies which bear upon the question. Significance is the proper attribute only of a sign cognized as such, or brought prominently under attention in its capacity as a sign, and not merely acting to direct the attention to what it suggests or reveals. The cognition of a sign, as such, involves a reversal of the natural order of association in mental acts. In our intuitions of sense, the sensations and impressions, which are the real signs of what they suggest, or direct the attention upon, are not cognized in themselves, — are not consciously cognized at all, in so far as they are significant, — but are as it were lost in the brighter light of that which they imply or reveal. The mind is unconscious of light while occupied with vision. To reverse this primitive order, to bring into equal or greater prominence in the attention that which directs attention to an object of thought, is to cognize a sign *as such*. But in this there is nothing added to the primitive powers of the understanding; there is rather an addition to the power of the attention. Comparison, abstraction, generalization, and even inference, depend on those fundamental laws of association common to all intelligences, through which resemblances and differences are cognized. Such acts must be relatively very imperfect when not "fixed and ratified by signs"; still the powers of understanding do not depend on language itself, but on the laws of mental association. Language is an efficient instrument of these powers, and that faculty of attention which renders it an available instrument is probably characteristic of the human mind, at least in the degree and perfection of its development.

To allow, then, that brutes can apply or understand proper names, while all cognizance of the generic power of names is denied them, is hardly a logical procedure; for Denomination is more essentially an act of clear and definite thought than Abstraction. The definition which Sir William Hamilton gives of the *primum cognitum* seems to us an apt description of the probable application of names in the brute intelligence. Such applications are probably "neither precisely general nor determinately individual, but vague and obscure." A name may be applicable to all resembling objects, but will be applied on every occasion to some particular one, and may never rise to that indifferent application to each and every one of the resembling objects which would constitute it the name of a class. For this reason it can hardly be regarded as a true name at all, even though it be applicable, like a proper name, to only one object; for in this case the sound of the word is associated with the single object in no other way than that which determines all other mental associations. But the same laws which would determine such an association would also associate the representations of resembling objects, and would direct the attention more or less definitely to their points of resemblance, and thus store the memory with generalized pictures of experience, from which would spontaneously flow such simple inferences as the actions of the higher brute animals seem, at least, to imply. And all this could take place without the instrumentality of language, or any distinct consciousness of signs, or of their significance as such.

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5. — *Modern Philology: its Discoveries, History, and Influence.* By BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT. First Series. Third Edition, revised and corrected. 8vo. pp. 360. Second Series. pp. 554. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.

THE first portion of this book was published about five years ago, and was at that time noticed in this journal. The remainder consists of essays which have appeared at various times in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," and are now republished with many corrections and additions. A book with such a title and on such a subject cannot fail of obtaining many readers among the increasing number who are interested in philological studies. But if we were asked whether this book will satisfy the wants of those who will turn to it for information, and whether it is thoroughly accurate and trustworthy, we should be obliged to say no, for reasons which we will here briefly set forth.

The title will, perhaps, mislead a little, as it is too inclusive. The book consists of five essays, of which one is on the History of Modern Philology. The others are on special topics, treated in the light of modern science, but no view is given of the subject of Philology as a whole, with its rules and methods set forth and illustrated. The first essay consists of an Historical Sketch of the Indo-European Languages. This is in the main good; the characteristics of the different languages are well brought out, and their relationship exhibited. But it is a great error to place the Scandinavian languages on the same level as the Dutch and Friesic, and class them as one of the divisions of the Low-German. The Scandinavian languages bear the same relation to the Low-German that the High-German do. All are indeed connected, but the point of departure is different. No one would say that the English was as closely related to the Swedish as to the Dutch, or even as to the German. Yet it ought to be so with Dr. Dwight's arrangement. Still less can we agree with the author in the conclusions which he draws from the genealogical history of languages. He infers not only the unity of the race, but also the divine origin of language. Not of language as such, but of some full, complete tongue, which he holds was taught to man by his Creator. All grammatical analysis tends to reduce language to the simplest possible form of certain syllables, each indeed pregnant with meaning. These syllables, for some unknown reason, were fitted to express each its own idea, and the instinct of man decided on their use. In the sense that all instinct is divinely created, language is of divine origin. But would Dr. Dwight hold that the Deity first developed language from this primitive state to a more advanced and complex structure, and then taught it to man? We think that Max Müller is misrepresented, or at least misunderstood, by Dr. Dwight in what he says of language being the product of one master-mind. We have never supposed Müller to mean that language was really originated in any perfect state by one man, but that the first man, through whom language was developed, gave it a coloring and a form which it has ever retained. This seems to be a necessary conclusion from the supposition of the origin of the race from one individual; though what Müller considers the imprint of one mind we should prefer to regard as resulting from the necessity of nature.

The chapter on the History of Modern Philology is a very readable account of some of the modern workers in that field. A view of philology in France, and of its able representatives, would have rendered it much more complete. Grimm's Scale is somewhat imperfectly stated. It is difficult to understand it or the examples which are given, as no explanation is offered of the irregularities in applying it to the German.

Chapter III. treats of the science of Etymology. Etymology is not itself a science, but only a part and a branch of the great science of language. As such, it demands scientific treatment. It has been far too often treated in a very empirical way. We have etymologicons of the Romance languages which are the right thing, and we have the unfinished work of the Grimms in German. But in English there is as yet nothing of any account. All attempts there have been very unscientific. Most of them have been made with a certain theory of etymology, which the lexicon was intended to prove. In Latin and Greek, also, students have nothing of much worth readily accessible.

In this chapter, after some excellent remarks on Freund, Passow, and Webster, the author undertakes to lay down rules for guidance in etymological study. These are hardly full enough, and do not hit the point. The etymology of a language is to be obtained as far as possible from itself, before resort is had to other languages for explanation. The words of the language should first be arranged in groups, by putting together all of the same origin or of connected roots. Then endeavor should be made to ascertain whether all these sprang from one word, or whether there were several co-existent and co-ordinate words. The history of the use of these words should also be investigated, so as to find out at what time each was first used, and whether it was in the language originally, or was introduced from some other language. Those words which we can thus trace no farther should then be compared with similar words and groups of words in other languages, and we should thus find out to what other language they are most related, and then, going one step back and repeating the process, we may finally come to the original root or form of the word, and perhaps hit upon its ultimate idea. At the same time, all the additions to the word in the shape of prefixes and terminations should be carefully studied, and their origin traced in the same way. All changes in spelling, shortenings, omissions, and contractions should be exactly noted, and a foundation would then be laid for the study of the phonetic laws of the language. We lay great stress on ascertaining the time when each word was first used; for by this means many mistakes may be avoided. This can only be done by a thorough study of the literature. In English, for example, we have many words of Latin origin, but they were introduced at very different times and under very different circumstances. *Street* is a relic of the Roman occupation; *altar* we get through the Saxon, and it came in with the introduction of Christianity; *arms* and *armor* are only traced to the Norman Conquest; while many others were not introduced till the revival of letters after the Reformation, and some are of still more recent date.

Dr. Dwight approaches this subject again in his last chapter, on Comparative English Etymology. Here was a fine chance for a needed work. It would have been well to show why all previous attempts at English etymology had been on a wrong basis, and to lay down the true principles and methods which should be followed. This our author does not do. The essay is taken up partly with general statements applying in some degree to English as well as to other languages, which are interesting, but very trite and unworthy of place in a book of this kind, and partly with remarks on certain peculiarities in English etymology. No attempt is made to explain these peculiarities, and thus no advantage is derived from their presentation. The mere facts are nearly all of them obvious to any one who has reflected at all upon the language; and unless there was some end to be gained by stating them, they might better have made place for something else. We notice also a certain looseness of statement, which indicates too much hastiness of judgment, and often a superficial scholarship. Thus, on page 314, Second Series, the author says, "From what a vast variety of sources comes the termination *ay* in English," and then adduces *play*, *bay*, *hay*, *stay*, *way*, *lay*, and other monosyllables, in most of which the so-called termination is an integral part of the root. In the same way, he might have said in how many ways we get the prefix *b*, and instanced all the words beginning with that letter.

It is also frequently said that an English word is derived from a German one. This is as bad as to derive the Latin from the Greek, which Dr. Dwight severely criticises. Yet he says that "Eng. *beard* comes from its German correspondent *bart*," and that *sail*, *hill*, and *had* are contracted derivatives of the German *segel*, *hügel*, and *gehabt*, *hatte*.

Toward the close of this chapter, it is remarked that "there are but few compound forms native to our language itself." These are said to consist of only two classes, — one of compounds of an adjective and a noun, or of two nouns, and the other of compounds chiefly adverbial, made with the preposition *at*. Does Dr. Dwight suppose that all our other compound words were either imported from other languages, or formed in imitation of other languages? But this latter supposition implies a capability of compounding to exist in the language. And how can it be proved that only compounds with *at* are original, and not also compounds of *out*, as *outlaw*, and of *in*, as *inside*, and of *fore*, as *forenoon*? And what does Dr. Dwight say to compounds of both nouns and verbs, which are very common, as *wash-tub*, *writing-book*, *godsend*, *spendthrift*, *browbeat*, *hoodwink*; or of verbs and prepositions, as *goby*, *foretell*; of two adverbs, as *whereas*; of adjectives and adverbs, as *somehow*; and of such compounds as *nevertheless*, *moreover*, *notwithstanding*?

The collection of etymological illustrations is, in the main, very good. They are mostly words of Latin origin only, though sometimes the same roots are traced into the Germanic languages. Dr. Dwight's studies have been mostly in the Latin and Greek, and he views other languages principally as connected with Latin and Greek. It is natural, therefore, that he should consider chiefly the Latin side of the English. This compend of examples will be serviceable to young students, as it will give them truer ideas of the connection between Latin and Greek, and of their relations to the modern languages, than they can obtain in any of their ordinary lexicons or text-books. But enthusiasm for Sanskrit analogues and for the results of comparative etymology will lead one too far, unless it is balanced by a sound judgment and a habit of questioning and disbelieving appearances. We can see frequent evidences here that the author has been misled by false lights. Take, for example, the word *smile*. We have in Skr. *smi*, and Gr. *μειδιάω*. An initial *σ* is sometimes dropped, so that *μειδιάω* may be for *σμειδιάω*; and as *l* is sometimes interchanged with *d*, the connection with *smile* is obvious. If this were so, we should expect to find the word in some of the other Germanic languages. But it exists only in the Scandinavian. In Danish we have *smile*, and in Swedish we have *smile* and *smälöja*. But this is compounded of *smä*, small, and *le* or *löja*, laugh; so that *smile*, instead of being an analogue of *μειδιάω*, is a contracted form, as if small laugh. Many other and more striking instances might easily be found.

The portion of the book which has evidently cost the most labor is the chapter on Comparative Phonology. Notwithstanding some merits, it is exceedingly untrustworthy, immethodical, and unphilosophical. First, the vowel-systems of the three classical languages are considered, both structurally and pathologically. Then the consonantal systems are treated in the same way, and then follows a special analysis of the Greek and Latin alphabets. By pathology is meant the affections of the letter, — such as variation, addition, suppression, and weakened and strengthened forms.

Phonology, though exhaustively treated by ancient Sanskrit grammarians, has been entirely neglected by later writers until the last few years. The phonology of Greek and Latin is being reduced to shape, but that of the Teutonic tongues, and even of the derived Romance languages, still requires much investigation. Almost nothing has been done with the phonology of the English language. Perhaps the best treatment of it is that in Mätzner's grammar, and this is empirical rather than theoretical. There is this thing to be noticed on this topic, that in Greek any change in the pronunciation was indicated by the spelling. The changes produced by the lengthening of the word at either end, or by the strengthening of it in the middle, were immediately indicated in the form of the word. The English has so long been fixed by printing, that, though now many changes are taking place in the quality and quantity of vowels, produced either by an increase of the word or a change of the accent, we do not notice them. A careful investigation of this subject will lead to many valuable results.

We know that speech is very much influenced by climate, the inhabitants of some regions being unable to produce sounds which are frequent among other peoples. We know, also, that a slight malformation of the mouth alters very much the character of the speech. Children are noted for their imperfect pronunciation. It would be a very interesting subject of inquiry, what are the invariable ways (if any) in which sounds are thus modified, and also how much the defective utterance of prominent individuals may have affected the pronunciation of a nation. The consonantal changes in a child's speech are very similar to some of those which Dr. Dwight gives us in the Greek and Latin, as the substitution of a lingual for a palatal, or *t* for *k*. A child says *tiss me* instead of *kiss me*. So the Greeks said *τὶς* while the Romans said *quis*.

And though linguals are easily substituted for each other, and the old Latin *t* in Mutina has become *d* in Modena, it is not so in the English word *decreed*. The final *d* here represents, according to Dr. Dwight, the *t* in *decretum*. To us, however, it seems to be the same *d* found in the past tense of all regular verbs. We are also in several places told that *β* interchanges with *μ*, and *vice versa*, and are given *βλώσκω*, and *βροτός*, for *μροτός*, as examples. But the best mode of explaining this is by the insertion of a *β* and then dropping the *μ*, and this is admitted by the author in another place. The connection between *m* and *b* is very close, because in opening our mouth after pronouncing *m* we almost involuntarily say *b*. This is seen in the words *dumb* and *lamb*. The letter *b* is stated to be epenthetic in *comburere;* but if not radical here, how can we explain *bustum*, a tomb? Dr. Dwight says that *α* is sometimes euphonic, but that in *ἀστήρ* and *ἀστεροπή* it certainly is not, but for etymological reasons must be radical. But we also have forms in Greek without the *α*, and there is the Skr. *târâ*, Lat. *stella*, Ger. *Stern*, and Eng. *star*. Are there etymological reasons that the *a* is radical? After drawing an elaborate distinction between apocope and echthlipsis, in which apocope is defined to be a suppression at the end of a word, most of the examples are of a suppression *near* the end of a word, and some of them are given as examples of echthlipsis also. Under the head of Pathological Affections of the Greeks, Dr. Dwight treats of Digammation, Sibilation, Aspiration, Reduplication, and Nasalization. We can understand how the last two are affections; and Aspiration also, because the aspirate is a mere breathing which is very variable. But how is digammation an affection? If it is no peculiar affection of a language to have some words contain a *b* or a *d*, how is it a peculiarity to have words with an *f* in them? Why not *betation* and *deltation*? The peculiarity consists in losing the digamma.

Under Aspiration, in classing languages according to their richness in aspirates, the author puts Sanskrit at the beginning, and the Slavic languages at the end of the scale, these being, he says, "nearly wanting in aspirates of every kind." We are at a loss how he came to make such a wild statement as this, for, though deficient in *th* and using *h* but little, they have a great number of aspirates, especially of peculiar sibilant-aspirates. In Russian *g* is sometimes pronounced *h* and *gh*, and there are, besides, *zh*, *tch*, *sch*, *schtch*, *kh* (hard), *ph*, and *s* (the sounds, as below, being here indicated in English letters). In Bohemian we have *f*, *h*, *s*, *tch*, *sh*, *zh*, *rzh*, and *ch* hard. And the Polish use *tsh*, *tch*, *ch* (hard), *f*, *h*, *rzh*, *sh*, *zh*, and *s*. Here is an abundance of aspirates. And not only are they numerous, but they are frequently used. We here take occasion to say, that a study of the Slavic languages would be of great benefit to a philological student. They stand next and not far off in usefulness to the Sanskrit. In them we see languages fuller in forms than the Greek or Latin, which are now in life and use, and we begin to realize how Latin was spoken. So in the study of phonology especially they offer great benefits. We are yet not sorry that Dr. Dwight has written this chapter on Phonology; for it will interest many who have not studied the subject before, and incite them to investigate it to a greater extent. But we hope that all will read it with great caution, trusting little and doubting much.

We wish we could speak well of Dr. Dwight's style, but it is not only inflated, overloaded, frequently careless and confused, but occasionally ungrammatical. The punctuation of his sentences is most wretched, and there is often the greatest difficulty in picking out the meaning. The subject is not only separated from the verb by commas, but often by semicolons or colons, and sometimes by all three. There is hardly a page that is not disfigured in this way. Whether Dr. Dwight has a peculiar theory of punctuation, we do not know; but if he has, he owes it to his readers to set it forth.

6. — *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution. With an Historical Essay.* By LORENZO SABINE. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1864. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xii. and 608, 600.

ON the first publication of Mr. Sabine's elaborate work on "The American Loyalists," as it was then denominated, the general subject of which it treats was discussed at length in this journal; and very little need be added to what was then written.* Our present remarks, therefore, will be confined to a notice of the changes which have been introduced in the enlarged and revised edition now before us, and to some further observations on the manner in which the author has executed a task of no little difficulty and delicacy. When his first edition was published, the printed sources of information for such a work were confined to a few books, of which the third volume of Hutchinson's "History of Massachusetts," "The Life of Peter van Schaack," "The Journal and Letters of Samuel Curwen," and Simcoe's "Military Journal" are alone worthy of special mention; and even now the number of works of this class is very small. It was to local traditions, contemporary newspapers, and monumental inscriptions that Mr. Sabine was obliged to resort for most of his details. But for conducting an inquiry which was rendered more than ordinarily difficult by the lack of manuscript documents, as well as of printed authorities, he possessed some personal advantages; and it soon became a specialty. He had early acquired the habits of patient industry which were essential to its successful prosecution, while by his residence in a frontier town he was brought into frequent contact with the immediate descendants of the men whose lives he had undertaken to write. His previous studies had given him a large familiarity with our Colonial history; he had already obtained an honorable rank as a biographer and an essayist; and his well-earned reputation for thoroughness of research and fairness of statement was a pledge that he would do justice to both parties. That the fruit of his labors justified the general expectation will be readily conceded; and from the first his work has been regarded as an important addition to our historical literature. In the new edition it ought to be received with even greater favor.

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* N. A. Review, No. 136, Art. VI.

In the form in which it is now published we have the matured results of more than twenty-five years' study of the subject; and on almost every page are the marks of careful revision. A considerable portion of the Historical Essay has been rewritten; the order of the topics treated in it has been judiciously changed in several instances; and it has also been much enlarged, in part, by incorporating the substance of an article on British Colonial Politics, which first appeared in our pages several years ago; and, in part, by adding some instructive remarks on the various obstacles which the leaders of the popular party had to encounter in carrying on the war. These changes and additions much increase the value of the Essay, and every one who has had occasion to consult this part of Mr. Sabine's work will be glad to learn that it has been divided into chapters, and furnished with a table of contents. Some of the statements in it, as our readers may remember, were called in question shortly after the appearance of the first edition, and Southern writers and speakers unhesitatingly accused Mr. Sabine of misrepresenting the part taken by South Carolina during the Revolution. To these charges he replies at length, reaffirming that "she failed to meet the requisitions of Congress for troops to the extent of her ability," that in this respect her course contrasts unfavorably with that of most of the other Colonies, and that during the contest there the two parties "did not always meet in open and fair fight, nor give and take the courtesies, and observe the rules of civilized warfare." These allegations he supports by adequate proof; and he also inserts again "the obnoxious table of the 'Continentals' furnished by the several States, in a new form, but without alteration as to results." In its present form, however, this tabular statement is much less open to criticism than was the first table, and the argument from it is even stronger, because less encumbered by details. In only one instance has Mr. Sabine found it necessary to correct an important statement of fact in consequence of the strictures on this part of his essay. In his first edition he asserted, in accordance with the general belief fifteen or twenty years ago, that Northern soldiers fought side by side with Southern soldiers in nearly all of the principal battles in Georgia and the Carolinas; but it is now known that this belief was erroneous, and Mr. Sabine readily admits that he has been unable to discover any evidence that Northern troops were employed in the campaigns south of Virginia, and that only a small number of them were present at the siege of Yorktown. It is perhaps needless to add, that two of the principal generals employed in the Carolinas — Greene and Lincoln — were from New England, and that another — Morgan, the conqueror at Cowpens — was born in New Jersey.

In passing to the body of the work, we notice the same marks of continued research and careful revision. Many new names have been added; new facts have been brought to light, and silently inserted in their proper place; a considerable number of the sketches have been rewritten or greatly enlarged; and some unimportant errors have been corrected. Even a cursory examination will show how large have been these additions. For instance, to take only a few examples from the first two letters of the alphabet, we find that the notices of John and Thomas Amory, which in the first edition covered only six lines, now fill three pages; the notices of the Rev. Dr. Auchmuty and his son Sir Samuel Auchmuty, which in the first edition were comprised in half a page, are extended to two pages; the notice of Henry Barnes of Marlborough is extended from three and a half lines to nearly two pages, and that of Nathaniel Brinley from two lines and a half to more than a page and a half. These additions of new names and of new matter are sufficient to require for the letters A and B more than twice as much space as they filled in the first edition; and a comparison of the other letters in the alphabet would show a similar result. In the aggregate, the new edition contains nearly twice as much matter as that which it supersedes; and it seems scarcely probable that future inquirers will be able to add many new facts of importance, or any noteworthy names, to Mr. Sabine's record. Undoubtedly some names have been overlooked; and there are some blanks to be filled, and some doubtful points to be settled, before the work can be justly regarded as an exhaustive account of our American Loyalists. But every competent critic will admit that few sins of omission can be laid to Mr. Sabine's charge; and even if his work were much less complete than it now is, it would still be a durable monument of his industry, his ample knowledge of his subject, and his entire freedom from any unfair bias towards either the Whigs or the defeated and despised faction whose history he has so satisfactorily illustrated.

In respect to one or two points, however, we are inclined to take exception to Mr. Sabine's plan; and without repeating what was said in our former notice as to his selection of the term Loyalists, instead of Tories, to designate the adherents to the Crown during the American Revolution, we think that he has not only been unfortunate in his choice of a title, but that he has included in his work notices of individuals who do not belong to the class designated. We see no reason why men who, like Theodore Atkinson, Jr., Governor Fitch of Connecticut, and Thomas Hancock, died before the first blood was shed, should be included in such a work. It is indeed true, as Mr. Sabine somewhere remarks, that long before the skirmish at Lexington party lines were as sharply defined as they were at any time afterward; but it is not less true that frequent changes of party occurred during the ten years from 1765 to 1775, and it can be affirmed of very few men who died before the final outbreak, that their opinions were so firmly settled as to leave no room for doubt in respect to the course which they would have taken after the war began. "In 1764 and 1765," says John Adams, "Harrison Gray, Esquire, Treasurer of the Province, and member of his Majesty's Council, and Colonel Brattle of Cambridge, also a member of his Majesty's Council, and colonel of a regiment of militia, were both as open and decided Americans as James Otis." * Yet the former went to Halifax when the British troops evacuated Boston, in 1776, and the latter was included in the Proscription and Banishment Act of 1778; and of three other prominent Loyalists — Jonathan Sewall, Daniel Leonard, and Samuel Quincy — Mr. Adams expresses the opinion that they had been patriots as decided as he was himself. Nor can we altogether see the propriety of includ-

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* Works, Vol. X. p. .93.

ing under one common designation men who, like Benedict Arnold, deliberately betrayed their native country, and men who, like Gage, Dunmore, and others, merely came here under a royal appointment, and probably had no intention of fixing their permanent residence in America. So, too, we think a strict observance of the limitations of his subject would have excluded the names of Arnold's second wife, of Lady Frankland, and of most of the other women mentioned in the second edition, as well as of the Rev. Eli Forbes, sometime minister of Brookfield and of Gloucester in this State, whose name appears for the first time in the new edition, and of others who are noticed in both editions. It is indeed certain that Mr. Forbes was at one time regarded as unfriendly to the popular cause; but Mr. Babson, the careful and accurate historian of Gloucester, says that it was a "groundless suspicion," and we are inclined to concur in this opinion. If Mr. Sabine has erred in any respect, it is in including persons whose position was so equivocal that they might sometimes be regarded as Tories and sometimes as Whigs, and who, from timidity or from dislike of extreme men and measures, never openly committed themselves to either party. Persons of this class would be properly enumerated in a Catalogue of Trimmers, but they scarcely belong in a Dictionary of Loyalists.

The names which would be excluded under these limitations are not numerous, but Mr. Sabine's book would be made better by their omission; and where there is so little room for criticism, we should be glad to bestow unqualified praise.

7.—*A Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, embodying for Popular Use and Edification the Results of German and English Exegetical Literature, and designed to meet the Difficulties of Modern Scepticism. With a General Introduction, treating of the Genuineness, Authenticity, Historic Verity, and Inspiration of the Gospel Records, and of the Harmony and Chronology of the Gospel History.* By WILLIAM NAST, D. D. Cincinnati: Poe and Hitchcock. 1864. Large 8vo. pp. 760.

THE substance of this work was originally published about two years ago in the German language.* It forms part of a projected Commentary on the whole New Testament, which the author was induced to undertake at the instance of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, for the benefit of his countrymen in the United States, among whom he has labored for many years as a missionary. The work having been favorably received both in this country and in Germany, it now appears, with considerable changes and additions, in an English dress. Dr. Nast has had the means of becoming well acquainted with the character and influence of the scepticism prevalent in Germany, as he was educated in the University of Tübingen, and was for six years the classmate and room-mate of the celebrated Dr. Strauss.

The title of the present volume describes its purpose so fully, that it only remains to speak briefly of the manner in which the author has executed the task proposed. The Introduction, which occupies about 160 pages, appears to us the most valuable portion of the work. "My object," Dr. Nast observes in his Preface, "was to preserve, for the instruction and edification of the Church, *those* portions of the different works on the genuineness, authenticity, and historic verity of the Gospel records which, after accurate comparison, I found to contain the very best that has been written on one or the other point, — and to bring the different testimonies within one focus and into a new relation to each other. Such a preservation and combination of arguments — incapable of material improvement — I judge to be far preferable to any attempt to bring out the old arguments in a new dress merely for the sake of imparting to them an appearance of originality." In accordance with this plan, he quotes very freely from many of the best writers on the subjects referred to, the longest extracts being made from Mr. Norton's "Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels." On the character of Christ regarded as "stamping a divine seal on the Gospel history," he gives a series of striking passages from Young, Bushnell, Schaff, Norton, and Ullmann. Westcott, Fairbairn, Alford, Mansel, and Rawlinson are among the authors cited most frequently on other points treated of in the Introduction, though many others are occasionally quoted. As regards the chronology and harmony of the Gospel narratives, the recent and truly valuable work of the Rev. Samuel J. Andrews, "The Life of our Lord upon the Earth," is followed. Though Dr. Nast has wisely preferred to give, as far as practicable, the precise language of the writers to whom he is chiefly indebted, instead of borrowing their thoughts and passing them off as original, his Introduction is not a mere piece of patchwork, but is well digested and arranged. It does not meet all the demands of the subject, but we know no other work in which so much valuable matter pertaining to the history and criticism of the Gospels is brought together in English in a popular form.

The commentary on Matthew and Mark is accompanied by the text of the common English version, divided into appropriate sections, to which, when necessary, an introduction is prefixed. The commentary proper immediately follows the text; the homiletical suggestions are in part printed by themselves, as an appendix to the commentary, and in part are interwoven with it. The purely philological, archæological, and critical notes are printed in a smaller type at the bottom of the page. The commentary, which is practical rather than critical, is mainly a compilation from numerous German and English writers, among whom Stier and Lange, Trench and Alexander, are perhaps the most prominent. The author himself cannot be regarded as a thorough and accurate scholar; and occasionally his errors are surprising. For example, speaking of the manuscripts of the New Testament, he says, "Of the existing manuscripts none are written on papyrus, but on vellum or paper of later origin. . . . . Not more than six manuscript fragments on vellum are known to be extant." (Page 16.) Now the fact is, that of the manuscripts of the New Testament which have come down to us, a large majority are written, not on paper, but on vellum or parchment. There are more than five hundred manuscripts of this class containing the Gospels in whole or in part. (See the Catalogue of MSS. prefixed to Scholz's edition of the Greek Testament.) In his note on Matt. i. 1, after explaining the meaning of the word "Christ" as "the Anointed," Dr. Nast remarks: "In a similar sense in which Jesus was called 'Christ,' believers are called 'Christians,' 'Anointed ones.'" (!) The work of Dr. Nast is of little value in a philological or critical point of view; but as a popular and practical commentary it will, perhaps, compare not unfavorably with most of those in common use.

8.—*A Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges.* By ALBERT HARKNESS, Ph. D., Professor in Brown University. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. 355.

MANY of our readers well remember that old companion of their school-boy days, Gould's edition of Adam's Latin Grammar. It was a good book in its day, much superior to its immediate predecessor, and rendered excellent service in classical education. The manual of the Messrs. Andrews and Stoddard, which took its place, was a far better work, constructed on a more scientific basis, and with high claims to completeness and accuracy in the exposition of the principles of the language. It is far from our purpose to find fault with this well-known book, but we think that, with all its acknowledged merits, it is destined to give place, after its long career of usefulness, to the work of Professor Harkness, now before us.

A new Grammar has been needed, conformed to the present advanced state of Latin philology, and the difficult task seems at length to have fallen into hands well fitted for its execution. The book of Professor Harkness is no mere compilation, no clever *rifacciamento* of the excellent Latin Grammars which have appeared in Germany during the last twenty-five years. With these works he is manifestly well acquainted; he has diligently used them, and indeed, as we learn from his Preface, he has formed his views of philology, in great measure, under the moulding influence of the German masters. But every one who carefully examines this Grammar will rest in the assured conviction that it is a genuine production of the author's, the conception wrought out in whole, and in the parts, in his own mind, and executed in a spirit of independent scholarship. It is the fruit of study and reflection, united with many years' experience in the business of instruction; and it will commend itself to the wants of the mature scholar, as well as of the pupil in the class-room. It comes nearer than any Latin Grammar we have seen in English to the merit of being an organic work, in which the phenomena which make up the body of the language are treated in their necessary connection with those principles which underlie them and give them all their vitality. This method of treatment has secured the requisite completeness of system, and an orderly procedure in the development of the forms and the constructions of the language. These merits, with others which flow from them, are especially illustrated in the Syntax; and though perhaps not better treated than the Etymology, yet, on account of the importance and the difficulty of this part of Latin grammar, we commend the author's discussion of it to classical teachers and scholars, being assured that it will bear the severest scrutiny. Pursuing the strictest method of analysis, the author first unfolds the doctrine of the sentences in general, and thence proceeds to discuss, in successive chapters, the syntax of the parts of speech of which the sentence is composed; first presenting each subject in general outline, and then discussing it in detail in the subdivisions. The reader is troubled with no arbitrary distinctions, but finds the constructions exhibited with simplicity and naturalness, because in conformity with the genius of the language itself. Take as a single instance, and this not a marked one perhaps, the treatment of the Predicate Genitive under the Syntax of Nouns, and compare it with the common explanations of the constructions which come under that head, and you will see how clear and simple, and how true to the language, is the author's method of unfolding the principles of Latin syntax. We think that every teacher will admire the brevity and conciseness of expression in the statement of the rules, and the nice care with which the examples are selected and translated. It is also a very good practical feature of the book, that at the close of the Syntax all the rules are given in a body.

If we were writing an article, instead of a notice, we should like to dwell at some length upon the author's admirable treatment of the Subjunctive Mood, — that *crux* of the teacher's patience, and yet more of the pupil's. It has been our fortune to read many good Latin Grammars, but we have never seen one in which this intricate subject was better discussed, and we know none in English in which it is treated so well. The substantial idea of the Mood is first briefly and clearly stated, and then, under nine heads, all its uses are developed out of this idea. We call attention to the discussion of the "Subjunctive of Purpose or Result," and especially the view presented of what is called "Mixed Purpose" and "Mixed Result"; also to the "Subjunctive by Attraction," and to the "Subjunctive in Indirect Discourse."

The publishers and author deserve the thanks of teachers and pupils for the superior mechanical execution of this work. And in saying this we do not refer merely to the excellence of the printing, but especially to the skilful advantage which has been taken of the varieties of type in distinguishing the divisions and subdivisions, and most of all in the paradigms, by presenting so distinctly to the eye, by a difference of type, the stems and the endings of the inflected forms.

We are well aware of the inconveniences incident to a change in text-books, especially a grammar; many teachers find the idea of such a change very distasteful, and prefer to go on undisturbed in the well-worn, familiar ways of instruction. But this work has such claims to attention, that no one really interested in classical education can afford to put it aside; and though it may have to wait awhile, till teachers are willing to break up old associations, we feel sure that it will ultimately win its way to general use in the schools and colleges of the country.

We hope that Professor Harkness will carry out the plan mentioned in his Preface, of preparing a smaller Grammar for the use of those who do not have in view a collegiate course of study.

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9. — *A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery, from the Days of the Patriarch Abraham to the Nineteenth Century. Addressed to the Right Reverend Alonzo Potter, D. D., Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Pennsylvania.* By JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D., Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont. New York. 1864. 12mo. pp. vii., 376.

To a thoughtful mind, few books more saddening than this have been produced even by the party spirit of these agitated and reckless times. In it a high dignitary of a Christian Church, claiming for himself direct succession from the Apostles, deliberately and laboriously offers up four millions of his fellow-creatures as an acceptable holocaust to God, and assumes that, in depriving them of all the rights of human nature, he is vindicating the eternal justice of a merciful Creator. This, of itself, were enough; but when we add that the apparent object of this unchristian argument is the covert apology of Southern rebellion through Southern slavery, we have said all that is necessary to consign the volume to general detestation.

The evil of the design is all that can rescue the weakness of the performance from pitying contempt. Bishop Hopkins has so long held a prominent position in an ecclesiastical body eminent for intelligence and scholarship, that we expected a work so pompously heralded and so laboriously prepared to prove the best and most ingenious defence of which a bad cause was susceptible. Our surprise has therefore been extreme in observing its shallowness, its superficiality, and its false logic. When we find the author gravely quoting from the Institutes of Justinian to exhibit the Roman law of slavery in the age of the Apostles; and, worse still, when the Novels of Leo the Philosopher, who reigned at the beginning of the tenth century, are adduced to show "the general aspect of slavery as it existed in quiet union with the primitive Church"; when St. Anselm is placed at the commencement of the eleventh, instead of the twelfth century; when Benedict VII., who was a martial feudal baron, is brought forward to rebuke "the tender susceptibilities so fashionable at the present day," and is moreover spoken of as a Pope of the thirteenth century, — we conclude that the author can only escape the charge of imposition by pleading a degree of ignorance which amounts to irresponsibility. So little acquainted, indeed, is he with the times of which he treats, that he instances St. Chrysostom's exhortation to slaves to care nothing for their servitude as a justification of slavery, not recognizing that it is only an expression of that asceticism which was the leading principle of the Church after the third century, and which in other shapes drove St. Simeon to his pillar and countless thousands to the cells of the Thebaid. Nor is he more fortunate in his conception of modern Christianity, when he virtually ignores its influence over our peculiar civilization, so different in its humanizing agencies from all that has gone before it. What might be expected from a disciple of Voltaire or of Tom Paine is hardly allowable in a Christian bishop.

The weakness and contradictions of his dialectics can scarcely escape the most hasty reader. We therefore pass them over to say a few words as to his defence against the "Protest" of the Pennsylvania clergy. That document reprobated the Bishop's "Bible View of Slavery" on account of its political bearing under existing circumstances. The Protest appears to have inflicted an immedicable wound, and Dr. Hopkins is nervously anxious to deny his complicity with the use made of his pamphlet as a "campaign document" in the exciting gubernatorial canvass of Pennsylvania in 1863. In his Introduction (p. 4) he endeavors to convey the impression that, in sending it to the committee that asked permission for its publication, he simply desired to gratify the curiosity of those individual gentlemen "who had a right to know the sentiments of every bishop in the Church, in answer to a respectful application," and he artfully disclaims the imputation that "I could have shrunk from avowing my convictions of the truth, through the love of popular praise or the fear of popular censure." In his answer to Bishop Potter, he formally declares (p. 44), "I did not suppose that it would be used in the service of any political party," and again (pp. 56, 57), "I utterly deny that I either wrote my pamphlet for the service of any political party, or gave my consent to the publication of the *Bible View of Slavery* under an expectation at the time that it would be used by any such party."

From these various assertions, expressed and implied, who would imagine that the pamphlet was originally written at the request of prominent Democrats of New York, and extensively circulated by them as a political document in the winter of 1861, — that in April, 1863, its republication was requested by some ardent members of the same party in Philadelphia, and that again it was used by them as their most efficient weapon in an active political contest? The Bishop would have us believe that he was twice deceived by his professed friends, "Episcopalians of a high character," and that he is the victim of doubly misplaced confidence, — though he is conveniently reticent as to his excision, in the second edition, of the Secession doctrines which, however seasonable in January, 1861, for men like Wood and Lamar, would have injured the prospects of his party friends in 1863. *Credat Judæus.* Such simplicity is scarcely compatible with the Bishop's long experience of men in his varied career as teacher, artist, clerk, lawyer, pastor, and prelate; and the value of his denials is shown by his admission in a moment of forgetfulness (p. 344): "And this pamphlet I gave them my consent to have reprinted at their expense, and made no objection, two months afterwards, to have it circulated by the Democratic party."

But we are giving too much space to a book whose only claim to notice is the dignity held by its author. Too shallow to possess value as an historical essay, too verbose and too dull for a political pamphlet, it must speedily sink into the limbo of the forgotten, curious only to the inquirers into the aberrations of human intellect.

10.—*Philosophy as Absolute Science.* By E. L. FROTHINGHAM. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. xxii., 453.

THIS is the first volume of a work designed to contain a comprehensive, and, so far as principles go, exhaustive system of Philosophy, in its three great departments of Ontology, Theology, and Psychology, the three being made one, as Spirit, Soul, and Body. The present volume comprises the Ontology; the second portion has, we understand, been a long time in manuscript, and is now preparing for the press; the third portion is not yet completed by the author. The undertaking is one of the boldest that can be conceived by the human mind. In this instance it has been conceived and executed by a new writer, whose name is unknown in literary or in scientific circles, and can be found on no list of academic men. This circumstance, unfortunate as it may be, ought not fatally to prejudice the thinking public against the book; for on every page it bears the strong marks of earnest, patient, vigorous thought, conducted by a clear mind, endowed with much aptitude for philosophical study, exercised in severe processes of reflection, and animated by a very noble, we may even say solemn, intellectual purpose. Moreover, the author has been employed on this work for the last twenty-five years; so that it is the work of a mature lifetime. These facts in themselves make the book interesting as a phenomenon, to say the least. A glance at its table of contents gives a sensation of curiosity, while an examination of its chapters convinces us that we have here a fresh, and on the whole original, statement of the great questions of Being and Existence. No one, not even the metaphysical *blasé*, can fail of getting a mental shock from the pages. They are enough to start the mockers at philosophy to their feet, and cause them to look up expectant.

Mr. Frothingham belongs to no school. He is not Hamiltonian or Kantian; he is neither sensationalist nor transcendentalist; neither theist, atheist, nor pantheist; neither "materialist" nor "spiritualist"; neither Romanist, Protestant, nor Swedenborgian, in the technical sense. He approaches the points under discussion from a new quarter, and occupies towards them an entirely new position. Taking the ground, which he carefully clears and holds, that all philosophy, in all ages and in all departments, has started from a single universal principle, which has led to atheism or to pantheism according as the principle was material or spiritual, and has conducted at last to scepticism and confusion, to the destruction of the individual personality, the disintegration of society, and the obliteration of all mental and moral distinctions, he boldly, at the outset, assumes *two Absolutes; two Uni-*

versal, Spiritual Principles or Causes, constituting opposite spheres of subsistence, mutually exclusive, but working together as the ground and condition of all existence. These principles he defines as *Infinite* and *Finite*, and they stand contrasted with each other as Light with Darkness, Truth with Error, Good with Evil, Life with Death. Neither the Infinite nor the Finite Principle can obtain definite manifestation by itself. The necessity of production draws them together, by a law of attraction which we see exemplified in male and female; the Finite or destructive principle being made subject to the Infinite or vital principle, to the end that life may be incarnated in definite forms. The necessary brevity of our statement forbids an unfolding of the author's full idea. His main point is the positing of two Absolute, Universal, Indefinite, Causing Principles, operative through infinite and finite laws, and co-operative through marriage, whereby the Finite, whose characteristics are *diversity*, *partiality*, and *separation*, — guile, hate, destruction in the absolute sphere of Being, falsehood, evil, and deformity in the phenomenal sphere, — is subjected in sacrifice to the Infinite, whose characteristics are *Unity*, *Universality*, and *Union*; — in the absolute sphere, Wisdom, Love, Power; in the sphere of phenomena, Truth, Good, and Beauty.

The action and interaction of these two principles, thus repelling and attracting one another, constitutes what we call existence, the definite forms of being in every degree, from God to man, and in every manifestation of both. The assumption of the two principles is the key to Mr. Frothingham's whole system. That removed, the whole is removed; that established, the whole is established. The object of this volume is to construct an ontology on this basis. It is, of course, a basis of *tri-unity*, the reconciliation of two opposites by a third power. The symbol of Trinity is stamped on the whole work. The phrase "Two and two, one against the other," continually lets the key-note fall on the reader's ear, as he passes through the intricate passages of explication. The development of the system is the comprehensive application of this formula.

Mr. Frothingham's system of Philosophy is not calculated to meet with much favor, at present at least, with either the thinkers or the actors. His ideas are too openly and absolutely repugnant to all the popular tendencies in speculation, even to the so-called "conservative" tendencies, resting as these do on premises which he repudiates; and his practical social ethics will be vehemently, and in some quarters scornfully, opposed by the masses and their leaders. Had he the skilful writer's mastery of the literary art, a copious vocabulary, a graceful diction, talent for manipulating and arranging his material, power to state his thoughts simply and illustrate them attractively, his book might cause a profound sensation throughout the more intelligent portion of the reading community. As it is, it will only succeed in gaining the attention of the thoughtful, conscientious few, who will not shrink from its rather hard and abstruse style. It ought, however, to command the attention of these. It deserves to be carefully read and deeply pondered; for it is a well-considered and powerful attempt to reinstate Philosophy on its ancient spiritual throne, and restore to it its supremacy over the minds and the lives of men.

11.—*America and her Commentators. With a Critical Sketch of Travel in the United States.* By HENRY T. TUCKERMAN. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. 8vo. pp. viii., 460.

Two centuries ago this volume would have borne the title, "America's Looking-Glasse, wherein she may behold her trew Image livelie projected." Here something like the wish of Burns is accomplished; and if we are not exactly permitted to see ourselves as others see us, we have at least the privilege of finding out how they wish us to be seen. It is very natural, perhaps, to be interested in what other people think of us, but we are not so sure that it is always very desirable. If we contrive to *be* something, we can afford to be perfectly easy as to what conclusion the world will come to about us, and one of the main impediments to our becoming our natural selves is that uneasy consciousness which is as great a fault in national as in individual character. So soon as we are really great, one of its first symptoms will be the ceasing to be jealous of our greatness on all occasions. It is only quackery that advertises in capitals and needs certificates a column long. We have generally found the purest, and in many respects the best, types of Americanism among backwoodsmen, who knew nothing, and, if they had, would have cared nothing, about European criticism. When America becomes what she ought to be, and what she will be when this war ends in the triumph of her vital principle, her opinion will be of vastly more consequence to the Old World than that of the Old World to her. As for comments upon our conventional solecisms by men who come here without ever having seen good society at home, and go away without having been admitted to it here, they do not greatly disturb us. What *does* disturb us rather is the sensitiveness to such things, which shows that there are those among us who would be glad to import the social trumpery which it was our greatest blessing to have left behind us in crossing the sea. "Manners maketh man," was good William of Wickham's motto; but by manners he meant an inward and spiritual grace, and if we contrive to get that, the outward elegance will either follow or be of small account. Our errand is to develop manliness, and not the elegance of the *vieille cour*. Veneer is very good in its way, but it should have solid stuff under it. And, pray, would it be so very dreadful if we *did* have a fashion or two of our own? We trust the epoch has gone by when the respectability of the country could thrill with virtuous indignation at the odious charge of eating its eggs out of a glass, and for ourselves, we can bear even graver indictments with equanimity, after having seen that conclusive argument against democracy, the common comb and brush, in the vestibule of the *hoftheater* of one of the more considerable German courts.

Mr. Tuckerman's aim, he tells us, was the modest one of giving us a "critical bibliography" of his subject, including American as well as foreign critics; and he professes to have been guided in his extracts mainly by the rarity of the works cited. His standard of rarity strikes us as rather low, and he is disproportionately discursive on particular topics, such as Bishop Berkeley, for example, whose life, we should think, was as familiar as his observation of America was limited. Generally, indeed, the amount of disquisition is out of all proportion to the extracted matter. Mr. Tuckerman is industrious, but by no means exhausts the subject. There is no allusion to John Dunton, whose account of what he saw in Boston and its neighborhood toward the end of the seventeenth century is so lively and amusing. We hope in a future edition he will be a little more full about the German travellers of the last century. Mittelberger especially throws much light on the subject of "redemptioners" among others, as does also (in English) the "History of an Unfortunate Young Nobleman" (Mr. Annesley). For the New England of a hundred years ago, the "Life of Jacob Bailey" is the best book we know, and deserves a reference if nothing more. Mr. Tuckerman's *obiter dicta* are not remarkable for their accuracy, as where he tells us (p. 252) that "Waller and Cowley introduced the *concetti* of the Italians into English verse, which in Elizabeth's reign was so pre-eminent for robust affluence." A writer, surely, need not go out of his way to convey misinformation. Nor do his estimates of the comparative value of different writers seem to us discriminating. We do not understand the principle of criticism which devotes more space to Timothy Flint and Fenno Hoffman than to Olmsted, whose works will hereafter rank with those of Arthur Young. We should prefer also an arrangement by topics, instead of the chronological one which Mr. Tuckerman has adopted. But, making every due exception, the book is both entertaining and instructive, and is animated throughout with a wholesome and hearty, but at the same time intelligent patriotism. We would suggest to the author a supplementary volume, in which he should draw more amply from the sources he has pointed out, and give us a sort of commonplace book of American travel, arranged under the various heads of social, climatic, and ethnological characteristics, Indian captivities, and the like. But we will not look too narrowly into the mouth of a gift-horse with so many good qualities. We thank Mr. Tuckerman for the result of his industry, and especially for having enriched his book with an excellent Index, which makes it all that could be desired for reference.

12.—*Enoch Arden, &c.* By ALFRED TENNYSON, D. C. L., Poet-Laureate. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. pp. 204.

IF this volume had been published anonymously, it would have passed as the work of a clever imitator of Tennyson. The poet seems to have reached that point, which only the greatest escape, where the imitation of one's former self begins. We have the trick of versification and expression in a measure disproportionate to the amount of meaning. The greatest poets are inimitable because their manner is the manner of their thought, and not of the vehicle which conveys it. That Tennyson is so much of a mannerist helps us in assigning him his true rank as a poet, and that rank must be finally determined less by contemporary pre-eminence than by the valid superiority which rests on a comparison of wider compass and more permanent relations. Tennyson, it appears to us, belongs to the highest order of minor poets, and there is always danger with such, that as the inspiration recedes the shell of manner only will be left. No man ever carved a single image, or embodied a single sentiment, with more delicate elaboration. Catullus himself does not excel him in that delicious simplicity which is the highest result of art, and few even of the greatest poets have equalled him in the truth and beauty of his descriptive epithets; but perfect as his smaller pieces confessedly are, his longer poems show a lack of continuity and grasp, and are rather successions of beautiful fragments than organic wholes. His range is exclusively that of the sentiments. He carves in ivory, and illuminates on vellum. Among contemporaries, we think Browning his superior in power of conception, Clough in depth and variety of thought; but in *tone* he has no equal. There are many salient verses, decuman waves of expression, many exquisite felicities of phrase in this volume, but, compared with "Maud," the greater part of it is poet-laureatry rather than poetry.

13.—*Poems by* DAVID GRAY, *with Memoirs of his Life.* Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1864. pp. xv., 239.

WE wonder if the plant which our liberal shepherds misname ivy ever fancies that it is of one substance with the oak by which it climbs, and that the trunk that holds it above the dead level of common earth is its own? There is, at any rate, a class of authors who are the victims of this illusion, and David Gray was one of them. Of a nature essentially weak-stemmed and clambering, he seems to have persuaded himself that, because by clinging to Keats and Wordsworth he could climb to a certain height by them, he was of the same species; that, because he liked them, he was like them. He had the temperament of genius, without those higher qualities which alone make that temperament endurable. One of his Sonnets shows that he was proud of the one thing he had in common with Keats, though that one thing was consumption. This is certainly the sublime of secondariness. In his verses there is not one that is above the neap-tide level of Blair's "Grave," or Grahame's "Sabbath"; the only difference being, that his diction has the trick of this century instead of the last. The one good thing in a Sonnet quoted by his friend Buchanan in proof of his powers is transfused from Shakespeare, and gains nothing in the transfusion. Lord Houghton's Introduction is exquisite alike for the kindliness and reserve of its tone, contrasting pleasantly with the rather ambitious "Memoirs" that follow it. The mechanical part of the volume does great credit to the taste of the publishers and the skill of the printers.

14.—*Forty Years of Pioneer Life. Memoir of* JOHN MASON PECK, D.D., edited from his Journals and Correspondence by RUFUS BABCOCK. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1864. pp. 360.

To say that a biography will be interesting to persons of the same religious persuasion with the subject of it, is to circumscribe its human interest within very narrow limits. We cannot imagine a Plutarch for Baptists or Unitarians. Dr. Peck's life was very well worth living, but might, we think, have been profitably written in a compass more suitable to the average length of human days. He was a man of an energy and will that would have made themselves felt in any calling, and which he devoted to missionary labors in behalf of his sect in the West. Though he made no great sacrifice in this, we believe that he did a great deal of good, and his life has something of the interest that belongs to those of all self-made men, though we think a line should be drawn between those who have merely made themselves something and those who have made themselves eminent. Something may be learned from the book of the early social condition of some of the Western States, though not so much as we had hoped. Perhaps Dr. Peck's journals might yield a better harvest than Mr. Babcock has known how to reap from them. At any rate, we have a picturesque glimpse here and there (like that of Judge Tucker with his law-office in the hollow trunk of a buttonwood) that makes us wish for more. We learn incidentally that "bushwhacking" meant originally to pull a boat along by laying hold of the bushes on the shore, and we do not know that the lives of many men teach us more.

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16. — *The History of Friedrich the Second, called Frederick the Great.* By THOMAS CARLYLE. In 4 vols. Vol. IV. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1864. pp. vi., 510.

WITH the gift of song, Carlyle would have been the greatest of epic poets since Homer. Without it, to modulate and harmonize and bring parts into their proper relation, he is the most amorphous of humorists, the most shining avatar of whim the world has ever seen. Beginning with a hearty contempt for shams, he has come at length to believe in brute force as the only reality, and has as little sense of justice as Thackeray allowed to women. But with all deductions, he remains the profoundest critic and the most dramatic imagination of modern times. Never was there a more striking example of that *ingenium perfervidum* long ago said to be characteristic of his countrymen. His is one of the natures, rare in these latter centuries, capable of rising to a white heat; but once fairly kindled, he is like a three-decker on fire, and his shotted guns go off, as the glow reaches them, alike dangerous to friend or foe. Though he seems more and more to confound material with moral success, yet there is always something wholesome in his unswerving loyalty to reality, as he understands it. History, in the true sense, he does not and cannot write, for he looks on mankind as a herd without volition, and without moral force; but such vivid pictures of events, such living conceptions of character, we find nowhere else in prose. The figures of most historians seem like dolls stuffed with bran, whose whole substance runs out through any hole that criticism may tear in them, but Carlyle's are so real, that, if you prick them, they bleed. He seems a little wearied, here and there, in his Friedrich, with the multiplicity of detail, and does his filling-in rather shabbily; but he still remains in his own way, like his hero, the Only, and such episodes as that of Voltaire in the present volume would make the fortune of any other writer.

16. — *Precedents of American Neutrality, in Reply to the Speech of Sir Roundell Palmer, Attorney-General of England, in the British House of Commons, May* 13, 1864. By GEORGE BEMIS. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1864. pp. viii., 83.

WHEN a nation feels vaguely that it has been wronged, no one can do it a more useful service than in showing it that its indignation is not unreasonable, for nothing is more likely to bring it back to composure than the assurance of being in the right. Mr. Bemis's countrymen owe him their thanks for teaching them that their own judicial precedents are so wholly on their side, and so precisely accordant with national dignity and justice, that they can afford to be patient in their resentment at the pinchbeck neutrality of England. In a question where temper is necessarily so large an ingredient, it is of great advantage to be brought back to our bearings by a dispassionate legal argument. Mr. Loring, in his able pamphlets, had already argued the law and ethics of the case; and now comes Mr. Bemis, with fresh citation of authorities, to meet the new ground assumed by the British Attorney-General, leaving no decent path of escape for him but by way of confession and avoidance. Mr. Bemis's monograph is pointed and timely, and we wish he would continue his researches so far as to give us a summary of the French doctrine of neutrality, as exhibited during our Revolutionary War.

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17. — *Life and Letters of David Coit Scudder, Missionary in Southern India.* By HORACE E. SCUDDER. New York: Hurd and Houghton. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1864. Sm. 8vo. pp. viii., 402.

DAVID COIT SCUDDER was born in Boston in 1835, and died, a missionary in India, in 1862. His life was not marked by unusual or striking events; his character was a simple one; his attainments were not extraordinary; he had not a wide reputation. Why, then, write his biography? why publish a volume of his Life and Letters? Although answer might be made on behalf of this book, that there are few lives so dull, few characters so level, that a frank and sincere account of them is without interest, yet there is a more special reason to be given for this biography, and one the force of which all readers of the book will readily acknowledge.

David Scudder was a man much loved, and worthy of much love. To preserve a record of his life was the happy duty of brotherly affection, not merely for the sake of giving a memorial of him to his nearest friends, but also in order to extend his influence and example to those who otherwise would have no knowledge of him. A biography like this, prepared with such true sympathy, exhibiting with such frankness and simplicity the qualities of the man, is, as it were, the fulfilment of the life cut short, the completion of its unfinished work. David Scudder was a man who would have grown with years, and who might, had his life been lengthened, have become much more than he had yet shown himself to be, — and this volume shows the direction of his advance, and the aim to which his steps were tending.

The book is, so to speak, one with the real life of its subject. It is done with so just a spirit, with such nice discrimination and such delicate taste, as to secure at once the confidence, the interest, and the sympathy of the reader. And besides its worth as a faithful study of character, it has a charm as affording fresh pictures of a New England boy's life in city and country, and as showing how strongly the Puritan convictions and traditions still affect thought and manners. And to the deeper student of religious opinion the volume is full of a sad interest, as indicating the causes of the slow progress of Christianity among the heathen.

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18. — *Ancient Law: its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas.* By HENRY SUMNER MAINE. With an Introduction by THEODORE W. DWIGHT, LL. D. First American from Second London edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. 8vo. pp. lxix., 400.

THIS reprint of Mr. Maine's work deserves a cordial reception. It reaches us too late to allow us to speak of the book at length as it deserves, but we may say in brief that its reputation is not now to win, it is established beyond question. The work is one of the most remarkable contributions ever made to the philosophy of law, and incidentally to the history of the development of some of the ruling ideas of modern civilization. It is the work of a man of solid and accurate mind, of strong and well-trained native powers, of active but disciplined imagination, and of great learning. It is written in a style of singular excellence, at once clear, compact, and elegant.

The book, although first published but a few years since, has already produced a marked influence on the study of the philosophy of history and of law. A more valuable addition could scarcely be made to the library of the student of the development of thought and the progress of civilization.

We trust that the success of this volume may be such as to induce the publisher to give to American scholars a similar reprint, but without an "Introduction," of Mr. John Austin's work on Jurisprudence.

NOTE TO ART. V. NO. CCIII.

THE Editors of the North American Review have received the following letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department: —

"BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, 26th May, 1864.

"GENTLEMEN: — In the article on the Navy of the United States, published in the April number of the North American Review, I find (page 463) the following statement: 'It appears from the evidence of the present Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, that at the Norfolk Yard there were seven hundred and sixty-eight guns, according to the returns made to the Ordnance Bureau. In the Report of the Senate Committee appointed to inquire into the circumstances attending the surrender of this station, it is said that other evidence goes to show quite conclusively that there were in the Yard, at the time of the evacuation, at least two thousand pieces of heavy ordnance, of which about three hundred were new Dahlgren guns.'

"The statement given at page 6 of my Report * (herewith enclosed) was carefully made up from the records of the Bureau, and it shows that the total number of guns of all calibres belonging to the Navy in March, 1861, was 2966. Now of this number 768 were in the Norfolk Yard when it was evacuated, and I so stated [as appears from the above extract] in my evidence before the Committee. This statement of mine was corroborated by the Rebel reports of the ordnance and other property found by them when they occupied the Norfolk Navy Yard.

"I desire to call attention to this fact, merely as a matter of historical record; for if there were 2000 guns in the Navy Yard at that time, it would only leave 411 to be divided among the other six yards, because there were, according to official reports, 555 guns afloat on board ship. Again, in March, 1861, the total number of heavy Dahlgren guns on hand was only 356; and if 300 of these were lost at Norfolk, whence did the Navy obtain the Dahlgren guns which at that time composed the batteries of the Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash, Roanoke, Niagara, Cumberland, and Powhatan, — in all, 212 guns of that model, — besides others that were mounted in the Mississippi, North Carolina, &c., and parked in the other Navy Yards?

"I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

"H. A. WISE,
"*Chief of Bureau ad interim.*

"Editors of North American Review, Boston, Mass."

[The conclusion of the Senate Committee, the correctness of which Captain Wise denies, is to be found on page 2, Senate Rep. Com., No. 37, 37th Congress, 2d Session.]

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* Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, October 20, 1863.

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